Meyer v. Kijakazi

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner will be AFFIRMED, and the complaint of Plaintiff Keith Meyer will be DISMISSED with prejudice. A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be entered on this same date. Signed by Sr. District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on 9/25/2024. (KXS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KEITH MEYER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY1,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:23 CV 1087 RWS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Keith Meyer brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for
disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. For the reasons
discussed below, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.
Background
Meyer protectively filed a Title II application for disability insurance benefits
on November 12, 2021. Tr. 547–56. He then submitted an amended application on
November 15, 2021, changing his alleged onset date to August 6, 2021. Tr. 557.
Meyer alleged that his disability was due to the main chamber in his heart not

Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20, 2023. Pursuant
to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Martin O’Malley should be substituted for
Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit.
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working on the left, chronic heart failure, insulin dependent diabetes, and an inability
to be in the heat or stand for long periods of time. Tr. 592.
Meyer’s application was denied at the initial claims level. Tr. 452–59. Upon
reconsideration, Meyer’s application was denied again. Tr. 460–67. Meyer then
filed a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), Tr. 489–
90, which was held on September 12, 2022. Tr. 411–51. On October 19, 2022, the
ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Meyer had the severe impairments
of cardiomyopathy and diabetes mellitus with peripheral neuropathy, but that he did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 13–
14. As a result, the ALJ concluded that Meyer was not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act at any time from the alleged onset date though the date of
decision. Tr. 18. On June 28, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Meyer’s request
for review. Tr. 1. As a result, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Meyer filed this action on August 28, 2023, seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. Meyers argues that the Commissioner’s decision
should be reversed because the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence.

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Legal Standard
To be eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, a claimant
must prove that she is disabled. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th
Cir. 2001). The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity” due to a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment”
that can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for at least twelve continuous months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant will
be declared disabled only if her impairment or combination of impairments is of
such severity that she is unable to engage in her previous work and—considering her
age, education, and work experience—she is unable to engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner engages in
a five-step evaluation process: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment or combination
of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
has the RFC to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The burden of proof rests with a claimant through
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the first four steps but shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Pate-Fires v. Astrue,
564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009).
When reviewing a denial of disability benefits, my role is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner’s decision complies with the relevant legal
requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Id.
Substantial evidence refers to less than a preponderance but enough for a reasonable
person to find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Id. I must affirm
the Commissioner’s decision if, “after reviewing the entire record, it is possible to
draw two inconsistent positions, and the Commissioner has adopted one of those
positions.” Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 2012). I may not reverse
the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence could also support
a contrary outcome. McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).
ALJ Decision
The ALJ denied Meyer disability benefits after finding that he was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the date of
his alleged onset of disability of August 6, 2021 through October 19, 2022, the date
of the decision. Tr. 18. At step one, the ALJ found that Meyer had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since August 6, 2021. Tr. 13. At step two, the ALJ found
that Meyer had the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus with peripheral
neuropathy and cardiomyopathy. Id. The ALJ also found the following non-severe
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impairments: hyperlipidemia, hypogonadism, and fatty liver. Id. At step three, the
ALJ found that Meyer did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 14. At step four, the ALJ found that
Meyer had the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a),
with several limitations. Tr. 14–15. Based on RFC, the ALJ found that Meyer was
capable of performing past relevant work as a product design engineer. Tr. 17.
Because Meyer was capable of his past relevant work, the ALJ concluded that he
was not under a disability at any point during the relevant period. Tr. 18.
Medical Records and Other Evidence Before the ALJ
With respect to the medical records and other evidence of record, I adopt
Meyer’s recitation of facts, ECF No. 8-1, to the extent they are admitted by the
Commissioner, ECF No. 11-1, as well as the additional facts submitted by the
Commissioner, ECF No. 12-1, as they are not contested by Meyer. Additional facts
will be discussed as necessary to address the parties’ arguments.
Discussion
Meyer argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because
the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence. A claimant’s
RFC is the most the claimant can do despite his limitations, and an ALJ must assess
it based on all relevant evidence in the claimant’s case record.
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20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(1). Relevant evidence includes “‘medical records, observations of
treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his
limitations.’” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Myers
v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013)). Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical
question, an ALJ’s RFC determination “‘must be supported by some medical
evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.’” Id. (quoting Cox
v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007)).
In this case, the ALJ found that Meyer had the RFC to perform sedentary work
as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) but with several limitations. Tr. 14–15. The
ALJ assessed the following limitations:
The claimant could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never
climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; occasionally balance; occasionally
stoop and crouch; never crawl or kneel; should have no concentrated
exposure to extreme heat or extreme cold; and no exposure to
unprotected heights or hazardous machinery.
Id. Meyer argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ failed to appropriately evaluate Meyer’s reported
limitations as required by SSR 16-3p and should have provided additional
limitations, such as the ability to take eight-hour breaks after working for a period
of two to four hours.
I find that the ALJ did not improperly discount Meyer’s subjective
complaints. When evaluating evidence of pain or other symptoms, an ALJ is never
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free to ignore a claimant’s subjective complaints. Basinger v. Heckler, 725 F.2d
1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 1984).

An ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective

complaints, however, if “they are inconsistent with the evidence as a whole.” Milam
v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 2015). In discounting a claimant’s subjective
complaints, an ALJ must consider all of the evidence and make an express
determination, detailing her reasons for discounting the claimant’s complaints,
identifying inconsistencies between the claimant’s complaints and the evidence in
the record, and discussing the relevant factors set forth in Polaski v. Heckler, 739
F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1066 (8th Cir. 2012).
The relevant factors include: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the
duration, intensity, and frequency of pain; (3) any precipitating and aggravating
factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) the
claimant’s functional restrictions; (6) the claimant’s work history; and (7) the
absence of objective medical evidence supporting the claimant’s complaints. Id. at
1065–66; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). While an ALJ must consider these
factors, she need not discuss how each factor supports her determination. Casey v.
Astrue, 503 F.3d 687, 695 (8th Cir. 2007). If an ALJ “explicitly discredits” a
claimant’s complaints and “gives a good reason for doing so,” a court should defer
to her determination. Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007).

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In this case, the ALJ determined that Meyer’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms”
but that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of
his symptoms were not “entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record.” Tr. 16. Although the ALJ did not discuss every relevant
factor in making this determination, she identified the relevant factors and stated that
she considered all of Meyer’s symptoms based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 and Social Security Rule 16-3p, Tr. 15, and it is clear that she considered
several factors and used numerous facts in evaluating Meyer’s complaints.
For instance, the ALJ considered inconsistencies between Meyer’s subjective
complaints and his reported daily activities. Tr. 15. In particular, the ALJ noted that
Meyer reported the ability to:
read, write, manage medical care, attend doctor’s appointments, live with
others, care for his cat, tend a small garden, perform personal care, perform
household chores, watch television, prepare simple meals, walk 400 yards at
a time, drive, go out alone, shop in stores and by computer, manage funds,
raise chickens, spend time with others in person, on the phone and via email,
texting and video chat, attend church, get along with others including
authority figures, follow instructions, and handle stress and changes in
routine.
Id. These significant daily activities undercut Meyer’s reported limitations. See
McDade v. Astrue, 720 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting claimant’s ability to
“perform some cooking, take care of his dogs, use a computer, drive with a neck
brace, and shop for groceries with … an electric cart”); Medhaug v. Astrue, 578 F.3d
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805, 817 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating “acts such as cooking, vacuuming, washing dishes,
doing laundry, shopping, driving, and walking, are inconsistent with subjective
complaints of disabling pain”). As a result, the ALJ’s determination that Meyer’s
reported daily activities were inconsistent with his subjective complaints is
supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ also considered the lack of objective medical evidence supporting
Meyer’s subjective complaints. Tr. 16; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (stating
objective medical evidence is useful in making reasonable conclusions about the
intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms); Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d
922, 931–32 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating an ALJ may not discount a claimant’s subjective
complaints “solely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence” but
may consider “the absence of objective medical evidence to support the
complaints”). For example, the ALJ noted that Meyer has a long history of diabetes
with peripheral neuropathy, including while he worked until the alleged onset date,
but that there was “little to no evidence that it has worsened since then.” Tr. 16. In
fact, Meyer’s physician assessed during a December 2021 visit that his condition
and symptoms were improving. Tr. 810.
In determining Meyer’s RFC, the ALJ related Meyer’s work limitations to the
medical evidence and his reported symptoms. Tr. 17. The ALJ found that Meyer
could perform a limited range of sedentary work consistent with objective medical
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findings showing coronary impairment, fatigue, and lower extremity edema, but no
deficits in gait, sensation, range of motion, or muscle strength. Id. And despite
“relatively normal exams,” id., the ALJ prescribed several further limitations in
consideration of Meyer’s reported symptoms. Id.
Finally, Meyer argues that the ALJ’s conclusions as to his reported symptoms
are not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ generally cited to
exhibits. However, the record shows that the ALJ did include pinpoint citations in
her decision and provided a complete analysis of the record. See, e.g., Tr. 16.
Additionally, Meyer does not suggest any specific, relevant evidence the ALJ failed
to analyze and does not cite any medical evidence in support of his argument that he
required additional limitations.
In light of these considerations and supporting facts, I find that the ALJ did
not improperly discount Meyer’s subjective complaints. The ALJ explicitly found
that Meyer’s complaints were not entirely consistent with the medical and other
evidence in the record, she identified good reasons for discounting the complaints,
and her determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
I will therefore defer to the ALJ’s determination. See Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1067
(“Because the ALJ gave good reasons for discounting [claimant’s] credibility, we
defer to the ALJ’s credibility findings.”); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584,

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590 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We will not substitute our opinion for that of the ALJ, who is
in a better position to assess credibility.”).2
Conclusion
“A claimant bears the burden of establishing his RFC.” Swink v. Saul, 931
F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 2019). While Meyer may believe that the evidence in his
case record should have been assessed differently, it is not my role to reweigh
evidence considered by an ALJ. See Hensley, 829 F.3d at 934. The ALJ’s decision
demonstrates that she evaluated all the medical and other evidence in Meyer’s case
record and adequately explained her reasons for the weight given to the evidence.
Because the ALJ’s decision complies with the relevant legal requirements and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, the Commissioner’s
decision will be affirmed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner will be
AFFIRMED, and the complaint of Plaintiff Keith Meyer will be DISMISSED with
prejudice.

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In addition to the considerations discussed above, the ALJ also considered a Transthoracic
Echocardiogram Test. Meyer argues that the ALJ misinterpreted the nature of this testing by
purportedly suggesting that it showed improvement in Meyer’s condition. This alleged error does
not, however, alter my conclusion that the ALJ did not improperly discount Meyer’s subjective
complaints because the ALJ identified other good reasons for discounting the complaints, and her
determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

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A separate Judgment in accordance with this Memorandum and Order will be
entered on this same date.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 25th day of September 2024.

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