Harris v. Astrue

Filing 14

ORDER affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed on 4/16/13 by District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
MELISSA HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 12-5031-CV-SW-DGK-SSA

ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER’S DENIAL OF BENEFITS
Plaintiff Melissa Harris seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her
application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies, and judicial review
is now appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
Harris alleges she became disabled as of January 1, 2008 due to depression, bi-polar
disorder, anxiety, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), reflux disease, bleeding ulcers, hearing loss,
food allergies, and fibromyalgia, and is, therefore unable to engage in substantial gainful
employment as a matter of law. After independent review of the record, carefully considering
the arguments set forth by the parties, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision denying SSI
benefits is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
Procedural and Factual Background
The complete facts and arguments are presented in the parties’ briefs and are repeated
here only to the extent necessary.

Standard of Review
A federal court’s review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny
disability benefits is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are consistent
with the Social Security Act, the relevant case law, and the regulations, and whether they are
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKinney v.
Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but
it is “enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the ALJ’s decision.” Id.
In making this determination, the court considers evidence that detracts from the
Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it. Id. If substantial evidence in the
record supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse because substantial
evidence in the record supports a contrary result or because the court may have decided the case
differently. Id.
Discussion
To establish entitlement to benefits, Plaintiff must show that she is unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment that has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §
1382(a)(3)(A). To determine a claimant’s eligibility for SSI, the Commissioner employs a fivestep evaluation process.1 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a).

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There is a five-step process for determining eligibility. If the fact-finder determines at any step of the evaluation
process that the claimant is or is not disabled, the inquiry does not continue. The applicant bears the burden of
showing he is disabled from steps one through four of the process. King v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 978, 979 n.2 (8th Cir.
2009). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are other jobs in the economy that the
claimant can perform. Id. The steps proceed as follows: First, the Commissioner determines if the applicant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the applicant is not disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At
step two, the Commissioner determines if the applicant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” or a combination of impairments that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous 12-month period.
If not, the applicant is not disabled; if so, the inquiry continues. At step three, the Commissioner considers whether
the impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. If so, the applicant is considered disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At step four, the
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At Plaintiff’s hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff suffers
from the following severe impairments: IBS, ulcers, asthma, status post gallbladder surgery,
social phobia, depression, and personality disorder with paranoid features. R. at 11. The ALJ
then determined that these disorders did not meet the requirements of any of the impairments
listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 and found that Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c),
meaning she could: lift and carry up to fifty pounds maximum and twenty-five pounds
occasionally; push and pull the same weight; stand or walk six hours out of an eight-hour work
day with normal breaks; and sit for six hours out of an eight-hour work day with normal breaks.
at 14. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, pollutants,
and other pulmonary irritants and was limited to work that was closely located to bathroom
facilities and did not require frequent contact with the general public. Id. The ALJ concluded
that, even with these restrictions, Plaintiff could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy.
Plaintiff now maintains that the ALJ erred in the following ways: (1) failing to properly
evaluate her credibility; (2) failing to base the RFC assessment on all medical evidence of
record; and (3) failing to consider Plaintiff’s obesity as a limiting impairment.
A. The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility, failing to consider the
factors set forth in the Social Security regulations and Polaski v. Heckler. 739 F.2d 1320 (8th

Commissioner considers if the applicant’s residual functional capacity allows the applicant to perform past relevant
work. If so, the applicant is not disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At step five, the Commissioner considers
whether, in light of the applicant’s residual functional capacity, age, education and work experience, the applicant
can perform any other kind of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) (2009); King, 564 F.3d at 979 n.2.
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Cir. 1984). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored the extent to which the medical
evidence and her daily living activities were consistent with her allegations of total disability.
The ALJ’s credibility finding must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole. When assessing a claimant’s credibility, “the ALJ must look to the
claimant’s daily activities; the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain; precipitating and
aggravating factors; dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and functional
restrictions.” Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Polaski, 739 F.2d at
1322). Credibility determinations are generally the province of the ALJ, and courts will defer to
an ALJ’s explicit credibility determination when it is supported by “a good reason.” Finch, 547
F.3d at 935.
Here, the ALJ provided four reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility. First, the ALJ
relied on inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s assertions and the substantial medical evidence of
record. R. at 16-17. For example, Plaintiff testified that she had diarrhea six to seven times per
day. R. at 49. However, medical treatment records in 2010 indicated that Plaintiff suffered from
diarrhea only twice per day and that diarrhea was lessened when Plaintiff excluded dairy from
her diet. R. at 445. After receiving new medication, she also reported improvement in her IBS.
See Collins ex rel. Williams v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 726, 729–30 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that if an
impairment can be controlled by treatment or medication, it cannot be considered disabling). The
ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s depression, which she alleged in the hearing was disabling, had
improved with medication. R. at 16, 442, 464. Accordingly, the ALJ found that the medical
evidence did not support the severity of symptoms Plaintiff alleged. See Gonzales v. Barnhart,
465 F.3d 890, 895 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that an ALJ may determine that “subjective pain
complaints are not credible in light of objective medical evidence to the contrary”).

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The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s daily living activities were inconsistent with her
subjective complaints of disability. R. at 16-17. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff lived alone, could
attend to her personal care needs, remembered to take her medication, prepared meals, performed
household chores and laundry, walked to places by herself, and shopped for groceries, clothing,
and personal items for up to two hours at a time. R. at 129. Although Plaintiff argues that
minimal daily living activities are not inconsistent with claims of disabling pain or inability to
work, see Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2008), here, the ALJ properly found that
Plaintiff’s extensive activities were inconsistent with her subjective complaints.
Third, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s failure to follow her doctor’s recommendations
regarding course of treatment, R. at 16-17, for example, noting that despite a physician’s referral
of Plaintiff to a therapist in May 2010, Plaintiff had not attended any therapy sessions. R. at 1617, 49-50. See Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 2005) (“failure to follow a
recommended course of treatment also weighs against a claimant’s credibility”).
Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had never worked, even prior to her application for
disability. R. at 16-17. See Ellis v. Barnhart, 392 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that an
ALJ could discount a claimant’s credibility in part because the claimant had not worked in the
seven years preceding his SSI application).
Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ articulated sufficient reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s credibility.

Given the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s accounts of disabling

impairments and the record evidence as a whole, the Court must uphold the ALJ’s credibility
assessment.

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B. The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff’s next argument is that the ALJ failed to properly calculate her RFC.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not rely on medical evidence in determining
Plaintiff’s RFC and that the ALJ should have obtained an opinion from a consulting examiner.
The Court finds these arguments without merit. RFC is defined as the most that a
claimant can still do despite her physical or mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a); Leckenby
v. Astrue, 487 F.3d 626, 631 n.5 (8th Cir. 2007). Incorporating all impairments and restrictions
that he found credible, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium level
work. R. at 33-37.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination of her RFC is invalid because it was not
supported by a physician’s opinion that specifically addressed all of Plaintiff’s exertional
impairments. In particular, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ’s work-related physical limitations
are not based on any medical opinion evidence because no consultative examiner, state agency
reviewing physician, or medical expert gave an opinion on Plaintiff’s ability to lift, carry, push,
pull, stand, walk, or sit.
However, the ALJ does not have to rely entirely on a doctor’s opinion in formulating a
claimant’s RFC, nor is he limited to choosing an RFC based on one of the medical opinions of
record. Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no requirement in the
regulations for a direct correspondence between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion
on the functional capacity in question.”). Rather, the ALJ must base a claimant’s RFC on all the
relevant evidence.
Commissioner.

SSR 96-8p.

This assessment is a task specifically reserved for the

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).

Relevant evidence includes medical records,

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observations of physicians and others, and a claimant’s own description of her limitations.
Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001).
Here, the ALJ properly considered all the relevant evidence of record, including
Plaintiff’s medical history and subjective allegations, and formulated an RFC that incorporated
only those impairments he found credible. Specifically, the ALJ considered medical evidence
that claimant’s conditions were well-controlled with medication, R. at 16, and that her
allegations of complete disability were not consistent with her reports of daily living activities.
Thus, the Court upholds the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC, finding that the ALJ’s
determination was based on substantial evidence of record and properly included only Plaintiff’s
credible limitations. See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 2010).
C. The ALJ was not required to consider Plaintiff’s obesity.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider whether her obesity was
a severe impairment which must be incorporated into her RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that
the ALJ never mentioned Plaintiff’s obesity in his decision and never assessed whether it was a
severe or non-severe impairment.

As a result, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in

determining her RFC.
In her benefits application, Plaintiff did not assert disability based on obesity. Moreover,
at her hearing, Plaintiff reported that she could not work due to anxiety, IBS, reflux, depression,
asthma, and neck pain. R. at 36, 38, 42, 44-46, 49. Plaintiff never mentioned obesity as a ground
for disability, even after the ALJ questioned her about her weight.
An ALJ is not obligated to investigate a claim not presented or raised at a hearing.
Anderson v. Barnhart, 344 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906,
909 (8th Cir. 1996)). While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ himself raised the issue here, and was,

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therefore, under an obligation to consider it, there is no case law supporting that proposition.
While the ALJ questioned Plaintiff about her weight, Plaintiff is the individual responsible for
bringing a claim regarding her disability. Brockman v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1993)
(noting that an ALJ has “no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the
application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability”).
Furthermore, there was no evidence that Plaintiff’s obesity limited her ability to work.
Although a few physicians noted Plaintiff’s obesity, none identified any work-related limitations
resulting from it. R. at 444-49, 463-68. Similarly, Plaintiff did not testify that her obesity caused
any work-related limitations. According, the ALJ was under no obligation to discuss Plaintiff’s
obesity in his opinion. See McNamar v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that it
was not reversible error for the ALJ to omit discussion of obesity where neither the medical
records nor the claimant’s testimony demonstrated that claimant’s obesity caused work-related
restrictions).
Conclusion
After careful examination of the record as a whole, the Court finds the Commissioner’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record.

Accordingly, the

Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: April 16, 2013

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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