Brock v. Spalding, et al

Filing 15

ORDER entered by Judge Nanette K. Laughrey granting Defendants Jane Spalding, Cheryl Scherer, Douglas Prudden, and Alan Earls' Motion to Dismiss. Signed on 6/19/18 by District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey. (Matthes Mitra, Renea)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
JONATHAN NATHAN BROCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
JANE SPALDING, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:18-cv-04036-NKL

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants Jane Spalding, Cheryl Scherer, Douglas Prudden,
and Alan Earls’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 8. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
I.

Background1
From October 2013 until December 2016, Plaintiff Jonathan Nathan Brock was an inmate

at Tipton Correctional Center. During that time, he was continuously subjected to secondhand
smoke from fellow inmates using tobacco. As a result, he suffered from extreme stress, anxiety,
and fear, and attempted to eliminate the sale of tobacco products at TCC, transfer out of TCC, or
create a separate non-smoking dormitory. Each of the Defendants worked at TCC, and were aware
of Plaintiff’s experiences and his attempts to find a solution, but refused to provide relief. In
February 2018, after he was released, Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendants, alleging Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference. The only relief that Plaintiff seeks is damages.
Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on March 28, 2018. Plaintiff’s opposition
brief was due on April 11, 2018. When no opposition was filed, the Court ordered Plaintiff to

1
The facts are found in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. 4. For purposes of deciding the Motion to
Dismiss, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. See Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).

show cause why the Defendants’ motion should not be granted, on or before May 4, 2018. The
Court also explained to Plaintiff that if he failed to comply, his complaint may be dismissed
without further notice. The Court’s Order was sent to Plaintiff via regular and certified mail, and
a green card showing that Plaintiff received the Order was docketed on ECF on April 27, 2018.2
Plaintiff failed to respond.
II.

Discussion
Defendants move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Zink v.
Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). A claim has facial plausibility when its allegations rise above the “speculative” or
“conceivable,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), and where “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Such a complaint will be liberally
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806
(8th Cir. 2008).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which
prevents damages claims against state officials in their official capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal
court. . . . This bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official
capacity.”). Although the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent damages claims against state
officials in their personal capacity, “absent a clear statement that officials are being sued in their

2
Although the Clerk of Court noted that the signature on the green card is “not legible,” the signature
on the green card matches Plaintiff’s signature on the Complaint. Cf. Docs. 4 and 14.
2

personal capacities,” courts must “interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity
claims.” Murphy v. State of Ark., 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Egerdahl v. Hibbing
Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff brings only one claim against each of the four Defendants: Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference. He fails to specify whether his claims are brought against the Defendants
in their personal capacities or their official capacities, and therefore the Court must treat them all
as official capacity claims.3 Accordingly, because the only relief that Plaintiff seeks is damages,
all of his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 (finding
that “an official-capacity action for damages could not have been maintained against [the state
official] in federal court”). As Plaintiff’s claims are barred, the Motion to Dismiss must be granted,
and the Court need not decide whether the Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 8, is granted.

/s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: June 19, 2018
Jefferson City, Missouri

3
Although Plaintiff was on notice of this issue, Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss and did not file a request to amend his complaint.
3