Smith v. AS America, Inc.
ORDER entered by Judge Nanette Laughrey. Plaintiff is entitled to the revised amounts of $183,704.98 in damages and $1,571.00 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to file her motion for any additional attorneys' fees and expenses. Signed on 12/30/2016 by District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey. (Specker, Suzanne)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
AS AMERICA, INC., d/b/a AMERICAN
Pending before the Court is the parties’ briefing on how this Court’s original
order, [Doc. 144], should be revised in light of the Eighth Circuit’s judgment on the
parties’ appeal. [Doc. 179].
On January 9, 2015, the Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding Plaintiff Jamie Smith’s Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claim.
[Doc. 144]. The Court concluded based on the evidence presented at trial that Defendant
American Standard violated the FMLA when it terminated Mr. Thomas Smith’s
employment, and that Mr. Smith’s wife, Plaintiff Jamie Smith, was entitled to damages
from February 8, 2011 through July 20, 2011. In total, Plaintiff recovered $27,731.68,
plus statutory interest.
Defendant appealed the Court’s decision regarding liability, liquidated damages,
and attorneys’ fees.
[Docs. 146, 171, 176].
Plaintiff cross-appealed the Court’s
application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine to limit her damages. [Doc. 168].
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Court’s order as to liability, liquidated damages, and
attorneys’ fees. [Doc. 179, p. 3]. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for
a new calculation of damages based on the Court’s erroneous finding at trial that Mr.
Smith was released from jail on July 20, 2011 rather than July 19, 2011. [Doc. 179, p.
At a conference following the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, both parties indicated to
the Court that additional evidence would not be needed beyond what was presented at
trial and in post-trial briefing. [Doc. 180]. The parties requested an opportunity to brief
how the Eighth Circuit’s decision affects the Court’s original decision. [Doc. 180].
Accordingly, following the issuance of the mandate, the Court invited briefing on how its
original order should be revised in light of the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. [Doc. 182].
The parties have since filed and responded to this briefing, as well as provided postremand proposed findings of fact. [Docs. 183, 184, 185, 186].
In its post-appeal briefing on how the Court should revise its judgment, Defendant
argues three separate dates at which Plaintiff’s damages should be cut off: December 31,
2012 for Mr. Smith’s failure to mitigate by no longer applying to new jobs; April 23,
2013 under the after-acquired evidence doctrine when Defendant discovered Mr. Smith
allegedly lied on his employment application; or March 3, 2014 upon Mr. Smith’s death.
In response, Plaintiff agrees only that her lost pay damages end at the time of Mr. Smith’s
death on March 3, 2014. Plaintiff also argues she is entitled to the $26,000 value of the
life insurance policy that would have been in place had Mr. Smith been employed by
Defendant at the time of his death. In addition, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to
additional attorneys’ fees for services before appeal and following remand, as well as for
expenses that were not recoverable in the Court of Appeals. [Doc. 183, p. 5].
A. Failure to Mitigate
Defendant argues that Mr. Smith’s lost pay damages should be cut off after
December 31, 2012 because after this time, Mr. Smith stopped submitting job
applications. Plaintiff responds that Defendant failed to carry its burden of proving that
Mr. Smith failed to mitigate his damages prior to his death.
A “wrongfully discharged employee must take reasonable measures to mitigate
damages.” Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1465 (8th Cir. 1994); see also, Kehoe
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic that . . .
‘plaintiffs use reasonable efforts to obtain other employment after termination.’”)
(quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1996)).
mitigation duty likewise applies to an employee who is terminated in violation of the
FMLA. See Dollar v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 710 F.3d 798, 808 (8th Cir. 2013)
(affirming the district court’s application of the mitigation duty to a trucking employee
who was wrongfully terminated in violation of the FMLA). “[W]hile the wrongfully
discharged employee must take reasonable measures to mitigate damages, the defendant3
employer bears the burden of proving that the employee failed to take those measures.”
Smith, 38 F.3d at 1465.
This Court already made the following findings of fact, which are relevant to the
mitigation of damages defense:
Following his termination [in February 2011], Mr. Smith began looking for
jobs, submitting approximately three to four applications per week. Mr.
Smith was arrested for domestic assault on July 13, 2011, and spent some
time in jail. Mr. Smith stopped applying for jobs in late 2012 and
submitted no employment applications in 2013 because he was earning
enough money “junking” and “salvaging” to pay his bills. [Doc. 144, p. 6].
Defendant contends that Mr. Smith could have minimized his damages by finding
comparable employment after his termination and thus, his failure to continue applying
for new work after 2012 constitutes a failure to mitigate.
The Eighth Circuit is clear that “[t]he defendant bears the burden of showing that
there were suitable positions and that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care in seeking
them.” Denesha v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 161 F.3d 491, 502 (8th Cir. 1998). Thus, to
prove this affirmative defense, the defendant must “show that the plaintiff failed to use
reasonable care and diligence and that there were jobs available which the plaintiff could
have discovered and for which the plaintiff was qualified.” Doyne v. Union Electric Co.,
953 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
The purpose of the failure to mitigate defense is to allow the employer to cut short
its liability if the wronged employee could have gotten a comparable job and elected not
to. Under these circumstances the employer should not have to support the ex-employee.
Logically, then, the defendant must carry the burden of proving its right to this defense.
See Denesha, 161 F.3d at 502.
In this case, Plaintiff offered evidence that Mr. Smith applied for three to four jobs
per week over nearly a two year period while also working odd jobs in construction.
Even after not getting better jobs that he consistently applied for, Plaintiff continued to
work at jobs he could find. Meanwhile, Defendant did not offer any evidence that there
were suitable positions available to Mr. Smith either before or after 2012. For these
reasons, Defendant did not carry its burden and is not entitled to cut off its liability to Mr.
Defendant, however, argues that because Mr. Smith stopped applying to jobs in
late 2012, Defendant is not required to put forth evidence that suitable jobs existed. As
support, Defendant cites authority from other circuits that have adopted an exception to a
defendant’s usual burden of proof to show the availability of comparable jobs See e.g.,
Wagner v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 17 Fed.Appx. 141, 154 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Although
an employer ordinarily must come forward with evidence that comparable work is
available, that is not the case if the plaintiff makes little or no effort to seek
employment”); Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1998)
(applying the rule that an employer “is released from the duty to establish the availability
of comparable employment if it can prove that the employee made no reasonable efforts
to seek such employment”); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999)
(recognizing the exception “reliev[ing] the defendant-employer of the burden to prove the
availability of substantially equivalent jobs . . . once it has been shown that the former
employee made no effort to secure suitable employment”); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991) (“If . . . an employer proves that the employee
has not made reasonable efforts to obtain work, the employer does not also have to
establish the availability of substantially comparable employment”) (superseded by
statute on other grounds); Sellers v. Delgado College, 902 F.2d 1189, 1193 (5th Cir.
How this Court should address this issue is a matter of first impression in the
Eighth Circuit. As already discussed, the Eighth Circuit expressly requires a defendant to
prove both that the plaintiff’s mitigation efforts were unreasonable and that comparable
jobs were available to the plaintiff, see, e.g., Doyne v. Union Electric co., 953 F.2d 447,
451 (8th Cir. 1992), and it has not identified any exception to its rule. Furthermore, even
if the Eighth Circuit were to adopt an exception to its rule when a plaintiff makes little
effort to seek employment, Defendant has not shown that Mr. Smith made no reasonable
efforts to obtain comparable work. See, e.g., Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d
47, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the rule that an employer “is released from the duty to
establish the availability of comparable employment if it can prove that the employee
made no reasonable efforts to seek such employment”) (emphasis added).
Reasonably, Mr. Smith began working occasional construction jobs while
simultaneously applying to three to four jobs every week for almost two years. Mr.
Smith’s construction work included “roofing, replacing floors in homes, bathrooms,
remodeling bathrooms, stuff like that, painting.” [Doc. 184, p. 3]. Although Mr. Smith
admitted that he stopped applying for jobs in late December 2012 that were comparable
to his factory job, the evidence shows that he still continued to work and presumably,
search for and apply to, construction-related jobs—the only jobs that he had successfully
obtained over this two year period. Mr. Smith’s pay from working these jobs totaled
$2,693 during the year of 2011; $1,195 during the year of 2012; and $3,285 during the
year of 2013,1 all of which Defendant is entitled to deduct from Plaintiff’s recovery.
[Doc. 183, p. 4]. He was not idle.
Defendant points to Mr. Smith’s testimony that he stopped looking for comparable
jobs in late 2012 “[b]ecause I’ve been working enough to where it’s paying my bills. It’s
not full-time, I don’t have the insurance and stuff I had before, but I am making enough
to get by.” [Doc. 184-2, p. 5]. Defendant suggests that Mr. Smith had removed himself
from the job market. The Court disagrees. Mr. Smith did not state that he was unwilling
to apply to future employment opportunities.
After two years and hundreds of
unsuccessful applications, it is understandable why Mr. Smith stopped going through the
motions of submitting applications for comparable employment.
Mr. Smith did not
“remove himself from the labor market,” as Defendant contends. Instead, he continued
searching for and working the only jobs that he had successfully obtained over this two
year time period—the construction work.
Considering his two year, unsuccessful search and his continued effort to find
some work, Mr. Smith reasonably took the best employment opportunity available to
him, according to the record before the Court
Mr. Smith was a felon with a criminal
Because the parties cite the same replacement income amounts in their briefing, the Court
accepts them as true.
record, a characteristic posing a significant obstacle to finding employment; he was
GED-educated and living in a rural area; and his skill set appears to have been restricted
to construction work and the other manual labor-related skills he used in his previous job
Together, these facts suggest that Mr. Smith’s job prospects were
limited, at best. It is not surprising that he could not find comparable employment
despite submitting hundreds of job applications in 2011 and 2012, and his decision to
stop applying for comparable jobs after this time period while continuing to work
construction was not unreasonable. To find otherwise would require someone to apply
mechanically for jobs that he could not reasonably get, while excusing the employer’s
failure to show that there were comparable jobs available.
The duty to mitigate does not require Mr. Smith’s efforts to have been successful.
See, e.g., Hartley v. Dillard’s, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (“A plaintiff’s
efforts to mitigate need not be successful but must represent an honest effort to find
substantially equivalent work.”). Rather, Mr. Smith’s duty—arising out of an affirmative
defense for which Defendant carries the burden—is limited to “reasonable diligence,”
which the Court finds that Mr. Smith satisfied under these circumstances. At a minimum,
this evidence shifts the burden to Defendant to show the availability of comparable
positions for which Mr. Smith was eligible and did not apply. Defendant, however, did
not proffer any such evidence.
B. After-Acquired Evidence
Defendant next contends that the after acquired evidence doctrine limits Plaintiff’s
recovery. Under this doctrine, if an employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing on the
part of the employee that would have resulted in a legitimate discharge, the employee’s
award for back-pay may be limited to the period between the unlawful termination and
the employer’s discovery of this evidence. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513
U.S. 352, 362 (1995). On this issue, “the employer bears a ‘substantial burden’ and must
show that such a firing would have taken place as a matter of ‘settled’ company policy.”
Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 408 (D. Minn. 1996)
(quoting Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1406 (8th Cir. 1994),
abrogated on other grounds by McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63). “The court must look to
the employer’s actual employment practices and not merely the standards articulated in
its employment manuals, for things are often observed in the breach but not in the
keeping.” Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2004).
Defendant contends that Mr. Smith “lied on his employment application” by
failing to list three of his five convictions. [Doc. 184, p. 6-7]. In the section of his job
application that asked about criminal convictions, Mr. Smith wrote:
Oct. 1992 burglary stealing etc.
Feb. 2002 felony in poss. of firearm
(Would like to explain during interview).
[Doc. 184-4, p. 1]. Mr. Smith also disclosed on his application that he had been in prison
from February 2002 through March 2007. [Doc. 184-4, p. 2].
Defendant characterizes Mr. Smith’s application as “falsified” and contends that it
would have terminated Mr. Smith upon discovering in April 2013, during discovery, that
Mr. Smith neglected to list three additional stealing and burglary convictions.
Court, however, is unconvinced that Mr. Smith’s application was falsified. Mr. Smith
explained why he had not listed the missing convictions, stating, “[T]hat’s what the ETC
is . . . What I was trying to do was condense because the paperwork . . .” [Doc.184-2, p.
8]. Moreover, common sense suggests that when one writes several items in list form
followed with “etc.,” the list is not complete. Mr. Smith’s wording on his application
does not indicate that he hid or omitted several of his convictions, but rather, that he was
signaling to his potential employer that there were more convictions than those listed and
that he wanted an opportunity to explain them in his interview.
Still, even if Mr. Smith’s application was arguably “falsified,” Defendant failed to
carry its burden of proof in asserting this after-acquired evidence defense. In order to
successfully utilize this doctrine, the employer must “establish that the wrongdoing was
of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds
alone.” McKennon, 513 U.S. at 362-63. In his application, Mr. Smith disclosed not just
one conviction but three convictions on two separate occasions followed by “etc.” and a
request to explain these convictions in his interview. Mr. Smith additionally disclosed to
Defendant that he was in prison for a five year period.
If Mr. Smith’s disclosed
convictions and his admitted extensive prison time did not dissuade Defendant from
hiring Mr. Smith at the time he applied, it is difficult to believe that Defendant would
have terminated Mr. Smith upon discovering that he had arguably misrepresented his
criminal history in his application. This argument is particularly unpersuasive in light of
the extent of the alleged misrepresentation, which was limited to Mr. Smith’s omission of
a few similar convictions from his employment application, although he put the employer
on notice by using the abbreviation, etc.
In addition, Defendant does not point to any
evidence showing that Defendant’s actual employment practice was to terminate
employees upon discovering incomplete information in their employment applications,
when the Defendant was on notice that the applicant wanted to discuss the subject matter
that was arguably incomplete. See, e.g., Sellers v. Mineta, 358 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir.
2004) (“The court must look to the employer’s actual employment practices and not
merely the standards articulated in its employment manuals, for things are often observed
in the breach but not in the keeping.”). Defendant has not carried its substantial burden
of showing that Mr. Smith would have been terminated as a matter of settled company
For the previous reasons, Plaintiff’s recovery is not limited by the after-acquired
C. Life Insurance Policy
The parties agree that Plaintiff’s recovery must be cut off as of March 2, 2014
because of Mr. Smith’s death on March 3, 2014. 2 Plaintiff, however, contends that she is
also entitled to the $26,000 employer-sponsored life insurance policy that Mr. Smith’s
estate would have received had Mr. Smith been employed at the time of his death.3
The FMLA entitles a successful plaintiff to damages equal to the amount of “any
wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such
employee by reason of the violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff concedes March 2, 2014 to be the appropriate damages cut-off date. [See Docs. 186,
p. 6 and 188].
The parties stipulated that, had Mr. Smith been employed at the time of his death, his estate
would have received the proceeds of his employer-sponsored life insurance policy, $26,000.
A claim for lost fringe benefits, including a life insurance policy, survives the death of an
employee. Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hosp. & Convalescent Center, 631 F.Supp.
174, 175 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (citing Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 (4th
Cir. 1985) and Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 279 n. 2 (8th
Cir.1983)). However, there is a split of authority on the proper measure of value of the
life insurance. Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot recover the $26,000 value of the policy,
citing to Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry. 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985). In Fariss, the
Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff could recover only the value of the life insurance
premiums paid not the actual proceeds from the life insurance policy. Id. at 965. The
Fariss court reasoned that Congress did not intend “to transform employers into insurers
merely because an insurance policy is part of the compensation for employment.” Id.
Citing the employee’s duty to mitigate, the court found that, “in most cases, the employee
can easily avoid the risk of being uninsured by purchasing an individual policy of
comparable value . . . [which] would permit full recovery of any additional premiums for
the comparable individual policy beyond what the employer would have paid.” Id. at
965-66. Accordingly, because there was no evidence that the employee had attempted to
obtain any substitute coverage, the court held that the plaintiff could “recover only the
premiums the employer would have paid.” Id. at 966.
Plaintiff, however, contends that she is entitled to the face value of the policy and
cites to Lubke v. City of Arlington. 455 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2006). In Lubke, the Fifth
[T]he correct measure of damages for lost insurance benefits in FMLA
cases is either actual replacement cost for the insurance, or expenses
actually incurred that would have been covered under a former insurance
plan. The lost ‘value’ of benefits, absent actual costs to the plaintiff, is not
Id. at 499 (emphasis added). Because Lubke precludes the recovery of the lost value of
insurance, this case does not support Plaintiff’s claim for the $26,000 value of Mr.
Smith’s life insurance policy.
Plaintiff also cites Foster v. Excelsior Springs City Hospital to support her claim.
631 F.Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
In Foster, the Western District of Missouri
considered a widowed plaintiff’s ADEA claim for the $60,000 value of her deceased
husband’s life insurance policy. Id. During employment, the defendant employer had
paid life insurance premiums for the widow’s husband, Guy. Id. After his employer
wrongfully terminated him in violation of the ADEA, Guy never procured a new policy
and died without life insurance. Id. The widow plaintiff submitted a life insurance
agent’s affidavit, which stated that an individual with Guy’s heart attack and health
history was generally uninsurable. Id. at 175. In light of this evidence, the Foster court
awarded the plaintiff the $60,000 value of the life insurance policy. Id. Citing Fariss,
the Foster court reasoned that the evidence showed Guy qualified for an exception to the
general rule that he must mitigate his damages and that in his case, it was the proceeds,
not the premiums, that would make him whole. Id.
The Court finds Foster unpersuasive given its citation to Fariss, which seems
contrary to the result in Foster. More importantly, Plaintiff has not presented evidence
that Mr. Smith was unable to buy substitute life insurance, as in Foster—the only case
cited by Plaintiff that awarded the face value of the life insurance policy as damages.
Finally, even if Plaintiff is entitled to the value of the life insurance premiums, she did
not provide any evidence of their cost, either during the course of trial or during the
parties’ additional briefing on damages. Therefore, regardless of whether Plaintiff is
entitled to recover the value of these life insurance premiums, the record is insufficient to
establish the amount of these damages.
D. Revised Damages
As a result of Defendant’s violation of the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled to recover
“any wages, salary, employee benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such
employee by reason of the violation,” along with “the interest on the amount . . .
calculated at the prevailing rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i). “Other compensation”
has been interpreted to include overtime pay, which is often awarded in connection with
violations of employment laws. See Pagan-Colon v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc., 697
F.3d 1, at *11-12 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing numerous cases awarding employees overtime
when employers violated federal employment laws).
Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the date of Mr. Smith’s termination on
February 8, 2011 through March 2, 2014, the day before Mr. Smith’s death. The Court
calculates these revised damages in light of the clarification provided by the parties
during a conference on December 12, 2016. [See transcript for Doc. 188]. At this
conference and in briefing, the parties conceded that assuming a damages cut-off date of
March 2, 2014, Plaintiff is entitled to 159.0 weeks of damages at $15.35 per hour.
However, Defendant later argued that the number of weeks of damages must be reduced
by one week to account for Mr. Smith’s incarceration from July 13, 2011 to July 19,
2011. [Doc. 189]. Although Plaintiff contested this week reduction of damages, the
record shows Mr. Smith would not have earned income during his week of incarceration.
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to 158.0 weeks of damages. The Court finds Mr. Smith
would have worked an average of 35.794 hours per week at $15.35 per hour. This entitles
Plaintiff to $86,801.49 in base wages for the 158-week damages period.
During Mr. Smith’s last year of employment with Defendant, he worked an
average of 1.74 hours per week in overtime at one-and-a-half times his normal hourly
pay. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to $6,330 in lost overtime pay.5 Between February 8,
2011 and March 2, 2014, Mr. Smith would have worked twenty-four holidays.6 [Doc.
183, p. 4]. Employees in Mr. Smith’s job classification were paid triple time for working
on designated holidays, which entitles Plaintiff to $5,894 in lost holiday pay. Mr. Smith
Defendant’s pay calculation of $549.33 per week divided by $15.35 per hour equates to an
average of 35.79 hours per week. [See Doc. 188 transcript and Doc. 184-5]. Plaintiff argued for
using a standard 40-hour work week instead. However, the Court finds the evidence of the
actual number of hours per week Mr. Smith worked in his last year of employment to be more
persuasive. [Doc. 184-5].
Plaintiff calculated overtime as 1.74 hours per week multiplied by 159 weeks multiplied by
one-and-a-half times Mr. Smith’s hourly rate of $15.35. Defendant did not contest this
calculation. [See Doc. 188 transcript]. Accordingly, the Court recalculated Mr. Smith’s
overtime using this same calculation but for 158 weeks.
Defendant did not address holidays in its briefing nor contest Plaintiff’s proposed finding that
Mr. Smith would have worked twenty-four holidays. Therefore, the Court relies on Plaintiff’s
proposed finding to determine that Mr. Smith would have been entitled to holiday pay for
twenty-four holidays. Holiday pay was calculated as $15.35/hour x 2.0 x 8 hours per day x 24
holidays. [Doc. 183, p. 4].
earned replacement earnings of $2,693 in 2011; $1,195 in 2012; and $3,285 in 2013 for a
total of $7,173. For the previous reasons, Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages in the
amount of $91,852.49.7 Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages in an equal
Plaintiff again requests prejudgment interest without opposition from Defendant.
Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of
$1,571.8 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(ii).
E. Additional Fees Requested
Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings also include a finding that Plaintiff is entitled to
additional fees incurred in this Court “before appeal and following remand” as well as
“expenses that were not recoverable in the Court of Appeals.”
[Doc. 183, p. 5].
Defendant responds that Plaintiff has not identified nor provided the amounts of these
additional fees. Without any authority to support Plaintiff’s request or evidence of the
specific amounts she is entitled to, the Court is unable to award these additional fees.
This amount was calculated by adding $86,801.49 in base wages plus $6,330 in lost overtime
wages plus $5,894 in lost holiday wages. Subtracted from this amount were Mr. Smith’s
replacement earnings of $7,173.
Because Defendant did not object to Plaintiff’s prejudgment interest calculations, the Court
relied on Plaintiff’s calculations and chart presented in Doc. 183-1. [See also Doc. 188
transcript]. Based on this chart and Plaintiff’s proposed findings, Plaintiff is due $754.00 in
prejudgment interest through October 2016. [See Doc. 183, p. 5]. In addition, Plaintiff
represents that prejudgment interest on the actual and liquidated damage awards accrues at a rate
of $15.75 per month for each month from November 2016 through the date of judgment. Id.
Therefore, the December 2016 date of judgment entitles Plaintiff to an additional $31.50 in
prejudgment interest. She is due an amount in liquidated damages equal to her actual damages,
taking into account the Court’s previous rulings. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).
Therefore, Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this Order to file her motion for any
additional attorneys’ fees and expenses.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court awards Plaintiff damages in the revised
amounts of $183,704.98 in damages and $1,571.00 in prejudgment interest.
s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: December 30, 2016
Jefferson City, Missouri
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