Smith v. AS America, Inc.

Filing 112

ORDER entered by Judge Nanette Laughrey. Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 104 , is denied. (Hatting, Elizabeth)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
JAMIE SMITH,

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Plaintiff,
v.
AS AMERICA, INC., d/b/a AMERICAN
STANDARD BRANDS,
Defendant.

No. 3:12-CV-05048-NKL

ORDER
Defendant brings a motion for partial summary judgment, Doc. 104, to cap
Plaintiff’s allowable damages based on the value of Plaintiff’s claim as represented
during a probate proceeding. For the reasons set out below, the Court denies Defendant’s
motion.
I.

Undisputed Facts
In 2012, Thomas Smith initiated this lawsuit against Defendant AS America

alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Doc. 1. On March 3, 2014,
Thomas Smith passed away. Doc. 104; Doc. 107. Thereafter, Plaintiff Jamie Smith,
Thomas Smith’s widow, filed an Application for Letters of Administration with the
probate court in Vernon County, Missouri. Doc. 104-1. In the Application for Letters of
Administration, Plaintiff attested that Mr. Smith has no real property and that the only
personal property Mr. Smith had is this lawsuit against Defendant. Id. Plaintiff attested

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that Mr. Smith’s claim in this case has a total value of $41,000. Id. The probate court
subsequently appointed Plaintiff as Mr. Smith’s personal representative. Doc. 104-2.
The probate court then published the Notice of the Letters of Administration on April 22,
2014, in The Nevada Daily Mail to put Mr. Smith’s creditors on notice. Doc. 104-3. On
July 7, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute Party, substituting
Plaintiff for Mr. Smith. Doc. 103.
II.

Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247
(1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate here because Defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
Defendant argues that based on Plaintiff’s representation to the probate court that
her claim has a value of $41,000, Plaintiff should now be judicially estopped from
recovering any more than the value represented at the prior proceeding. The nature of
Plaintiff’s representation, however, was not such that her recovery should be limited.
The reason for Plaintiff’s representation is apparent upon a cursory review of
Missouri probate law. The Missouri Probate Code sets out special procedures for the
administration of “small estates,” defined as those estates valued at $40,000 or less. §
473.097, R.S.Mo. The sole asset of Mr. Smith’s estate is this lawsuit against Defendant.
Doc. 107-1. As the true value of Mr. Smith’s claim will not be ascertainable until the
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conclusion of this lawsuit, Plaintiff’s attorney in the probate proceeding “listed the
‘probable value’ of the claim as $41,000 . . . in order to clarify that the special procedure
for ‘small estates’ did not apply, and that the Court should proceed to issue Letters of
Administration and appoint a Personal Representative.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit has outlined a three factor test for determining when judicial
estoppel is appropriate:
First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its
earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party
has succeeded in persuading the court to accept that party’s earlier
position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a
later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or
the second court was misled. Absent success in a prior proceeding, a
party’s later inconsistent position introduces no risk of inconsistent
court determinations, and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity.
A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.
Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2006). In this case, there is
no risk of inconsistent court decisions and no evidence that Plaintiff would derive an
unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on Defendant by being allowed to recover
the full value of her claim.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff may have benefitted from her representation by
diminishing the statutorily mandated attorneys’ fees that Plaintiff must pay or by
discouraging creditors from filing claims against Mr. Smith’s estate.
Defendant’s first argument is incorrect. The statutorily mandated fees are based
on “the value of the personal property administered and of the proceeds of all real
property sold under order of the probate court.” § 473.153, R.S.Mo. This value is not
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determinable until after estate administration is complete, which will not occur until after
this lawsuit concludes and Mr. Smith’s creditors are paid off.

Furthermore, the

representation of the value of this lawsuit was made to the probate court in part by
Plaintiff’s attorney, the person who would be harmed most by an undervaluation of
Plaintiff’s claim if that valuation determined attorney fees.
Defendant’s second argument is also unpersuasive, as Defendant “has presented
no evidence to support the existence of such creditors.” Young v. Time Warner Cable
Capital, L.P., 2006 WL 2927569, at *5 (W.D. Mo. 2006). In the absence of identifiable
creditors who opted not to file claims against Mr. Smith’s estate based on Plaintiff’s
valuation of this lawsuit, the Court will not speculate about an unfair advantage Plaintiff
may have derived by avoiding such creditors. See id.
Given the nature of Plaintiff’s representation, the integrity of the Court is not
compromised by allowing Plaintiff to fully litigate the value of her claim. Furthermore,
Defendant is not prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to prove the estate’s actual damages.
As such, judicial estoppel is inappropriate in this case.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s partial Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: September 16, 2014
Jefferson City, Missouri
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