O'Laughlin v. Holder et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2 ) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Signed by District Judge John A. Ross on 1/11/2022. (CLO)

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 1 of 12 PageID #: 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY PATRICK O’LAUGHLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 4:21-cv-01117-JAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Timothy Patrick O’Laughlin
for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No.
2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action
without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma
pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The
court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 2 of 12 PageID #: 21

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820
F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not
required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it
the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even
pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of
law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are
not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not
mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Background
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently in custody at the Rochester Federal
Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota. In order to better understand the instant complaint, it is
necessary to briefly look at his prior court records.
On May 2, 2012, plaintiff was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri with two counts of interstate stalking and one count of interstate threatening
communication. United States v. O’Laughlin, No. 4:12-cr-181-CDP-1 (E.D. Mo.). Before

2

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 3 of 12 PageID #: 22

disposition of his criminal case could occur, a petition to determine plaintiff’s mental condition
was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. United States v.
O’Laughlin, No. 6:15-cv-3419-BP (W.D. Mo.). On September 19, 2016, the Western District
ordered plaintiff civilly committed, following a determination that he was not competent to
proceed to trial. The Western District’s commitment order was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals on August 10, 2017. United States v. O’Laughlin, No. 16-4244 (8th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff has made subsequent efforts to be released from his commitment. On April 3,
2018, the Western District denied his pro se motion for discharge. United States v. O’Laughlin,
No. 6:15-cv-3419-BP (W.D. Mo.). Then, on July 2, 2018, the Western District denied his motion
for a hearing. Plaintiff appealed, and the judgment was affirmed on August 19, 2019. United States
v. O’Laughlin, No. 18-2473 (8th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 23,
2020. O’Laughlin v. United States, No. 19-7428 (2020).
On August 2, 2018, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. O’Laughlin v. Smith, No. 6:18-cv-3237-BP (W.D. Mo.). The petition was dismissed on
December 17, 2018. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment on May 15, 2019. O’Laughlin v.
Smith, No. 18-3749 (8th Cir. 2019).
During the pendency of plaintiff’s commitment, he has filed numerous motions for release
in the Western District, which have been denied. See, e.g., United States v. O’Laughlin, No. 6:15cv-3419-BP (W.D. Mo. Mar. 1, 2021) (order denying seventeen motions filed by plaintiff between
January 11, 2021 and February 23, 2021). At present, plaintiff remains under commitment pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
On January 29, 2021, in plaintiff’s criminal case, the Honorable Catherine D. Perry issued
an order directing the government to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed

3

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 4 of 12 PageID #: 23

without prejudice. United States v. O’Laughlin, 4:12-cr-181-CDP-1 (E.D. Mo.). On August 25,
2021, at the request of the government, Judge Perry ordered an additional competency evaluation
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. An amended order was filed under seal on September 3, 2021. At present,
the results of the competency evaluation have not been received.
The Complaint
Plaintiff brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming former United States
Attorney Generals Eric H. Holder and Loretta Lynch as defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 1). They are
sued in both their official and individual capacities. The complaint is handwritten on a Courtprovided § 1983 form. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the form complaint, plaintiff has
written: “See Attached.” (Docket No. 1 at 3).
Attached to the complaint is an exhibit titled: “Attachment to Complaint of Libel, Slander
and Defamation of Character and False Arrest Pursuant to Title 42 USCS 1983.” (Docket No. 1-1
at 1). The attachment adds former United States Attorney Generals William Barr and Jeff Sessions
as defendants. It is divided into six sections, which the Court will go through in turn.
First, plaintiff begins with a jurisdictional statement, in which he alleges that defendants
have libeled him, slandered him, and defamed his character by falsely accusing “him of
committing several offenses including threatening persons, stalking individuals, sexual
misconduct, lewdness and inappropriate behavior.” Because he was criminally charged in the
Eastern District of Missouri, he invokes this Court’s jurisdiction.
Second, in the section labeled “Statement of Complaint,” plaintiff again accuses defendants
of libel, slander, and defamation of character. (Docket No. 1-1 at 2). He bases these claims on the
contention that defendants knowingly and falsely accused him “of having committed several
offenses against former female acquaintances and former supervisory employees in an attempt to

4

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 5 of 12 PageID #: 24

get him committed into the Bureau of Prisons.” Plaintiff states that these accusations have
presented him as a person who “stalks women,” as a person who threatens women and their
families, as a person who “abuses [with] violence,” and as a person who has committed lewd acts
to gain the attention of women. He further asserts that these accusations have been made without
proof or evidence, and has “caused him to be permanently injured by such falseness.”
Third, in the section labeled “Memorandum of Law,” plaintiff cites and briefly discusses
three separate cases arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). (Docket No. 1-1 at 2-3).
These cases each discuss the intentional torts exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity. In particular, plaintiff – perhaps misapprehending the meaning of these cases – notes
that claims arising under libel and slander fall within the exception to the sovereign immunity
waiver, and cannot be brought under the FTCA.
Fourth, in the section labeled “Statement of Facts,” plaintiff repeats his contention that
defendants have libeled him, slandered him, and defamed his character by making “false
accusations of sexual misconduct, stalking, threatening behavior and lewdness and inappropriate
behavior towards women whom he was in acquaintance.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 3). He states that
these purportedly false accusations have “completely ruined and destroyed his honorable
reputation that goes as far back as middle school.” Plaintiff adds that he was an aircraft technician
in the United States Army, and that he was honorably discharged from the service.
Fifth, in the section labeled “Relief Sought,” plaintiff requests ten million dollars in
punitive damages for psychiatric, psychological, and emotional distress during his years of
imprisonment. He also asks for “immediate release from confinement due to its illegality.”
Finally, in his “Conclusion,” plaintiff asks “that his complaint of libel, slander and
defamation of character be granted.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 4).

5

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 6 of 12 PageID #: 25

Based on the background described above, it is apparent that plaintiff is accusing
defendants of wrongfully bringing the criminal charges that resulted in the filing of United States
v. O’Laughlin, No. 4:12-cr-181-CDP-1 (E.D. Mo. May 2, 2012).
Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that defendants are liable to him for libel, slander, defamation of character, and false
arrest. Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court reviewed his complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Based on that review, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court must dismiss
this action without prejudice.
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983/Bivens Claims
As noted above, plaintiff specifically asserts that he is bringing this civil action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is meant “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to
deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.” See Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
Defendants, however, are not state actors, but former federal employees. Thus, plaintiff’s claims
are properly construed as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 389 (1971).
In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court enforced a damages remedy to compensate
persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 389, 397 (1971). Subsequently, in two other cases, the Supreme Court
approved of an implied damages remedy for the violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process
clause, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Ziglar v.

6

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 7 of 12 PageID #: 26

Abbasi, 137 S.C. 1843, 1854-55 (2017). Thus, generally speaking, “[a] Bivens claim is a cause of
action brought directly under the United States Constitution against a federal official acting in his
or her individual capacity for violations of constitutionally protected rights.” Buford v. Runyon,
160 F.3d 1199, 1203 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998).
“An action under Bivens is almost identical to an action under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983, except
that the former is maintained against federal officials while the latter is against state officials.”
Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999). As such, claims under Bivens and claims
under § 1983 involve the same analysis. Solomon, 795 F.3d at 789 n.7. Furthermore, the body of
case law regarding § 1983 applies to Bivens actions. Id.
i.

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has sued defendants in their official capacities. An official capacity Bivens suit is
treated as being made against the United States itself. See Buford, 160 F.3d at 1203. However, “[i]t
is well settled that a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States and its agencies
because of sovereign immunity.” Id. See also Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir. 1982)
(“Bivens and its progeny does not waive sovereign immunity for actions against the United States;
it implies a cause of action only against federal officials”). Therefore, plaintiff’s official capacity
claims against defendants must be dismissed.
ii.

Individual Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has also sued defendants in their individual capacities. As noted above, a Bivens
action “is almost identical to an action under section 1983, except that the former is maintained
against federal officials while the latter is against state officials.” See Christian v. Crawford, 907
F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“This court has referred to a Bivens action as the federal law analogous to § 1983”). Liability in a

7

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 8 of 12 PageID #: 27

42 U.S.C. § 1983 case is personal. See Frederick v. Motsinger, 873 F.3d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 2017).
In other words, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M.
v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). As such, § 1983 liability “requires a causal link
to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,
1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). See also
Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1149 (8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing plaintiff’s excessive bail claims
because none of the defendants set plaintiff’s bail, and therefore, “there can be no causal
connection between any action on the part of the defendants and any alleged deprivation” of
plaintiff’s rights). To that end, a plaintiff must allege facts connecting the defendant to the
challenged action. See Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).
In this case, plaintiff has not alleged the personal responsibility of any of the named
defendants. That is to say, plaintiff has not presented any facts showing what former Attorney
Generals Holder, Lynch, Barr, and Sessions did or did not do to harm him. All four defendants are
referred to as a group, and plaintiff never attributes any specific actions to them. Instead, he broadly
accuses them all of false accusations, without ever once presenting a fact that connects them to the
challenged action. Indeed, plaintiff fails to allege that defendants even knew about the existence
of his criminal case, much less took personal actions against him that led to him being wrongly
charged.
Beyond plaintiff’s failure to establish any causal link between defendants and the violation
of his constitutional rights, the Court notes that plaintiff has failed to state any claim whatsoever.
To state a claim, plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere
possibility of misconduct.” See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. “A pleading that merely pleads labels
and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions

8

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 9 of 12 PageID #: 28

devoid of factual enhancement will not suffice.” Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817-18 (8th Cir.
2010).
Here, plaintiff does not demonstrate a plausible claim for relief. Rather than presenting any
facts, he simply repeats his causes of action, accusing defendants of making false accusations
against him, resulting in criminal charges. There are no allegations to support his contentions, just
labels and conclusions. This is insufficient to state a claim.
For all these reasons, plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against defendants must be
dismissed.
iii.

Cannot Seek Release

To the extent that plaintiff seeks immediate release, the Court notes that he cannot seek
such relief through this type of civil action. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is
entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy
is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). See also Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (explaining that Supreme Court “has held that a prisoner in state
custody cannot use a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his
confinement”); Adams v. Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 644-45 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a habeas
action is the proper vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the legality of his sentence or seek
immediate or speedier release); and Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that when “a prisoner directly attacks the validity of his sentence, the proper vehicle is a habeas
corpus action”).

9

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 10 of 12 PageID #: 29

B. FTCA Claim
Plaintiff specifically asserts – at several different places in his complaint – that he is
bringing the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, plaintiff devotes a section of his
attachment to discussing FTCA case law. The Court has therefore reviewed his complaint to
ascertain whether he has a viable claim under the FTCA.
It is well established that the United States is entitled to sovereign immunity, and cannot
be sued without its consent. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967). However, the FTCA
“waives federal sovereign immunity for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable.”
Newcombe v. United States, 933 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2019). See also Demery v. U.S. Dept. of
Interior, 357 F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that FTCA “allows suits against the United
States for personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment”). In other
words, the FTCA acts as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, which opens the door to statelaw liability claims against the federal government for harm caused by a governmental employee.
Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019).
Any claim under the FTCA would be subject to dismissal for three reasons. First, plaintiff’s
claims regarding libel, slander, defamation of character, and false arrest appear to fall under the
so-called intentional torts exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (providing that the FTCA’s waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States does
not apply to “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with

10

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 11 of 12 PageID #: 30

contract rights”); and Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with district
court that plaintiff could not proceed on slander claim under the FTCA as it fell within the
intentional torts exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity).
Second, plaintiff does not appear to have exhausted his administrative remedies. Under the
FTCA, an action shall not be instituted against the United States “unless the claimant shall have
first presented his claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally
denied by the agency in writing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Complete exhaustion of administrative
remedies is required before the judicial process is invoked. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Porter v. Fox, 99
F.3d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1996). That is, before bringing an action against the United States, a
claimant must present his or her claim to the appropriate federal agency, and the agency must make
a final decision. Bohac v. Walsh, 386 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2004). Failure to comply with the
exhaustion requirement will result in the dismissal of the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 808 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding “that conformity with
§ 2675(a) is a jurisdictional term of the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity”). See also
Allen v. United States, 590 F.3d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[a] federal district court does
not have jurisdiction over an FTCA claim unless it was first presented to the appropriate federal
agency”). Here, plaintiff has presented no indication that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies by first presenting his claim to the appropriate federal agency.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the
FTCA. “A pleading must offer more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action to state a plausible claim for relief.” Johnson v. Precythe, 901 F.3d
973, 977 (8th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff has made no attempt to even approach the level of plausibility.

11

Case: 4:21-cv-01117-JAR Doc. #: 6 Filed: 01/11/22 Page: 12 of 12 PageID #: 31

His complaint lists various causes of action, including libel, slander, defamation of character, and
false arrest, but makes no attempt to show how defendants are liable for this misconduct.
Specifically, there is no indication as to what acts or omissions the four defendants allegedly
committed. Instead, he relies on legal conclusions that are entirely unsupported. This is not
sufficient to state a claim. See Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002)
(“While the court must accept allegations of fact as true…the court is free to ignore legal
conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal conclusions
cast in the form of factual allegations”); and Neubauer v. FedEx Corp., 849 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir.
2017) (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do”).
For all these reasons, even if plaintiff’s complaint is construed as containing a claim under
the FTCA, the claim would be subject to dismissal.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this 11th day of January, 2022.

_______________________________
JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12