Barton v. Saul

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED. Signed by District Judge Sarah E. Pitlyk on 09/19/2022. (ANP)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TRAVIS BARTON

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Plaintiff,
vs.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1
Defendant.

Case No. 4:20-CV-01787-SEP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of
Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, denying the application of
Plaintiff Travis Barton for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Because there is substantial evidence to support the decision denying benefits,
the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s denial of Plaintiff’s application.
I.

BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2018, Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging that he had been unable to work due to

disability since April 5, 2018. (Tr. 170-77). Plaintiff alleged disability due to injuries caused by a
motor vehicle accident. (Tr. 338). His application was denied, and Plaintiff filed a Request for
Hearing by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Tr. 166). On December 12, 2019, the ALJ held a
hearing on Plaintiff’s claim. (Tr. 52-72).
In an opinion issued on February 5, 2020, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled as
defined in the Act. (Tr. 18-34). Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Hearing Decision with the
Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Appeals Council. (Tr. 169). On September 10, 2020, the
SSA’s Appeals Council denied his Request for Review. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff has exhausted all
administrative remedies, and the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. Pursuant to Rule
25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she is substituted as the Defendant in this case. No further
action is needed for this action to continue. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (last sentence).
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II.

STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY UNDER THE ACT
To be eligible for benefits under the Act, a claimant must prove he or she is disabled.

Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 955
F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). The Act defines as disabled a person who is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also
Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010). The impairment must be “of such severity that he
is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether
a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in a five-step
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a);2 see also McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605,
611 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing the five-step process). At Step One, the Commissioner determines
whether the claimant is currently engaging in “substantial gainful activity”; if so, then he is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Two, the Commissioner
determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment, which is “any impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities”; if the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611. At Step Three, the Commissioner
evaluates whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the “listings”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); McCoy, 648
F.3d at 611. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Commissioner will find the claimant
disabled; if not, the Commissioner proceeds with the rest of the five-step process. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(d); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Prior to Step Four, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s “residual functional
capacity” (RFC), which is “the most a claimant can do despite [his or her] limitations.” Moore v.

All references throughout this opinion are to the version of the regulations that was in effect as of the date
of the ALJ’s decision.
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Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e). At Step Four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can return to his
past relevant work by comparing the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the
claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(f); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
If the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled; if the claimant cannot, the
analysis proceeds to the next step. Id. At Step Five, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make an
adjustment to other work in the national economy; if he cannot make such an adjustment, he will be
found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); McCoy, 648 F.3d at 611.
Through Step Four, the burden remains with the claimant to prove that he is disabled.
Moore, 572 F.3d at 523. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that, given
the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, there are a significant number of other
jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.; Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1064
(8th Cir. 2012).
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
Applying the foregoing five-step analysis, the ALJ here found that Plaintiff has not engaged

in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date; that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of
status post multiple fractures, soft tissue injury, traumatic brain injury, and esophageal restriction;
and that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. 23-26). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work,
except that he must avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants. (Tr. 26).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments precluded him from his past relevant work. (Tr.
30). Additionally, because the applicable regulations state that the sedentary work environment is
not significantly impacted by the avoidance of pulmonary irritants, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff’s one limitation would have little or no effect on the occupational base of sedentary work
(Tr. 31). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the Act, from
the alleged onset date through the date of the decision. (Tr. 31).
IV.

STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
This Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it complies with the relevant legal

requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C.
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§§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935,
942 (8th Cir. 2009); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). “Under the substantialevidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains
‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.
1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate
to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. See also Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at
1154 (“Substantial evidence . . . means—and means only— ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”) (quoting Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at
229).
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, the
Court considers both evidence that supports that decision and evidence that detracts from that
decision. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1063 (8th Cir. 2012). However, the Court “‘do[es] not
reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, and [it] defer[s] to the ALJ’s determinations regarding
the credibility of testimony, as long as those determinations are supported by good reasons and
substantial evidence.’” Id. at 1064 (quoting Gonzales v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)).
“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from
the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the
ALJ’s decision.” Partee v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d
785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005)).
V.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision, asserting that substantial evidence does not support

the ALJ’s decision. Defendant argues that the ALJ properly evaluated and considered all evidence
of record when reaching the RFC, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination.
As described above, this Court’s role is to determine whether the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3);
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Pate-Fire, 564 F.3d at 942; Estes, 275 F.3d at 724. As long as there is
substantial evidence in the record that supports the decision, this Court may not reverse it simply
because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or
because the Court would have decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747
(8th Cir. 2001).
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The Court has reviewed the entire transcript and the parties’ briefs. Based on a careful
review of the record, and for the reasons stated in the ALJ’s opinion and in the Government’s brief,
the Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal to be without merit and further finds that the record
as a whole reflects substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. See Sledge v. Astrue, 364 Fed.
App’x 307 (8th Cir. 2010) (district court summarily affirmed the ALJ).
The Court acknowledges that the record contains conflicting evidence, and the ALJ could
have reached a different conclusion. However, this Court’s task is not to reweigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ. The ALJ’s weighing of the evidence here fell within the available “zone of
choice,” and the Court cannot disturb that decision merely because it might have reached a different
conclusion. See Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011).
VI.

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ made a proper RFC

determination based on a fully and fairly developed record. Consequently, the Court determines
that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.
Dated this 19th day of September, 2022.

SARAH E. PITLYK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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