Adkins v. Downtown Dental Associates et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. [ECF No. 2 ]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to supplement amended complaint is GRANTED. [ECF No. 10 ]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall detach pages 3, 4 and 5 of ECF No. 10 and file them as exhibits to Plaintiff's first amended complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., for employment discrimination based on race against Defendants Dr. Joel Leudeke, Dr. Graydon Ballard, III, and Pauline Harrelson are DISMISSED, without prejudice, as they are legally fri volous and fail to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.  7;§ 2000e, et seq., the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process to issue upon Defendant Downtown Dental Associates at: 720 Olive Street, Suite 1700, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and common law claims of negligence and negligence per se, the Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process to issue as to Defendants Downtown Dental Associates, Dr. Joel Leudeke , Dr. Graydon Ballard, III, and Pauline Harrelson at: 720 Olive Street, Suite 1700, St. Louis, Missouri 63101. A separate Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 01/06/2021. (ANP)

Case: 4:20-cv-01515-JCH Doc. #: 11 Filed: 01/06/21 Page: 1 of 9 PageID #: 116

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
CHARECE M. ADKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOWNTOWN DENTAL ASSOCIATES,
et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:20-CV-1515-JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motions of self-represented Plaintiff Charece M.
Adkins for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and to supplement her amended
complaint, ECF No. 10. Upon review and consideration of the financial information filed in
support, the Court finds Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee and the motion to proceed in forma
pauperis will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court will also grant Plaintiff’s motion to
supplement her amended complaint to include her charge of discrimination and right-to-sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).
Additionally, the Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s amended complaint and for the
reasons discussed below, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to issue process or cause process
to issue upon Defendant Downtown Dental Associates on Plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination
claims; and to issue process or cause process to issue upon Defendants Downtown Dental
Associates, Dr. Joel Leudeke, Dr. Graydon Ballard, III, and Pauline Harrelson on Plaintiff’s 42
U.S.C. § 1981 race discrimination claims.

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Background
On October 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant action against her former employer,
Downtown Dental Associates (“DDA”), and three supervisors alleging employment
discrimination on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), as well as claims under
Missouri common law for negligence and negligence per se. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff did not attach to her complaint a copy of her charge of discrimination or EEOC
right-to-sue letter. Consequently, on November 12, 2020, the Court issued an Order directing
Plaintiff to supplement her complaint with the required documents. ECF No. 5 (citing Stuart v.
General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 630 (8th Cir. 2000) (“In order to initiate a claim under
Title VII a party must timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receive a
right-to-sue letter.”)).
On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Supplement Complaint,” which the
Court construed as a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 7. The Court granted
Plaintiff’s request, directed the Clerk to detach the relevant attachments from the motion and file
as Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. ECF No. 8. The Court again ordered Plaintiff to submit a
copy of both her EEOC charge of discrimination and right-to-sue letter if she wished to proceed
with her Title VII claims. Id.
On January 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a second “Motion to Supplement Complaint.” ECF No.
10. Attached to the motion is a copy of both her charge of discrimination and EEOC right-to-sue
letter. The Court will grant this motion and consider the attachments, ECF No. 10 at 3-5, as exhibits
to her amended complaint.

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Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is asserted in one hundred and one (101) numbered
paragraphs against her former employer, DDA, and three supervisors, Dr. Joel Leudeke, Dr.
Graydon L. Ballard III, and Pauline Harrelson. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff brings her claims pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII for employment discrimination based on race. Additionally,
Plaintiff brings common law claims for negligence and negligence per se.
According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff, an African American female, applied to
work as a dental assistant at DDA in January of 2019. Plaintiff states she was educationally
qualified for the position and had prior experience in the field. Plaintiff was interviewed by
Defendant Harrelson, the Office Manager at DDA, who offered her a “three[-]day work-in
opportunity and explained that she would be hired, if she demonstrated in those three days that
she’s qualified for the position.” On January 17, 2019, after the three-day period, Harrelson hired
Plaintiff.
Immediately after starting her employment with DDA, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Dr.
Leudeke and Dr. Ballard treated her differently because of her race and created a hostile work
environment. Plaintiff states they would “snatch tools out of her hands” and “then push the tools
back into her hands” which could have caused her injury, spoke to her rudely, and ignored her
when she greeted them in the morning or presented job-related questions. Plaintiff states Dr.
Leudeke and Dr. Ballard made her feel “uncomfortable, unwelcomed, and made it known that they
didn’t want her working with them, although she hadn’t done anything wrong.”
Plaintiff alleges she was informed by an employee at DDA that “DDA doesn’t hire blacks”
and “DDA only hires blacks to look good on paper then gets rid of them.” Plaintiff alleges she
heard Dr. Ballard say “I don’t like your kind” as he passed by her. On January 27, 2019, the day

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after Dr. Ballard made the comment, Plaintiff was terminated and replaced with a white woman
who had no experience as a dental assistant. Plaintiff asked Harrelson why she was terminated, but
she was not provided with a reason. Plaintiff alleges her termination was an adverse employment
action that would not have occurred but for her race.
Plaintiff seeks “actual economic damages,” “compensatory damages, including but not
limited to those for past and future pecuniary and non-pecuniary loses, emotional distress,
suffering, loss of reputation, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, [and] loss of enjoyment
of life,” as well as punitive and nominal damages.
Plaintiff submitted a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights (“MCHR”) on June 5, 2019, alleging race discrimination. ECF No. 9-1. The MCHR
informed Plaintiff on July 15, 2019 that it dually filed her charge with the MCHR and the EEOC.
ECF No. 9-2. On December 13, 2019, the MCHR issued a determination of no probable cause,
which Plaintiff alleges she did not receive notice of until six (6) months after its issuance. 1 ECF
No. 9-3. On December 21, 2020, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a notice of right-to-sue. ECF No. 10.
It therefore appears, at this stage of litigation, the instant Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action is
timely filed.
Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim for

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint is brought pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with two Missouri
common law claims. Because the amended complaint does not appear to allege any claims pursuant to the
Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) there is no need for this Court to address the timeliness of this
lawsuit as to the MHRA 90-day statute of limitations. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.111(1) (claims brought
under the MHRA “shall be filed within ninety days from the date of the commission’s notification letter to
the individual.”).

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relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which
is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
When reviewing a self-represented litigant’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court
accepts the well-pled facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and liberally
construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible,
the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to
be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.
2015). However, even self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state
a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).
See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts
or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff that assumed facts that had not been
pleaded).
Discussion
A. Title VII Claims
The purpose of Title VII is to ensure a workplace environment free of discrimination. Ricci
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009). Title VII prohibits “employer discrimination on the basis

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of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, in hiring, firing, salary structure, promotion and the
like.” Winfrey v. City of Forrest City, Ark., 882 F.3d 757, 758 (8th Cir. 2018). “Title VII [also]
prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee who is engaged in a protected activity,
which can be either opposing an act of discrimination made unlawful by Title VII . . . or
participating in an investigation under Title VII.” Hunt v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 282 F.3d
1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 2002). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff asserting a Title
VII racial discrimination claim must establish: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
qualification for the position; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) facts giving rise to an
inference of discrimination on the basis of race. Robinson v. American Red Cross, 753 F.3d 749,
754 (8th Cir. 2014).
Having reviewed the amended complaint, including the charge of discrimination and the
notice of right-to-sue from the EEOC, the Court determines Plaintiff has alleged enough for initial
review against Defendant DDA as to the race discrimination claim under Title VII. Plaintiff alleges
she is a member of a protected class, is a qualified dental assistant, was subjected to an adverse
employment action because of race, and similarly situated employees of a different race were
treated more favorably. Therefore, based on the Court’s initial review, the Court will order process
to issue against Defendant DDA on the Title VII claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Court, however, will dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against Defendants Harrelson,
Dr. Leudeke, and Dr. Ballard. Title VII provides a remedy only against an employer. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely held that “supervisors may not be held individually liable
under Title VII.” Bonomolo–Hagen v. Clay Central–Everly Community School District, 121 F.3d
446, 447 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690,
691–92 (8th Cir. 1997)); see also Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir.

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1998). As a result, Plaintiff's Title VII claims against his employer, DDA, are sufficient to proceed
at this time; however, as to her supervisors as individuals, such claims fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, are legally frivolous, and will be dismissed.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims
Section 1981 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). To establish a prima facie case for race discrimination under § 1981, “a plaintiff
must show (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she met her employer’s legitimate
expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise
to an inference of discrimination (for example, similarly situated employees outside the protected
class were treated differently).” Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F .3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Having reviewed the amended complaint, the Court determines Plaintiff has alleged
enough for initial review against Defendants DDA, Dr. Leudeke, Dr. Ballard, and Harrelson as to
her race discrimination claim under § 1981. Plaintiff alleges she is a member of a protected class,
is a qualified dental assistant, and was subjected to disparate treatment and an adverse employment
action because of race, and similarly situated employees of a different race were treated more
favorably. Therefore, based on the Court’s initial review, the Court will order process to issue
against all Defendants on the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
C. Negligence and Negligence Per Se Claims
As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled federal claims pursuant to Title VII and
42 U.S.C. § 1981 to survive initial review. As such, plaintiff’s state common law claims of

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negligence and negligence per se may, at this stage of litigation, be entertained under the federal
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
is GRANTED. [ECF No. 2].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement amended complaint
is GRANTED. [ECF No. 10].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall detach pages 3, 4 and 5 of
ECF No. 10 and file them as exhibits to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., for employment discrimination based on
race against Defendants Dr. Joel Leudeke, Dr. Graydon Ballard, III, and Pauline Harrelson are
DISMISSED, without prejudice, as they are legally frivolous and fail to state a claim for relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to Plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination brought
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., the
Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process to issue upon Defendant Downtown Dental
Associates at: 720 Olive Street, Suite 1700, St. Louis, Missouri 63101.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to Plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and common law claims of negligence and negligence per se, the
Clerk of Court shall issue process or cause process to issue as to Defendants Downtown Dental
Associates, Dr. Joel Leudeke, Dr. Graydon Ballard, III, and Pauline Harrelson at: 720 Olive Street,
Suite 1700, St. Louis, Missouri 63101.

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A separate Order of Partial Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 6th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
JEAN C. HAMILTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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