Allen v. Astrue
Filing
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ORDER and OPINION reversing Commissioner's final decision and remanding for reconsideration. Signed on 04/19/2012 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Will-Fees, Eva)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
CHARLES E. ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security.
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Case No. 11-4189-CV-C-ODS
ORDER AND OPINION REVERSING COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION
AND REMANDING FOR RECONSIDERATION
Pending is Plaintiff's request for review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s
final decision denying his applications for disability benefits. The Commissioner's
decision is reversed, and the case is remanded for reconsideration.
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential process for evaluating disability claims,
and found Plaintiff was not disabled at step four of the process because he retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to his past work as it was actually
performed. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of his RFC; instead, he
challenges the ALJ’s assessment of the job requirements as they were actually
performed.
The Commissioner correctly contends that at step four the claimant is deemed
not disabled if can perform either (1) the functional demands of his job as he actually
performed them or (2) the functional demands of the job as it exists in the national
economy. E.g., Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 853 (8th Cir. 2007). Here, the ALJ
was quite clear in finding Plaintiff could perform his past work as a Security Aide II at the
State Mental Hospital as it was actually performed by him. R. at 26. He described that
past work thusly:
The claimant’s past relevant work . . . was performed at the sedentary
level of exertion as he actually performed it. He described his job as
watching monitors, answering phones, and letting people in and out of
buildings. He also transported patients to Columbia from time to time. He
reported in this job he walked 1 hour, stood 1 hour and sat 6 hours during
an 8-hour day. The heaviest weight he lifted was 10 pounds.
R. at 26. The Record supports these findings. Plaintiff described the exertional
requirements in a form filed during the administrative process. On that form, he added
to the answer about lifting that there was “no major lifting required for last several years
at job.” In a box asking him to describe what he did “all day,” he wrote that he “watched
monitors and answered phones. I let people in and out of the buildings. I also
transported patients to Columbia from time to time.” R. at 161. During his testimony,
Plaintiff explained that the State Hospital housed “criminally insane” and “violent”
patients, and it was often necessary to restrain and otherwise physically control them.
R. at 42-43, 50.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s findings are inconsistent with the job requirements as
set forth by the State Hospital as described in the hospital’s own records. R. at 132.
This point is not entirely conclusive because, as stated, the ALJ found Plaintiff could
perform his past work as it was actually performed, not as the job is typically performed.
However, the typical job requirements do lend some credence to Plaintiff’s testimony
that his duties included having to physically restrain (or at least be capable of
restraining) violent and difficult patients, and makes the ALJ’s omission of the these
requirements even more troubling.
The Commissioner argues the ALJ is entitled make findings regarding the duties
actually performed by Plaintiff and in doing so may resolve factual differences in the
Record. This is true – but in this case, it is not clear whether the ALJ “resolved a factual
difference” or simply overlooked the evidence. Plaintiff testified that his job duties
included addressing violent individuals; if the ALJ found this testimony not credible, one
would expect him to have said so. It could be that the ALJ found the testimony was
inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements on the form appearing at page 161, but if this is
so (1) one must first conclude the information was fairly sought on the form, which is not
an obvious point, (2) again, one would expect the ALJ to indicate that he placed more
credence on Plaintiff’s written answer, and (3) one would expect some clear indication
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that Plaintiff did not actually have to perform the job as it is typically performed.
Ultimately, it is hard to conclude that the ALJ was resolving a factual dispute when the
dispute is not even mentioned.
The Court does not believe there is substantial evidence in the Record as whole
to support the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s actual job duties. It is not clear that the
form fairly sought information about the need to be capable of handling violent patients,
nor is it clear that handling violent patients should be considered on a list of job tasks
Plaintiff did “all day.” While it may be, as the Commissioner’ suggests, that Plaintiff’s job
duties were modified for him, the Record does not contain substantial evidence
supporting this conclusion.
Plaintiff’s suggestion that he is entitled to an award of benefits is rejected. The
Record does not conclusively establish that Plaintiff is entitled to benefits; for that
matter, it does not conclusively establish that he is unable to perform his past work.
The case must be reversed and remanded for re-evaluation at step four of the
sequential analysis and, if necessary, for consideration at step five.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATE: April 19, 2012
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