Jones v. State of Missouri et al

Filing 56

ORDER. Plaintiff Jones is ordered to pay Defendant Stewart attorney fees in the amount of $4,815.64. Signed on 2/10/15 by District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey. (Order mailed to Darryl Lynn Jones) (Matthes, Renea)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
DARRYL LYNN JONES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:14-cv-04087-NKL

ORDER
The Court granted Defendant Joni Nadine Stewart’s motion for sanctions under
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 11 against Plaintiff Darryl Lynn Jones on January 8, 2015 and
directed Stewart to file a statement of reasonable fees and costs. [Doc. 51.]

Stewart

filed a statement of attorney fees, [Doc. 52], and Jones filed a response, [Doc. 54]. The
Court now orders Jones to pay Stewart attorney fees in the amount of $4,815.64, for the
reasons discussed below.
“A sanction imposed under [Rule 11] must be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the conduct….

[I]f imposed on motion and warranted for effective

deterrence, [sanctions may include] an order directing payment to the movant of part or
all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses directly resulting from the violation.”
Rule 11(c)(4). See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (the
purpose of Rule 11 “is to deter baseless filings in the district court”). In determining the
appropriate sanction, the Eighth Circuit has identified factors such as “the wrongdoer’s
history, experience and ability; … the severity of the violation; … the degree to which
malice or bad faith contributed to the violation; and … other factors.” Van Deelen v. City

of Kansas City, 2006 WL 2077640, 19 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (citing Pope v. Federal Express
Corp., 49 F.3d 1327, 1328 (8th Cir. 1995)). The particular sanction imposed is a decision
made within the court’s discretion. Pope, 49 F.3d at 1328.
As for his history, experience and ability, Jones’ complaint reflects that for 20
years, he has disputed paternity and his child support obligation in various ways, without
any success. He has “requested DNA confirmation [of paternity] incessantly from the exwife and from Missouri [Child Support Enforcement].”

[Doc. 1, p. 5].

He has

challenged paternity in California and Missouri state court proceedings. And he has
objected to child support enforcement efforts in Colorado, Missouri, and Florida.
His violation in this case was serious. The claim he filed against Stewart was
frivolous, inasmuch as the federal courts lack jurisdiction over family law matters, but he
refused to correct or withdraw them despite the notice he was given.
Further, he pursued his claim against Stewart in bad faith. Twenty years of
experience in unsuccessfully disputing his child support obligation in various venues and
proceedings throughout the country, in combination with the notice he was provided in
this case, were sufficient to have apprised Jones that his claim in this case was frivolous,
but he continued to pursue it. Jones’ bad faith is in fact demonstrated all the more by his
response to Stewart’s fee statement.

Notwithstanding the Court’s rulings, Jones

maintains the position that he is entitled to “fight for justice and force Defendants to
comply with federal law and the US Constitution,” and that “federal jurisdiction” applies.
[Doc. 54, p. 1.]
The Court also observes that Jones’ claimed poverty may be self-imposed. In his
2

Financial Affidavit, signed and certified by him on 2/11/2104, he stated he is
unemployed, but that at his last job, he earned “$21000” per month. [Doc. 3.] He quit a
“bank job” in 1998. [Doc. 1, p. 4.] In 2009, he was an “independent contractor/
administrative consultant coordinating after-school tutoring program for ESE and at-risk
youth on behalf of a non-profit agency …. [His] pay was grant-based and [in 2008 he]
made around $18,000[.]” [Doc. 1, p. 8.] In January 2013, he claimed to be a doctoral
candidate. [Doc. 1, p. 5.]
Although Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting device, in view of the foregoing and in its
discretion, the Court concludes that the appropriate sanction to deter further abuse of the
judicial process is an award of Stewart’s fees incurred in defending against Jones’ claim.
The Court has reviewed Stewart’s statement of fees for reasonableness. The Court
subtracts $646.88, reflecting fees related to Jones’ interlocutory appeal of the Court’s
Order dismissing Jones’ claims against Defendant State of Missouri. 1 The hourly rate of
$287.50 charged by Stewart’s attorney is a reasonable rate. Therefore, the reasonable
fees incurred by Stewart total $4,815.64.
Plaintiff Jones is ordered to pay Defendant Stewart attorney fees in the amount of
$4,815.64.
s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: February 10, 2015
Jefferson City, Missouri

1

The subtracted fees are for services provided on 10/10/2014 (1.50 hours for
$431.25) and 10/23/2014 (0.75 hours for $215.63).
3