Jones v. Corizon Inc. et al

Filing 93

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kenneth Hall's Motion for Summary Judgment 48 is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Edwin Jones's claims are DISMISSED as to Defendant Kenneth Hall. A separate judgment is filed this date. Signed by District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 8/18/2020. (KEK)

Case: 4:18-cv-00984-RWS Doc. #: 93 Filed: 08/14/20 Page: 1 of 12 PageID #: 1306

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
EDWIN JONES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
JESSICA ENGLE, RN, in her individual )
capacity, KENNETH HALL, in his
)
individual capacity, JENNIFER DOWD, )
f/k/a JAN MARTIN, in her individual
)
capacity, & DIANE MAUK, in her
)
individual capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 4:18 CV 984 RWS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Edwin Jones is a 61-year-old inmate in the Missouri Department of
Corrections’ (MODOC) Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center
(ERDCC). On October 28, 2016, while experiencing symptoms of a stroke, Jones
went to the medical bay at the ERDCC, self-declared a medical emergency, and
waited for nearly an hour before receiving care. On June 15, 2018, Jones filed this
lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs by the corrections
officer and healthcare providers working in the ERDCC medical bay. The
healthcare providers—Jessica Engle, Diane Mauk, and Jennifer Dowd—each
agreed to a settlement with Jones, the details of which they are currently finalizing
[ECF No. 90]. Accordingly, this Memorandum and Order pertains only to

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Defendant Kenneth Hall’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons below, I
will grant C.O. Hall’s motion for summary judgment.
I.

Background
On October 28, 2016, Edwin Jones, pushed in a wheelchair by fellow inmate

Eric Campbell-Bey, presented at the ERDCC medical bay and approached the
front desk in the waiting area. Seated at the front desk were Corrections Officer
Kenneth Hall and Certified Nurse Assistant Jennifer Dowd. Jones self-declared a
medical emergency and told C.O. Hall that he believed he was having a stroke. At
the time, Jones showed visible signs of medical distress, including shaking, a
drooping mouth, and an inability to control his body movements or sit up straight.
Because Jones could not write, C.O. Hall completed Jones’s entry in the medical
bay’s self-declare sign-in log and wrote that the time was 10:59 a.m.
At the front desk in the medical bay’s waiting area, there is a document titled
“Self Declare Guidelines” that lists examples of medical emergencies, including
strokes and heart attacks. See Self Declare Guidelines, ECF No. 70-7. When an
inmate self-declares a medical emergency, “immediate triage” is to be “conducted
by a nurse in direct communication with the offender, and the offender will be
provided health services according to the needs of his heath condition.” See IS1141 Emergency Health Services, MODOC Institutional Services Procedure Manual,
ECF No. 70-4, III(C)(4),(6).

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For nearly an hour after he self-declared a medical emergency, and while
exhibiting signs he was having a stroke, Jones sat in the waiting room at the
medical bay without receiving treatment for his medical condition. Multiple
medical bay staff members, including a registered nurse, interacted with Jones and
denied him the emergency care he requested. C.O. Hall was present in the waiting
area during these interactions and, according to Jones, witnessed them. CampbellBey pleaded with C.O. Hall to find help for Jones.
The exact time is disputed, but at least 53 minutes after C.O. Hall logged
Jones’s arrival in the medical bay, a nurse acknowledged that Jones was suffering
from a medical emergency, and Jones was transferred to Parkland Health Center.
There, doctors determined that Jones had suffered a stroke and that too much time
had passed for a tissue plasminogen activator shot to ameliorate long-term damage.
Jones suffered significant harm as a result of the stroke, including difficulty
moving his left leg and left arm. He now spends half of his time in a wheelchair.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

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responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those
portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a
motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on
his pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the
essential elements of his case on which he bears the burden of proof. Id. at 324. In
resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has an
affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy.
Crossley v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004).
III.

Analysis
C.O. Hall argues he is entitled to summary judgment because (a) Jones

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (b) C.O. Hall is entitled to
qualified immunity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jones, I
find that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Jones exhausted his
administrative remedy but also that C.O. Hall is entitled to qualified immunity.
a. Exhaustion
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, which C.O. Hall has the burden
to establish. See Minter v. Bartruff, 939 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2019). Because

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there remains a genuine dispute of material facts about Jones’s exhaustion efforts, I
will not grant C.O. Hall’s summary judgment motion on exhaustion grounds.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act mandates that “[a]n inmate must exhaust
all available administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 suit.” Porter v.
Sturm, 781 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2015). “‘[T]he boundaries of proper
exhaustion’ depend on the prison’s specific administrative requirements.”
Townsend v. Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)). MODOC has a three-step administrative grievance
process: an informal resolution request (IRR), a grievance, and a grievance appeal.
Each step has time limits that govern the timeliness of filing; the inmate must file
the IRR within fifteen days of the incident, a grievance within seven working days
of the prison’s response to the IRR, and a grievance appeal within seven days of
receiving the response to the grievance. See Wewerka v. Roper, No. 4:09CV1973
CDP, 2010 WL 4628093, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2010), aff’d, 431 F. App’x 517
(8th Cir. 2011). After the inmate receives a response to the appeal, the inmate has
exhausted the grievance procedure. See id.
C.O. Hall argues that Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in
two ways: (1) Jones did not address wrongdoing by C.O. Hall in the administrative
grievance process, and (2) Jones’s grievance appeal was untimely. Upon
reviewing the record, I find that Jones sufficiently preserved his right to file a

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lawsuit against C.O. Hall. First, “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply
because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). Rather, the exhaustion inquiry requires me to determine
whether Jones has “complete[d] the administrative review process in accordance
with the applicable procedural rules.” Id. at 218 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 88 (2006)).
Because “[n]othing in the [Missouri Department of Corrections] policy itself
supports the conclusion that the grievance process was improperly invoked simply
because an individual later named as a defendant was not named at the first step of
the grievance process,” Edwin Jones was not required to specifically name C.O.
Hall in his grievance. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. Even still, Jones identified C.O.
Hall as one of the people present in the medical bay waiting area while Jones
waited for medical treatment. The IRR and Grievance filings each contain detailed
accounts of Jones’s experience in the medical bay on October 28, 2016 [ECF No.
51-2]. Although Jones’s IRR and Grievance filings primarily focus on the conduct
of the nurses and certified nurse assistants in the medical bay, I find that Jones’s
grievance gave the MODOC a “fair and full opportunity to adjudicate” Jones’s
claims against C.O. Hall. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90.
I also find that there is a question of material fact as to whether Jones filed a
timely appeal. C.O. Hall argues that Jones’s grievance appeal was untimely, but

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Jones provides evidence that he submitted his appeal on time. C.O. Hall’s
argument relies on the date the grievance office received the appeal (March 9,
2017) as the filing date. Jones claims he filed his grievance appeal on March 6,
2017; his claim is supported by the sworn affidavit of Charles Smith, another
inmate. See ECF No. 70-19 (reporting that Smith heard the grievance officer
assigned to Jones say to Jones, “if you have someone ask me about it, I will let
them know that you turned your Grievance Appeal into me on March 6, 2017”). If
Jones submitted his application on March 6, 2017, it was timely.
Moreover, Jones himself previously challenged MODOC’s determination
that his appeal was untimely through a grievance appeal. In response to Jones’s
appeal, MODOC wrote that Jones’s grievance was duplicative because he
“received the Grievance Appeal response and exhausted the grievance process.”
See ECF No. 51-2, p. 13. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Jones, I
cannot conclude as a matter of law that Jones failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. C.O. Hall is not entitled to summary judgment on exhaustion grounds.
b.

Qualified Immunity

C.O. Hall also argues he is entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine of
qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson

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v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). Jones responds that C.O. Hall is not entitled to qualified
immunity, because C.O. Hall violated Jones’s clearly established Eighth
Amendment rights.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment. “The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”
Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). A prison official can violate a prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment rights if he is “deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious
medical needs.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1997).
To sustain a deliberate indifference claim, Jones must make “a two-part showing
that (1) [he] suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) [C.O. Hall]
knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it.” Id. (citations omitted). Based on
the factual record before me, I find that C.O. Hall was not deliberately indifferent
to Jones’s serious medical need. Jones suffered from an objectively serious
medical need and C.O. Hall knew of the need, but C.O. Hall did not deliberately
disregard it.
Jones and C.O. Hall agree that Jones self-declared a medical emergency
when Jones presented at the medical bay on October 28, 2016. The facts also

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establish that Jones suffered a stroke that day. C.O. Hall also does not contest that,
in the medical bay, Jones exhibited symptoms of a stroke, that Jones and
Campbell-Bey requested assistance for Jones, or that C.O. Hall was present in the
medical bay waiting area when other prison staff disregarded Jones’s emergency.
C.O. Hall instead argues that his actions did not constitute a deliberate disregard of
Jones’s medical condition. He contends that he was not trained in recognizing or
diagnosing symptoms of a stroke and that he followed proper procedure by
notifying a nurse of Jones’s self-declared emergency.
A lack of medical training is not itself a defense to liability under the
deliberate indifference standard. While “deliberate indifference must be measured
by the official’s knowledge at the time in question,” Schaub, 638 F.3d at 915
(citations omitted), the symptoms Jones exhibited were so severe that “even a
layperson could have understood” that his condition was serious. Williams v.
York, 891 F.3d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 2018). I find that C.O. Hall knew of Jones’s
serious medical need.
However, C.O. Hall’s actions in response were not “equivalent to criminallaw recklessness.” Schaub, 638 F.3d at 914. I assess the factual record of what
C.O. Hall did—and failed to do—based on C.O. Hall’s knowledge at the time in
question. This knowledge included Jones’s self declaration, C.O. Hall’s

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observation of Jones’s symptoms, Campbell-Bey’s statements to C.O. Hall, and
C.O. Hall’s observation of how medical bay staff responded.
According to Jones, after C.O. Hall completed Jones’s entry on the selfdeclare sign-in sheet, C.O. Hall left the waiting area. See Pl.’s Statement of
Additional Material Facts (SAMF), ECF No. 65, ¶ 24. When he returned, C.O.
Hall asked Campbell-Bey to push Jones to the waiting area designated for inmates
who self-declare medical emergencies, approximately ten feet from the desk where
C.O. Hall sat. Id. ¶ 25. This substantially aligns with C.O. Hall’s statement that he
told a nurse of Jones’s medical emergency. See Def.’s Statement of Material
Facts, ECF No. 50, ¶ 14.
After C.O. Hall told a nurse of Jones’s self declaration, Jones did not
immediately receive treatment. See id. Ex. B, ECF No. 51, 42:9-23. C.O. Hall
remained seated nearby while at least one nurse interacted with Jones and declined
to treat him. Id. ¶ 28. While it may have been negligent for C.O. Hall not to
follow up or advocate for more urgent treatment for Jones, C.O. Hall’s failure to
further assist Jones was not deliberately indifferent. C.f. Estate of Rosenberg by
Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The prisoner must show
more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement
with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”).

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The Eighth Amendment did not require C.O. Hall to second-guess the nursing staff
members who spoke with Jones and declined to immediately treat him.
Jones cites a section of MODOC’s Emergency Health Services Procedures
Manual, which states that a staff member who “reasonably believes an offender is
not receiving appropriate health services care . . . should report their concerns to
the chief administrative officer without delay.” See IS11-41 Emergency Health
Services, MODOC Institutional Services Procedure Manual, ECF No. 70-4,
III(A)(6). However, established law, and not MODOC’s policies, determines
whether C.O. Hall was deliberately indifferent to Jones’s serious medical need.
See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no federal
constitutional liberty interest in having state officers follow state law or prison
officials follow prison regulations.”) (citation omitted).
C.O. Hall did not persist in seeking help for Jones when others declined to
treat him, but he “did take some action to respond” to Jones’s medical emergency.
Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 418 (8th Cir. 2000). With “hindsight’s perfect
vision,” it is clear that C.O. Hall could have done more to bring attention to Jones
as he suffered from a stroke. Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 915 (8th Cir.
2011). However, even Jones’s account of what happened that day demonstrates it
was reasonable at the time for C.O. Hall to defer to the decisions of the medical

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personnel in the medical bay. C.O. Hall was not deliberately indifferent to Jones’s
serious medical needs.
IV.

Conclusion
C.O. Kenneth Hall’s conduct did not violate Edwin Jones’s clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights. As a result, C.O. Hall is entitled to
qualified immunity, and I will grant his motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kenneth Hall’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [48] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Edwin Jones’s claims are
DISMISSED as to Defendant Kenneth Hall.
A separate judgment is filed this date.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 14th day of August, 2020.

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