Enos v. O'Malley

Filing 18

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is affirmed. Signed by District Judge Henry Edward Autrey on 3/10/2025. (CLH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
TRACY ENOS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
1
LELAND DUDEK,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 4:24CV499 HEA

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of Plaintiff for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 401434(g) and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385. The Court has reviewed the filings and the
administrative record as a whole, which includes the hearing transcript and medical
evidence. The decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
INTRODUCTION

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Leland Dudek became the Commissioner of Social Security on February 16, 2025. Pursuant to
Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Leland Dudek should be substituted as the
defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 USC §405(g) for judicial review of
Defendant's final decision denying Plaintiffs applications for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) under Title XVI.
On September 25, 2015, and November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed applications
for DIB and SSI benefits, respectively. (Tr. 160-1, 175-82). On February 5, 2016,
Defendant issued a Notice of Disapproved Claims. (Tr. 91-5). On February 16,
2016, Plaintiff filed a timely Request/or Hearing by Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (Tr. 109-112). After a hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
dated January 26, 2018. (Tr. 13-33). On February 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed a timely
Request for Review of Hearing Decision/Order with Defendant agency's Appeals
Council that was undated. (Tr. 156-9). On August 7, 2018, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 1-6). On October 4, 2018, Plaintiff filed a
complaint in this Court and on December 30, 2019, this Court issued a
Memorandum and Order reversing and remanding the case to the ALJ. (Tr. 550-61,
590-616, 617). February 14, 2020, the Appeals Council Ordered the case back to
the ALJ. (Tr. 618-22). After a second hearing, the ALJ issued another unfavorable
decision dated October 6, 2020. (Tr. 427-53). On January 13, 2021, plaintiff filed a
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second complaint in this Court, which resulted in a second Remand Order dated
November 8, 2023. A third hearing was held and a third unfavorable decision was
issued dated December 20, 2023. (Tr. 902-928). Plaintiff's case is, again, before
this Court as the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Agency.
Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying her application for DIB and SSI. Plaintiff argues that the
administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in relying on a non-examining physician’s
residual functional capacity assessments which were completed almost a year prior
to the hearing as not based on the full record. She further argues the decision lacks
a proper evaluation of Plaintiff’s treating providers, Dr. Giuffra and Psychiatric
Mental Health Nurse Practitioner (PMHNP) Cunningham.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1385 (Tr. 160-63, 175-85).
Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3),
provide for judicial review of a “final decision” of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (SSA). The applications were denied initially and by an
ALJ in January 2018, following an administrative hearing (Tr. 523-43). The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review in August 2018 (Tr. 544-49)
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and, following a complaint filed by Plaintiff, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri remanded the case in December 2019 (Tr. 590-617). The
Appeals Council later vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the claim in
February 2020 (Tr. 618-22). After a new hearing, an ALJ again found Plaintiff not
disabled in October 2020 (Tr. 961-87). A new complaint was filed in July 2021,
and the Court remanded the claim in November 2022 (Tr. 988-1009). Following
the Appeals Council’s order of remand (Tr. 1010-12) and a new administrative
hearing (Tr. 929-53), an ALJ again found Plaintiff not disabled as defined in the
Act (Tr. 902-28). This action followed.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s bipolar affective disorder was a severe
impairment (Tr. 908). At step three of the sequential assessment, the ALJ found
moderate limitations in all four broad areas of functioning and that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the requirements of an impairment listed in or medically equal to one contained in
20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (Tr. 909-11).
The ALJ considered the medical and nonmedical evidence and determined
that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform work with mental and social limitations
(Tr. 911). Specifically, Plaintiff was limited to work that required only occasional
changes in the work setting that were introduced gradually and could maintain the
concentration required to understand, remember, and carry out simple and routine
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tasks and could stay on task and meet reasonable production requirements in an
environment that allowed her to maintain a flexible and goal-oriented pace but
could not work at a fast pace such as an assembly line (Tr. 911). Plaintiff could
have occasional interaction with supervisors and occasional interaction with coworkers, but could not perform tandem tasks, and occasional superficial interaction
with the public such as providing limited information in response to questions, but
the work must not involve things like handling customer complaints or responding
to customer questions as a primary component of the job (Tr. 911).
The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to a qualified vocational expert
assuming an individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC (Tr. 950). In
response, the vocational expert identified work existing in significant numbers in
the national economy that the individual could perform (Tr. 951). Accordingly, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 918).
Plaintiff filed her applications for dib and SSI alleging disability beginning
September 23, 2015 (Tr. 160-63, 175-85, 219). She stated that she was born in
1965, and she alleged disability due to bipolar affective disorder, anxiety and panic
attacks, major recurrent depression, and arthritis (Tr. 160, 175, 219). The Court
further adopts the facts as set forth by the ALJ regarding Plaintiff’s medical
treatment and vocational history (Tr. 907-17).
DISCUSSION
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As long as substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ's
decision, a reviewing court must affirm. Grindley v. Kijakazi, 9 F.4th 622, 627 (8th
Cir. 2021). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a
reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a decision.” Kirby v.
Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). The court “do[es] not reweigh the
evidence or review the factual record de novo.” Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188
(8th Cir. 1994). If, after reviewing the evidence, “it is possible to draw two
inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the
[ALJ's] findings, [the court] must affirm the decision.” Robinson v. Sullivan, 956
F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ cannot rely on a non-examining physician’s
RCE when the agency RFC assessments, were not based on the full record.
Plaintiff’s argument fails to recognize that although the ALJ found Dr. Skolnick
and Dr. Akenson’s opinions entitled to significant weight, she also discussed the
subsequent evidence in the record and formulated a significantly more restrictive
RFC than Dr. Skolnick. (Tr. 911-14) Moreover, the ALJ discussed the evidence that
Plaintiff’s symptoms responded to medication with normal mental status findings
throughout Plaintiff’s treatment. (Tr. 1168, 1231-32, 1238-40, 1245-47, 1252-54,
1259-61, 1266-68, 1271-72, 1277, 1287, 1292).

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Likewise, the ALJ discussed the consistency of Dr. Akenson with Plaintiff’s
medical records. Dr. Akeson noted that Plaintiff did not routinely experience
episodes of manic and/or depressive behavior and was not hospitalized since 2015.
Indeed, the record establishes that to date, Plaintiff has not been hospitalized since
briefly in 2015. Again, the ALJ found a more restrictive RFC than Dr. Akeson.
Although Plaintiff argues the ALJ again did the “exact same thing in this
decision as in the previous decisions,” Plaintiff fails to recognize the ALJ’s
decision is based on Plaintiff’s treatment, daily activities, Plaintiff’s abilities to
carry out normal functions such as caring for her children, driving, helping care for
the family pet, perform normal grooming functions, drive, shop, present as alert,
oriented, pleasant and cooperative with appropriate mood and affect, with intact
memory, intelligence, attention, concentration, judgment, and insight. The ALJ did
not merely rely on the two consultive opinions, but based her decision on the
opinions and the medical record before her and Plaintiff’s own testimony as to her
daily functions
Significantly, the ALJ’s opinion appropriately assessed Plaintiff’s use of
marijuana and alcohol use, the issue on which the matter was remanded in 2023.
The ALJ found that neither marijuana nor alcohol was a significant factor in
Plaintiff’s disability determination.

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With respect to the weight given to Plaintiff’s treating medical providers, Dr.
Giuffra and Nurse Practitioner Masha Cunningham, the ALJ carefully discussed
Dr. Giuffra’s treatment notes, the length of treatment and effectiveness of
Plaintiff’s symptoms. (Tr. 916-17). Each opinion offered by Dr. Giuffra was
discussed by the ALJ. The ALJ noted inconsistencies with the record and specific
inconsistencies between his treatment notes and opinions.
Nurse Practitioner Cunningham’s opinion was given partial weight because
her opinion as to marked limitations were not consistent with the record. Indeed,
Nurse Practitioner Cunningham was not completely committed to a finding that
Plaintiff’s stopping work was due to her mental health. The ALJ carefully
considered Nurse Practitioner Cunningham’s opinion vis a vis the entire record and
concluded that it was not fully supported.
The Eighth Circuit requires the reviewing court to “determine whether the
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole.” Baker v. Barnhart, 457 F.3d 882, 892 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance [of the evidence],” in that it
merely requires that a reasonable person find the evidence adequate to support the
Commissioner's decision. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Cox v. Barnhart, 345
F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 2003).

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The reviewing court must find deficiencies that significantly undermine the
ALJ's determination to reverse and remand. Draper v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 1127,
1130 (8th Cir. 2005). The court may reverse the Commissioner's decision only if it
falls outside of the available zone of choice; a decision is not outside this zone
simply because the evidence also points to an alternate outcome. Buckner v. Astrue,
646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011. The ALJ’s opinion is based on the entire record,
the inconsistencies noted in Plaintiff’s treating providers, and Plaintiff’s own
description of her impairments and daily functioning. As such, it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole and must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing analysis, the ALJ’s decision is supported by the
appropriate standard and is affirmed.
Accordingly
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
Dated this 10th day of March 2025.

________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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