Caruso v. St. Louis, City of
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Louis's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shirley Padmore Mensah on November 16, 2020. (MCB)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, CITY OF,
Case No. 4:20 CV 581 SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant City of St. Louis’s (“Defendant’s”) Motion
to Dismiss. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff Michael Caruso brought this action alleging that the termination of
his employment as a police officer by Defendant upon his turning 65 violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count 1), and constituted retaliation
in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (Count 2). The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the
legal sufficiency of a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim “has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility
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standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The Court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe them in the
plaintiff’s favor, but it is not required to accept the legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the
facts alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 696
F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). A court must “draw on its judicial experience and common
sense,” and consider the plausibility of the plaintiff’s claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each
individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir.
2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Factual and Procedural Background
The facts, as alleged in the First Amended Complaint, are as follows: Plaintiff Michael
Caruso was employed by Defendant as a police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department,
City of St. Louis (“Department”). He began his employment with the Department on December
20, 1976. He was promoted to the rank of major in January 2013 and was subsequently promoted
to Lieutenant Colonel. On August 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant alleging
discrimination based on his gender and race (hereinafter “2016 Discrimination Lawsuit”). The
Discrimination Lawsuit settled on or before August 6, 2017.
Plaintiff turned 65 on June 30, 2019. Defendant had the ability to extend Plaintiff’s
employment even after he turned 65. As such, in the months leading up to his birthday, Plaintiff
submitted multiple requests to Defendant for his employment to be extended beyond his 65th
birthday. His requests went unanswered until June 28, 2019, when he was called into a meeting
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with the chief of police and told his request was denied and that he was “out of here.” The Director
of Public Safety for Defendant made disparaging comments about Plaintiff’s age, said Plaintiff
needed to go, and that the Director needed to move some of the younger guys up. On June 29,
2019, Plaintiff was notified that his employment would end at 5:00 p.m. that day.
Plaintiff alleges he was fired due to his age and in retaliation for filing the 2016
Discrimination Lawsuit against Defendant. Other employees of Defendant requested that their
employment be extended beyond their 65th birthdays, and Defendant granted their requests and
either did not terminate those employees or gave the other employees different positions within
the City of St. Louis.
On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed this action alleging Defendant’s termination of his
employment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and
constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. During the Rule 16 scheduling
conference, the Court gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint prior to ruling on
Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff then filed his First Amended Complaint, incorporating additional
allegations to support his two causes of action. (Doc. 17.) In response, Defendant filed a
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, arguing the First Amended
Complaint does not cure the defects in Plaintiff’s original Complaint. The Court has considered
the parties’ briefing related to the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint in
determining whether the First Amended Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(Docs. 5, 6, 10, 11, 18, 19).
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A. COUNT I: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the ADEA. The ADEA makes it unlawful
to discharge an individual because of his age and, as Plaintiff has asserted, the Amended Complaint
sets out (albeit in summary terms) the elements of a claim for age discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1); Grant v. City of Blytheville, Ark., 841 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that to
state a claim for discriminatory treatment based on age, the discharged employee is required to
prove: (1) the employee was a member of a protected age group; (2) the employee met the
employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) there are circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination based on age).
Defendant concedes Plaintiff was terminated because of his age but argues Plaintiff’s
discharge fell within an exemption in the ADEA that allows state and local governments to set a
mandatory retirement age for police officers provided certain requirements are met. Specifically,
under 29 U.S.C.§ 623(j), state and local governments are allowed to set mandatory retirement ages
for firefighters and law enforcement officers if the following two requirements are met: First, the
discharge must have been pursuant to a state or local law requiring mandatory retirement by a
certain age; and, second, the discharge must be pursuant to a bona fide retirement plan that is not
a subterfuge for impermissible age discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)-(2). 1 To satisfy the first
The full text of 29 U.S.C. § 623(j) is as follows:
(j) Employment as firefighter or law enforcement officer
It shall not be unlawful for an employer which is a State, a political subdivision of a State, an agency or
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, or an interstate agency to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual because of such individual's age if such action is taken-(1) with respect to the employment of an individual as a firefighter or as a law enforcement officer, the employer
has complied with section 3(d)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1996 if the
individual was discharged after the date described in such section, and the individual has attained-(A) the age of hiring or retirement, respectively, in effect under applicable State or local law on March 3,
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requirement, the mandatory retirement law must either have been in effect on March 3,
1983 or must have been enacted after September 30, 1996; and, if the latter, the discharge must
occur no earlier than age fifty-five. See Correa-Ruiz v. Fortuno, 572 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009)
(construing 29 U.S.C. §623(j)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) to mean the discharge must have been “pursuant
to a mandatory retirement plan that either was in effect on March 3, 1983 or was enacted after
September 30, 1996. The only-age related limitation on the latter option is that the discharge occurs
no earlier than age fifty-five.”).
1. PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED PURSUANT TO A MANDATORY RETIREMENT LAW THAT
MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF §623(J)(1).
In this case, the First Amended Complaint alleges that, at the time he was terminated,
Plaintiff was a police officer in the City of St. Louis and had been a St. Louis City Police Officer
since 1976. Pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. §86.207, all police officers in the City of St. Louis must
become members of the Police Retirement System of St. Louis (“PRS”) as a condition of their
employment with the police division. A Missouri statute enacted in 1979, Mo. Rev. Stat. §
86.250(2), provided that “[a]ny [PRS] member in service who has attained the age of sixty-five
shall be retired forthwith….” Mo. Rev. Stat. §86.250(2) (emphasis added). The statute was later
amended in 2015 to mandate that “[a]ny [PRS] member in service who has attained the age of
sixty-five shall be terminated as a police officer and retired forthwith.…” 2 Id. (emphasis added).
(B)(i) if the individual was not hired, the age of hiring in effect on the date of such failure or refusal to hire
under applicable State or local law enacted after September 30, 1996; or
(ii) if applicable State or local law was enacted after September 30, 1996, and the individual was discharged,
the higher of-(I) the age of retirement in effect on the date of such discharge under such law; and
(II) age 55; and
(2) pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter.
The full text of section 86.250(2) states:
Retirement of a member on a service retirement allowance shall be made by the board of trustees as follows:
(2) Any member in service who has attained the age of sixty-five shall be terminated as a police officer and
actually retired forthwith provided that upon request of the chief of police the board of trustees may permit
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Taking as true the well-pleaded facts in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and all
reasonable inferences therefrom, it is clear that Plaintiff, a long-serving police officer in the City
of St. Louis, was subject to Defendant’s mandatory retirement plan set out in Mo. Rev. Stat.
§86.250(2), which was enacted in 1979. However, Plaintiff contends Mo. Rev. Stat. §86.250 does
not satisfy the ADEA’s requirement that a mandatory retirement plan must have been in effect as
of March 3, 1983. This is so, Plaintiff posits, because in March of 1983 Mo. Rev. Stat. §86.250(2)
did not require that any member who attained the age of sixty-five be “terminated as a police
officer.” This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the ADEA’s exemption under §623(j) applies when the individual has attained the
mandatory age of retirement under applicable state law, provided the law was in effect on March
3, 1983. 29 U.S.C. §623(j)(1)(A). As Plaintiff correctly notes, the statute in effect on March 3,
1983, did not require that a member who reached the age of 65 be “terminated as a police officer.”
However, both the law in effect in March 1983 and the subsequent amendment in 2015 establish
a mandatory retirement age by requiring that members who reach the age of 65 “be retired
forthwith.” The additional requirement that members who reach age 65 be “terminated as a police
officer” did not change the mandatory retirement age. For purposes of the instant motion, the fact
that the law in effect on March 3, 1983 did not include the words “terminated as a police officer”
distinguishes it from the 2015 amendment but makes no difference to the analysis under §623(j).
Plaintiff’s argument also ignores the alternative basis for an exemption offered in
§623(j)(1)(B)(ii). Under §623(j)(1)(B)(ii), states or their subdivisions may discharge a law
enforcement officer pursuant to a mandatory retirement plan enacted after September 30, 1996, so
long as the discharge occurs no earlier than age fifty-five. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)(B)(ii). See
such member to remain in service for periods of not to exceed one year from the date of the last request
from the chief of police.
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Fortuno, 572 F.3d at 9 (noting that, by its terms, §623(j) is satisfied if discharge was pursuant to a
mandatory retirement plan that either was in effect on March 3, 1983 or was enacted after
September 30, 1996, so long as the discharge otherwise complies with §623(j)). Here, the current
version of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 86.250(2) was enacted in 2015. As amended, §86.250(2) requires both
retirement and termination of a police officer who attains age 65.
Plaintiff also contends that neither the ADEA exemption in § 623(j) nor Mo. Rev. Stat. §
86.250 are applicable to justify his termination because he was terminated before he turned 65.
However, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that he was notified that his employment
would end at 5:00 pm on the day before he turned 65. This means Plaintiff’s employment continued
until close of business on his last day at age 64, and on his first day at age 65, he was in mandatory
retirement. Because Plaintiff’s employment ended and retirement began when he reached age 65,
Defendant’s conduct is in conformance with the requirement in Mo. Rev. Stat. §86.250(2) that
PRS members who attain the age of 65 “be retired forthwith.” 3
For all of the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the
facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint together with Missouri law support Defendant’s
argument that Plaintiff was discharged pursuant to a mandatory retirement law for police officers
that met the requirements of the ADEA exemption in §623(j)(1).
Plaintiff briefly argues that even if RSMo § 86.250(2) allowed for mandatory retirement at age 65, it could not apply
to police officers employed by the City of St. Louis, because the City of St. Louis did not control the Department in
1983. In 1983, the Department was governed by a Board of Police Commissioners, and the City of St. Louis did not
assume control of the Department until September 2013. See RSMo § 84.344 (any city not within a county may
establish a municipal police force on or after July 1, 2013). Plaintiff once again ignores the ADEA exemption’s
statutory criteria. The ADEA’s exemption under § 623(j) requires the mandatory retirement provision was either was
in effect on March 3, 1983 or was enacted after September 30, 1996, and that it meets the aforementioned age
limitations. Nothing in the language of the provision even suggests that a change in control of the Department after
1983 renders section 623(j) in applicable. Further, as Defendant points out, Missouri law specifically provides that the
transition from state to local control does not limit or change the rights or benefits provided in the police pension
system under chapter 86. See RSMo § 84.346. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument is without merit.
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2. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
NEITHER ALLEGES NOR OTHERWISE CONTAINS
FACTS THAT PLAUSIBLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT LAW
FOR POLICE OFFICERS WAS SUBTERFUGE FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION.
The First Amended Complaint contains no facts that plausibly show the mandatory
retirement law for St. Louis City police officers was subterfuge for age discrimination. The closest
Plaintiff comes to making such an assertion is Plaintiff’s allegation and argument that the chief of
police could exercise discretion in making exceptions to mandatory retirement under § 86.250(2);
but declined to do so for Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that this refusal, combined with “disparaging
comments” made by the director of public safety, establish Plaintiff’s termination was solely
because of his age. In other words, Defendant had the option to allow Plaintiff to remain employed,
but because it wanted younger employees to fill his role, it chose not to extend Plaintiff’s
employment, discriminating against him because of his age.
In ADEA claims based on a mandatory retirement age, courts consistently reject this
argument, finding that the defendant’s “motives are irrelevant” because “a forced retirement
system is precisely what the ADEA allows.” Sadie v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:10 CV 822, 2012
WL 10520, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2012), aff'd, 718 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiffs point
out that prior to 2010 the custom within the police department was to grant every officer’s request.
But Plaintiffs fail to show why that matters for purposes of an ADEA claim.”); see also Knight v.
State of Ga., 992 F.2d 1541, 1547 (11th Cir. 1993) (amendment to Georgia’s state trooper
retirement law expanding the Director of the Department of Public Safety’s discretion to waive
the mandatory retirement rule did not render the mandatory retirement law in violation of the
ADEA); Correa–Ruiz v. Fortuno, 573 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2009) (“Using age as a basis for requiring
retirement is precisely what section 623(j)(2) entitles the Commonwealth to do....”); Feldman v.
Nassau Cnty., 434 F.3d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[d]espite plaintiff’s contention to the contrary,
showing that [New York’s civil service statute] discriminates on the basis of age rather than ability
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cannot be enough to make section [623(j)] inapplicable.”); Minch v. City of Chicago, 363 F.3d
615, 629 (7th Cir.2004) (“The ADEA does not forbid Chicago from making age-based retirement
decisions as to its police and fire personnel....”).
For the foregoing reasons, Count I must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege
facts that plausibly show the defendant is liable for violating the ADEA.
B. COUNT II: TITLE VII RETALIATION
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 prohibits retaliation against employees who report
workplace discrimination. A retaliation claim has the following prima facie elements: (1) the
employee engaged in protected activity, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action,
and (3) a causal connection exists between the adverse employment action and the protected
activity. E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 772 (8th Cir. 2003).
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges his termination on the day before his 65th birthday was
retaliation for filing a prior lawsuit against Defendant for discrimination based on Plaintiff’s
gender and race. Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity by filing the Discrimination Lawsuit
against Defendant, and Plaintiff’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action, meeting
the first two elements of a retaliation claim. The parties’ dispute lies in the third element, whether
a causal connection exists between Plaintiff’s termination and the Discrimination Lawsuit.
To adequately plead a causal connection, a plaintiff must allege but-for causation. Wilson
v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff “must thus show
that her conduct was a ‘determinative-not merely motivating—factor’ in the [employer’s] actions.”
Robinson v. Am. Red Cross, 753 F.3d 749, 756 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd.
of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 985 (8th Cir. 2011)). “[A]n inference of causation may be established
through indirect evidence, such as the closeness in time between the protected and adverse
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actions.” Id. However, the more time that elapses between the two events, the weaker the inference
of causation. Id. “Any inference of causation evaporates if the adverse action occurs months after
the protected activity.” Id. “In such cases, a plaintiff must present additional evidence of a causal
link, which can include escalating adverse and retaliatory action.” Id.; see also Wright v. St.
Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 739 (8th Cir. 2013) (Timing alone is usually insufficient to
establish that the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharge is pretext).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege but-for causation. His allegation
that “Plaintiff was fired in retaliation for filing the Discrimination Lawsuit against the City” is a
conclusion without support from any factual allegations. The allegations show that Plaintiff was
terminated more than 58 months after he filed his Discrimination Lawsuit. Any potential inference
of causation based on temporal proximity “evaporates” after such a large lapse in time between
the protected activity and adverse action. See, e.g., Robinson, 753 F.3d at 756 (rejecting assertion
that six months of elapsed time establishes causation); Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d
881, 886 (8th Cir. 2015) (discharge of plaintiff three months after her complaint is insufficient to
prove causation); Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 2003)
(“time interval of more than two months is too long to support an inference of causation”).
Plaintiff amended his Complaint to add new allegations that, upon information and belief,
other similarly situated employees requested their employment be extended beyond their 65th
birthdays, and that Defendant granted extension requests for similarly situated employees who had
not sued Defendant. These allegations are also insufficient to establish a causal connection. See,
e.g., Davis v. Johnson, 2017 WL 157784, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 10, 2017), judgment entered sub
nom. Davis v. Jefferson Reg'l Med. Ctr. Preferred Provider Org., 2017 WL 157785 (E.D. Ark.
Jan. 10, 2017) (“While the bar for considering alleged comparators at the pleading stage must be
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low, Dr. Davis hasn’t cleared it with his allegations about Dr. Dharamsey’s and Dr. Boast’s
deficiencies.”). Plaintiff has not identified the similarly situated employees, nor has he alleged how
they are similarly situated. 4 Plaintiff does not allege whether the similarly situated employees held
the same position or job title as Plaintiff, let alone whether they dealt with the same supervisor.
Such conclusory allegations, unsupported by additional factual allegations, do not suffice to state
Plaintiff argues that his burden at the motion to dismiss stage in a discrimination-based suit
is not onerous, and this is not an issue to be decided on the pleadings. See Wilson, 850 F.3d at 372
(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)) (“This simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts
and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”). However, the Eighth Circuit has held that
“elements of the prima facie case are not irrelevant to a plausibility determination in a
discrimination suit.” Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016). “A plaintiff must
assert facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims ...,
rather than facts that are merely consistent with such a right.” Id. “While a plaintiff need not set
forth detailed factual allegations, ... the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to
provide the grounds on which the claim rests.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 5
“The test for whether employees are similarly situated ‘is rigorous and requires that the other employees be similarly
situated in all relevant aspects before the plaintiff can introduce evidence comparing herself to the other employees.’”
Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir.2012) (alteration omitted) (quoting Fields v. Shelter Mut.
Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir.2008)). “‘The individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same
supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and [have] engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating
or distinguishing circumstances.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Morgan v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 486 F.3d
1034, 1043 (8th Cir.2007)).
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit and its district courts dismiss retaliation claims where the plaintiff fails to plausibly allege
the retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the defendant’s adverse action. See, e.g., Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1059 (affirming
dismissal); Bad Wound v. Zinke, 2019 WL 1060819, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2019) (granting motion to dismiss because
allegation of termination four months after plaintiff reported discrimination was insufficient to allege a plausible link
to any protected activity); Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minnesota, 455 F. Supp. 3d 871, 887 (D. Minn.
2020) (plaintiff’s allegations “do not plausibly show the but-for causal connection essential to Warmington’s Title IX
retaliation claim”); Gage v. Brennan, No. 4:17-CV-2872 CAS, 2018 WL 3105418, at *7 (E.D. Mo. June 25,
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Plaintiff has not met this threshold. In fact, his First Amended Complaint makes clear that
Plaintiff’s attainment of the mandatory retirement age was, at the very least, a motivating factor
for his termination. (Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 10, 16-18.) Defendant’s mandatory retirement age is 65, and in
the months leading up to his 65th birthday, Plaintiff submitted multiple requests to extend his
employment beyond age 65, indicating that he anticipated the upcoming termination due to his
age. The allegations that the Director of Public Safety “made disparaging comments about
Plaintiff’s age, said Plaintiff needed to go, and the Director needed to be moving some of the
younger guys up” further support that Plaintiff’s age was the reason for his termination, not the
lawsuit he filed years ago. The allegations simply do not support that the Discrimination Lawsuit
was the but-for cause of Defendant terminating Plaintiff on the eve of his 65th birthday. See
Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1059 (“It is not enough that retaliation was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’
factor in the employer’s decision.”). Because Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible causal connection
between his Discrimination Lawsuit and his termination, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of St. Louis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
5) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: November 16, 2020.
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
2018), motion for relief from judgment denied, No. 4:17-CV-2872 CAS, 2018 WL 4777302 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2018)
(dismissing claim where factual allegations could not support an inference that plaintiff’s unspecified EEO activity
was the but-for cause of adverse employment actions).
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