Williams et al v. University City Police Department

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs SJ, DW, and MW are STRICKEN from this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion seeking leave to commence this action without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. 3 , is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. 2 , is DENIED as moot. IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Signed by District Judge Matthew T. Schelp on August 1, 2022. (BRP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MARILYN M. WILLIAMS, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
v.
UNIVERSITY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendant.

No. 4:22-cv-00416-MTS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Plaintiff Marilyn M. Williams for
leave to proceed in this action without prepaying fees or costs. Upon consideration of the motion
and the financial information provided therein, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is unable to pay
the filing fee. The Court therefore will grant the Motion. Additionally, for the reasons discussed
below, the Court will dismiss this action.
Legal Standard
This Court is required to review a complaint filed in forma pauperis to determine whether
summary dismissal is appropriate.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

This Court must dismiss a

complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in
either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

The Complaint
Plaintiff filed the Complaint against the University City Police Department. She invokes
this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, and she states that her First and Second Amendment
rights are at issue. The Court therefore construes the Complaint as filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on behalf of herself and three individuals identified as SJ,
DW, and MW. However, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of others. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (stating that to satisfy the standing requirement, a plaintiff
“must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties”). Further, while federal law authorizes Plaintiff to plead and
conduct her own case personally, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, she is not a licensed attorney and therefore
may not represent other individuals in federal court. See Lewis v. Lenc–Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d
829, 830 (7th Cir. 1986). The Court therefore will strike SJ, DW, and MW from this action.
For her statement of claim, Plaintiff alleges that during a visit to a Jack-in-the-Box
restaurant with her three children, she asked the manager to remake her taco. Plaintiff and the
manager “had words back and forth,” and as plaintiff walked outside, the manager called the
police and said Plaintiff had a firearm.

Doc. [1] at 5.

Plaintiff left the parking lot and

approached the next intersection, “was flagged by University city police department,” and
arrested. Id.
Plaintiff indicates she was charged with flourishing, driving while suspended, and having
expired license plates. She attaches copies of a summons and other documents, but they are
illegible. Plaintiff complains she was not asked for identification or proof of insurance. She was
placed in a holding cell and asked to remove her head scarf in violation of her “religious as well

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as human rights.” Id. She states she lacked “proper clothing,” but does not explain what she
means by that. She complains she was searched in front of men, but she does not allege that any
part of her body was unclothed during the search or describe any aggravating factors. She makes
no attempt to identify a person or persons responsible for the alleged misconduct. She claims
she can “prove her imprisonment was false,” and she states she never pulled her firearm from her
glove box and her “First and Second Amendment rights was violated.” Id. She seeks damages.
Discussion
Plaintiff has named the University City Police Department as the sole defendant.
However, the University City Police Department is a department or subdivision of local
government, not a legal entity that is subject to suit under § 1983. Therefore, the Complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant. See Ketchum v. City of
West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal of West Memphis
Police Department and West Memphis Paramedic Services because they were “not juridical
entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi County Jail, 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir.
2001) (upholding the preservice dismissal of a § 1983 action by a prisoner against a jail facility
and a county sheriff’s department because neither defendant was a suable entity). Even if
Plaintiff had named the municipality as a defendant, the Complaint would not state a valid
municipal liability claim. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
690–91 (1978); Calgaro v. St. Louis Cty., 919 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a
municipality “may be liable for a constitutional violation under § 1983 only if the violation
resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality”). The Court will therefore dismiss this
action at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs SJ, DW, and MW are STRICKEN from this
action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion seeking leave to commence this
action without prepaying fees or costs, Doc. [3], is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A
separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Doc. [2], is
DENIED as moot.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
Dated this 1st day of August, 2022.

MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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