Davis-Bey v. State of Missouri

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to add Cole Brewer to the docket as a defendant in this action. The Court grants Davis-Bey's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, doc. 5 , and orders Davis-Bey to pay an in itial filing fee of $1.00 no later than March 5, 2024. Davis-Bey must make her remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and include upon it: (1) her name; (2) her prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding. Pursuant to Rule 21, the Court dismisses as improperly joined Davis-Bey's claims in her amended complaint relating to: (1) deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs; (2) placemen t on 96-Hour Psychiatric Hold; (3) unlawful conditions of confinement at the St. Louis Justice Center; (4) violation of her due process rights/loss of property; and (5) Missouri state law tort claims of slander, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court also dismisses Davis-Bey's claims against the "State of Missouri Corporation Employees," the "Vital Statistics Office," and the State pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous and for fai lure to state a claim. Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to dismiss these defendants from this action. The Court stays all remaining proceedings for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution against Brewer in this cas e pending final disposition of the criminal proceedings against Davis-Bey in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2023). The Court orders Davis-Bey to notify the Court in writing concerning the final disposition of th e criminal charges pending against her in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2023). The Court administratively closes the remaining proceedings in this case pending final disposition of the criminal proceedings pend ing against Davis-Bey in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2023). An order of partial dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. (Initial Partial Filing Fee due by 3/5/2024.), Cole Brewer added. State of Missouri and State of Missouri Corporation Employees terminated., Terminate Case. Signed by Chief District Judge Stephen R. Clark on 2/6/2024. (CLT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
JADA DAVIS-BEY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI,
Defendants.

No. 4:23-cv-00857-SRC

Memorandum and Order
This matter is before the Court on the application of self-represented Plaintiff Jada DavisBey for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee.

Doc. 5.

For

the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Davis-Bey does not have sufficient funds to pay the
entire filing fee and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $1.00.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Further, based upon a review of the amended complaint, the Court dismisses five of Davis-Bey’s
six claims because she improperly joined them.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

Additionally, the

Court stays and administratively closes the remainder of this action pursuant to Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384 (2007).
I.

Background
Davis-Bey, a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated at St. Louis City Justice Center, filed

an initial complaint in this action on July 5, 2023, by filing a document titled “ComplaintPetition to Cancel Birth Certificate Properly.”

Doc. 1 at 1–2.

She attached her housing card

from the Justice Center, as well as a document titled “Notice to State and Foreign Enclave/Court
of the European Colonizer(s) to Correct their System(s) Records and Motion for Order of
Dismissal and Memorandum of Understanding—Cease and Desists [sic] All Court Action.” Id.

at 3–4.

Because of the nature of Davis Bey’s allegations, the Court interpreted her filing as one

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The Court required Davis-Bey, on September 22, 2023,

to amend her complaint on a court-provided form in accordance with Local Rule 2.06.

Doc. 3.

The Court also ordered Davis-Bey to either pay the filing fee of $402 or file a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. Id. at 1–2.

Davis-Bey filed an amended complaint on a court-provided

form, as well as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, on October 13, 2023.

Docs. 4, 5.

Davis-Bey’s action appears to involve an underlying criminal case pending in the Circuit
Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri. See State v. Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Jud.
Cir., St. Louis City).

The State charged Davis-Bey with one count of felony discharge/shooting

a firearm from a motor vehicle and one count of felony armed criminal action.
for a status hearing on May 2, 2024, at 9:30 a.m.

That case is set

Id.

In the present case, Davis-Bey asserts claims against defendants, “State of Missouri
Corporation Employees” and the “Vital Statistics Office,” under Section 1983, and she alleges
that she sues Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

Doc. 4 at 2.

However, under both the caption and “Statement of Claim” portions of the amended complaint,
Davis-Bey lists only the “State of Missouri” as the defendant. See id. at 3–4, 6.

The Court

assumes that Davis-Bey intended to name all three entities as defendants in this action:
(1) “State of Missouri Corporation Employees”; (2) “ Vital Statistics Office”; and (3) the State.
The complaint also makes several allegations against Cole Brewer, which the Court construes as
including Brewer as a defendant in this case.

The Court however makes no determination as to

whether any of these defendants, other than the State, actually exist.

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Davis-Bey asserts “that the State of Missouri made [her] a corporate personality.” Id. at
3.

She claims that the State threw her into jail and detained her, even after she returned “its

corporate birth certificate to the Vital Statistics Office in Jefferson City, Missouri.” Davis-Bey
claims that she found out the State made her a corporation when it sent her a notice to pay
parking-meter fines that listed the jurisdiction as a corporation.

Davis-Bey alleges:

Id.

State of Missouri Corporate Employees has [sic] not removed the Jada Davis-Bey
Corporation from their corporate system(s) and has been holding me Jada DavisBey kidnapped under the color of law, and without any probable cause in the St.
Louis City Justice Center . . . since January 18, 2023 . . . .
Id.

In the amended complaint, Davis-Bey complains that she was falsely arrested on or about

January 13, 2023, and then falsely imprisoned on a detainer, because of Probation Officer Cole
Brewer’s failure to give a statement to a state-court judge.

Id.

She additionally claims that

Brewer made false statements about her in September 2023, which resulted in her being placed
on a 96-hour psychiatric hold for detention, evaluation, and treatment.

Id. at 4.

Davis-Bey states that the former St. Louis City prosecutor first released her from
confinement, but then rearrested her on a “fake warrant.” Id. at 3.

She asserts that the State

has “failed to supervise” its employees in that no one has informed the Missouri courts that they
do not have jurisdiction to deprive Davis-Bey of her liberty or the ability to kidnap her.

Id. at 6.

Davis-Bey asks that this Court require the Missouri courts to cease and desist all actions against
her and require the court and corrections to release her.

Id.

Davis-Bey appears to allege unlawful conditions of confinement in St. Lous City Justice
Center.

Her complaint is difficult to read, but it appears Davis-Bey claims that she had to drink

“sewer water” at the Justice Center, was served food with glass in it, and had to eat white flour

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products daily. Id. at 4.

Davis-Bey asserts that the correctional officials should have moved

inmates when the water supply became contaminated.

Id. at 6.

Davis-Bey also asserts in a conclusory fashion that she was subjected to libelous
statements, slandered and defamed, and subjected to intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Moreover, she states that she was subjected to the “inhalation of mase [sic]” and deprived of
medical evaluation by two doctors between March 24, 2023, and May 1, 2023.

Davis-Bey does

not elaborate on these statements; thus, the Court does not know what medical condition she is
referring to, what statements she is purportedly referring to or what defendant or defendants she
is attempting to link to the actions.

Id. at 4.

Lastly, Davis-Bey claims that she lost all her possessions from her storage unit and car
when she went to jail. Id.

She also claims that she has lost her jewelry and her Social Security

benefits during her incarceration. Id. at 6.

Davis-Bey claims that she will have to estimate

how much the State owes her once she can see how much her pawned jewelry is worth.
6.
II.

Id. at

Davis-Bey seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief in this action.
Discussion
a.

Filing fee

Pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee.

If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or

her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an
initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the
prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior sixmonth period.

After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make
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monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account. § 1915(b)(2).

The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly

payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10,
continuing until the prisoner fully pays the filing fee.

Id.

Davis-Bey has not submitted a certified inmate account statement as required by
Section 1915(a)(2). Instead, Davis-Bey has submitted a document titled, “Resident Transaction
Details.” Doc. 6. Because Davis-Bey failed to provide the Court with a certified account
statement as required, the Court requires Davis-Bey to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00.
See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that when a prisoner is
unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court
should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about
the prisoner’s finances”). If Davis-Bey cannot pay the initial partial filing fee of $1.00, she
must submit a certified copy of her inmate account statement in support of her claim.
b.

Improperly joined claims

Davis-Bey alleges a multitude of allegations in her amended complaint, including:
(1) false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution claims (“kidnapping”);
(2) deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs at an unknown facility; (3) placement on
96-Hour Psychiatric Hold against her will; (4) unlawful conditions of confinement at the St.
Louis Justice Center; (5) violation of her due process rights/loss of property; and (6) state-law
tort claims of slander, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Because

such pleading practices violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20, the Court dismisses

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all Davis-Bey’s claims, except her false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution
claims, pursuant to Rule 21.
In George v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit held that unrelated claims brought by prisoner
plaintiffs against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, not only “to prevent the sort of
morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits like this one, but also to ensure that
prisoners pay all fees required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th
Cir. 2007).

A court should reject complaints like this one, id., either by severing the action into

separate lawsuits or by dismissing improperly joined claims or defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
21; DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844–45 (3d Cir. 2006); Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d
1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000); Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th
Cir. 1988).
Rule 21 permits severance of claims if a plaintiff improperly joined them.

The rule

states, in pertinent part, that on motion or sua sponte, “the court may at any time, on just
terms . . . sever any claim against a party.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Severance is appropriate when

the claims are “discrete and separate,” meaning they are each capable of resolution without
dependence or effect on the other. See Gaffney v. Riverboat Servs. of Ind., Inc., 451 F.3d 424,
442 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
When determining whether to sever claims pursuant to Rule 21, district courts consider
(1) whether the claims are significantly different from one another and would require distinct
evidentiary proof; (2) whether severance would promote judicial economy; and (3) whether
severance or the absence of a claim would unduly prejudice either party.

See Off. Comm. of

Unsecured Creditors v. Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).
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Courts frequently utilize these same considerations when examining a motion to bifurcate claims
under Rule 42(b). See, e.g., Griffith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 344, 346 (M.D. Pa.
2014); Goldstein v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. 18- 3163, 2018 WL 6198463, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 28, 2018) (citing Shapiro, 190 F.R.D. at 355).
In Davis-Bey’s first claim in her amended complaint, she complains that the State failed
to change her name and as a result she was “kidnapped” “without probable cause.”

The Court

liberally construes her claim to mean that she believes the State subjected her to false arrest, false
imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution in January 2023.
False arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution claims are significantly
different from Davis-Bey’s other claims in this lawsuit which relate to: (1) deliberate
indifference to her serious medical needs; (2) placement on 96-Hour Psychiatric Hold;
(3) unlawful conditions of confinement at the St. Louis City Justice Center; (4) violation of her
due process rights/loss of property; and (5) Missouri state law tort claims of slander, defamation,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Additionally, Davis-Bey has two current
lawsuits in which she is pursuing three of these claims.

See Davis-Bey v. Reynolds, No. 4:23-

cv-1049-SEP (E.D. Mo.) (alleging unlawful conditions of confinement at St. Louis City Justice
Center and deliberate indifference to her medical needs at the Justice Center); Davis-Bey v. St.
Lous Metropolitan Police Dep’t., No. 4:23-cv-901-SRW (E.D. Mo.) (alleging that her
psychiatric hold was unlawful and defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical
needs).

For these reasons, the Court dismisses as improperly joined all Davis-Bey’s claims,

except her claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful prosecution claims. Below,
the Court addresses the substance of those claims.
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c.

Claims against the state for “Kidnapping” Davis-Bey

Davis-Bey first attempts to argue that the State “made [her] a corporate personality,” and
in doing so, “kidnapped” her without probable cause and took her to the St. Louis City Justice
Center, where she has remained since January 18, 2023.

She sues the “State of Missouri

Corporation Employees” and the “Vital Statistics Office” for making her a corporation, which
she believes caused her arrest.
In the probable-cause statement filed in conjunction with the criminal complaint in State
v. Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Jud. Cir., St. Louis City), the facts state that an officer
asked Davis-Bey, who was sitting inside her van outside the Social Security Administration
Building, to move her van. At that time, she threatened to shoot the officer if he tapped on her
window.

When another officer asked her to exit her van, she refused to comply and threatened

to shoot the second officer. To remove Davis-Bey, the officer broke the van’s side window.
In response the Davis-Bey fired one shot from inside the van using a .38 revolver.

The officer

then arrested Davis-Bey and took her to the police department for processing, where she stayed
until transported to the Justice Center on January 18, 2023. The State charged Davis-Bey with
one count of felony discharge/shooting a firearm from a motor vehicle and one count of felony
armed criminal action.
The Court finds no mention of Davis-Bey as a “corporation” in the charging documents.
Thus, Davis-Bey’s claims against the “State of Missouri Corporation Employees” and the “Vital
Statistics Office” for making her a corporation, which she believes caused her arrest, are
frivolous and subject to dismissal. This claim is wholly irrational and fanciful, and not entitled
to deference. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (allowing courts to dismiss
8

clearly baseless claims, including “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional” claims and those that
“rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, Davis-Bey cannot state a claim in this action against the State for money
damages because the State is not a Section 1983 “person.” “Section 1983 provides for an action
against a ‘person’ for a violation, under color of law, of another’s civil rights.” McLean v.
Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Deretich v. Off. of Admin. Hearings, 798
F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against
‘person[s]’ only”). However, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are
‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also
Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a “[s]tate is not a person
under § 1983”); Kruger v. Nebraska, 820 F.3d 295, 301 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a state
is not a person for purposes of a claim for money damages under § 1983”). Because Davis-Bey
is missing an essential element of a Section 1983 action, the Court must dismiss her claim for
money damages against the State of Missouri.
Second, sovereign immunity also protects the State from Davis-Bey’s claims for money
damages. “Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its
consent.” Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011). The Eleventh
Amendment confers sovereign immunity on a non-consenting state from lawsuits brought in
federal court by a state’s own citizens or the citizens of another state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974); Webb v. City of Maplewood, 889 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The
Eleventh Amendment protects States and their arms and instrumentalities from suit in federal
court . . . .” (citations omitted)); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 618–19 (8th Cir.
9

1995) (“Generally, in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or
departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.” (quotation
omitted)). Sovereign immunity also bars a claim for money damages against a state official
sued in an official capacity. Andrus ex rel. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir.
1999) (“A claim for damages against a state employee in his official capacity is barred under the
Eleventh Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
Two “well-established exceptions” to the sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh
Amendment exist. Barnes v. Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1992). “The first exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity is where Congress has statutorily abrogated such immunity by
clear and unmistakable language.” Id. (quotation omitted) The second exception is when a
state waives its immunity to suit in federal court. Id. at 65. Courts find that a state waived its
immunity only when” it states such waiver using “the most express language or” when
“overwhelming implications from the text . . . leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.” Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473 (1987).
Neither exception applies to this case.
The Court finds the first exception inapplicable because Section 1983—under which this
case arises—does not revoke a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.
See Will, 491 U.S. at 66 (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the wellestablished immunity of a State from being sued without its consent.”); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 341 (1979) (“[W]e simply are unwilling to believe . . . that Congress intended by the
general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity of the States.”). The
second exception does not apply because the State of Missouri has not waived its immunity in
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this type of case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600(1) (explaining that sovereign immunity is “in
full force and effect,” and providing exceptions relating to the “negligent acts or omissions by
public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles or motorized vehicles within the
course of their employment” and “[i]njuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s
property”). For this reason as well, the Court must dismiss Davis-Bey’s claim for money
damages against the State.
To the extent that Davis-Bey seeks prospective injunctive relief, she has not
demonstrated the State’s liability. Such liability may attach to a governmental entity if a
constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a
deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079 (8th
Cir. 2018); see also Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing
“claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of
inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, three ways exist for Davis-Bey
to prove the State’s liability.
A plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to
“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the
[governmental] official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of
Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). For a policy that is
unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no other evidence than a statement of the policy and
its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, 486 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 2007). However, when “a
policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a [governmental entity] should have
done more to prevent constitutional violations,” a plaintiff must prove more: the plaintiff must
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“establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a produce of
deliberate or conscious choice by policymakers.” Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
A plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy
or custom. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004).
However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an
unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of the City of Norfolk,
340 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). In this case, Davis-Bey has not presented any facts
supporting the proposition that any of the State’s policies or customs, or its failure to train,
harmed her. Thus, the Court finds that Davis-Bey has not demonstrated the State’s liability and
dismisses her claims against it accordingly.
d.

False-arrest and false-imprisonment claims against Brewer

Davis-Bey also indicates that she believes Brewer is responsible for her arrest and
detainment.

See also Davis-Bey v. Brewer, No. 4:23-cv-00507-HEA (E.D. Mo.). The Court is

somewhat skeptical that Davis-Bey has stated enough in her amended complaint to state a claim
for false arrest and false imprisonment against Brewer.

In this lawsuit, as to Brewer, Davis-Bey

merely complains that she was falsely arrested on or about January 13, 2023, and then falsely
imprisoned on a detainer, because Brewer failed to give a statement to the state-court judge in
her criminal case.

Moreover, Davis-Bey’s claims in this lawsuit differ from her claims in her

civil action against Brewer, Davis-Bey v. Brewer, No. 4:23-cv-00507-HEA (E.D. Mo.), in which
she asserts that Brewer was at the scene in front of the Social Security Administration Building
when she was arrested and made a false statement there that she would “shoot up the social
security administration building [sic]” causing her arrest.
12

Nonetheless, in an abundance of

caution, the Court will stay this action, pursuant to the principles in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384 (2007), against Brewer.
In Wallace, the court held that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking
damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by
criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant is detained pursuant to legal
process.”

Id. at 397.

The court instructed that where “a plaintiff files a false arrest claim

before [she] has been convicted . . . it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with
common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal
case is ended.” Id. at 393–94.

Otherwise, the court and the parties are left to “speculate about

whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it will result in conviction, and whether the
impending civil action will impugn that verdict, all this at a time when it can hardly be known
what evidence the prosecution has in its possession.” Id. at 393 (internal citation omitted).
In this case, Davis-Bey asserts claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against
Brewer.

The principles in Wallace dictate that the Court should stay further consideration of

Davis-Bey’s Section 1983 claims against Brewer until the underlying criminal matter currently
pending against Davis-Bey has been resolved through criminal appeals and post-conviction
processes. Additionally, a stay or abstention until resolution of the criminal matter would be
appropriate because a prisoner may not recover damages in a Section 1983 suit where the
judgment would necessarily imply the invalidity of her conviction, continued imprisonment or
sentence unless the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged or called into question by
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994);
Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995).
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III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to add Cole Brewer to the docket as a

defendant in this action.

The Court grants Davis-Bey’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis,

doc. 5, and orders Davis-Bey to pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 no later than March 5, 2024.
Davis-Bey must make her remittance payable to “Clerk, United States District Court,” and
include upon it:

(1) her name; (2) her prison registration number; (3) the case number; and

(4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
Pursuant to Rule 21, the Court dismisses as improperly joined Davis-Bey’s claims in her
amended complaint relating to:

(1) deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs;

(2) placement on 96-Hour Psychiatric Hold; (3) unlawful conditions of confinement at the St.
Louis Justice Center; (4) violation of her due process rights/loss of property; and (5) Missouri
state law tort claims of slander, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The

Court also dismisses Davis-Bey’s claims against the “State of Missouri Corporation Employees,”
the “Vital Statistics Office,” and the State pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim.

Accordingly, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to dismiss these

defendants from this action.
The Court stays all remaining proceedings for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
unlawful prosecution against Brewer in this case pending final disposition of the criminal
proceedings against Davis-Bey in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed
Jan. 17, 2023).

The Court orders Davis-Bey to notify the Court in writing concerning the final

disposition of the criminal charges pending against her in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2023).

The Court administratively closes the
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remaining proceedings in this case pending final disposition of the criminal proceedings pending
against Davis-Bey in State v. Jada Davis, No. 2322-CR00082-01 (22d Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 17,
2023).

An order of partial dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 6th day of February 2024.

STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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