Brown v. Dollar General Corp.

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36 ) is GRANTED. The Court will issue a separate judgment consistent with this Memorandum and Order. (JMP)

Case: 4:18-cv-00719-JCH Doc. #: 47 Filed: 07/28/20 Page: 1 of 20 PageID #: 387

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
VERTRICE BROWN

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Plaintiff,
vs.
DOLGENCORP, LLC,
Defendant.

Case No. 4:18-CV-00719-JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In this action, Plaintiff Vertrice Brown (“Plaintiff”), alleges that her former employer,
Defendant Dolgencorp, LLC (“Defendant”), discriminated against her on the basis of her disability
by terminating her employment, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. She also alleges a violation of her rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Defendant now moves for summary judgment
(Doc. 36) and, for the reasons explained below, its motion will be granted.
I. Facts1 and Procedural Background
Plaintiff worked for Defendant at various times and in multiple locations since 2011. The
most recent position Plaintiff held was that of store manager at a Dollar General in St. Charles,
Missouri, where she was employed in 2016. Dollar General store managers are responsible for
the implementation of all store processes, including staging, stocking, and storage of merchandise,
and are often the only employee in a store at any given time. The essential physical requirements

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The facts were taken from the parties respective Statements of Material Facts and the exhibits attached thereto.
See Docs. 38, 39, and 43.

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for the store manager position include frequent walking, standing, bending, stooping, and kneeling,
as well as occasional climbing on ladders.
Plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral osteoarthritis in her knees, for which she was seeing
Dr. John McAllister (“Dr. McAllister”). Plaintiff visited Dr. McAllister on June 1, 2016, at which
appointment he imposed various work restrictions on Plaintiff, including “no heights, [and] no
repetitive bending, stooping or squatting.” Doc. 38-5. Dr. McAllister specified that “if modified
work is not available [Plaintiff] is deemed unable to work.” Id. After that appointment, Plaintiff
contacted her District Manager, Bobbi Whittaker (“Whittaker”), to inform her of the work
restrictions, and Whittaker directed Plaintiff to contact Dollar General Human Resources
department (“HR”). Plaintiff subsequently contacted HR, and was informed that she would need
to take medical leave.

HR also instructed her to contact Defendant’s third party leave

administrator, Matrix (“Matrix”). Plaintiff did so, and Matrix informed her of the required
paperwork that would need to be submitted in order for leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”) to be approved, including a Department of Labor Certificate of Health Care
Provider form (“DOL Certification”), which would have to be filled out and submitted by her
physician in order to substantiate Plaintiff’s need for leave. It is Defendant’s consistently applied
policy to require employees to have the DOL Certification submitted to Matrix when requesting
FMLA leave, and such leave is not generally approved unless a properly completed DOL
Certification is received.
Dr. McAllister appeared to have submitted the DOL Certification, at Plaintiff’s request, on
or around June 2, 2016, but it was not completed properly. On June 3, 2016, Matrix sent to Brown
a letter informing her that the information in the DOL Certification was incomplete. The letter
further stated that they had faxed another copy to her doctor, and that it was Plaintiff’s

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“responsibility to follow up with [her] doctor to ensure the highlighted areas of the form are
completed and returned to Matrix no later than June 22, 2016,” or her leave would be denied. Doc.
38-4 at 23. The letter additionally informed Plaintiff that any time off that was not approved as
FMLA leave may result in her termination. On June 17, 2016, Matrix received the correctly
completed DOL Certification from Dr. McAllister, which certified the first two weeks of Plaintiff’s
leave of absence, and Plaintiff’s FMLA leave was approved for the period between June 1 and
June 14, 2016.
On June 16, 2016, Plaintiff informed Matrix that her doctor had scheduled her to have
surgery on one of her knees on July 13, 2016. Plaintiff received a voicemail from Matrix on June
21, 2016, which stated, in relevant part, that Matrix was “calling to inform [Plaintiff] that [her]
leave of absence was approved only through June 14,” and that, “to extend [Plaintiff’s] leave we
will need documentation from the doctor’s office.” Doc. 38-6. Plaintiff called Matrix on June 21,
2016, and left a voicemail stating that she had called her doctor’s office, and that the office needed
Matrix to fax to them an extension request. Upon that request, Matrix faxed the required form to
Plaintiff’s doctor to support her extended leave request. However, Matrix has no record of ever
having received the additional DOL Certification form from Plaintiff’s doctor as needed to approve
FMLA leave beyond June 14, 2016. Plaintiff asserts that the “appropriate paperwork” was
forwarded to Matrix, but the document2 she submits to support that assertion is not the DOL
Certification. See Doc. 39-4.
Plaintiff next received a letter, dated July 1, 2016, from Defendant, informing her that
Matrix had completed their review of the documentation received regarding her FMLA leave, and

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The exhibit Plaintiff submits to support her assertion is not the required DOL Certification, and does not
contain the same information required on that form. Doc. 39-4. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 is merely a Return to Work
form dated June 21, 2016, and signed by Plaintiff’s doctor, indicating that she was not yet released to work.

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that while June 1, 2016, through June 14, 2016, had been approved, any further leave from June
15, 2016, through July 13, 2016, had been denied. Doc. 38-4. The letter went on to state that if
“additional information is provided . . . [regarding Plaintiff’s] medical condition . . . it will be
reviewed by Matrix.” Id. The letter further provided that if Plaintiff had any questions about the
leave process or had information to add to her leave request, to contact her Matrix claims examiner.
Id. Finally, the letter stated that any time off not approved “may result in disciplinary action up to
and including discharge.” Id.
Plaintiff also received a voicemail from Matrix on July 1, 2016, informing her of the denial
of further FMLA leave beyond June 14, 2016. Plaintiff called Matrix on July 6, 2016, indicating
that she was returning their call, and when Matrix called her back they were unable, for reasons
that are not clear on the record, to leave a voicemail. In late August, 2016, Plaintiff spoke to her
manager, Whittaker, about her desire to return to work, but did not indicate a possible return date.
On August 29, 2016, Whittaker emailed Defendant’s Leave Administration office about Plaintiff’s
leave status, stating that “[s]he has been out on leave since I took over this district so I do not get
email updates on her leave status.” On August 31, 2016, Defendant’s Leave Administration office
emailed Whittaker, stating that Plaintiff’s “leave extension was denied and her leave [was] closed
so there haven’t been any email updates. We will send her a 10 day letter and see if she responds.”
Doc. 38-9 at 5.
Defendant then sent Plaintiff a letter, dated August 31, 2016, and mailed to the address
Plaintiff had on file with Defendant (the “10-Day Letter”), informing her that she was “currently
on an unapproved absence because [her] approved leave ha[d] expired,” and that she must “contact
Dollar General HR Shared Services, Leave Administration within ten days from the date of [the]
letter to discuss [her] employment status.” Doc. 38-8. The 10-Day Letter went on to state that if

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Plaintiff failed to contact Dollar General’s Leave Administration within the next 10 days, her
employment would be terminated. Id. Plaintiff did not timely contact Dollar General’s Leave
Administration department in response to the 10-Day Letter. See Doc. 43 at 8-9.3 Plaintiff did
text her manager, Whittaker, on September 7 and September 14, 2016, about the possibility of
meeting at the store. However, Whittaker did not know about Plaintiff’s termination when she
was texting with Plaintiff, and did not learn that Plaintiff had been dismissed until after Plaintiff
informed her of the same on September 16, 2016. Plaintiff was terminated on September 14, 2016,
with an effective date of September 10, 2016.
Plaintiff asserts that she did not receive the 10-Day Letter until September 16, 2016, after
the period in which to respond had already expired. On September 19, 2016, Plaintiff updated her
address on file with Defendant, and called the Dollar General Employee Response Center at the
number provided in the 10-Day Letter. She informed the employee to whom she spoke that she
had not received the letter until after the time period to respond had passed. Defendant’s records
indicate that the employee informed Plaintiff that she had been “removed from the system” as of
September 10, 2016, because Defendant had not heard from her within the ten-day period. The
employee to whom Plaintiff spoke informed Plaintiff that she could dispute her termination
through Defendant’s ADR program. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a termination dispute form
on September 25, 2016.

Plaintiff, in her response to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts, denies that she failed to contact the Leave
Administration department as required by the 10-Day Letter, but she cites to no evidence in the record that could
refute this fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) provides that a party asserting that a fact “is genuinely disputed must
support the assertion by (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . ..” As Plaintiff does not support her
denial of this fact with citation to any material from the record, the fact is deemed admitted. See Jones v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 991 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court properly deemed facts admitted that were not
properly controverted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to
properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may (2) consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion.”).
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Upon review, Defendant upheld Plaintiff’s termination, stating that “Vertrice was notified
by Matrix on 7/1 regarding her leave denial for 6/16/7/13 as it was not certified; There are no
records of any leave being requested after 7/13 and no contact from Vertrice after 7/6 until 9/19
when she called upset that she didn’t get her letter until 9/16. Vertrice’s 10 day letter was sent
8/31. Her termination was processed on 9/14 effective as of 9/10. On 9/19 she called to change
her address.” An employee from Defendant’s Leave Administration office spoke with Plaintiff on
September 29, 2016, informing her that her termination would stand due to the expiration of her
approved leave, and additionally informing her that she was eligible for rehire. At some point,
Plaintiff did apply for the position of assistant manager with Dollar General, but was not hired at
that time.
On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant action. See Doc. 1. Plaintiff thereafter filed her
First Amended Complaint on October 30, 2018, alleging that Defendant discriminated against her
on the basis of her disability by terminating her employment in violation of the ADA, and that
Defendant violated her right to medical leave under the FMLA by interfering with that right, as
well as by discriminating against her and retaliating against her for exercising her rights under the
statute.4. See Doc. 14. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all Plaintiff’s claims.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

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Plaintiff, in her brief in opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, discusses certain claims
that were not included in her Amended Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to
accommodate her disability, retaliated against her in violation of the ADA, and failed to re-hire her after her
termination. Defendant correctly notes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint did not allege claims under the ADA for
retaliation, failure to accommodate, or failure to re-hire, and Plaintiff may not, therefore, raise them in opposition to
summary judgment. To the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims that are not in her Amended
Complaint, the Court will not consider such, as it is bound by the allegations found therein. See, e.g., Pulczinski v.
Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012) (a district court properly refuses to consider
allegations that were not pled); Northern States Power Co. v. Federal Transit Administration, 358 F.3d 1050, 1057
(8th Cir. 2004) (parties may not manufacture at summary judgment claims which were not pled); Scott v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CIV. 10-3368 MJD/SER, 2011 WL 3837077, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 29, 2011) (“In essence,
by raising these representations in his opposition brief, Plaintiff is attempting to amend his Amended Complaint to
include new allegations of fraud. Such action is impermissible.”); Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp.,

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013). The movant “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and must identify “those
portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant does so, the nonmovant
must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials,
but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Wood v. SatCom Mktg., LLC,
705 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2013). “On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those
facts.’” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
In determining the appropriateness of summary judgment, “the relevant inquiry is whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Bingaman v. Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 1 F.3d 976, 980 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986).

868 F.2d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in
opposition to a motion . . .. To hold otherwise would mean that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will .
. . simply by raising a point in a brief.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Spectra Merck Int’l, Inc. v. Euler ACI
Collection Servs., Inc., No. 03 C 899, 2004 WL 1393600, at *6 n. 4 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2004) (A “plaintiff cannot
amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”).

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III. DISCUSSION
A. ADA Wrongful-Termination Claim
The ADA bars private employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on the
basis of an actual or perceived disability. See Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. Of America, Inc., 889
F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2018); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102 and 12112(a). A “qualified individual” under
the ADA is defined as a person “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). To prove a wrongful-termination claim, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a qualified
individual with a disability, as defined by the ADA5; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) the adverse action was based on her disability. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 403
F.3d 1026, 1034 (8th Cir. 2005).

“Under the ADA, prohibited discrimination includes

discrimination against a qualified individual because of his or her disability (i.e., intentional
discrimination), see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b)(1), as shown by evidence of disparate treatment or
other proof that will vary according to the specific facts of the case.” Lipp v. Cargill Meat
Solutions Corp., 911 F.3d 537, 543 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.,
152 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. 1998).
In the absence of direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent, a plaintiff may
offer indirect evidence of disability discrimination. Id. at 544. In cases where a plaintiff relies on
indirect evidence to prove intentional discrimination under the ADA, courts apply the burdenshifting framework provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under

The ADA, as amended, defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as having such an impairment”
if that individual has been “subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”
Id. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added).
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the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that she was disabled under the ADA, was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job, and there was “a causal connection between an adverse employment
action and the disability.” Lipp, 911 F.3d at 544. If the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case,
“the burden of production then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse action.” Id. The employer’s responsibility to present proof of a nondiscriminatory, legitimate justification for its action is not an onerous task. See Bone v. G4S Youth
Services, LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir. 2012). Once an employer offers a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s
proffered reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination. Lipp, 911 F.3d at 544.

To

demonstrate pretext, the employee must show that the employer’s proffered reason is “unworthy
of credence.” Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 446 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2006). An employee may
demonstrate pretext in multiple ways, including (1) by demonstrating that the employer’s proffered
reason has no basis in fact; (2) that similarly situated employees were treated more leniently; (3)
that the employer changed its explanation for why it fired the employee; and (4) that the employer
deviated from its policies. Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2008). See also EEOC
v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., F.3d 963, 970 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff may show pretext, among
other ways, by showing that an employer (1) failed to follow its own policies, [or] (2) treated
similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner. . ..”) (alteration in original).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she was disabled, or that
anyone regarded her as disabled in a way that substantially limited a major life activity, and
therefore, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. In
support of this argument, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s testimony that her osteoarthritis does not

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substantially limit her activities, such as walking or working, and that her condition does not “deter
[her] work or anything.” Doc. 38 at ¶ 16. However, it matters not whether Plaintiff has
demonstrated that she was disabled or regarded as disabled. Even assuming arguendo that she has
established a prima facie case, Defendant has shown a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating Plaintiff’s employment, and Plaintiff cannot show that reason was a pretext for
discrimination.
Defendant maintains that it fired Plaintiff because she failed to respond to the August 31,
2016, 10-Day Letter. At that time, Plaintiff’s approved leave had expired, she had been on
unapproved leave for over two months, and she had failed to submit the required documentation
to support extension of her leave. It is clearly a legitimate employment decision to terminate an
employee for not following established policies that are applicable to and required of all
employees. Indeed, courts in the Eighth Circuit have repeatedly held that violation of company
policy is a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for terminating an employee. See Ebersole v.
Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, (8th Cir. 2011) (summary judgment affirmed where employee
was terminated for violating company policy by falsifying information about client visits); Hill v.
Walker, 918 F. Supp. 819, 834-35 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (granting summary judgment where employee
failed to return to work when instructed to do so); Matthews v. Bank of America, 2011 WL 6884795
(8th Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment where employee failed to provide requested medical
documentation to support her absence as required by company policy); Norman v. Union Pacific
R.R. Co., 606 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment where employee failed
to submit a return to work release).
Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot show that
Defendant’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. See Lipp, 911 F.3d at 544. Here,

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Defendant terminated Plaintiff because it was following its own policies with respect to gaining
approval for FMLA medical leave, and Plaintiff has presented no evidence suggesting that other
similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably, or differently in any way. Additionally,
Defendant has consistently stated that Plaintiff was discharged because she failed to respond to the
10-Day Letter sent to her because Defendant determined that she was out on unapproved medical
leave. See Fatemi v. White, 775 F.3d 1022, 1048 (8th Cir. 2015) (noting that a plaintiff may
demonstrate pretext by pointing to an employer’s shifting explanations for an adverse employment
decision). Plaintiff has also failed to present any evidence that Defendant has ever shifted its
explanation, or that its consistently-stated reason for her termination—her failure to respond to the
10-Day Letter issued because of unapproved medical leave—was false.
Additionally, when questioned at her deposition about whether she believed there was
anyone associated with Defendant who held any kind of animus or ill will towards her because of
her disability, Plaintiff answered, “No.” See Doc. 38-1 at 28. When asked whether anybody ever
made any negative comments to you about her medical condition or disability, Plaintiff again
answered, “No.” Id. When asked whether her direct manager or any other member of management
had ever made any negative comments about her being out on leave or having a medical condition,
she said, “No.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant’s proffered reason for her
termination was not based in fact. Much of Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to summary
judgment centers around her contention that Defendant was mistaken in its belief that she failed to
submit the required documentation to support an extension of her FMLA leave, and accordingly,
there was no justification for issuing the 10-Day Letter. However, even if she were correct in that
assertion, this would not change the Court’s analysis. The Court’s inquiry is limited to whether

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Defendant genuinely believed that Plaintiff had failed to submit the required documentation, which
in turn led Defendant to issue the 10-Day Letter, and if so, whether this belief was the reason for
her discharge.
It is undisputed that Defendant has no record of Plaintiff providing a DOL Certification
form that substantiated a need for FMLA leave past June 14, 2016. Doc. 38-13 at ¶21. Dollar
General, through Matrix, repeatedly asked Plaintiff for additional information to substantiate her
leave beyond the two weeks supported by the DOL Certification form that she submitted for her
leave in early June. Plaintiff received both a letter from Matrix and a phone call informing her
that she needed to provide further medical documentation to support additional leave. Neither
Dollar General nor Matrix has any record of Plaintiff responding to those communications by
providing the required DOL Certification. Plaintiff argues that she in fact did have “the appropriate
paperwork sent to Matrix on July 2, 2016, for her medical leave up to October 13, 2016.” Doc. 39
at ¶ 72. However, the exhibit Plaintiff submits to support that assertion is not the required DOL
Certification, and does not contain the same information required on that form. See Doc. 39-4.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 is merely a Return to Work Certification form dated June 21, 2016, and signed
by Plaintiff’s doctor, indicating that she was not yet released to work. Id.
It is additionally undisputed that on August 31, 2016, Plaintiff was sent a 10-Day Letter
asking her to contact Defendant to discuss her employment status, because she had been out on
unapproved leave for more than two months at that point. Plaintiff did not respond to the letter
within the ten-day period, and, because of that failure to respond, her employment was terminated
on September 10, 2016. Plaintiff argues that she should not have been terminated for her failure
to respond, as she did not receive the letter until the ten-day window had passed.

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While it is unfortunate that Plaintiff did not receive the 10-Day Letter until after the time
to respond had passed, that fact does not in any way indicate that Defendant’s proffered reason for
her termination was pretextual. Whether Defendant’s employment decision was mistaken, unwise,
or harsh is not material to the Court’s analysis. The Eighth Circuit has long held that courts are
not concerned with the correctness or wisdom of the reason given for the employer’s decision, but
only “whether [the proffered reason for termination] was the real reason for the termination and
not a pretext for [disability based] discrimination.” Crimm v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 750 F.2d
703, 712 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Ward v. International Paper Co., 509 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir.
2007) (“[I]t is not the role of this court to sit as a ‘super-personnel department’ to second guess the
wisdom of a business’s personnel decisions.”) (quoting Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241
F.3d 948, 957 (8th Cir. 2001); Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006)
(“The consideration in evaluating pretext is whether the employer honestly believed the employee
violated the company code of conduct or policy, not whether the employer was factually correct
in its conclusion.”).
Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant was mistaken about her failure to follow company
policy, but she offers no evidence to refute that Defendant genuinely believed that she had, and
that such genuine belief led to her termination. Therefore, there is no issue of fact regarding
whether Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination was pretext for
disability discrimination. As such, Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails, and Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on that claim.
B. FMLA Claim
Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated her rights under the FMLA by depriving her of leave
to which she was entitled and taking adverse action against her for exercising her rights under that

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statute. The FMLA entitles any “eligible employee” to a total of twelve work weeks of leave
during any twelve-month period to care for a “serious health condition” that renders the employee
unable to perform the functions of his or her work. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), (D); 29 C.F.R. §
825.112(a). The FMLA also protects workers who exercise their rights under the statute. It is
unlawful “for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit
recognizes three distinct claims brought under the FMLA: “entitlement”6 claims; “retaliation”
claims; and “discrimination” claims. Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 711 F.3d 883, 890-91 (8th
Cir. 2013); Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). While
it is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to bring all three claims, as she alleges in her Amended
Complaint that she was “denied leave, her leave was interfered with, and she was retaliated against
because of her attempt to take medical leave as prescribed under the FMLA.” Doc. 14 at ¶¶ 2627.
An employee may bring an entitlement claim when her employer “refuses to authorize
leave under the FMLA or takes other action to avoid responsibilities under the Act.” Pulczinski,
691 F.3d at 1005. “An employee proceeding on this theory need not show that an employer acted
with discriminatory intent.” Id. An FMLA retaliation claim may be brought when “an employee
opposes any practice made unlawful under the FMLA—for example, if an employee complains
about an employer’s refusal to comply with the statutory mandate to permit FMLA leave—then
the employer may not take adverse action against the employee who [was] engaged in the
opposition.” Id. at 1006. An employee may sue for discrimination when her employer “takes

Such claims were once labeled “interference” claims. However, the Eighth Circuit has instructed that the
FMLA claim “formerly described as interference claims henceforth shall be called ‘entitlement’ claims.” Bosley v.
Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 705 F.3d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 2013).
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adverse action against [her] because [she] exercise[d] rights to which [s]he is entitled under the
FMLA.” Id. “In this scenario, the employer does not prevent the employee from receiving FMLA
benefits. Rather, it is alleged that after the employee exercised [her] statutory rights, the employer
discriminated against [her] in the terms and conditions of employment. An employee making this
type of claim must prove that the employer was motivated by the employee’s exercise of rights
under the FMLA.” Id.
The FMLA is structured to not only grant leave rights to qualified employees, but also the
right to restoration of their employment upon completion of the leave.

See 29 U.S.C. §

2614(a)(1)(A). However, that does not mean that an employee may not be terminated while on
leave; the FMLA is not a strict liability statute. See Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1115
(8th Cir. 2012) (“Although an employee ‘can prove interference with an FMLA right regardless
of the employer’s intent,’ the FMLA ‘is not a strict-liability statute.”) (quoting Estrada v. Cypress
Semiconductor, Inc., 616 f.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2010)). Therefore, if an employer had lawful
reason to discharge an employee, the FMLA does not shield that employee on leave from such
discharge. “As long as an employer can show a lawful reason,” i.e., a reason not related to unlawful
interference with or discrimination due to taking FMLA leave, “the employer will be justified to
interfere with an employee’s FMLA leave rights.” Throneberry v. McGee Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403
F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[E]very discharge of an employee while she is taking FMLA leave
interferes with an employee’s FMLA rights. However, the mere fact of discharge during FMLA
leave by no means demand an employer be held strictly liable for violating the FMLA’s prohibition
of interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights.”).

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i. Retaliation Claim
The Court will first address Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. As explained above, “[i]f an
employee opposes any practice made unlawful under the FMLA—for example, if an employee
complains about an employer’s refusal to comply with the statutory mandate to permit FMLA
leave—then the employer may not for that reason take adverse action against the employee who
is engaged in the opposition.” Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1005-06. Here, the adverse action alleged
by Plaintiff was her termination. In order to prevail on her FMLA retaliation claim, then, Plaintiff
must allege and demonstrate that prior to her termination, she opposed a practice made unlawful
under the FMLA, or complained about a denial of FMLA leave. See Ernst v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 4:17CV2514 HEA, 2018 WL 2087254, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2018). Plaintiff never
opposed any practice made unlawful under the FMLA prior to her termination, nor did she
complain during her employment that she was subjected to an illegal practice under the FMLA.
Accordingly, her FMLA retaliation claim fails as a matter of law, and Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on that claim.
ii. Entitlement Claim
An entitlement claim arises when an employer refuses to authorize leave under the FMLA,
or takes other action to avoid responsibility under the Act. Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1005; see also
Estrada, 616 F.3d at 871 (An FMLA entitlement7 claim occurs “when an employer’s action deters
or attached negative consequences to an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights.”). Defendant
argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiff was granted all the
FMLA leave and benefits to which she was entitled, and she was terminated due to her failure to
respond to the 10-Day Letter, and not to avoid employer responsibility under the Act. Plaintiff

Estrada referred to the claim as one for “interference,” as that was the preferred nomenclature at the time the
decision was issued. However, as noted supra, the Eighth Circuit now refers to such claims as “entitlement” claims.
7

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fails to address her FMLA entitlement claim in her memorandum in opposition to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. However, the Court must nonetheless consider whether Defendant
has shown that it is in fact entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claim as pled in the
Amended Complaint.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff sought and received approved FMLA leave for the period
between June 1, 2016, and June 14, 2016. Plaintiff provided the required DOL Certification form
for that initial leave, and, upon compliance with that requirement, her leave was approved.
However, when Plaintiff sought to extend her leave, Defendant required that Plaintiff provide
another DOL Certification form for leave beyond June 14, 2016, and Plaintiff never did so.
Defendant informed Plaintiff that her leave was only approved through June 14, 2016, and any
leave beyond that would not be approved until Plaintiff submitted to Matrix an additional DOL
Certification form. Plaintiff was informed on July 1, 2016, both by letter and telephone, that any
leave beyond June 14 required additional documentation. See Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 17-52. Plaintiff was
likewise repeatedly informed that any time off that was not approved could result in disciplinary
action, up to and including termination.
An entitlement claim under the FMLA cannot succeed unless the plaintiff can show that
she “gave h[er] employer adequate and timely notice.” Chappell v. Bilco Co., 675 F.3d 1110, 1116
(8th Cir. 2012). Such adequate notice may include an employer “require[ment] that a request for
leave is supported by certification from a health care provider.” Id. Here, Defendant has a
consistently applied policy of requiring that certain documentation be submitted in order to obtain
approved FMLA leave, Plaintiff failed to abide by the policy, and her termination was the eventual
result when she also failed to timely respond to the 10-Day Letter.

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Plaintiff seems to believe that she should be excused from the requirement to abide by
company policy, both because she had other “paperwork” submitted, and because, even though
she failed to communicate with Matrix as required, she did communicate by telephone with her
supervisor, Ms. Whittaker, while she was out on medical leave. However, as discussed above, the
other “paperwork” to which Plaintiff refers was not the required DOL Certification form.
Additionally, Ms. Whittaker never indicated to Plaintiff that she had any authority to approve or
extend her FMLA leave—and indeed, she had no authority to do so—but rather, directed Plaintiff
to contact Human Resources for further information about FMLA leave. Because Plaintiff failed
to provide Defendant with the required certifying documentation for FMLA leave after June 14,
2016, and did not respond when asked to do so, the Court concludes that her termination did not
amount to interference under the FMLA. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s entitlement claim.
iii. Discrimination
A discrimination claim arises under § 2615(a)(1) “when an employer takes adverse action
against an employee because the employee exercises rights to which he is entitled under the
FMLA.” Pulczinski, 691 F.3d at 1006. Plaintiff maintains that she was terminated because she
exercised her right to take FMLA leave. Absent direct evidence8 of discrimination, the Court will
evaluate Plaintiff’s FMLA discrimination claim, like her ADA discrimination claim, under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that she offers direct evidence of discrimination for the Court’s consideration, (Doc.
40 at 5-7); however, she never explains what such evidence may entail, and the Court can find none in the record.
The only “direct evidence” of discrimination cited by Plaintiff is the fact that she was off work for a medical
condition when she was terminated. However, as noted previously, the FMLA is not a strict liability statute, and the
mere fact that a discharge occurs while an employee is on leave does not mean an employer is automatically liable
under the Act. “As long as an employer can show a lawful reason,” i.e., a reason not related to unlawful interference
with or discrimination due to taking FMLA leave, “the employer will be justified to interfere with an employee’s
FMLA leave rights.” Throneberry v. McGee Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 2005).
8

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Plaintiff argues that the fact that her termination occurred while she was on medical leave
demonstrates that she was fired not because she failed to respond to the 10-Day Letter, but rather,
because of discriminatory intent. Plaintiff asserts that the temporal proximity between her taking
leave and her termination proves that “Dollar General was . . . trying to justify her termination
because she was injured and required an extended medical leave.” See Doc. 40 at 9. However,
“the mere fact of discharge during FMLA leave by no means demands an employer be held strictly
liable for violating the FMLA’s prohibition of interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights.”
Throneberry, 403 F.3d at 979. There is no evidence that Defendant terminated Plaintiff because
she exercised her rights under the FMLA. Indeed, as argued by Defendant, the timeframe around
her termination would seem to support the opposite conclusion. If Defendant were intent on
discriminating or retaliating against Plaintiff for taking FMLA leave, it could have terminated her
in early July of 2016, when her extended leave was initially denied for lack of proper authenticating
paperwork. But instead of taking that course, Defendant worked with Plaintiff for months,
communicating with her about her leave status, explaining what was needed to extend her leave,
and finally terminating her only after she failed to respond to the 10-Day Letter, at which point she
had been on unapproved leave for more than two months.
While Plaintiff may believe that the decision to terminate her was harsh or misguided, the
Court is concerned only with whether Defendant discharged her because she exercised her rights
under the FMLA. See Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 2014) (Federal
courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”)
(quoting Johnson v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 424 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2005). Additionally,
Plaintiff’s testimony does not support that her termination was due to discriminatory intent. When
asked what actions Plaintiff believed were taken by Defendant in retaliation for taking FMLA

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leave, she responded, “Termination.” Doc. 38-1 at 29. When further asked, “Anything else?” she
said, “No.” Id. When asked what made her believe the termination was retaliatory, she simply
stated, “Because they took my job away.” Id. She further testified that no one associated with
Defendant had ever made any negative comments about her taking FMLA leave. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has offered nothing to indicate that her termination was the result of
discriminatory intent, rather than the result of Defendant’s determination to fire her for failure to
follow company policy. Therefore, Plaintiff’s FMLA discrimination claim fails for the same
reason that her ADA claim fails. Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for her termination, and Plaintiff has not shown that the reason proffered was but a pretext for
discrimination. As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FMLA
discrimination claim as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on both Counts of
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36)
is GRANTED.
The Court will issue a separate judgment consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2020.
/s/Jean C. Hamilton
JEAN C. HAMILTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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