A.L. et al v. Special School District of St. Louis County et al

Filing 36

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No. 28 ], is granted in part and denied in part. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I and V are DISMISSED. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants' prior Joint Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. No. 14 ], is DENIED as moot. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 10/24/2024. (CLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
A.L., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 4:24CV179 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Special School District of St.
Louis County (“SSD”) and Ferguson-Florissant School District’s (“FFSD”) Joint
Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 28]. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. For the reasons
set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
Facts and Background
On February 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the SSD and the
FFSD pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). They
also filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3).
In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to
provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA (Count I),
and they seek attorneys’ fees as the prevailing parties pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)
(Count II). Plaintiffs bring claims of disability discrimination under § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Counts III
and IV), as well as race and disability discrimination under the Missouri Human
Rights Act (“MHRA”) (Count V). They ask the Court to find that: Defendants
violated the child-find provisions of the IDEA, Defendants failed to provide a
FAPE under the IDEA, and that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties before the
Administrative Hearing Commission (“AHC”). They seek damages and request
that the Court order Defendants to provide compensatory educational services for
the entire duration of the child-find violation.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges the following facts: A.L. is a
nine-year-old boy enrolled in the fourth grade in the FFSD. He has a medical
diagnosis of dyslexia and educational diagnoses of language impairment, sound
system disorder, and specific learning disabilities in basic reading, reading fluency,
and written expression.
When A.L. was in kindergarten in 2019, FFSD provided A.L. with a
state-mandated reading assessment, and he scored one out of six in “concepts of
spoken word.” FFSD provided A.L. with another reading assessment in first grade,
and he again failed the “concepts of spoken word” section. In 2020, FFSD placed
A.L. in a reading intervention group that utilized a program called Systematic
Instruction in Phonological Awareness, Phonics, and Sight Words (“SIPPS”) for
the entire school year but did not notify his parents about the results of his reading
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assessments or refer him for an evaluation for suspicion of a learning disability.
A.L. entered second grade as a “non-reader,” who was reading at a kindergarten
level, and FFSD again placed him in the SIPPS program. From January to May
2022, FFSD provided A.L. with an hour of before-school reading intervention.
When A.L. entered third grade in the fall of 2022, his teacher had not been
notified about his prior reading levels and interventions because FFSD had no
procedures for sharing information about students from one year to the next. When
A.L. received a positive result in a state-mandated dyslexia screening in September
2022, FFSD placed him in the SIPPS program. On October 5, 2022, A.L.’s mother
sent an email to his teacher to formally request a plan under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The teacher notified the school counselor and referred A.L. to
the Care Team, which is the mechanism for FFSD teachers to initiate an evaluation
process and special education services. The Care Team referred A.L. to the SIPPS
program for data gathering and scheduled a follow-up meeting in six weeks, but
the Care Team failed to conduct a follow-up meeting.
On December 13, 2022, A.L.’s mother asked FFSD about her request for a
§ 504 plan. FFSD informed her that her request had been denied and that she
should ask A.L.’s pediatrician to test him for dyslexia. When A.L.’s mother
contacted A.L.’s pediatrician, she was told that pediatricians do not ordinarily
conduct dyslexia tests. She then reached out to the Missouri Department of
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Elementary and Secondary Education and was told to contact the Missouri Office
of Civil Rights.
On January 4, 2023, A.L.’s mother emailed multiple FFSD employees
requesting written confirmation that the school had denied her request for a § 504
plan. On January 12, she sent an email requesting an Individualized Education Plan
(“IEP”) for A.L. On January 23, FFSD held a § 504 eligibility meeting, decided to
provide A.L. with a § 504 plan for the rest of the school year, noted that A.L.’s
parents had requested a special education evaluation, and determined that there
was reason to suspect that A.L. had disabilities. In February, SSD refused the
requested evaluation based on its determination that FFSD’s data packet did not
support a suspicion of disability. A.L.’s parents later discovered that the data
packet did not include important information such as A.L.’s Galileo scores, writing
samples, and intervention data.
In April 2023, A.L.’s parents retained counsel and renewed their request for
an evaluation. They filed a due process complaint on May 1. FFSD then evaluated
A.L. and, in late June, found him eligible for special education services on the
bases of a language impairment, sound system disorder, and specific learning
disabilities in basic reading skills, written expression, and reading fluency.
Defendants determined that A.L. was eligible for special education on July 12, and

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they wrote an IEP for him on July 27. A.L. began receiving special education
instruction at the beginning of the school year on August 28.
The AHC held a due process hearing on the petition in October. On
November 3, 2023, the AHC issued a decision, finding that Defendants violated
their child-find obligation under the IDEA by failing to conduct an educational
evaluation of A.L. when his parents requested an evaluation in January 2023. The
AHC found that the child-find violation deprived A.L. of 14 school days of special
education services and ordered Defendants to provide 1,386 minutes of
compensatory special education services. However, the AHC denied Plaintiffs’
request to order Defendants to provide compensatory education through the NOW!
program.
Defendants move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state
a claim. [Doc. No. 28]. They argue that Count I was not timely filed within 45 days
of the AHC’s November 3, 2023 decision, Count II should be dismissed because it
is untimely and Plaintiffs have not proven that they were the prevailing parties,
Counts III and IV failed to adequately allege facts establishing bad faith or gross
misjudgment, and Count V should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss. [Doc. No. 30].
However, Plaintiffs do not contest the motion to dismiss with respect to Count V,
as they concede that they did not exhaust their administrative remedies.
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Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When analyzing a motion to
dismiss, “a court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Martin v. Iowa,
752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). However, courts “need not accept as true a
plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Glick
v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019).
Discussion
Count I – Failure to Provide a FAPE under the IDEA
Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed as time-barred because
Missouri has an explicit time limitation for seeking judicial review of the AHC’s
decision. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Missouri law provides a 45-day time limit for
bringing such a claim, but they contend that § 1415(i)(2)(B) does not require the
Court to use Missouri’s 45-day time limit and that using the 45-day time limit
would frustrate the broad remedial purpose of the IDEA.
The IDEA provides that the party bringing an action under § 1415(i)(2)(A)
“shall have 90 days from the date of the hearing officer to bring such an action, or,
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if the State has an explicit time limitation for bringing such action under this
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Under
Missouri law, a party may appeal the AHC’s decision in federal court “within
forty-five days of the agency’s final decision.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 162.962(3). The
Missouri State Plan for Special Education contains regulations implementing Part
B of the IDEA and states that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decisions
made in a hearing may appeal the decision within forty-five (45) days to the state
courts . . . or in federal court without regard to the amount in controversy.”
Missouri State Plan for Special Education: Regulations for Implementing Part B of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Missouri Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education, at 80 (April 2023).
The Court finds that Missouri’s 45-day time limit for seeking judicial review
of the AHC’s decision applies to Count I. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 162.962(3); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines,
LLC, 556 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2009) (“In the usual case, if ‘the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms.’” (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241
(1989))). Thus, the deadline for Plaintiffs to appeal the AHC’s November 3, 2023
decision was December 18, 2023. Because Plaintiffs filed their complaint on

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February 1, 2024, Count I is untimely and must be dismissed. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(B); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 162.962(3).
Count II – Attorneys’ Fees under the IDEA
Defendants argue that Count II should be dismissed as untimely for the same
reasons as Count I. But unlike § 1415(i)(2)(B)’s statute of limitations for merits
actions, the IDEA “does not include a statute of limitations for a prevailing party to
file a cause of action for attorneys’ fees.” Richardson v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 957
F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B), (i)(3)). In
Richardson, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision to borrow
the statute of limitations for IDEA merits actions from the state’s statutory
framework for IDEA compliance and apply it to a § 1415(i)(3) claim for attorneys’
fees. Id. at 875. The court reasoned that doing so would not frustrate the policy
embedded in the IDEA, “particularly in our circuit where we have held that the
statute of limitations period for a prevailing party seeking attorneys’ fees does not
begin to run ‘until the 90-day period [expires] for an aggrieved party to challenge
the IDEA administrative decision by filing a complaint in court.’” Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Brittany O. v. Bentonville Sch. Dist., 683 F. App’x 556, 558 (8th
Cir. 2017) (per curiam)). Because the statute of limitations period did not begin to
run until February 1, 2024, Count II is timely. See id.

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Defendants assert that Count II also fails because the AHC ordered
significantly less relief than Plaintiffs requested and, thus, Plaintiffs were not the
prevailing parties. Plaintiffs respond that they were the prevailing parties because
the AHC ordered Defendants to provide compensatory education services that
altered the legal relationship between the parties and directly benefitted A.L.
“A litigant is a ‘prevailing party’ if he obtains ‘actual relief on the merits of
his claim [that] materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.’”
Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (alteration in
original). Here, the AHC ordered Defendants to provide A.L. with 1,386 minutes
of compensatory educational services. Because those services were actual relief on
the merits of Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim that materially altered the legal relationship
between the parties by modifying Defendants’ behavior in a way that directly
benefitted A.L., Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties. See id. (“This right to
compensatory education suffices to make [Plaintiffs] a ‘prevailing party’ entitled to
attorneys’ fees.”). Accordingly, Count II adequately states a claim.
Counts III and IV – Disability Discrimination under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
Defendants argue that Counts III and IV fail because the First Amended
Complaint did not contain factual allegations establishing that Defendants acted in
bad faith or with gross misjudgment, which is required to state a claim for
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violations of the ADA and § 504 that are based on educational services for
disabled children. Plaintiffs contend that the allegations regarding Defendants’
failure to identify A.L. as a child with a disability in need of special education
services over the course of years, Defendants’ failure to include relevant
documentation in A.L.’s data packet without rational justification, A.L.’s
documented signs of dyslexia and failure to meet grade-level expectations, and his
teacher’s suspicion that A.L. might have a learning disability are sufficient to
establish that Defendants acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment.
“A plaintiff’s prima facie case under § 504 requires a showing that the
plaintiff (1) was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) was denied the benefits
of a program or activity of a public entity receiving federal funds; and (3) was
discriminated against based on his disability.” Estate of Barnwell ex rel. Barnwell
v. Watson, 880 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2018). Where the alleged § 504 and ADA
violations are based on educational services for disabled children, the Eighth
Circuit has consistently held that “the plaintiff must prove that school officials
acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment.” B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway
R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2013). To establish bad faith or gross
misjudgment, “a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct ‘depart[ed]
substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards [so] as to
demonstrate that the person[s] responsible actually did not base the decision on
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such a judgment.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 2008)). Bad faith or gross
misjudgment requires more than mere non-compliance with the applicable federal
statutes. Richardson, 957 F.3d at 876. Instead, “[t]he non-compliance ‘must
deviate so substantially from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the defendant acted with wrongful intent.’” Id. at
876-77 (quoting B.M. ex rel. Miller, 732 F.3d at 887). Taking the well-pleaded
allegations as true and giving Plaintiffs the benefit of reasonable inferences, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for violations of § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
Count V – Race and Disability Discrimination under the MHRA
Defendants contend that Count V should be dismissed because Plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and Plaintiffs concede that they did
not file a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights (“MCHR”) prior to bringing their MHRA claim. Because Plaintiffs admit
that they did not file a charge of discrimination with the MCHR prior to filing their
complaint, they have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to
their MHRA claim. See Henson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1080 (8th
Cir. 2021) (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.075.1) (explaining that plaintiffs must
exhaust their administrative remedies under Missouri law by filing a charge of
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discrimination with the MCHR before brining claims under the MHRA).
Therefore, Count V must be dismissed.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part. Count I is dismissed as untimely, and Count V is
dismissed for failure to exhaust. Counts II, III, and IV remain viable and may
proceed.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss,
[Doc. No. 28], is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counts I and V are DISMISSED.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendants’ prior Joint Motion to
Dismiss, [Doc. No. 14], is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 24th day of October, 2024.

________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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