Heard v. O'Malley

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order. (Leland Dudek added. Martin O'Malley terminated.) Signed by Sr. District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/11/25. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
KATHLEEN HEAROD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LELAND DUDEK,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:24-cv-00077-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This action is before the Court for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security finding that Plaintiff Kathleen Hearod was not disabled
prior to her 50th birthday,2 and thus not entitled to disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, during that time. For the
reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who filed this action pro se, has failed to comply with the Court’s Case

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Leland Dudek became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security in February of
2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Leland Dudek
should be substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit. No further action
need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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The ALJ found that after Plaintiff turned 50 years old and, thus, her age category
changed to an individual closely approaching advanced age under the Commissioner’s
regulations, the regulations—specifically, Rule 201.14 of the medical-vocational
guidelines (20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2)—directed a finding of disability. Tr.
26. Plaintiff does not challenge that finding here.

Management Order (“CMO”) (ECF No. 7), which provides that she must “attach to [her]
brief a statement of uncontroverted material facts, with each fact set forth in a separately
numbered paragraph and supported by citations to the administrative transcript.” ECF
No. 7 at 2. Plaintiff’s pro se brief (ECF No. 15) was largely devoid of citations to the
administrative transcript. Nevertheless, Defendant responded to the facts set forth in
Plaintiff’s brief by admitting in part and denying in part the facts stated; has supported
the admissions and denials with appropriate citations to the administrative transcript; and
has included a statement of additional uncontroverted material facts with citations to the
administrative transcript. ECF No. 16-1.
Plaintiff filed a reply brief (ECF No. 17), which she supplemented with leave of
the Court (ECF Nos. 19 & 20). In granting such leave, the Court reminded Plaintiff that
she was bound by the CMO’s requirement that any response to Defendant’s statement of
additional facts must set forth whether Plaintiff admits or denies each numbered
paragraph in the Commissioner’s statement and must support any denials with citations to
the record. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff has filed a response to Defendant’s statement of
additional facts which largely denies each of Defendant’s facts stated. However, upon
review of the response and the portions of the transcript cited therein, the Court notes that
Plaintiff’s “denials” do not indicate that the facts set forth in Defendant’s statement of
facts are untrue. Rather, the “denials” are simply supplemental facts that Plaintiff
believes support her arguments. See ECF No. 21.
Upon careful consideration, the Court adopts the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s
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opening and reply briefs to the extent admitted by Defendant or otherwise supported by
the record, as well as the facts set forth in Defendant’s Statement of Additional
Uncontroverted Facts, which have not been properly controverted by Plaintiff and which
are supported by the record. Specific facts will be discussed as needed to address the
parties’ arguments.
Plaintiff, who was born on January 8, 1973, applied for benefits on April 26, 2021,
when she was 48 years old. She alleged disability beginning on March 20, 2021, due to
a concussion suffered following a fall on February 14, 2021. Plaintiff’s application was
denied at the administrative level, and she thereafter requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
A hearing was held on November 9, 2022. Plaintiff, who was represented by
counsel at that time, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing. By decision
dated February 1, 2023, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine and traumatic brain injury.
The ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments or combinations of
impairments met or medically equaled one of the deemed-disabling impairments listed in
the Commissioner’s regulations. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, as defined in the
Commissioner’s regulations, with the following exceptions:
[Plaintiff] can lift up to 10 pounds occasionally; she can stand/walk for about
2 hours and sit for up to 6 hours in an 8 hour work day, with normal breaks;
she can occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes or
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scaffolds; she can occasionally balance and crawl; she should avoid moderate
exposure to excessive vibration and operational control of moving
machinery; she should avoid unprotected heights and exposure to hazardous
machinery; her work is limited to simple and routine tasks; and she cannot
perform work that requires hourly quotas.
Tr. 22.
The ALJ next found that, prior to January 7, 2023 (when, as noted above,
Plaintiff’s age category changed to an individual closely approaching advanced age),
Plaintiff could perform certain unskilled sedentary jobs listed in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) (hand packer, production worker, and inspector tester
sorter), which the VE testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s RFC and
vocational factors (age, education, work experience) could perform and that were
available in significant numbers in the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act during that time.
However, the ALJ found that as of January 7, 2023, the date Plaintiff’s age
category changed, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines directed a finding that Plaintiff was
“disabled,” based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a timely request for review by the Appeals Council, which
was denied on November 8, 2023. Plaintiff has thus exhausted all administrative
remedies, and the ALJ’s decision stands as the final agency action now under review.
As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff raises the following arguments in her pro
se brief before this Court: (1) the ALJ erred by finding her not disabled prior to her 50th
birthday based on her traumatic brain injury and the medical record; (2) the VE’s
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testimony did not support the ALJ’s decision; and (3) the ALJ should have further
developed the record to include witness statements from Plaintiff’s family members and
others.
Plaintiff has submitted with her brief filed in this Court witness statements from
her adult son, who also serves as her caregiver; her two adult daughters, and a personal
care assistant working with a community provider, all apparently prepared in November
of 2024. ECF No. 15-1, 15-2, 15-3, and 15-4. These letters describe Plaintiff’s
difficulties in completing activities of daily living since her traumatic brain injury.
Plaintiff asks that the ALJ’s decision be reversed in part, and that full benefits be
awarded. Plaintiff further seeks $100,000 for mental anguish and emotional distress that
she claims were suffered from the denial of her full benefits.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Statutory Framework
In reviewing the denial of Social Security disability benefits, a court must review
the entire administrative record to determine whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 992 (8th
Cir. 2011). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence . . . is more than a mere scintilla.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019). “It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

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A reviewing court “must consider evidence that both supports and detracts from
the ALJ’s decision. If, after review, [the court finds] it possible to draw two inconsistent
positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner’s
findings, [the court] must affirm the decision of the Commissioner.” Chaney v. Colvin,
812 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Put another way, a court should
“disturb the ALJ’s decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice.” Papesh
v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). A decision does not
fall outside that zone simply because the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion had it been the finder of fact in the first instance. Id.
To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy, by reason of a
medically determinable impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for not
less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner has promulgated
regulations, found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, establishing a five-step sequential evaluation
process to determine disability. The Commissioner begins by deciding whether the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the Commissioner decides
whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of impairments. A
severe impairment is one which significantly limits a person’s physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A special technique is used to
determine the severity of mental disorders. This technique calls for rating the claimant’s
degree of limitations in four areas of functioning: understanding, remembering, or
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applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace; and adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3).
If the impairment or combination of impairments is severe and meets the duration
requirement, the Commissioner determines at step three whether the claimant’s
impairment meets or is medically equal to one of the deemed-disabling impairments
listed in the Commissioner’s regulations. If not, the Commissioner asks at step four
whether the claimant has the RFC to perform his past relevant work. If the claimant
cannot perform his past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts at step five to the
Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant retains the RFC to perform work that is
available in the national economy and that is consistent with the claimant’s vocational
factors – age, education, and work experience. See, e.g., Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d
922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010).
At step five, the medical-vocational guidelines come into play. These guidelines
“are a set of charts listing certain vocational profiles that warrant a finding of disability or
non-disability.” McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir.2011) (citing 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpt. P, App. 2). “If the ALJ’s findings as to RFC, age, education, and work
experience fit any of the combinations of those criteria contained in the Tables in
Appendix 2 to Part 404, then the ALJ must reach the conclusion (either ‘disabled’ or ‘not
disabled’) directed by the relevant Rule or line of the applicable Table.” Phillips v.
Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 816
(8th Cir.1993)). When a claimant cannot perform the full range of work in a particular
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category of work (medium, light, and sedentary) listed in the regulations, the ALJ must
generally produce testimony by a VE (or other similar evidence) to meet the step-five
burden. See Baker v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 882, 894 (8th Cir. 2006). But even though
the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at this step, the burden of
persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926,
932 (8th Cir. 2016).
Finding of No Disability Prior to January 7, 2023 Based on RFC and VE Testimony
Although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to follow proper protocol and ignored
her traumatic brain injury diagnosis, it is clear from the record that the ALJ followed the
above-noted sequential evaluation process, including the special technique for evaluating
mental impairments, and recognized that both Plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury and her
cervical spine degenerative disc disease were severe impairments. However, the ALJ
found that these impairments, alone and in combination, did not rise to the level of a
listed impairment. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this finding was erroneous.
Plaintiff “bears the burden at step three of showing that [her] impairments meet or
equal an impairment described in the listings.” Cronin v. Saul, 945 F.3d 1062, 1066–67
(8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “To establish equivalency, a claimant must present
medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one, most similar, listed
impairment.” Id. “[M]erely being diagnosed with a condition named in a listing and
meeting some of the criteria will not qualify a claimant for presumptive disability under
the listing.” Lott v. Colvin, 772 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2014).
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Here, the ALJ properly discussed the applicable listings—namely, listings 1.15
and 1.16 for Plaintiff’s spinal impairment, and listing 11.18 for Plaintiff’s traumatic brain
injury—at step three, and explained why Plaintiff failed satisfy the criteria required to
qualify her for presumptive disability under these listings. Tr. 20-21. Plaintiff has not
identified any error in these findings or explained which criteria she satisfies or what
evidence in the record supports such a contention.
Likewise, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s impairments in the context of
determining her RFC at step four. A claimant’s RFC is defined as “what [the claimant]
can still do” despite her “physical or mental limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The
ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence, including
the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s
own description of her limitations. McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.
2000) (citing Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Here, the ALJ considered the consistency of the evidence including the objective
medical imaging, examination findings, Plaintiff’s treatment and its effectiveness, prior
administrative medical findings, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and Plaintiff’s
testimony, in assessing the RFC. Tr. 21-24. Upon consideration of the evidence, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms were not fully supported by the record. Tr. 22.
As the ALJ discussed, Plaintiff sustained a concussion after falling and hitting her
head in February 2021. Tr. 23. She was diagnosed with post-concussive syndrome,
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posttraumatic headaches, chronic migraines, and, later, emerging vestibular dysfunction.
Tr. 23, 285, 606. Plaintiff’s cervical spine MRI results showed a straightening of the
normal cervical lordosis, clinically related to muscle spasm, and multi-level cervical
spine disc protrusion. Tr. 23, 1146-47. However, her brain MRI was unremarkable.
Tr. 286. In the months following her concussion, Plaintiff developed right-side
weakness, right-side neck pain, confusion, and mental fogginess and was evaluated for a
stroke, which was ruled out. Tr. 23, 485, 515. Plaintiff improved with physical or
vestibular therapy, occipital nerve blocks, and medication. Tr. 606, 610, 810, 911, 1161.
Plaintiff’s treating provider for her post-concussive syndrome, Matthew Bayes,
M.D., noted in June of 2021, that he was “confused by [Plaintiff’s] inconsistent physical
exam findings,” and reported that notwithstanding her subjective complaints, Plaintiff
was alert and oriented, in no apparent distress, and had excellent eye contact, thought
content, and speech. Tr. 602. Dr. Bayes further noted that he was “confused that
[Plaintiff] can work on her inventions right now but she cannot work as a classroom
teacher.” Id.
In August 2021, Plaintiff stated that her headaches were “pretty much
nonexistent.” Tr. 474). She was treated on more than one occasion in a well-lit room
without complaint or apparent distress. Tr. 606, 614. The record reflects normal gait
and/or coordination throughout the relevant time period. See, e.g., Tr. 285, 326, 478,
606, 610, 668, 702, 915, 1155.

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Due to her symptom improvement, Dr. Bayes discussed with Plaintiff on
September 1, 2021 stopping therapy and released Plaintiff to go back to work as a
substitute teacher, if she so chose. Tr. 614. Further, in October of 2022, during
physical therapy through SSM Health, Plaintiff ambulated independently during
functional testing and showed no impairment with straight and normal cadence, change in
gait speed, stepping around objects, and stairs. Tr. 1205-06. The record thus does not
support a finding of greater physical limitations than those the ALJ incorporated into the
RFC.
As to Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments, she was repeatedly found to be alert
and oriented with intact comprehension, and normal memory, attention, and
concentration throughout the relevant time period. Tr. 285, 602, 606, 627, 914. The
record simply does not support impaired concentration or attention beyond the ALJ’s
limitations to simple and routine tasks with no hourly production quotas.
The ALJ also considered prior administrative medical findings but incorporated
into the RFC even greater limitations than those found by state agency medical
consultants, based on the ALJ’s independent and thorough examination of the record.
Tr. 23-24. At the initial level of review, the state agency medical consultants found that
Plaintiff could perform medium exertional work with occasional climbing of ramps,
stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Tr. 70-71. On reconsideration, the consultants
determined that Plaintiff could perform light exertional work and occasionally climb
ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and must avoid even moderate exposure to
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vibration and hazards. Tr. 81-82. State agency psychological consultants at the initial
and reconsideration levels of review found that Plaintiff could understand and remember
simple to complex tasks; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace with simple tasks; adapt;
and interact in most social situations. Tr. 69, 84. But upon review of the medical
records, observations of treating physicians, and Plaintiff’s own descriptions of her
limitations, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments required greater limitations.
Thus, the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to only sedentary work with several additional
restrictions as reflected in the RFC, to account for Plaintiff’s physical and mental
symptoms. Tr. 22.
In asserting that the ALJ erred, Plaintiff focuses heavily on a statement made by
her treating provider, Dr. Bayes, on August 9, 2021 that Plaintiff was “really not making
any progress” (Tr. 610). However, the ALJ took note of this statement in evaluating
Plaintiff’s RFC. Tr. 23. Further, the same note from Dr. Bayes goes on to state that
Plaintiff was not on any medication except Tylenol or Advil; that despite preferring to be
seen in a room with the lights off, Plaintiff was alert and oriented in no apparent distress;
that Plaintiff had a normal gait; that her near point convergence test was normal; and that
while she had some mild pain in her neck, back pain, and subjective reports of decreased
sensation, there was no weakness and no significant pain over the greater or lesser
occipital nerve. Dr. Bayes’s assessment on this date was therefore post-concussion
syndrome, but he reported an “inconsistent exam” and only “possible vestibular

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dysfunction” with a note that he would like to discuss the case with Plaintiff’s physical
therapist. Tr. 610.
Further, a note from Dr. Bayes only one month later, on September 1, 2021 (when
Plaintiff was still 48 years old), reported that Plaintiff’s symptom score had dropped from
102 to 83, that Plaintiff was seen in a well-lit room without complaint and did not
describe any lower extremity, arm, or low back pain when Dr. Bayes palpated her
cervical spine, and that although Plaintiff quit her job as a teacher, she was “very active
outside of work,” including working on her inventions and doing podcasts. Tr. 614. In
short, Dr. Bayes’s treatment notes as a whole, and read in the context of the entire record,
support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s impairments were not so severe as to render her
disabled prior to her 50th birthday.
In addition to Dr. Bayes’s statement, Plaintiff focuses on her symptoms related to
her alleged “photophobia” or light sensitivity; Plaintiff argues that these symptoms
should have given rise to a more restrictive RFC. See ECF No. 20 at 3. The ALJ took
note of Plaintiff’s subjective reports of light sensitivity and found that while Plaintiff’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause this and other
alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of these symptoms were not fully supported by the record. Tr. 22.
This finding by the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the record. For
example, the portions of the record Plaintiff cites as support of her symptoms related to
light sensitivity are merely notes documenting Plaintiff’s own subjective reports of such
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sensitivity and Plaintiff’s decision to wear dark glasses to her appointments. See ECF
No. 20 at 3; see also Tr. 524, 261-62. But as noted above, Plaintiff was also reported to
be seen in a well-lit room without complaint (Tr. 614), and the imaging of her orbital
contents and optic nerves was normal. Tr. 264. Likewise, Plaintiff’s treating doctor,
Seth Hepner, M.D., indicated the following in his April 28, 2021 neurology evaluation of
Plaintiff: “Interestingly, my MA reports that [Plaintiff] came back from the waiting room
just fine, but upon entering the exam room immediately started complaining that the
lights were too bright, and that voices were too loud, and she reports it was ‘as if a switch
had been flipped.’” Tr. 284. In his impression, Dr. Hepner indicated that Plaintiff had
post-concussive syndrome with posttraumatic headache and “[c]hronic migraine without
aura without status migrainosus, not intractable,” but he did not indicate any medical
diagnosis related to Plaintiff’s alleged light sensitivity. Tr. 285-86. Nor has Plaintiff
identified any other such diagnosis in the record. Plaintiff simply has not demonstrated
that the record supports further restrictions in the RFC based on her subjective reports of
light sensitivity.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that one of her physical or vestibular therapy providers,
Athletico, “determined that she was not well enough to continue” and that she was
“terminated from the program because she was not well enough to participate” (ECF No.
17 at 2-3). In support of these assertions, she cites pages 810 through 834 of the
transcript. ECF No. 17 at 3. These pages of the transcript demonstrate that, early on in
her therapy, Plaintiff needed frequent breaks (Tr. 833, 831) and that, on one occasion, she
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had to rest in isolation due to an instance of increased noise that day at the clinic but that
she thereafter returned and was able to complete the full program (Tr. 811). The same
records also indicate that, over the course of her therapy, Plaintiff repeatedly
demonstrated improved exercise tolerance and reduced symptoms, and was expected to
only further improve with continued vestibular rehabilitation (Tr. 827, 825, 819, 817,
814). However, Plaintiff thereafter cancelled her therapy appointments, was reported to
have “non-compliance with recommended session attendance,” and self-discharged with
a note from Athletico that its “attempts to contact [Plaintiff] were unsuccessful.” Tr.
808-09. Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that Athletico terminated Plaintiff from its
physical therapy program due to Plaintiff’s symptoms or impairments is simply not
supported by the record.
In short, after carefully reviewing the totality of the evidence, the ALJ formulated
an RFC that accommodated all of Plaintiff’s functional limitations, as supported by the
record, and Plaintiff has not shown that the record supports any greater degree of
limitation.
Nor has Plaintiff identified any error in the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony.
“A vocational expert’s testimony based on a properly phrased hypothetical question
constitutes substantial evidence” supporting the ALJ’s decision. Galloway v. Kijakazi,
46 F.4th 686, 689 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). And “the ALJ's hypothetical
question to the vocational expert needs to include only those impairments that the ALJ
finds are substantially supported by the record as a whole.” Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465
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F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ’s hypothetical question in this case included all
of the limitations that the ALJ found consistent with the record and also set forth in
Plaintiff’s RFC. As noted above, the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence,
and the hypothetical question to the VE was therefore proper.
Development of the Record and New Statements from Family Members and Others
Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to assert that the ALJ should have
sought information from nonmedical sources such as her family members and a personal
care assistant whose November 2024 statements Plaintiff now submits to this Court. An
ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly, but “[u]ltimately, the claimant bears
the burden of proving disability and providing medical evidence as to the existence and
severity of an impairment.” Kamann v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2013).
“There is no bright line rule indicating when the Commissioner has or has not adequately
developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis.”
Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The inquiry
focuses on “whether [the plaintiff] was prejudiced or treated unfairly by how the ALJ did
or did not develop the record; absent unfairness or prejudice, [courts] will not remand.”
Onstad v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff has not shown that any additional evidence provided by her family
members or other sources here would have altered the ALJ’s assessment. The letters
Plaintiff now provides merely restate her subjective complaints. Plaintiff has not shown
the letters are non-cumulative or that there is any reasonable likelihood the letters would
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have changed the Commissioner’s determination so as to warrant remand to the ALJ.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Colvin, 762 F.3d 701, 708 (8th Cir. 2014) (describing standard for
remand to consider additional evidence not presented to the ALJ or Appeals Council).
Request for Compensatory Damages
In addition to an award of benefits for the period prior to her 50th birthday,
Plaintiff requests damages for mental anguish she alleges to have suffered from the
wrongful denial of benefits. As noted above, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any error in
the ALJ’s decision. Further, the Court’s role on judicial review is merely to affirm,
modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision, with or without remanding the cause for
rehearing. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court has no authority to award money
damages. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988) (“The [Social Security] Act,
however, makes no provision for remedies in money damages against officials
responsible for unconstitutional conduct that leads to the wrongful denial of benefits.”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED. A separate Judgment shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

_______________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated on this 11th day of March, 2025.
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