Peterson v. Madson et al

Filing 103

ORDER entered by Judge Nanette Laughrey, denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, Doc. #79 , and terminating Plaintiff's motion for order, Doc. #100 . (Barragan-Scott, Alana)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
MARSHALL LAWRENCE PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
WILLIAM MADSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:17-cv-04058-NKL

ORDER
Plaintiff Marshall Lawrence Peterson asks the Court to reconsider its Order dismissing
Count I of his amended complaint. Doc. 79. The motion is denied.
I.

Background
Count I of the amended complaint, Doc. 54, is against 31 persons who own or owned

plots of land in the same subdivision as Peterson, and concerns a judgment entered by the Circuit
Court of Camden County, Missouri in 1995. 1 The Camden County Circuit Court held that the
plaintiffs in that case had demonstrated adverse possession and granted their petition to quiet
title. In the case before this Court, Peterson requests a declaratory judgment under Count I,
finding that the 1995 state court judgment “is null and void” because neither he nor other
necessary, indispensable parties were made part of the state court lawsuit or given notice; the
state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; and neither statutory nor common law requirements
relating to adverse possession were established. Id., p. 11.
Several of the Defendants filed motions to dismiss Count I, arguing that there was a
pending, parallel proceeding filed in the Camden County Circuit Court in 2015, involving the
1

The amended complaint contained two additional counts, against other
defendants, concerning a “vacate roadway” order entered by the Camden County Commission in
2005. Doc. 54, pp. 12-14.

same parties and issues as the case before this Court. Docs. 58, 63, 64, and 66. Specifically,
Peterson filed a lawsuit in Camden County Circuit Court in 2015 against the same 31 Defendants
whom he is suing in Count I of his amended complaint before this Court. See Peterson v.
Madson, et al., no. 15CM-CC00251, Cir. Ct. Camden County, Missouri. Doc. 58-1 and 58-44.
His allegations in the state court petition are the same as those in his amended complaint before
this Court. Several of the defendants 2 in the 2015 state-court case also filed counterclaims
against Peterson, including a counterclaim that was the mirror image of Peterson’s state court
petition. Specifically, the defendants (or counterclaim plaintiffs) set out Peterson’s allegations,
then their own allegations that the 1995 state-court judgment was valid pursuant to the terms of
the subdivision plat, and then asked the state court to declare that the 1995 state-court judgment
was valid. Doc. 58-3, pp. 8-10 (Second Amended Counterclaim, Count I).
Peterson voluntarily dismissed his petition in the 2015 Camden County case on
6/14/2016, stating that he would refile in the near future. Doc. 58-2. However, the defendants,
or counterclaim plaintiffs therein, continued to pursue their counterclaims and on 5/25/017, the
Camden County Circuit Court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding that the 1995
state-court judgment “is valid and enforceable” and denying Peterson’s motion for summary
judgment on the counterclaim.

Doc. 58-4, p. 1. The state court subsequently entered an

“Interlocutory Judgment” on 7/14/2017, which provided in relevant part:
[T]he judgment dated October 10, 1995, entered in Camden
County Case No. CV195-522CC is not void, but rather is valid,
binding, and enforceable against Peterson …; the law prevents
Peterson … from directly or collaterally attacking said judgment;
there is no basis for Peterson … to set aside, amend, modify or
change said judgment; and Peterson … [is] barred from bringing
further actions to challenge the validity, enforceability, or binding
effect of said judgment[.]
2

James Charter IV, Stephanie Paro, Rosemary Butts, Patrick Garvey, Diana
Garvey, Michael McCray, Melanie McCray, William Crabtree, Michael Fogelson, Jeanette
McColligan, Kenneth Carpenter, and Erin Carpenter.
2

Doc. 81-1, pp. 2-3.
This Court concluded that the proceedings before it and before the Camden County
Circuit Court are parallel, and that requiring the parties to proceed in both courts would be
uneconomical and vexatious, and would serve no useful purpose, and that abstention was
therefore appropriate with respect to Count I of the amended complaint. This Court further held
that dismissal, rather than a stay, was the most appropriate course of action because the scope of
the state court action was broad enough to resolve all disputes between the parties and there was
no apparent reason why this action would return to federal court. The Court dismissed Count I in
its entirety and with respect to all Defendants against whom it was brought. Doc. 77.
II.

Discussion
A.

Peterson’s premature notice of appeal does not divest this Court of
jurisdiction to dispose of the motion to reconsider.

The Court first addresses a preliminary matter. Peterson filed his motion to reconsider
eight days after entry of the order dismissing Count I, and four weeks later filed a notice of
appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The dismissal order adjudicated fewer than all claims in the action.
Such an order may not be appealed, subject to the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the collateral order doctrine. Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 553 F.3d
609, 635 (8th Cir. 2009). The dismissal order does not fall under § 1292 (requests for injunctive
relief, certified questions, etc.), nor was a judgment entered, Rule 54(b). Assuming that it is an
immediately appealable, collateral order, however, the notice of appeal would not divest this
Court of jurisdiction because a notice of appeal is not effective until such a motion is ruled. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i), and MIF Realty L.P. v. Rochester Assocs., 92 F.3d 752, 755 (8th
Cir. 1996) (a motion to reconsider tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal, and a notice of

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appeal filed prior to disposition of such a motion does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to
rule on it). Therefore, the Court will proceed to rule on the motion.
B.

Peterson demonstrates no basis for reconsideration.

Generally, a district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion
to reconsider. In re Levaquin Products Liab. Litig., 739 F.3d 401, 404 (8th Cir. 2014). However,
such a motion “serve[s] a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.” Arnold v. Sec. Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2010). It “is
not a vehicle for simple reargument on the merits.” Broadway v. Norris, 193 F.3d 987, 990
(8th Cir. 1999). In other words, motions to reconsider do not generally start over consideration of
previously-ruled motions.
Peterson raises six “Points” in his motion to reconsider. Doc. 79, pp. 3-14. As discussed
below, Peterson establishes neither any manifest errors of law or fact, nor seeks to present newly
discovered evidence, and the motion is therefore denied.
1.

“REMOVE CLOUD FROM TITLE”

Peterson first argues that he purchased his lot because of the number of roadways in the
subdivision and that neither he, nor anyone else, would have purchased property in the
subdivision had they known about the cloud on the title, or at least, would not have purchased
property without demanding a discount. Doc. 79, p. 3. Peterson did not make this argument in
response to the motions to dismiss, see Doc. 67 3, and it is therefore waived. See United States v.
Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents, 838 F.3d 930, 937-38
(8th Cir. 2016) (where argument was raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider, the district
court properly treated it as waived).
3

Plaintiff filed one set of suggestions in opposition, Doc. 67, to the motions to
dismiss Count I of the amended complaint, Docs. 58, 63, 64, and 66.
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2.

“LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION”

Peterson next argues that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
1995 judgment because the elements of adverse possession were not met and the state court did
not have evidence before it showing that part of the land had been purchased by Union Electric.
Doc. 79, p. 4. The Circuit Courts of Missouri are courts of general jurisdiction and as such, they
have subject matter jurisdiction over any case or controversy, MO. CONST. ART. V, § 14(a), and
MO. REV. STAT. § 478.070, including a case or controversy involving adverse possession.
Whether the elements of adverse possession were not established or judgment should not have
been entered under the circumstances in 1995, as Peterson argues, goes to the merits of the
claim, not the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Peterson demonstrates no manifest error
of law or fact to justify reconsideration.
3.

“MIRROR IMAGE COUNTERCLAIM”

Peterson argues that the counterclaim in the pending state court proceeding, to declare the
1995 judgment valid, was void because he was not a party to the 1995 judgment and the
counterclaim defendants therefore were not entitled to a declaration against him concerning the
1995 judgment. He further argues that in the pending proceeding, the state court has decided
only that the 1995 judgment was valid with respect to the parties in the 1995 case, which does
not affect him. Therefore, he argues, abstention principles do not support dismissal of his
Count I in this case. Doc. 79, pp. 5-9.
Declaratory judgment is generally available in Missouri state courts to “anyone…in any
instance” when such relief “will terminate a controversy or remove an uncertainty.” Mo. Sup.
Ct. R. 87.02(d). Peterson demonstrates no manifest error of law with respect to the state court’s
ability to reach the dispute presented by the counterclaim defendants.
Furthermore, in granting the counterclaim plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and
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denying Peterson’s motion for summary judgment, the state court did rule on the effect of the
1995 judgment with respect to Peterson.

Specifically, the court stated in its Interlocutory

Judgment entered July 14, 2017 that the 1995 judgment “is not void, but rather is valid, binding,
and enforceable against Peterson”; “the law prevents Peterson … from directly or collaterally
attacking said judgment”; “there is no basis for Peterson…to set aside, amend, modify or change
said judgment”; and that “Peterson … [is] barred from bringing further actions to challenge the
validity, enforceability, or binding effect of said judgment.” Doc. 81-1, pp. 2-3. Therefore,
Peterson has demonstrated no manifest error of fact.
4.

“A JUDGMENT VS. A CONTRACT”

Peterson states that a judgment is not a contract.

He argues that the counterclaim

plaintiffs “could have” asked the state court to enter rulings about the subdivision deed and plat,
which “are contracts” and which the state court did have authority to rule on, but they failed to
make such a request even though that is what their counterclaim was truly about. Doc. 79, p. 9.
As discussed above, Peterson has demonstrated no manifest error of law concerning the
state court’s ability to reach the issue presented by the counterclaim defendants. He therefore
demonstrates no manifest error of law respect to a claim that, he argues, the counterclaim
plaintiffs “could have” made.
5.

“AS EXPLAINED ABOVE, THE COURT CAN SEE THIS DOES
NOT SATISFY THE BRILLHART ABSTENTION IN SEVERAL
WAYS”

Peterson argues that the case before this Court does not present “local questions,” rather,
the “main issue brought to this Court and the state court is the federal question of … due
process”; the issues between this case and the state court case “are not at all the same”; the
parties are not the same; it would be uneconomical for only the state court case to proceed; and
the “increased discretion” under Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and Wilton v.
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Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995), does not apply to declaratory judgment actions involving
violation of important federal rights. Doc. 79, pp. 10-11.
Peterson did not argue in his response to the motions to dismiss that a federal claim for
due process would foreclose abstention, or that a federal question of due process was the “main
issue” before the Court, nor even mention due process. See Doc. 67. Therefore, the argument is
waived. See United States v. Thirty-Two Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Dollars and Fifty-Six
Cents, 838 F.3d 930 at 937-38.
Peterson’s remaining arguments—concerning similarity of the issues between this case
and the state court case, and similarity of the parties, and whether it would be uneconomical for
the federal case to proceed—do not demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact that would merit
reconsideration. As addressed in the dismissal order, substantially the same parties are litigating
substantially the same issues in the state court. The counterclaim plaintiffs in the state court
proceeding are defendants in the case before this Court. Although not all 31 defendants whom
Peterson sues under Count I herein are counterclaim plaintiffs in the state court proceeding, the
parties in the two suits need not be identical as Peterson suggests, only substantially the same.
W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Sunset Sec., Inc., 63 F. App’x 965, 967 (8th Cir. 2003).
Peterson also suggests that the 1995 state court judgment was narrow, in that it was
entered after the defendant defaulted, and argues that the claim he asserts in Count I herein
“cannot be tested at all” in state court, so the issues in the two proceedings are not substantially
similar. Doc. 79, p. 10. However, and as discussed in the dismissal order, Peterson sued both in
state court and in this Court for a declaration that the 1995 state-court judgment is void, alleging
that the state court had not had necessary and indispensable parties before it, that he had no
notice whatsoever, and the state court did not have authority to enter the judgment. Although
Peterson voluntarily dismissed his claims in the pending state court proceeding, the counterclaim
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plaintiffs therein, who are also defendants in the case before this Court, asserted a counterclaim
identifying the same dispute between Peterson and themselves, and asking that the 1995 statecourt judgment be declared valid. As discussed in the dismissal order and above, that claim
could be satisfactorily adjudicated in the state court proceeding. Declaratory judgment is
generally available in Missouri state courts to anyone in any instance when such relief will
terminate a controversy or remove an uncertainty. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 87.02(d). Peterson even filed
a motion for summary judgment with respect to the counterclaim in state court. Peterson
demonstrates no manifest error of law or fact with respect to substantial similarity of the issues.
Finally, Peterson argues that it would be more efficient to litigate the issues in this court
than in the state court. However, in the dismissal Order, the Court observed that the state court
proceeding had been filed in 2015 and had made substantial progress, i.e., to the summary
judgment stage, in contrast to the case before the Court which at the time was only two months
old. The Court was also “mindful that if it elected to decide the issue in the place of the
Missouri court that is currently resolving the same question, then it could be indulging in the
very ‘gratuitous interference’ that the Supreme Court in Wilton warned against.” Doc. 77 p. 7
(citing Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283 (“[W]here another suit involving the same parties and presenting
opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pending in state court, a district court
might be indulging in gratuitous interference…if it permitted the federal declaratory action to
proceed”)).
Furthermore, in his reply suggestions in support of reconsideration, Peterson now cites
Pauli v. Spicer, 2014 WL 5139384 (Mo. App. Oct. 14, 2014), which weighs against his motion
to reconsider. Pauli was a case for declaratory judgment filed by the two property owners
against Defendant Spicer, about a judgment entered in an earlier case in 2008. The 2008
judgment concerned property in which the property owners had an interest. They were not
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parties to that earlier case, but Defendant Spicer was, and the court therein proceeded to quiet
title in favor of Defendant Spicer. Later, in Pauli, the property owners sought a declaration that
the 2008 judgment was null and void, because they were necessary and indispensable parties to
that case. The trial court in Pauli proceeded to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Spicer, but
the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 2008 judgment was null and void, and ordering
that judgment be entered in favor of the property owners.

Peterson cites no authority

demonstrating that this Court may reverse or modify a state court judgment, but he does cite
authority, Pauli, demonstrating that the type of argument he makes concerning the 1995 Camden
County Circuit Court judgment is one that Missouri courts will entertain.

Peterson has

demonstrated no manifest error of law or fact in support of his Point 5.
6.

“OPTIONS—PAST, CURRENT AND FUTURE”

Peterson’s final argument is that he has other options for removing the cloud “from the
title that was put there by the 1995 lawsuit[,]” but he believes the “ʽrelief from void judgment’
approach is more thorough and potentially much quicker overall.” Id., pp. 12-16. Efficiency of
proceeding in state court rather than this Court was addressed in the preceding section. Nothing
in Peterson’s Point 6 demonstrates manifest error of law or fact that justifies reconsideration.
III.

Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, Doc. 79, is denied.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: October 20, 2017
Jefferson City, Missouri

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