Jones v. State of Missouri et al

Filing 39

ORDER entered by Judge Nanette Laughrey. Defendant State of Missouri's motion to dismiss [Doc. 16] is granted. (Barragan-Scott, Alana) Modified on 9/16/2014 (Barragan-Scott, Alana). A copy of the Order was mailed to the Plaintiff. Modified on 9/16/2014 (Barragan-Scott, Alana).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
DARRYL LYNN JONES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:14-cv-04087-NKL

ORDER
Defendant State of Missouri’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 16, is granted because the State
has Eleventh Amendment immunity.
I.

Background

The Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri entered a decree in 1993
dissolving the marriage of Darryl Lynn Jones and Defendant Joni N. Jones (now Stewart). 1 The
court ordered Darryl Jones to pay child support with respect to a child born during the marriage.
Doc. 17-1, p. 2. The State, through its Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support
Enforcement, took steps to enforce Jones’ support obligation beginning around 1993 and
continuing through the present. Jones doubts he is the child’s biological father, but his numerous
requests for genetic testing—made to the State and his former wife—have been denied.
1

For purposes of ruling on the State’s motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the
allegations in Jones’ complaint as true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974
(2007). The Court will also consider the authenticated decree of dissolution of Jones’ marriage,
Doc. 17-1, attached to the State’s suggestions in support of its motion to dismiss. Because the
decree is necessarily embraced by the pleadings, considering the decree in the context of ruling
on a motion to dismiss does not convert the motion to one for summary judgment. See
Enervations, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining and Mfrg. Co., 380 F .3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004)
(documents necessarily embraced by the pleadings may be considered in ruling on a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12).

Making brief references to his right to due process, the “Family [Support] Act of 1988,”
and the “1996 Federal Welfare Reform Act,” Doc. 1, p. 1, and Doc. 1-1, Jones asks this Court for
an order requiring genetic testing; awarding damages against the State for denying genetic
testing; and requiring the State to notify his past employers of the outcome of the testing.
II.

Discussion

The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suit against a state, or an agency or department
of a state, for money damages or any other relief, absent waiver by the state or valid
congressional override. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Florida Dept. of State
v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 684 (1982); and Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d
591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007).
Jones points to no waiver by the State, and the State says it has not waived sovereign
immunity.
Nor does Jones demonstrate that the two Acts he cites effect a waiver of the State’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. In relevant part, the Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100-485, required the states to enact mandatory, or presumptively correct, guidelines for
awards of child support in order to continue to participate in the federal Aid to Families with
Dependent Children Program; and to operate child support enforcement programs. The Act
makes no provision for suit by private parties in federal court. See De La Cruz. V. Colon-Rodon,
952 F.Supp.2d 385, 376-8 (D. Puerto Rico 2013) (suit by parents for review of Puerto Rico’s
child support guidelines; examining Family Support Act and legislative history, and concluding
no private cause of action exists). See also Maynard v. Williams, 72 F.3d 848, 854-55 (11th Cir.
2011) (suit to enforce Family Support Act provision for child care services; rejecting private
cause of action). Given the lack of authority in this statute to even bring suit in court, it cannot

2

be interpreted to suggest that the State has waived sovereign immunity concerning any dispute
under the statute.
The Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, was a legislative package
designed to revamp several federally funded welfare programs. Jones points to nothing in the
particularly lengthy and comprehensive Act that provides him a private cause of action relevant
to his claims, and it appears there is no such provision. See Walters v. Weiss, 349 F.Supp.2d
1160, 1166 (E.D. Ark. 2003) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 654b, which addresses collection and
support payments, confers no private enforcement rights upon custodial parents who receive
support payments). Therefore, there can be no waiver of sovereign immunity concerning any
dispute under this statute.
Jones’ claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In view of the foregoing, the
Court need not address the State’s additional arguments in support of its motion to dismiss.
III.

Conclusion

Defendant State of Missouri’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 16, is granted and Plaintiff’s
claims are dismissed with prejudice.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: September 16, 2014
Jefferson City, Missouri

3