Koparan v. The Boeing Company

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's partial motion to dismiss is GRANTED. ECF No. 10 . Counts II and V are DISMISSED; however, the dismissal of Count V is WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Sr. District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig on 3/11/25. (KJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
AYSIN KOPARAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:24-cv-01383-AGF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant The Boeing Company’s (“Boeing”)
motion for partial dismissal, seeking to dismiss Counts II and V of Plaintiff Aysin
Koparan’s employment discrimination complaint for failure to state a claim. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
Taken as true for the purpose of this motion, Plaintiff alleges the following facts.
Plaintiff was employed by Boeing for 15 years, last serving as a Senior Business
Operation Lead in St. Louis County, Missouri. ECF No. 6, Compl. ¶ 8. During her time
as a Boeing employee, she routinely received stellar performance reviews—until she
began raising concerns in the summer of 2022. Id. ¶ 9. On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff
attended an after-hours event with Boeing coworkers at Syberg’s restaurant on Dorsett
Road. Id. ¶ 10. While there, Greg Corcoran (“Corcoran”), a Senior Lead Engineer above
her in the corporate hierarchy, asked Plaintiff, in front of other employees, “[w]hen did
you have sex last?” Id. ¶ 11. After Plaintiff chose not to respond, he then asked about

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her first sexual experience, which prompted Plaintiff to reply “[d]o not talk to me that
way again.” Id. ¶ 12. Corcoran followed by asking, “Are you having a cat fight?” (when
referring to Plaintiff’s relationship with a female co-worker, and adding, “[w]hat’s going
on between you and your husband?” and “[y]ou don’t seem like the marrying type.” Id. ¶
13.
On August 18, 2022, Plaintiff sent a text to Corcoran about his comments and
requested that he not speak to her that way again. Id. ¶ 14. Additionally, Plaintiff
decided to file a formal complaint against him. Id. ¶ 16. On August 28, 2022, Corcoran
texted Plaintiff, “[d]id you by chance get to the Festival of Nations[.] Thought about you
when the picture in the paper was a Turkish booth,” and on September 1, 2022, he texted:
“[o]ne last text. Are we never going to talk unless it’s hello and good morning or work
related? Work is totally separate. I will never mix personal and work.” Id. ¶¶ 20-21. On
September 3, 2022, Plaintiff responded to Corcoran, “[t]here are 2 separate relationshipspersonal and work. You are only WORK. So, please don’t text my personal number, just
use work email to communicate. Thanks.” Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff was later interviewed by a member of Boeing’s Ethics department on
September 15, 2022, and was subsequently asked to “walk back that her complaints were
related to sexual harassment.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Fearing for her job and feeling pressured,
she agreed. Id. Following this, Plaintiff began experiencing different forms of alleged
retaliation: she received fewer work assignments, was excluded from meetings and
discussions, attitude towards her at the office noticeably changed, and Corcoran openly
discussed Plaintiff’s complaint with coworkers in a resentful manner. Id. ¶¶ 28-32.

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Plaintiff also received her first negative performance review from her supervisor, Ryan
Taylor, because even though she did “good work,” the ethics complaint “slowed (him)
down.” Id. ¶¶ 35-37. This, in turn, affected her workload, bonus, and ability to make
lateral moves or be promoted. Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Plaintiff was further discouraged from
making complaints by Jordan Woodward, a Senior Leader, by implying to her over text
that she should read a book titled “Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff.” Id. ¶ 42.
Despite informing Corcoran that she did not want to be contacted on her personal
number, Plaintiff still received unwanted communication, both virtually and at the office.
Id. ¶ 19. Between the dates of September 3, 2022, and June 3, 2023, Corcoran
flirtatiously lingered around her desk and sent Plaintiff multiple texts after being told not
to contact her personal number. Id. ¶¶ 19-24. Specifically, on February 7, 2023, and
June 2, 2023, respectively, Corcoran sent Plaintiff the following messages:
“Sorry to text your work phone with personal question but I just wanted to
let you know I am praying for your people in turkey[.]”
“I know you hate me but rest assured I continue to pray for you and your
entire family.”
Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
And, on June 3, 2023, Corcoran asked if Plaintiff was “popping into work,” which
initiated a conversation described by Plaintiff in her complaint as follows:
“No. Will be on leave and most likely won’t even have a job soon. Pretty
much was told to find another job … Ryan pretty much gave me a bad
performance review and took my work from me and gave it to someone
else. Double retaliation…”
Mr. Corcoran replied: “You can have my job.”

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Plaintiff then asked if he had gotten any written corrective action, to which
he replied: “No. Someday we will talk(.) Did you get one(?) I would so
love to get together and talk when you get yourself together[.]”
[Plaintiff] then mentioned going to Ryan about Michelle, who was raised in
connection with the comments at [S]yberg’s. Mr. Corcoran then replied:
“You just said something that solved the puzzle for me[.]” (reply from
[Plaintiff])
“That you told him about our conversation” (reply from [Plaintiff])
“That I asked when you first had sex” (reply from [Plaintiff])
“I guess you told him more!!” (reply from [Plaintiff])
“We really need to get together and clear the air!” (further discussion,
including [Plaintiff] stating, “Jordan is nice to me, but I can see the pressure
of Ryan telling him to get rid of me(.) They have the power to get rid of
me”)
“Would you mind sharing your address” ([Plaintiff] asks why.)
“Perhaps I want to send something kind(.) I would never show up without
being invited.” ([Plaintiff] stated “You don’t have to do that and I am sure
you are not crazy (enough) to show up at my door”)
“I know better than to show up at your door you will shoot me! lol”
Id. ¶¶ 43-46.
Plaintiff filed suit on August 30, 2024, after filing a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and receiving a notice of
right to sue. Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII for retaliation (Count I); hostile work
environment based on sex (Count II); sex discrimination (Count III); retaliation in
violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (Count IV); discrimination based
on national origin and race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) (Count V);

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and retaliation/illegal discharge in violation of the Missouri Whistleblower Protection
Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 285.575 (Count VI).
ARGUMENT OF PARTIES
Boeing has moved to dismiss Count II (hostile work environment based on sex) as
untimely, arguing that Plaintiff failed to include any facts alleging sexual harassment
occurring within 300 days of the filing of her Charge of Discrimination. ECF No. 10,
Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) ¶ 3. Boeing asserts that, because the behavior Plaintiff was
subjected to during the filing period was neither based on sex nor met the standard of
being severe or pervasive, Plaintiff is unable to use them to anchor the untimely
allegations. Id. ¶ 4. Boeing also argues that, by failing to demonstrate that the alleged
harassment was based on sex or affected her employment, Plaintiff has not made out an
actionable claim for hostile work environment. Id. Further, Boeing seeks dismissal of
Count V (race discrimination under Section 1981) because Plaintiff’s allegations based
on national origin do not entitle Plaintiff to protection under Section 1981. ECF No. 11.
As to Count II, Plaintiff opposes the partial motion to dismiss and argues both that
she has satisfied the pleading standard for a hostile work environment claim and that the
claim is timely because a continuing violation has been sufficiently pled. See ECF No.
14, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to [Boeing’s] MTD (“Opp.”). As to Count V,
Plaintiff has agreed to voluntarily dismiss her Section 1981 claim without prejudice.
In reply, Boeing does not oppose the dismissal of Count V without prejudice. As
such, the Court will dismiss Count V without prejudice.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s claims must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The reviewing court accepts the plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party. Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). But “[c]ourts are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, and factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
DISCUSSION
To establish a prima facie claim for hostile work environment under Title VII, a
plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected
group; (2) unwelcome harassment occurred; (3) a causal nexus exists between the
harassment and the protected group status; and (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment. Collins v. Pac. R.R. Co., 108 F.4th 1049, 1053
(8th Cir. 2024). Where the alleged harassment is by a non-supervisory coworker,
plaintiffs must also show their employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take proper action. Sickels v. McDonough, No. 4:21-CV-00963-JAR, 2024
WL 3844850, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 16, 2024) (quoting Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 799 (8th Cir. 2021)).
“The fourth element requires [Plaintiff] to demonstrate that the harassment she
experienced was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her]
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Collins, 108 F.4th at 1053

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(internal quotations and citation omitted).1 “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
Courts will consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether a
hostile work environment exists. Henthorn v. Capitol Commc’ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021,
1026 (8th Cir. 2004). Factors that are considered include the frequency and severity of
the behavior; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether the behavior unreasonably interferes with plaintiff’s job
performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 934
(8th Cir. 2002).
“The Supreme Court has cautioned courts to be alert for workplace behavior that
does not rise to the level of actionable harassment.” Al–Zubaidy v. TEK Indus., Inc., 406
F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2005). For that reason, the standards for a hostile environment
are “demanding . . . [and] conduct must be extreme and not merely rude or unpleasant to
affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Alagna v. Smithville R–II Sch. Dist.,
324 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “More than a few isolated

As discussed further below, the Eighth Circuit has continued to impose a “severe
or pervasive” harassment requirement for hostile work environment claims, even after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024), which
addressed the standard for demonstrating discrimination with respect to the terms and
conditions of employment for the purpose of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII.
See Collins, 108 F.4th at 1053-54 (addressing both disparate treatment and hostile work
environment claims post-Muldrow).
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incidents are required,” and the alleged harassment must be “so intimidating, offensive,
or hostile that it ‘poisoned the work environment.’” Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., Inc., 181
F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
Applying this analysis, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a prima
facie hostile work environment claim. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint satisfies
the first two elements of a hostile work environment claim, namely that (1) Plaintiff is a
member of a protected class, and (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment.
The Court will also assume without deciding that Plaintiff has plausibly pled facts in
support of the third element by pleading facts showing that at least some of Corcoran’s
communications with or conduct toward Plaintiff was based on her sex, so as to causally
connect the alleged harassment to Plaintiff’s protected status.
However, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly plead facts in support of the fourth
element: that the complained-of harassment was severe or pervasive as to affect her
employment. In other words, even if Plaintiff is correct that a continuing violation has
been pled, and the Court views the allegations as “a single unlawful employment
practice,” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002), the alleged
harassment still does not rise to an actionable level. As such, the Court will dismiss
Count II without reaching the question of timeliness.
Unwelcome Harassment Based on Sex
To establish the third element of hostile work environment, a plaintiff “must
always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” Onacle

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v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). The only communications or
text messages from Corcoran alleged to be even remotely “tinged with offensive
connotations,” were his questions at Syberg’s asking Plaintiff about her sexual
experiences, her relationship with her husband, and her possible “cat fight” with a female
co-worker, as well as his later text acknowledging his conduct at Syberg’s.2 Compl. ¶¶
11-15, 46. Plaintiff further alleges that Corcoran would “flirtatiously linger[]” around her
desk. Id. ¶ 19. Accepting these allegations as true, the Court will assume without
deciding that Plaintiff has alleged some degree of harassment based on sex.
Severe or Pervasive Harassment
Even assuming that Plaintiff has alleged some form of harassment based on sex,
her hostile work environment claim must be dismissed because she has not plausibly pled
that the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive as to make the work environment
objectively hostile. In attempting to satisfy this element, Plaintiff, unsuccessfully,
compares her situation to cases with facts inapposite to hers. See e.g., Kopman v. City of
Centerville, 871 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (D.S.D. 2012) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because he made “[t]wo to three comments a week for 14 months,”
which were directed to [plaintiff’s] body, including mention of her breast size, leering at

None of the other text messages mentioned or even implicated Plaintiff’s sex at
all, except perhaps Corcoran’s text wishing Plaintiff a Happy Mother’s Day. Compl. ¶
24. The other texts, such as Corcoran saying he was “pray[ing] for [Plaintiff] and
[Plaintiff’s] entire family,” asking if Plaintiff was “popping into work” when she had
taken FMLA leave, and asking if “[Plaintiff] would [] mind sharing [her] address” so he
could “[p]erhaps . . . send something kind,” cannot plausibly be construed as harassment
based on sex Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 43, 46.
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her, commenting on how she looked in jeans, and making derogatory remarks to her);
E.E.O.C. v. Wyeth, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (determining genuine
issues of fact precluded summary judgment on plaintiff’s sexually hostile work
environment claim because defendant made derogatory comments to her, drove by and
yelled at her as she worked, and made physical threats towards her regarding her family);
Hanna v. Boys & Girls Home & Family Servs., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053-54
(N.D. Iowa 2002) (denying summary judgment due to plaintiff being repeatedly
subjected to unwanted sexual advances by her coworker, including him grabbing his
buttocks, thrusting his groin at her, and repeatedly commenting on her walk and
appearance). The facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim are far less egregious than any of
the above-cited cases.
First, the frequency of the conduct alleged here is insufficient to demonstrate a
hostile work environment existed. The complained-of behavior—while unwelcome—
was infrequent. Following the initial incident at Syberg’s on August 17, 2022, and
continuing until June 3, 2023, Corcoran contacted Plaintiff on only four separate
occasions after being told not to contact her. Courts have found similar situations to be
below the requisite pleading standard. See Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935 (holding that a single
request for a relationship, four or five isolated incidents of hand touching, a request to
draw a planter with an obvious sexual innuendo, and teasing was not enough to constitute
a claim for hostile work environment); see also Hairston v. Wormuth, 6 F.4th 834, 84142 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding a prima facie case was not made because plaintiff’s three

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alleged instances of non-physical harassment did not permeate or poison the work
environment).
While the Eighth Circuit has signaled that a few—or even one—alleged instance
of harassment can create an issue of fact as to whether a hostile work environment exists,
those cases involved far more egregious behavior and/or sexual harassment than that
alleged here. See Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1997)
(emphasizing that two instances of sexual touching and the following sexual innuendos
made over a continuous period of time were sufficient to uphold a jury verdict finding
that a hostile work environment existed); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 598
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a single severe act of harassment [in this case, a sexual
assault] can, without more, constitute a hostile work environment that is actionable under
Title VII).
Second, the severity of the alleged conduct is not indicative of a hostile work
environment. Corcoran’s questions and comments about Plaintiff’s sex and personal life
on August 17, 2022, may be perceived as “rude or unpleasant” Alagna, 324 F.3d at 980,
or even “vile or inappropriate” but not necessarily actionable. See Blomker v. Jewell, No.
14-174, 2015 WL 853617, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2015), aff’d 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir.
2016). As noted above, almost all of Corcoran’s alleged communications were not based
on Plaintiff’s sex at all. Further, the messages were relatively benign. For example,
stating that a Turkish festival booth made him think about Plaintiff might be deemed
unpleasant, but it falls far below the “demanding” pleading standard. See Alagna, 324
F.3d at 980. Messages sent by Corcoran after being asked not to contact Plaintiff’s

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personal number were similarly inoffensive: mentioning that he is praying for Plaintiff’s
family and people in Turkey, wishing her a Happy Mother’s Day, asking if she was
coming into the office, suggesting they meet at some point to clear the air, and asking for
her address to send her something kind. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, 43-46. Even taken together
with Corcoran’s conduct at Syberg’s, these allegations are simply insufficient to plausibly
state a claim for hostile work environment.
Plaintiff cites to Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) to argue
that a plaintiff need only show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of
employment,” which need not be significant, serious, or substantial. While Muldrow
focuses on claims of disparate treatment rather than claims of hostile work environment,
Plaintiff seeks to extend Muldrow’s reasoning to this case by citing to McNeal v. City of
Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887, 904 (6th Cir. 2024), which held that “hostile-work-environment
claims arise out of the same statutory language as disparate-treatment claims.”
Plaintiff’s reliance on McNeal is misplaced. In coming to its decision, the Sixth
Circuit still conducted an analysis of whether the environment would reasonably be
perceived as hostile or abusive. See McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at
22). To do so, the court considered the totality of circumstances using the same factors
the Court applies here—frequency and severity of the behavior; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether the behavior
unreasonably interferes with plaintiff’s job performance. McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904.
Only after deciding a genuine issue of fact existed regarding severity, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s judgment on the hostile work environment claim. Id.

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Regardless of the holding in Muldrow, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that the
complained-of conduct was severe or pervasive. See Davis v. McDonough, No. 23-3419,
2025 WL 212065, at *2 (8th Cir. Jan. 16, 2025) (per curiam) (decided post-Muldrow and
listing factors courts should consider in determining whether harassment was severe and
pervasive, including discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult); see also Collins,
108 F.4th at 1053 (requiring—post-Muldrow—that alleged harassment to be severe or
pervasive to make out a hostile work environment claim); Johnson v. United States
Postal Service, No. 24-1381 (8th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025) (per curiam (same).
Third, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Corcoran’s conduct was physically
threatening or humiliating. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Eighth Circuit has appeared
critical of hostile work environment claims where there is no alleged touching, physical
violence, or overt threats. See Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1058 (affirming defendant’s motion
to dismiss, mentioning that “none of the alleged incidents involved actual touching”);
Hales v. Casey Mktg. Co., 886 F.3d 730, 735 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant where there was no touching or
overt threats); LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th
Cir. 2005) (grating summary judgment in favor of defendant where “[n]one of the
incidents was physically violent or overtly threatening.”).
In this matter, Plaintiff alleges no instances of physical touching. And, while she
contends that Corcoran’s texts included “threatening allusions to showing up at her
house,” (Compl. ¶ 46; Opp. at 6) the actual messages would not be perceived, objectively
or subjectively, as overtly threatening. For instance, Plaintiff highlights Corcoran text

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message asking for Plaintiff’s address to send her something kind, stating that he “kn[e]w
better than to show up at [Plaintiff’s] door.” Compl. ¶ 46.
But conduct far more egregious than this has routinely been held insufficient to
establish a hostile work environment claim. See Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934-35. For
example, in a case relied upon by the Eighth Circuit in Duncan, the Seventh Circuit held
that a plaintiff’s claim failed because the complained-of conduct was not sufficiently
severe and pervasive “when plaintiff’s supervisor asked plaintiff for dates, asked about
her personal life, called her a ‘dumb blond,’ put his hand on her shoulder several times,
placed ‘I love you’ signs at her work station, and attempted to kiss her twice at work and
once in a bar.” See Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993)
(collecting cases).
In the immediate case, Plaintiff was never physically touched, she was not overtly
threatened, and the comments made to her at the bar and over text were far less
inappropriate than those deemed unactionable in Weiss. Behavior may be deemed
“boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly immature,” but that does not mean it necessarily
amounts to an objectively hostile work environment. See Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935. As
such, the Court finds Corcoran’s remarks do not plausibly rise to the level of severe or
pervasive. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim.3

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This holding does not preclude Plaintiff’s separate claims for discrimination and
retaliation in the other counts of her complaint that are not the subject of this motion to
dismiss.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. ECF No. 10. Counts II and V are DISMISSED; however, the dismissal of
Count V is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
_______________________________
AUDREY G. FLEISSIG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 11th day of March, 2025.

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