Ball-Bey v. Chandler et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V of Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 76) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With respect to Defendants r equest for injunctive relief, the motion is GRANTED. With respect to the request to dismiss the claims against Dotson, Chandler, and Vaughn in their official capacities, because they are redundant with the claims against the City, the motion is GR ANTED. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against Defendant Dotson, Chandler, and Vaughn in their official capacities are DISMISSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on November 16, 2020. (MCB)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
KYLE CHANDLER, et al.,
Case No. 4:18-CV-01364-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V of Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Petition for Failure to State a Claim, filed by Defendants City of St. Louis
(“City”) and Samuel Dotson (“Dotson”), Kyle Chandler, (“Chandler”) and Ronald Vaughn
(“Vaughn”), in their official capacities (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”). 1 (Doc. 76). The
motion has been fully briefed, and the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 12). For the following
reasons, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Following the filing of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Defendants City and Dotson
filed a motion to dismiss all of the claims against them failure to state a claim. The Honorable
Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge, consolidated the instant case with several similar
cases for purposes of resolving the motions to dismiss in those cases. (Doc. 50). Judge Clark later
entered a Memorandum and Order granting the motion and dismissing the claims against the City
The complaint at issue is titled “First Amended Complaint,” but because Plaintiff has already
filed an amended complaint, the Court will refer to this as the Second Amended Complaint.
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and Dotson, as well as the official capacity claims against Chandler and Vaughn. Ball-Bey v.
Chandler, 415 F. Supp. 3d 884 (E.D. Mo. 2019)
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same causes of action against the
Municipal Defendants, but he adds several additional factual allegations in an attempt to address
the deficiencies identified by Judge Clark. In the instant motion, the Municipal Defendants argue
that the new allegations are not sufficient and that Plaintiff has still failed to state a claim against
them. Thus, the Court will begin with a discussion of the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint and a brief discussion of the Memorandum and Order dismissing the claims against the
Municipal Defendants. The Court will then discuss the factual allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint and will address whether those allegations are sufficient to state a claim against the
A. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint
On January 3, 2019, Plaintiff Dennis Ball-Bey filed the First Amended Complaint in this
case against four defendants: Kyle Chandler, a police officer employed by the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department (“SLMPD”); Ronald Vaughn, a police officer employed by the
SLMPD; Sam Dotson, former SLMPD police chief; and the City of St. Louis. 1st Am. Compl.
Plaintiff alleged that on or around August 19, 2015, Chandler, Vaughn, and other officers went to
a residence to execute a search warrant. Id. at ¶ 18. Chandler, Vaughn, and an ATF agent were
assigned to cover the backyard of the residence. Id. While there, Plaintiff’s son, Mansur Ball-Bey
(“Mansur”), and a fourteen-year-old were walking in an alley way behind the residence when they
first made visual contact with Chandler and Vaughn. Id. at ¶ 19. Chandler and Vaughn, with guns
drawn, chased Mansur and the fourteen-year-old. Id. The fourteen-year-old stopped and hid, and
Mansur continued to run. Id. Chandler and Vaughn chased Mansur through the backyard of a
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neighboring property and fired multiple shots, striking him once in the back and killing him. Id. at
¶ 21. Mansur was unarmed and had no criminal record. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22. Plaintiff alleged that in
shooting Mansur, Chandler and Vaughn were driven, motivated, and protected as a direct result of
several policies and customs that permeated the City of St. Louis for the three years preceding his
death. Id. at ¶¶ 24-76.
Plaintiff asserted five claims in the First Amended Complaint: (I) use of excessive force in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Chandler and Vaughn in their official and individual capacities; (II) wrongful death/assault and
battery pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 537.080(1) and 516.120, against Chandler and
Vaughn in their individual and official capacities; (III) failure to train, supervise, and control in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sam
Dotson, former Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis, in his official capacity, and the City of St.
Louis; (IV) failure to train, supervise, and control pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dotson, in
his official capacity; and (V) municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and
Dotson, in his official capacity. (Doc. 21).
The basis for Plaintiff’s claim of municipal liability was his allegation that the City of Saint
Louis had two policies and a custom that were the driving force behind the shooting of his son: the
written “Normal Policy,” the written “Rec Policy,” and the unwritten “You Run, You Pay” custom
that arose out of the two policies.
Under the written “Normal Policy,” defendants accused of resisting arrest are normally
charged with a municipal ordinance violation, for which public defenders are not provided, instead
of with a state misdemeanor charge. 1st Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-53. Specifically, SLMPD’s Special
Order 8-01 § 7, issued September 15, 2012, states:
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B. CHARGING OF DEFENDANT
1. Under normal circumstances, the defendant will be charge under a city ordinance
violation of resisting arrest or interfering with an officer. The information
application will be made at the City Counselor’s Office.
Id. at ¶ 51. In addition, SLMPD’s Special Order 8-01 § 5, also issued on September 15, 2012,
NOTE: The Public Defenders will not be required to provide legal services to
persons charged with a violation of county or municipal ordinances.
Id. at ¶ 52. Plaintiff alleged that this policy was designed to place defendants charged with resisting
arrest who might have excessive force claims into municipal court. Id. at ¶ 53. The Normal Policy
required the SLMPD officer to charge individuals with a state misdemeanor arrest in extenuating
circumstances, such as where the suspect used or threatened the use of physical force. Id. at ¶ 54.
Under the written “Rec Policy” (also sometimes called the “Blanket Release Policy”),
prosecutors will not amend a municipal resisting arrest charge unless the accused person signs a
release of all civil claims against the City. Specifically, the City of St. Louis Counselor’s office
has a policy that states:
3. Resisting arrest & Interfering with a Police Officer charges cannot be amended
without first obtaining a signed release from defendant (See Sample.)
Id. at ¶ 26 (emphasis in original). The Rec Policy requires the releasor to enter into a contract
between the City of St. Louis, any employee of SLMPD, and others, under threat of criminal
prosecution. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleged that the release was written to censor, restrain, and deter
civil rights lawsuits against Defendant City of St. Louis. Id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff also alleged that it
acted as a method to conceal and obscure civil rights violations by SLMPD. Id. Plaintiff had not
found a single case in which Defendants legally enforced one of these release agreements; the
release was not created for its legal effect, but for its psychological effects, resulting in accused
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victims not petitioning the court for redress of civil rights violations. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff cited
statements from former prosecutors and a law professor who have opined that although these
releases are probably unenforceable, they have the effect of convincing defendants that they have
no legal redress, and they do not sue. Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.
City prosecutors were trained under this Blanket Release policy, and they base their
decisions about whether to amend or dismiss charges solely based on the Blanket Release Policy.
Id. at ¶¶ 53-54. The policy does not distinguish between frivolous and meritless claims. 1st Am.
Compl. ¶ 40. The City Counselor, Julian Bush, trained, supervised, and controlled prosecutors to
seek a release agreement of all civil rights claims, regardless of any exonerating facts presented by
a defendant. Id. at ¶ 43. Defendant City, through Bush, trained, supervised and controlled
prosecutors to obtain a signed release agreement after discovering possible civil rights violations
and without analyzing any civil rights violations. Id. at ¶ 49. When asked whether there was any
way around “a clear cut bogus arrest,” a chief prosecutor with Defendants’ municipal division
replied, “no, my whole point, why would I plead down a charge, and potentially be looking at civil
liability. I’m not doing myself any favors by doing that.” Id. at ¶ 39. The policy has resulted in
numerous, widely known, and accepted practices of prosecutorial overreaching to obtain
signatures on blank release forms or force falsely accused victims to trial. Id. at ¶ 41.
Plaintiff alleged that under these two policies, the use of excessive force by SLMPD
officers in “resisting arrest” cases has been concealed and shielded from judicial oversight, because
suspects who resist arrest are charged in municipal court (where they do not have a public
defender), and then forced to release their excessive force claims or face a criminal resisting arrest
charge. Id. at ¶¶ 30, 35, 49, 52-53, 56-57. Plaintiff also alleged that, as a direct result of the Rec
and Normal Policies, a custom developed under which SLMPD officers use unjustified force
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and/or make unlawful arrests for the purpose of seizing evidence any time an alleged offender
walks away, runs, or protests his or her innocence, then claim that the suspect “resisted arrest.” Id.
at ¶¶ 57-59. This custom is referred to as the “SLMPD tyrannical practices” or as the “You Run,
You Pay” (“YRYP”) custom. To support the existence of the YRYP custom, Plaintiff alleged
fourteen prior incidents of alleged misconduct, including five instances in which an officer
discharged a weapon and charged a suspect with resisting arrest as a municipal violation, four
instances in which officers shot at suspects running away, and three instances in which officers
unlawfully arrested individuals, charged them, then tried to get them to sign release agreements.
Id. at ¶¶ 61-73. Plaintiff alleged that Mansur was shot by Defendants Chandler and Vaughn as a
result of these tyrannical practices, and the practices “were created, motivated, protected, and
encouraged directly and indirectly by Defendants’ Rec & Normal policies and practices.” Id. at
In Plaintiff’s failure to train, supervise, and control claims, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
City of St. Louis and Dotson trained SLMPD to use tyrannical customs and practices, including
using deadly force to effectuate resisting arrest violations with no threat to officer safety; using
unjustified force to effectuate municipal ordinance violations of resisting arrest; using excessive
force; conducting unlawful searches and seizures and then charging municipal violations; and
using deadly force when the offender does not present a threat but the offender runs, pulls away,
or protests his innocence. Id. at ¶ 101. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant City of St. Louis was
negligent in its supervision, training, and control by failing, inter alia, to train Chandler and
Vaughn in the proper use of firearms and deadly force in situations where their lives and the lives
of others were not in danger. Id. at ¶¶ 103. 112. Plaintiff also alleged that the City and Dotson
were deliberately indifferent to these patterns and practices and to the obvious need for training
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and the foreseeable consequences of these failures to train, supervise, and control Chandler and
Vaughn. Id. at ¶¶ 106, 113-14.
B. Judge Clark’s Dismissal of the Claims Against the Municipal Defendants
Judge Clark found that Plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest the
existence of a widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct, as is required to
establish municipal liability based on an unofficial custom. Ball-Bey, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 895-97.
He also found that Plaintiff had not pleaded sufficient facts to show a causal link between the Rec
& Normal policies and the alleged custom or a direct causal link between the alleged YRYP custom
and Chandler and Vaughn’s killing of Plaintiff’s son. Id. at 897-99. In addressing Plaintiff’s failure
to train or supervise claims (Counts III and IV) Judge Clark found that Plaintiff had not included
any facts to support his conclusion that the City failed to train Chandler and Vaughn in the areas
identified; did not allege any facts about what the SLMPD training program includes or does not
include; and did not plead facts showing a pattern of constitutional violations of which policymaking officials could be charged with knowledge of a failure to train their employees. Id. at 90001.
After dismissing the claims against Municipal Defendants, Judge Clark unconsolidated the
cases, and the case is now before the undersigned. (Doc. 52).
C. Additional Allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the same claims against the same
defendants, based on the same theories of liability, and he includes nearly all of the same factual
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allegations as he did in the First Amended Complaint. 2 He also includes several new factual
allegations, including the following.
First, Plaintiff alleges several statistics regarding past incidents involving shootings by
SLMPD officers. These facts include a criminologist’s report finding that St. Louis police officers
fired their weapons at people 98 times from 2008 through 2011, and 12 suspects died; the same
report’s finding that about half of those incidents took place during foot chases (like the instant
case), where the offenders were alleged to have resisted; the same report’s finding that (like
Mansur) fewer than 27% of the “resisting arrest” suspects were actually armed; a criminologist’s
report finding that of the 230 police-involved shootings in the City of St. Louis (population
318,000) between 2003 and 2012, most were concentrated in a relatively small number of areas,
with the area where Mansur was shot being one of those with the highest numbers of shootings;
the same criminologist’s report finding that the most common pattern of incidents giving rise to
shootings were incidents that involved “suspicious persons” who (like Mansur) were on foot or in
a vehicle; that between 2012 and 2014, SLMPD officers discharged their firearms approximately
183 times, with more than half of those incidents taking place during foot chases where the
offender is alleged to have resisted; and that three specific incidents occurred in a six-month period
in the neighborhood where Mansur was shot that involved an officer discharging a firearm, the
individual involved being charged with resisting arrest, and the individual involved signing a
release agreement. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-24. Plaintiff further alleges that the “RAMS” system
used to track firearm discharges, use of force, and resisting arrest claims was discontinued in 2014,
making data collection difficult. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff also cites, and attaches an exhibit to the
The Second Amended Complaint does not include all fourteen specific instances of past police
force used against suspects resisting arrest. The Court sets forth in this section the instances that
are included in the Second Amended Complaint.
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Second Amended Complaint, a media report from 2017 showing that St. Louis police led the nation
in the rate of police shootings, with a per capita yearly average nearly double that of the next
highest department on the list. Id. at ¶ 25; Ex. A. to 2d Am. Compl., Doc. 59-2, at pp. 23-24.
Plaintiff also includes in the Second Amended Complaint some descriptions of specific
incidents involving the use of excessive force against individuals who resisted arrest: a 2014
incident in which an individual ran and resisted arrest, which resulted in an SLMPD officer fatally
shooting the individual in the legs and head; a 2014 incident in which three friends were stopped
by an SLMPD officer, the friends ran, the officer pursued them, and the officer fired at them while
they were running away; and a federal criminal indictment in which federal prosecutors described
an incident in which SLMPD brutally beat an unarmed undercover officer, then falsely claimed
that the officer had resisted arrest and was not compliant in an effort to justify their use of force.
Id. at ¶¶ 34, 79-80.The news articles attached as exhibits to the Second Amended Complaint
describe additional incidents: a 2011 incident in which an individual was fatally shot and the City
of St. Louis paid family members $900,000; a 2013 incident in which an individual was shot 21
times after he crashed his car following a police pursuit and his family was awarded $400,000; and
a 2010 incident in which an individual was shot after he ran from police who were trying to arrest
him for alleged drug activity, and his family was awarded $212,500. Ex. A to 2d Am Compl., Doc.
59-2, at pp. 7-8.
Plaintiff also included new allegations related to the City’s use of the Rec Policy/Blanket
Release Policy. Plaintiff alleges that Craig Higgins, the Defendant’s municipal division attorney
manager, made clear that Defendants aggressively pursue settlement releases in claims of
excessive force in only “resisting arrest” type cases. 2d. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Plaintiff quotes Higgins
as stating, “So, I can’t say that this is just how we do business down here. But in those instances
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where there are physicality is in involved [sic], the City seeks to obtain a settlement release.” Id.
Higgins further clarified:
If, you know, if a person says you’re under arrest and you start running
away, and now they catch you and beat you down, yeah, that’s civil, but we started
with the premise that you ran away. So, you did resist. So, I would issue that case.
But since I now know that was a beat down after the fact, I may be more
amenable to say well, if you wanna take a release, I’ll dismiss the charges. Some
people might say, no, ‘cause they may say, the beat down happened after the fact.
I’m like, I understand.
But in that instance I can’t say that the resistance didn’t occur. So, I think if
we’re tryin’ to say that, you know on every resistance case or in defense case I
require a release before I dismiss it. I would- I would say yeah, that’s true, but it’s
not like I’m making an issue of determinations. To issue or not issue.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Plaintiff also added factual allegations regarding the numbers of settlement releases
executed under the Rec Policy/Blanket Release Policy. Plaintiff alleges that under this policy,
hundreds of victims settled their excessive force claims for running away from Defendants. Id. at
¶¶ 28-29. Plaintiff alleges that initially, the public believed that the City had only settled 44 cases
since 2010, totaling $4.7 million for various injuries, wrongful imprisonment, or death. Id. at ¶ 27.
However, Plaintiff alleges that he has uncovered 650 executed settlement agreements, since 2010,
stored in boxes at the SLMPD, 94% of which settled allegations for excessive force, unlawful
searches, and seizures arising from the specific charge of “resisting arrest.” Id. at ¶ 27. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants were on notice that officers were beating suspects and discharging their
firearms because suspects ran away. Id. at ¶ 28. As examples of individuals who were charged
with municipal resisting arrest violations and pressured to sign releases of excessive force claims,
Plaintiff alleges the names, dates, and locations of 169 specific incidents between January 2013
and August 2015 in which individuals were charged with resisting arrest and secretly settled claims
for allegations including excessive force and unlawful seizure arising from their arrest for running
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away; 46 of these incidents involved discharge of a firearm. Id. at ¶¶ 29-33, 85. 3 Plaintiff alleges
that Defendants were fully aware of the excessive force allegations, yet failed to investigate any
of the facts underlying any of the executed release agreements and/or the corresponding
allegations. Id. at ¶ 33.
Plaintiff also includes some new factual allegations related to his failure to train and
supervise claims, including allegations that Defendant Dotson had a duty to train Defendants
Chandler and Vaughn on the proper use of force when an offender runs, but that Dotson failed to
properly institute training and policies to prevent the use of deadly force when an offender runs
and that Dotson failed to properly train officers on charging resisting arrest Id. at ¶ 22(e)-(f).
LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim satisfies
the plausibility standard “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but it must contain factual allegations that “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007).
Plaintiff’s allegations are not crystal clear on the question of whether all 169 individuals were
charged with resisting arrest as a municipal code violation, rather than with a state misdemeanor.
However, in light of Plaintiff’s allegation that a “suspect would be charged with violation of Muni.
Code 15.10.10, appear in St. Louis Municipal court and [be] pressured to sign the ‘Rec’ i.e. the
169 individuals as alleged herein,” 2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 85, and drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of Plaintiff as the non-moving party, the Court will assume that all 169 incidents involved
municipal resisting arrest charges.
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When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all of the
factual allegations in the complaint, though it need not accept the legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The Court must make “all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Usenko v. MEMC LLC, 926 F.3d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 2019).
In their motion to dismiss, Municipal Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Counts III, IV,
and V. They make three arguments: (1) that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City for
municipal liability or failure to train, supervise, and control, because Plaintiff fails to allege an
unconstitutional policy or custom that caused a constitutional injury; (2) that Plaintiff fails to state
an actionable claim for injunctive relief against the City because Plaintiff lacks standing to assert
such a claim and, in any event, the complaint fails to allege an unconstitutional policy or custom
causing constitutional injury; and (3) that the Court should dismiss the claims against Dotson,
Chandler, and Vaughn in their official capacities, because such claims are redundant. The Court
will address each issue in turn.
Municipal Liability and Failure to Train, Supervise, and Control Claims
1. Municipal Liability
Section 1983 of Title 42 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and other local government units are “included among those
persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A
municipality may be liable under § 1983 where either “the action that is alleged to be
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unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers” (a “policy” claim) or where the alleged
constitution deprivation is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom
has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels” (a
“custom” claim). Id. at 690-91. However, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. Instead, “[m]unicipal liability exists ‘only where the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation.’” Perkins v. Hastings, 915 F.3d 512, 52021 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that two official policies—the Rec Policy and the
Normal Policy—helped to create a custom (the You Run, You Pay custom) that caused his son’s
injuries. To establish a claim based a custom, the plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the existence of
a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental
entity’s employees; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the
governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and
(3) that plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the
custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Corwin v. City of Independence,
Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Snider v. City of Cape Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149,
1160 (8th Cir. 2014)). “[T]he pattern of unconstitutional conduct must be so pervasive and
widespread so ‘as to have the effect and force of law.’” Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796, 802
(8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1996)). The Court will
address each element in turn.
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i. Widespread pattern of unconstitutional misconduct
With respect to the first element of the municipal liability claim, the Municipal Defendants
argue that here, as in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has not included factual allegations
sufficient to show the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct by SLMPD officers.
As Judge Clark noted in his Memorandum and Order, “[t]he Eighth Circuit has not directly
addressed the quantum of ‘continuing, widespread, persistent’ conduct a plaintiff must allege to
satisfy the Iqbal standard in this context, though it has held that isolated incidents do not suffice
and that allegations of ‘many’ incidents do establish liability.” Ball-Bey v. Chandler, 415 F. Supp.
3d 884, 895 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (citing Wilson v. City of N. Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 322-23 (8th
Cir. 1996), & Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 504 (8th Cir. 1987)). See also Plamp v.
Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 460 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]hree concrete complaints . . .
scattered over approximately twelve years and contain[ing] little in terms of content” were
insufficient to show a widespread pattern of conduct at the summary judgment stage).
In assessing the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, Judge Clark found that the
fourteen instances alleged by Plaintiff over a six-year time period, occurring in a city of 319,000
residents (fewer than 2.5 instances per year), did not plausibly suggest the existence of a
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct. Ball-Bey, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 89597. In making this finding, Judge Clark contrasted Plaintiff’s allegations in the First Amended
Complaint with those made in two cases where courts did find that the plaintiffs had made
allegations of a custom of use of excessive force to sufficient withstand a motion to dismiss:
Simpson v. Ferry, 202 F. Supp. 3d 444, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2016), and Flanagan v. City of Dallas, Texas,
48 F Supp. 3d 941 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
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In Simpson, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured when a Philadelphia police officer used
excessive force against him, and he asserted claims against the City based on the department’s
policy or custom of allowing and acquiescing in its officers’ use of excessive force. 202 F. Supp.
3d at 447-48. The plaintiff alleged that the City had failed to conduct proper investigations of
complaints of use of force or to discipline officers for using excessive force, thereby allowing
officers to use excessive force with impunity; that from 2009 to 2014, approximately 1,223
lawsuits were brought against the City for police misconduct; that during that period the City paid
more than $40 million in damages and settlements for police misconduct lawsuits; and that a news
article revealed that one-third of the police misconduct lawsuit payouts during the time period
involved allegations of excessive force. Id. at 452-53. The court noted that it was “cognizant that
mere allegations, and even settlements, do not establish liability or the existence of an unlawful
custom.” Id. at 453. However, the court also noted that at this early stage, it must assume the
veracity of the statistics and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The court
concluded that the statistics alleged by the plaintiff, in conjunction with the plaintiff’s personal
history of being targeted by police, were sufficient to plead a widespread practice of excessive
force. Id. at 53. The court also found that in light of these statistics, the plaintiff had pleaded
sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that the former mayor and former police commissioner were
generally aware of the frequency with which excessive force violations occurred. Id. at 43.
In Flanagan, the plaintiffs’ child was shot during a struggle with a Dallas police officer.
48 F. Supp. 3d at 944-45. The plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the City had a persistent,
widespread practice of using excessive force that rose to the level of a custom having the force of
official City policy. Id. at 953-54. Plaintiff alleged that the policy of the police department was to
shoot first and ask questions later, that a councilman had informed the media that there were
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training issues in the department that had resulted in the killing of an unarmed individual, that
Dallas was at the top of the list of police misconduct statistics in the South, along with several
other Texas cities; that Dallas is ranked number 11 in police misconduct incidents; that the total
number of officer-involved shootings was 144; that 86 grand juries had been convened to
investigate police misconduct; that 60 unarmed African-American men had been killed by Dallas
police officers over the past 13 years; that at least 12 other shootings of unarmed individuals by
Dallas police officers took place during the year of the plaintiffs’ son’s death (and including
descriptions of three of the shootings, all of which occurred after the incident involving the
plaintiffs’ son); and that there were 94 open department internal investigations into officerinvolved shootings. Id. at 953. The court found that the plaintiff had pleaded facts sufficient to
demonstrate a persistent, widespread practice of allegedly unlawful seizure and use of force. Id. at
953-54. The court also noted that because of the seriousness of shooting incidents, “it is reasonable
to allow a lower number of incidents to establish a pattern of conduct in a shooting case” than in
cases involving less serious police misconduct. Id. at 954.
As Judge Clark found, the allegations in the First Amended Complaint fell well short of
those found sufficient to establish a widespread pattern in either Simpson or Flanagan. Unlike the
plaintiff in Simpson, Plaintiff did not include in the First Amended Complaint statistics such as the
number of lawsuits filed against the City for police misconduct over a particular time frame, how
many of those included allegations of excessive force, or the amount of money paid to settle such
lawsuits. Unlike the plaintiff in Flanagan, Plaintiff did not include allegations such as how police
misconduct statistics in St. Louis compared to those in other cities, the total number of officerinvolved shootings in the City, the number of unarmed individuals killed by City police officers,
or the number of open internal affairs investigations into officer-involved shootings. Judge Clark
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also pointed out that Plaintiff did not include other allegations that might have bolstered his
allegations, such as the number of complaints, claims, or lawsuits asserting excessive use of force
in similar circumstances and how those were resolved; the population of the City; the number of
officers in the SLMPD; the number of stops made or encounters involving SLMPD officers; facts
to show that the force used in the fourteen incidents alleged was excessive or that the individuals
involved had protested unlawful arrests; how long Chandler and Vaughn had been police officers,
how many times they had been accused of alleged excessive use of force, or other facts from which
conclusions about patterns could be drawn. Ball-Bey, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 896-98.
The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, however, bring this case much closer
to the facts of Simpson and Flanagan. First, like the Plaintiff in Simpson, Plaintiff has now alleged
statistics that plausibly suggest significant numbers of incidents involving allegations of excessive
force by SLMPD officers against individuals who resisted arrest. Plaintiff now alleges the
existence of at least 611 settlement agreements (94% of 650 total settlement agreements) that
settled allegations of excessive use of force, false imprisonment, and illegal searches, occurring
since 2010. The latest date of those settlements is unclear, 4 but even if they span the entire 10 years
from 2010 through the filing of the proposed Second Amended Complaint in 2020, that translates
to approximately 61 settlement agreements involving allegations of excessive force per year. In
addition, Plaintiff has identified 169 specific incidents of executed settlement agreements
involving claims of excessive force and unlawful seizures arising from arrests for resisting or
running away from 2013 through 2015, and 46 of those incidents involved discharge of a firearm;
this translates to 56 incidents per year, 15 per year involving discharge of a firearm. Although
In his Sur-Reply, Plaintiff states that these settlements were dated between 2010 and 2015 (Doc.
89, at 2); however, that is not apparent from the language of the Second Amended Complaint.
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these numbers are not as high as the number found sufficient to show a pattern in Simpson (68
lawsuits per year involving allegations of excessive force), 5 Simpson involved a city with a
population more than four times that of St. Louis. 6
Like the Simpson court, this Court is cognizant of the fact that “mere allegations, and even
settlements, do not establish liability or the existence of an unlawful custom.” 202 F. Supp. 3d at
453. However, also like the court in Simpson, at this stage the Court must treat Plaintiff’s
allegations as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. The Court also
acknowledges that Plaintiff here alleges settlement agreements rather than lawsuits, and Plaintiff
does not allege that the City paid large amounts of money to settle excessive force claims.
However, the lack of such allegations makes sense in light of Plaintiff’s theory that the effect of
the Rec and Normal policies is to deter victims of excessive force from filing lawsuits, instead
pushing them into signing releases to avoid criminal prosecution.
As the Municipal Defendants point out, Plaintiff includes few details regarding the specific
facts surrounding most of these incidents. However, the same was true in Simpson, where the
allegations of a widespread practice of excessive force were based on general statistics rather than
specific, factually similar cases. Moreover, as Plaintiff points out, the allegation that the 169
incidents involved municipal charges of resisting arrest (rather than state misdemeanor charges,
The plaintiff in Simpson alleged 1223 lawsuits in six years, one-third of which involved
allegations of excessive force, giving rise to an average of 68 lawsuits per year.
Judge Clark previously took judicial notice of the fact that according to the 2010 United States
Census, the population of the City of St. Louis was over 319,000 according to the 2010 United
States Census. See Ball-Bey v. Chandler, 415 F. Supp. 3d 884, 896 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (citing U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce, 2010 Census of Population and Housing (2012)). According to the same
source cited by Judge Clark, the population of the City of Philadelphia in 2010 was more than
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which Plaintiff alleges are required where the suspect used or threatened the use of physical
force)—supports the inference that any force used, especially deadly force, was excessive.
Plaintiff’s new allegations also bring this case closer to the facts in Flanagan. Like the
Plaintiff in Flanagan, who alleged that Dallas was ranked highly compared to other cities in police
misconduct incidents and had high rates of officer-involved shootings and shootings of unarmed
suspects, Plaintiff has now included allegations that the SLMPD had an unusually high per capita
rate of police shootings compared to other cities; that between 2012 and 2014, SLMPD officers
discharged their firearms approximately 183 times, with more than half of those incidents taking
place during foot chases where the offender is alleged to have resisted; and the most common
pattern of incidents giving rise to shootings were incidents that, like the one here, involved
“suspicious persons” who were on foot or in a vehicle. In addition, like the plaintiff in Flanagan,
who provided details for three of the alleged shooting incidents showing similarities to the case at
hand, Plaintiff has provide more details regarding six incidents—five in which a suspect was shot
while running away from police, and one in which an one in which an undercover officer was
severely beaten and falsely accused of having resisted arrest.
The Municipal Defendants correctly point out that Plaintiff has provided details regarding
fewer incidents, occurring over a longer time frame, than did the plaintiff in Flanagan. The Court
agrees with the Municipal Defendants that, standing alone, the allegations regarding six incidents
would not show a widespread practice of use of excessive force. However, those allegations do
not stand alone; they stand together with Plaintiff’s allegations regarding shooting statistics in St.
Louis; Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the manner in which the Municipal Defendants’ policies
have the effect of discouraging victims of excessive force who resist arrest from filing lawsuits by
causing victims to choose between executing releases or face criminal prosecution; the statement
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of Craig Higgins, the Defendant’s municipal division attorney manager, that in situations in which
an officer “beats down” an individual who ran away, a resisting arrest charge would be made and
would not be dismissed unless the individual signed a release of civil claims; Plaintiff’s allegations
of over 600 settlement agreements releasing excessive force claims in resisting arrest cases since
2010; and Plaintiff’s allegations of 169 specific incidents between 2013 and 2015 where
individuals charged with resisting arrest settled excessive force claims through releases.
Although it is a somewhat close call, the Court finds that in light of the new allegations in
the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the existence of a widespread,
persistent custom of use of excessive force against individuals who resist or run away.
ii. Deliberate indifference
As discussed above, to establish liability based on an unofficial custom, a plaintiff must
show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of [the pattern of misconduct] by the
governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct.”
Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700. The Municipal Defendants do not specifically challenge the element of
deliberate indifference. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met
his burden of pleading facts sufficient to show deliberate indifference. As discussed above,
Plaintiff alleges that the Municipal Defendants were on notice that officers were beating suspects
and discharging their firearms because suspects ran away, and Plaintiff alleges that the Municipal
Defendants were aware of large numbers of excessive force allegations in large numbers of
settlement agreements related to resisting arrest cases in the three years prior to Mansur’s shooting
death, yet failed to investigate any of the facts underlying any of the executed release agreements
and/or the corresponding allegations and failed to provide proper training to their officers in the
use of force. These allegations are sufficient to plausibly suggest that the Municipal Defendants
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were aware of the misconduct and were deliberately indifferent to it or tacitly authorized it. See,
e.g., Simpson, 202 F. Supp. 3d at 454 (holding that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded knowledge
of a custom of excessive force and acquiescence by a decisionmaker; reasoning in part that “in
light of the statistics cited above, if [the defendants] were aware of the frequency with which
excessive force claims occurred (or, at a minimum, were at least alleged and documented), but
failed to conduct proper investigations into those alleged violations, and further failed to
implement procedures to prevent future violations, this could plausibly suggest a disregard for
known threats of constitutional injuries to civilians, or, at a minimum, a high likelihood of such
iii. Causation/Moving Force
The Court next considers the Municipal Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has not
pleaded sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the policies and customs and the injury
in this case. As discussed above, to establish a claim for municipal liability based on a custom, the
Plaintiff must show that he “was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e.,
that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Corwin, 829 F.3d at 700.
In analyzing the Second Amended Complaint, Judge Clark found that aside from Plaintiff’s
conclusory allegations of causation, which were not entitled to the presumption of truth, Plaintiff
had pleaded no facts from which the Court could infer either that the Rec & Normal policies were
the moving force behind the YRYP custom or that the YRYP custom was the moving force behind
Chandler and Vaughn’s conduct toward Mansur.
The Municipal Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint, like the First
Amended Complaint, contains only conclusory allegations to suggest a causal connection between
the policies and customs at issue and the shooting in this case. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues
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that the inference of a causal connection is supported by several new factual allegations in the
Second Amended Complaint.
Although it is, again, a somewhat close call, the Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds that
Plaintiff has adequately alleged the requisite causal links between the Rec and Normal Policies,
the YRYP custom, and Chandler and Vaughn’s actions here. As the Eighth Circuit has noted,
“Evidence that a police department has failed to investigate previous incidents similar to the
incident in question may support a finding that a municipal custom exists, and that such a custom
encourages or allows officers to use excessive force without concern for punishment.” Mettler v.
Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir. 1999). See also Ricketts v. City of Columbia, Mo., 36
F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is logical to assume that continued official tolerance of repeated
misconduct facilitates similar unlawful actions in the future”) (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915
F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Simpson is again instructive. In Simpson, the court found that Plaintiff had pleaded
sufficient facts to satisfy the element of causation by alleging that City officials “allowed excessive
force violations to occur, failed to investigate allegations of excessive force by [Philadelphia Police
Department] officers, and that this inaction encouraged police officers to further engage in
excessive force violations, including the incident at issue in this case.” 202 F. Supp. 3d at 454.
Here, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are stronger than those found sufficient
in Simpson. Plaintiff alleges both that City officials failed to investigate hundreds of incidents
involving allegations of use of excessive force and that the City adopted policies that insulated
officers who used excessive force in resisting arrest cases from facing lawsuits. He also alleges
that Chandler and Vaughn were driven, motivated, and protected as a direct result of the Rec &
Normal Policies, and that Plaintiff’s injury was a direct substantial, and proximate result of the
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SLMPD tyrannical patterns and practices. Taking all of these allegations together, Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged facts to plausibly suggest that the City’s actions and inactions encouraged
officers to use excessive force in resisting arrest cases, including in the specific incident at issue
in this case.
The Municipal Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has not alleged that Vaughn or
Chandler were aware of the practice of asking municipal court defendants charged with resisting
arrest to sign releases, Plaintiff has not pleaded the requisite causation element. The Court
disagrees. Plaintiff’s theory is that the Rec & Normal policies caused a widespread custom of use
of excessive force against suspects resisting arrest to develop among SLMPD officers, and that
custom was the moving force behind Chandler and Vaughn’s conduct. It is not necessary that
Chandler and Vaughn had specific knowledge of the Rec & Normal policies; it is sufficient that
the Court can infer that their behavior was caused by the unofficial custom that arose as a result of
The Court expresses no opinion on the likelihood that Plaintiff will be able to prove each
of the elements of his municipal liability claim. However, “to survive a motion to dismiss,
[Plaintiff’s] allegations need only be plausible, not probable.” McDonough v. Toles, No. 19-CV2238 (PJS/TNL), 2020 WL 4481961, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2020). See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement . . . .” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery
is very remote and unlikely.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). At this stage, Plaintiff has
met his burden. The Court also notes that the Municipal Defendants have not directed the Court to
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any cases finding that allegations to those similar to the case at bar to be insufficient to state a
claim for municipal liability.
For all of the above reasons, the Court will deny the Municipal Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the municipal liability claim in Count V.
2. Failure to Train, Supervise, or Control
The Court next addresses the Municipal Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for failure to train, supervise, or control. To state a claim for supervisory liability
under § 1983 for a failure to train or supervise, Plaintiff must plead: (1) notice of a pattern of
unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of those acts; (3) failure to take sufficient remedial action; and (4) proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s injury. Livers v. Shenck, 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012). A failure to train may
serve as the basis for § 1983 liability where “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. A court
analyzes a claim for failure to supervise the same way it analyzes a claim for failure to train.
Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013). “A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir.
2017) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)).
The Municipal Defendants’ principal argument for why Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for failure to train or supervise is similar to their argument regarding municipal liability: that
Plaintiff has not alleged a pattern of constitutional violations similar to the one that allegedly
occurred in this case. As discussed above, the Court finds that argument unpersuasive. The Court
also finds the other elements of the claim have been adequately pleaded, at this early stage. In light
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of the allegations regarding the exceptionally high rates of shootings by SLMPD officers, the
specific instances of shootings and beatings of suspects running away from police, and the
numerous settlement agreements involving allegations of excessive force (which Plaintiff alleges
the Municipal Defendants were aware of), the Court finds that the Municipal Defendants were on
notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts caused by subordinates. Taking as true allegations that
the Municipal Defendants failed to investigate any of the facts underlying any of the executed
release agreements and/or the corresponding allegations; failed to train Chandler and Vaughn on
the proper use of force when an offender runs; failed to properly institute training and policies to
prevent the use of deadly force when an offender runs; and failed to properly train officers on
charging resisting arrest, the Court finds it plausible that the Municipal Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized such conduct and failed to take appropriate remedial
action. As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also alleged sufficient facts to show
that custom of using excessive force against suspects resisting arrest was the moving force behind
the shooting of Mansur. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to suggest
the Municipal Defendants’ failure to address that custom—by, e.g., investigating allegations of
excessive force and training officers in the appropriate use of force against offenders who run—
proximately caused the injury in this case.
For all of the above reasons, the Court will deny the Municipal Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to train, supervise, and control claims.
Claim for Injunctive Relief
In Count V (municipal liability), Plaintiff requests, in addition to compensatory damages,
“a permanent injunction from Defendants’ Rec & Normal practices and policies.” 2d Am. Compl.
p. 40. Defendant argues that the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed both for lack of
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standing and for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff provides no response to the Municipal
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court has held that for the plaintiff to have standing to seek injunctive relief,
instead of just damages, the plaintiff must show “a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will
be wronged again—a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.’” City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
In Lyons, a plaintiff who had been choked into unconsciousness by police during a traffic stop
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief, requesting an injunction banning the City’s use of
such holds. Id. at 98, 105. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue
for injunctive relief:
Lyons’ standing to seek the injunction requested depended on whether he was likely
to suffer future injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers. Count V
of the complaint alleged the traffic stop and choking incident five months before.
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on October 6, 1976, while
presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual
officers and perhaps against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate
threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense,
by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness
without any provocation or resistance on his part. The additional allegation in the
complaint that the police in Los Angeles routinely apply chokeholds in situations
where they are not threatened by the use of deadly force falls far short of the
allegations that would be necessary to establish a case or controversy between these
Id. at 105. See also, e.g., Brown v. City of Ferguson, Mo., No. 4:15CV00831 ERW, 2015 WL
8313796, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2015) (relying on Lyons and dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief where “Plaintiffs have alleged Defendant City authorized officers
to act in a discriminatory manner, but they have not established more than a mere possibility they
will again encounter police and face discrimination”).
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After review of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, and in the absence of
any contrary argument from Plaintiff, the Court agrees with the Municipal Defendants that Plaintiff
lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. Plaintiff, who is the father of the man who was shot by
police, does not include in the Second Amended Complaint any facts to suggest that there is any
real or immediate threat that he will be arrested, resist or run away, and be subjected to excessive
force. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Municipal Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim
for injunctive relief. The Court need not reach the Municipal Defendants’ remaining arguments
regarding Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
Official-Capacity Claims Against Dotson, Chandler, and Vaughn
The Municipal Defendants’ final argument is that the Court should dismiss the officialcapacity claims against Dotson, Chandler, and Vaughn, because such claims are functionally
claims against the City and thus are redundant of the claims asserted against the City. Plaintiff
provides no response to this argument.
The Eighth Circuit has held that “[a] suit against a government officer in his official
capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.” Veatch v.
Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d
920, 925 (8th Cir.2007). Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit has held that it proper for a district court
to dismiss a claim against an officer in his official capacity “as redundant of the claim against the
City.” Id. See also, e.g., Taylor v. St. Louis Cmty. Coll., No. 4:18CV00272 SNLJ, 2018 WL
5078360, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 18, 2018) (“Because plaintiff has asserted this claim against
defendant Gee in his official capacity and also against [St. Louis Community College], the court
finds the claim redundant and must be dismissed.”).
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Because Plaintiff’s claims against Dotson, Chandler, and Vaughn, in their official
capacities are functionally claims against the City, and the absence of any contrary argument from
Plaintiff, the Court agrees with the Municipal Defendants that these claims are redundant and will
dismiss the official-capacity claims.
For all of the reasons above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Counts III, IV, and V of
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 76) will be GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. With respect to Defendants’ request for injunctive relief, the
motion is GRANTED. With respect to the request to dismiss the claims against Dotson, Chandler,
and Vaughn in their official capacities, because they are redundant with the claims against the
City, the motion is GRANTED. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims against Defendant Dotson, Chandler, and
Vaughn in their official capacities are DISMISSED.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated this 16th day of November, 2020.
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