Sayles v. Saint Louis University

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. (See Full Order.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Saint Louis University's Motion for Summary Judgment #17 is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Catherine D. Perry on 4/23/2019. (CBL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
LAYTONYA SAYLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.

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No. 4:18 CV 743 CDP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Laytonya Sayles claims that her employer, defendant Saint Louis
University, unlawfully terminated her employment on account of her race and
disability, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.1 Because the undisputed evidence before
the Court shows that Sayles released all claims of discrimination against the
University, I will grant the University’s motion for summary judgment on Sayles’
claims.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment must be granted when the pleadings and proffer of
evidence demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
1

I earlier dismissed Sayles’ claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Torgerson v. City of
Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). I must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and accord her the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379 (2007).
Initially, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of an issue for trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a motion is properly made and supported, the
nonmoving party may not rest upon the allegations in her pleadings or in general
denials of the movant’s assertions, but must instead come forward with specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Torgerson, 643 F.3d
at 1042. A verified complaint is equivalent to an affidavit for summary judgment
purposes. Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
If the nonmoving party fails to properly address an assertion of fact made by
the movant, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit me to consider the fact
undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Local Rules of this Court, however,
require it. Under Local Rule 4.01(E), moving parties must include a statement of
uncontroverted material facts with their memorandum, with citations to the record
if the fact(s) are established by the record.
Every memorandum in opposition shall include a statement of
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists.
Those matters in dispute shall be set forth with specific references to
portions of the record, where available, upon which the opposing
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party relies. The opposing party also shall note for all disputed facts
the paragraph number from movant’s listing of facts. All matters set
forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for
purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing party.
E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(E) (emphasis added). A party’s pro se status does not excuse
them from complying with the rule. See Bennett v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 295
F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, I deem admitted any statement of fact
that Sayles did not specifically controvert in response to the University’s motion.
Evidence Before the Court on the Motion
The following recitation of undisputed facts is taken from Sayles’ verified
complaint, the University’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts, and my
independent review of the record. The facts stated in the University’s Statement
are deemed admitted because Sayles did not specifically controvert them in
response to the motion for summary judgment. Further, because a party cannot
rely on unsworn/unattested declarations or statements to support or oppose a
motion for summary judgment, I do not consider the unsupported factual
averments made in Sayles’ unsworn response to the University’s motion. Banks v.
Deere, 829 F.3d 661, 667-68 (8th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff Sayles was a Senior Financial Assistant at St. Louis University. On
May 30, 2017, the University informed Sayles that it was eliminating her position
and that her employment would be terminated. On or around that same date, the
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University presented Sayles with a Mutual Agreement of Separation, Waiver, and
Release (Release Agreement).
Sayles had worked at the University for ten years. When the University
informed Sayles’ of her termination on May 30, she was on leave under the Family
Medical Leave Act as a result of being involved in a motor vehicle accident that
occurred on April 12, 2017.
On July 10, 2017, Sayles signed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that the
University discriminated against her in her employment on account of her race and
disability.2 The charge was filed with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights
and the EEOC on July 19, 2017.
On July 12, 2017, Sayles executed the Release Agreement, which provided,
in part:
Release by Employee. In consideration of the payment, benefits and
rights provided to Employee under the terms of this Agreement,
Employee, for and on behalf of Employee and Employee’s heirs and
assigns, hereby forever releases the [University], and each and every
one of its past and present trustees, officers, employees, insurers,
attorneys, agents or representatives (collectively, the “University
Releasees”), from any and all manner of claims, complaints or causes
of action of any kind and nature whatsoever, which Employee may
have or claim to have against the University Releasees by reason of
Employee’s employment with the Employer, Employee’s separation
from employment with the Employer, or otherwise (the “Released
Claims”).
2

In her charge of discrimination, Sayles claimed her disability was a medicine-induced odor that
caused the chairman of her department to cover his mouth, plug his nose, and avoid her. (ECF 11.)
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Such Released Claims include, but are not limited to, claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§2000e, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”) and the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§621, et seq., [and] the Americans With
Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§12101, et seq. . . .
Paragraph 6 of the Release Agreement provided, in part:
Time for Consideration and Return of Executed Agreement.
Employee understands that Employee has forty-five (45) days
calendar days from Employee’s receipt of this Agreement to consider
and accept it. . . . Employee further understands that Employee may
revoke this Agreement within seven (7) calendar days after signing
it[.] . . .
Employee acknowledges that Employer hereby advises Employee to
consult an attorney (at Employee’s expense) concerning the meaning
and legal implications of this Agreement before signing it. Employee
acknowledges that Employee has had sufficient time to seek the
advice and assistance of an attorney, that Employee understands fully
all of the terms of this Agreement, that it is in writing and is written in
manner that is understood by Employee, that Employee has been
afforded sufficient time to review this Agreement in order to decide
whether to sign, that Employee has signed this Agreement of
Employee’s own free will and under no threat or duress by the
Employer or any other person.
As consideration for Sayles’ release of all claims arising from her
employment with the University and separation therefrom, the University provided
Sayles severance payments in the form of the continuation of Sayles’ base salary
paid over a period of fifteen weeks in the gross amount of $12,768.00. The
University also provided additional consideration, including assistance from
human resources and career services.
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From August 4 through November 30, 2017, the University issued several
severance payments to Sayles in the form of checks.
Discussion
An employee’s waiver of rights to bring an employment discrimination
claim in exchange for a settlement agreement is valid when such waiver is
knowing and voluntary. Warnebold v. Union Pac. R.R., 963 F.2d 222, 223 (8th
Cir. 1992).
In her unsworn response to the University’s motion for summary judgment,
Sayles appears to contend that her execution of the Release Agreement was not
knowing because she had had a severe concussion from the motor vehicle accident.
Sayles provides no support for this averment and I do not consider it in
determining the University’s summary judgment motion. Banks, 829 F.3d at 66768.3
My review of the Release Agreement in toto shows it to constitute a clear,
knowing, and voluntary waiver of Sayles’ employment discrimination claims. The
Release Agreement was itself clear and unambiguous. Sayles was given
substantial time to consider the Release Agreement and its terms, and she signed
the agreement forty-three days after the University provided it to her. Sayles had
seven days thereafter to revoke the agreement and did not do so. The Release
3

I note that two days before executing the Release Agreement, Sayles signed her charge of
discrimination under penalty of perjury.
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Agreement also advised Sayles to consult an attorney regarding the meaning and
legal implications of the agreement before signing it. By signing the agreement,
Sayles acknowledged that she fully understood the terms of the agreement and that
she had had sufficient time to review it. Finally, by virtue of the nature and length
of her position with the University, it is reasonable to infer that Sayles was an
educated and knowledgeable individual.
Because the Release Agreement was supported by consideration and
constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sayles’ employment discrimination
claims, Saint Louis University is entitled to summary judgment on Sayles’ claims.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Saint Louis University’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [17] is GRANTED.
An appropriate Judgment is entered herewith.

____________________________________
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 23rd day of April, 2019.

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