Colyer v. Leadec Corp.

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Partial Dismissal (Counts III and IV) (ECF No. 8 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count IV of Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge Jean C. Hamilton on 5/9/2022. (NEP)

Case: 4:22-cv-00193-JCH Doc. #: 23 Filed: 05/09/22 Page: 1 of 5 PageID #: 183

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT COLYER,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
LEADEC CORP.,
Defendant.

Case No. 4:22CV193 JCH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal (Counts III
and IV), filed February 23, 2022. (ECF No. 8). By way of background, Plaintiff filed a Charge
of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on
September 12, 2019. (ECF No. 5-2).1 In his Charge of Discrimination, Plaintiff checked the
boxes for discrimination based on race and retaliation; he did not check the box for age
discrimination. Plaintiff indicated the discrimination at issue transpired between October 1,
2018, and May 15, 2019. As to the particulars of his charge, Plaintiff stated in part as follows:
“I believe I have been discriminated against due to my race, Black, and terminated in retaliation
for participating in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.” (ECF No. 5-2, P. 2).

“When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider material
attached to the complaint and materials that are public records, do not contradict the complaint,
or are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Hogsett v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities,
No. 4:18CV1907 AGF, 2019 WL 446876, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2019) (citing Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)).
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Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC, dated October 15, 2021.
(ECF No. 5-1). He filed his Petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, on
January 13, 2022, asserting claims for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., age discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and race
discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 5 (hereinafter “Complaint”)).2
Defendant removed the case to this Court on February 16, 2022, on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). As stated above, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Partial
Dismissal (Counts III and IV) on February 23, 2022. (ECF No. 8).
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the complaint in the
light most favorable to plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court, “must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039
(8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The complaint’s factual allegations must be sufficient “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level,” however, and the motion to dismiss must be granted
if the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (abrogating the “no set of
facts” standard for Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Furthermore, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
Plaintiff originally included a claim for Workers’ Compensation Discrimination under the
Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act. In a Memorandum and Order entered May 5, 2022, the
Court severed the claim and remanded it to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri.
(ECF No. 22).
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action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (pleading offering only “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not do)).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, in his Complaint Plaintiff asserts claims for race discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII, age discrimination under the ADEA, and race discrimination and
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (ECF No. 5). Defendant asserts Plaintiff may not pursue his
Title VII retaliation claim or his age discrimination claim, as the charge he filed with the EEOC
made no such claims.
Before a plaintiff may file a complaint in federal court alleging violations of the ADEA
or Title VII, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC.1 Brown v. General Motors, LLC, No. 4:20CV1760 RLW, 2022
WL 343415, at *2 (E.D. Mo. February 3, 2022). In Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583 (8th Cir.
2005), the Eighth Circuit elaborated upon the administrative exhaustion requirement as follows:
The reason for requiring the pursuit of administrative remedies first is to
provide the EEOC with an initial opportunity to investigate allegations of
employment discrimination and to work with the parties toward voluntary
compliance and conciliation. The proper exhaustion of administrative
remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring [his or] her employmentdiscrimination claim, along with allegations that are like or reasonably
related to that claim, in federal court. Although we have often stated that
we will liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of
remedies purposes, we also recognize that there is a difference between
liberally reading a claim which lacks specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo,
a claim which simply was not made. The claims of employment
discrimination in the complaint may be as broad as the scope of the EEOC
investigation which reasonably could be expected to result from the
“Exhausting administrative remedies requires timely filing a charge with the EEOC and
receiving a right to sue letter.” Wilkes v. Washington University School of Medicine, No.
4:06CV1833 MLM, 2007 WL 1040929 at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2007) (citation omitted).
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administrative charge.
Parisi, 400 F.3d at 585 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A plaintiff may not
raise in federal court allegations outside the scope of the EEOC charge.” Hatton v. Accord Bldg.
Services, L.L.C., No. 4:09CV1888 SNLJ, 2010 WL 2540117 at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jun. 16, 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Upon consideration, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s claim of age
discrimination must be dismissed, as it is not “reasonably related” to Plaintiff’s original EEOC
charge. Brown, 2022 WL 343415, at *2. Despite having the opportunity to do so, Plaintiff did
not claim age discrimination in his EEOC charge; instead the charge lists only race and
retaliation as bases for discrimination.3 (See ECF No. 5-2, P. 1). Even liberally construing the
charge, it cannot be said to encompass allegations of age discrimination. See Brooks v. Midwest
Heart Group, 655 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that even with all inferences drawn in
favor of the plaintiff, her charge did not allege age discrimination, and thus the claim remained
unexhausted and was properly dismissed). As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim of age discrimination, and so the
claim must be dismissed. Id.
With respect to his claim for retaliation under Title VII, however, as noted above Plaintiff
checked the box for retaliation in his Charge of Discrimination. (See ECF No. 5-2, P. 1). He
further stated in his narrative that he believed he had been terminated in retaliation for
participating in protected activity, in violation of Title VII.

(Id., P. 2).

Under these

circumstances, the Court finds Plaintiff’s retaliation claim falls within the scope of the EEOC
investigation reasonably expected to result from the administrative charge, and so Defendant’s

3 Plaintiff further did

not mention age or age discrimination in his narrative.
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Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal (Counts III
and IV) (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED.

Dated this 9th Day of May, 2022.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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