Winston v. McBee

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Accordingly, Court grants Winston's 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The Court denies and dismisses Winston's 1 Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Brought Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as time barre d. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings. The Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. An Order of Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order. Signed by Chief District Judge Stephen R. Clark on 2/5/24. (JAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
MONIQUE L. WINSTON,

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Petitioner,
v.
CHRIS MCBEE,
Respondent.

No. 4:23-cv-01010-SRC

Memorandum and Order
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Monique Winston’s [4] Response and
[5] Supplemental Response to the [3] Order to Show Cause dated September 26, 2023. In the
Order, the Court directed Winston to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss her
application for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as time barred. For
the following reasons, the Court concludes that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) time bars Winston’s
application and dismisses this case.
I.

Background
Winston is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at Chillicothe

Correctional Center in Chillicothe, Missouri. Doc. 1 at 1. On June 4, 2015, she pleaded guilty
to two counts of kidnapping to facilitate a felony, five counts of felony abuse or neglect of a child,
and two counts of felony endangering the welfare of a child. Missouri v. Winston, No. 14-CR01180 (22d Jud. Cir. Ct., City of St. Louis). On July 17, 2015, the court sentenced Winston to a
30-year total term of imprisonment in the Missouri Department of Corrections. Petitioner did not
file a direct appeal. On May 14, 2020, Winston filed a pro-se motion to set aside her conviction
pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. Winston v. State, No. 2022-CC-1272 (22d Jud.

Cir. Ct., City of St. Louis). Winston, through counsel, voluntarily dismissed the action on July
30, 2023. Id.
The Court reviewed Winston’s state case on Case.net, Missouri’s online case-management
system. The Court takes judicial notice of this public state record. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d
988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a district court may take judicial notice of public state
records); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may
take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records”).
II.

Legal Standard
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts

provides that the Court shall summarily dismiss a Section 2254 petition if it plainly appears that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Under Section 2244(d):
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
…
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
A judgment becomes final under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking
review in the state’s highest court expires. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012).
Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 30.03, a conviction and sentence become final
after the expiration of the ten-day period for filing a notice of appeal. See also Camacho
v. Hobbs, 774 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2015) (stating that when a petitioner foregoes state
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appeals, a court must look to state-court filing deadlines to determine the expiration of the
time for seeking direct review).
III.

Discussion
Winston did not appeal her sentence entered on July 17, 2015. Because she did not appeal,

her judgment became final under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) on July 27, 2015, causing the limitations
period to begin running. The limitations period expired on July 26, 2016, approximately seven
years before Winston filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus by placing her application
for writ of habeas corpus in the prison mailing system on August 7, 2023.
The Court notes that the statute of limitations tolls while state post-conviction proceedings
are pending. See Maghee v. Ault, 410 F.3d 473, 475 (8th Cir. 2005). To that end, an application
for post-conviction relief “is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is in
continuance—i.e., until the completion of that process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219–20
(2002). However, Winston failed to file her post-conviction proceedings in Winston v. State, No.
2022-CC-1272, until after the statute of limitations had already expired. Thus, it could not toll
the already-expired statute of limitations.
In her response brief and supplemental response, Winston asserts that the Court should not
dismiss her application for writ of habeas corpus as untimely because she was unaware of her time
to appeal her conviction and sentence. Doc. 5 at 1; see also doc. 4 at 2. She also claims that her
attorney failed to inform her of when she was supposed to file her “Form 40,” or post-conviction
motion.

Doc. 5 at 1.

Moreover, she was sent to Vandalia Prison immediately after her

sentencing and was kept in Receiving and Orientation for approximately a month. Id. The
prison did not allow her to access the law library at that time. Id. After the prison released her
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from “R&O,” it sent Winston to Administrative Segregation for ten days and then placed her on
suicide watch “for a while.” Id; see also doc. 4 at 2. Afterwards, Winston “did not have enough
time left to file.” Id; see also doc. 4 at 2. Winston states she was moved to Chillicothe Prison
on February 28, 2017, at which time that prison placed her in a lockdown unit. Doc. 5 at 2.
Winston also mentions that she currently has several mental conditions, including bipolar disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and anxiety. Doc. 4 at 3. She claims
that she currently takes medication for her mental disorders, and she asks the Court to take her
mental illness into consideration when reviewing her habeas action. Id. She indicates that she
has worked on bettering herself in prison, including taking several courses to deal with her
behaviors and actions. Doc. 5 at 3–4.
The Court understands Winston to claim entitlement to equitable tolling, pursuant to which
the one-year limitations period set forth in Section 2244(d)(1)(A) may be tolled if a petitioner
demonstrates (1) she has diligently pursued her rights, and (2) an extraordinary circumstance
prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Muhammad v. United
States., 735 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 2013).
Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy used only in rare circumstances. Jihad v.
Hvass, 267 F.3d at 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2001). It “affords the otherwise time-barred petitioner an
exceedingly narrow window of relief.” Id. Application of equitable tolling “must be guarded
and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted
statutes.” Id. at 806 (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000)).
In the case at bar, Winston makes no effort to demonstrate that she attempted to diligently
pursue her rights prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. She does not explain the
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exact time periods when she was in lockdown or on suicide watch at Vandalia Prison or indicate
whether she could send or receive mail during those time periods. Rather, she gives generalized
and conclusory statements as to why she claims she could not file a direct appeal during that time.
Additionally, Winston fails to articulate why she did not file a petition for writ of habeas corpus
with this Court during the past seven years, even assuming this Court could consider some time
periods for equitable tolling. Her failure to explain the time periods she would like tolled, and
exactly why the Court should toll them, means Winston has not shown that she diligently pursued
her rights, and as such, she cannot demonstrate entitlement to the infrequently granted equitable
tolling. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; Muhammad, 735 F.3d at 815.
Although Winston asserts that she was unable to go to the law library to research her
claims, that she was confused about the statute of limitations, and that she lacked legal help, these
excuses do not establish grounds for equitable tolling. A prisoner’s pro-se status, lack of legal
knowledge or resources, her confusion about or miscalculations of the limitations period, or her
failure to recognize the legal ramifications of actions taken in prior post-conviction proceedings
are not adequate to warrant equitable tolling. See Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.
2004). Furthermore, in general, ineffective assistance of counsel, such as whether Winston’s
prior counsel told her the wrong information about the “Form 40” statute of limitations, does not
warrant equitable tolling. Walker v. Norris, 436 F.3d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Beery
v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2002). An attorney’s miscalculation of a filing deadline is
also not an extraordinary circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling. Rues v. Denney, 643
F.3d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 2011).

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Lastly, the Court cannot find that Winston’s mental status provides equitable tolling in this
instance. In the Eighth Circuit, a mental impairment may support equitable tolling. Nichols v.
Dormire, 11 Fed. App’x 633, 634 (8th Cir. 2001). “[W]hether it will do so will depend on its
‘degree and duration.’” Martin v. Fayram, 849 F.3d 691, 698 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nichols,
11 Fed. App’x at 634). As Winston described, she suffers from mental-health issues, such as
bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and anxiety. Doc. 4 at
3. But she has not alleged any particularized description showing her condition adversely affected
her during the relevant time period. See docs. 4, 5. For example, she has not alleged that her
condition “was so severe as to preclude [her] from filing court documents or seeking the assistance
of others to do so.” Martin, 849 F.3d at 698. Winston did allege that she was unable to go to the
law library because of her participation in a rehabilitation program in the mental-health unit. See
doc. 4 at 2; doc. 5 at 1–2. But Winston chose to sign up for and enter that program, see doc. 5 at
1–2, and she has not alleged that her condition affected her understanding of her rights or the
applicable deadlines before she did, see docs. 4, 5. In short, Winston has not demonstrated that
degree and duration of her mental impairment support equitable tolling.
Moreover, for equitable tolling to apply based on a prisoner’s mental condition, the
prisoner must show that she diligently pursued her federal rights. See Gordon v. Arkansas, 823
F.3d 1188, 1195–96 (8th Cir. 2016) (explaining that prisoner failed to show why he could not have
filed his federal habeas petition in the remaining nine months even though he was on restrictive
treatment-precaution conditions for three months of his twelve-month statute of limitations
period). As discussed above, Winston has failed to show she diligently pursued her rights. Thus,

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the Court cannot find a basis for equitable tolling.

As a result, the Court finds that

Section 2244(d)(1)(A) time bars Winston’s application and dismisses it.
The Court has considered whether to issue a certificate of appealability. To do so, the
Court must find a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right. See
Tiedeman v. Benson, 122 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 1997). A substantial showing is a showing
that issues are debatable among reasonable jurists, a Court could resolve the issues differently, or
the issues deserve further proceedings. Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing
Flieger v. Delo, 16 F.3d 878, 882–83 (8th Cir. 1994)). Because Winston has made no such
showing, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. The Court applauds Winston for
her achievements and accomplishments while incarcerated. The Court also acknowledges
Winston’s sharing of personal struggles and mental-health issues. Even so, the Court must
apply the law as enacted by Congress, and that law bars Winston’s claim as untimely.
Accordingly, Court grants Winston’s [2] Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. The
Court denies and dismisses Winston’s [1] Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Brought Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as time barred.

See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus

Proceedings. The Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. An
Order of Dismissal accompanies this Memorandum and Order.
So ordered this 5th day of February 2024.

STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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