Vaughan v. Aegis Communications Group, LLC

Filing 78

ORDER denying 42 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 47 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 62 motion for summary judgment; denying 29 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Signed on 9/9/14 by District Judge M. Douglas Harpool. (View, Pat)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION
WAYLON VAUGHAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AEGIS COMMUNICATIONS
GROUP, LLC and AEGIS USA, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:13-cv-05097-MDH

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Aegis Communications Group’s (“ACG”) Motion to
Dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 29), Defendant Aegis
USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Count VI (Doc. No. 42), Defendant ACG’s Motion to Dismiss
Count V (Doc. No. 47), and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 62). 1 After careful consideration and for the following reasons, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss; and denies the Motions to Dismiss Counts V, VI and VII.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s

First

Amended

Complaint

alleges

fraudulent

inducement

and

misrepresentation in employment negotiations (Count I); negligent misrepresentation (Count II);
unjust enrichment (Count III); breach of contract (Count IV); forced labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589;

1

Defendant ACG references a separate “pending” Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint – Doc. No. 7 – which was filed on July 17, 2013. However, a review of the
docket sheet reflects that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was filed on October 17, 2013.
As such, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count V is Moot.
1

1595)(Against Defendant ACG) (Count V); forced labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589; 1595)(Against
Defendant Aegis USA) (Count VI); and Benefitting from Forced Labor (18 U.S.C. § 1589;
1595)(Against Defendant ACG)(Count VII).

These claims are brought against Plaintiff’s

employers Aegis Communications Group, LLC (“ACG”) and Aegis USA, Inc. 2
Aegis USA and ACG operate call centers in various locations around the United States.
Plaintiff began working for ACG in 2007 as a telephone sales representative at its Joplin,
Missouri call center. Plaintiff took a leave of absence from June 2011 to June 2012 from his
employment to participate in a Cross-Shoring Program. Plaintiff returned to Joplin, Mo in June
2012 and is still employed as a telephone sales representative in the call center. Defendants
contend the Cross-Shoring program was intended to be a mutually-beneficial opportunity for
employees to obtain additional training and gain experience living, working and studying abroad,
while also offering American clients access to American employees at a lower cost to clients.
Plaintiff contends it was developed in response to the global market for outsourced customer
service and intended to provide cheaper services to a client. Nonetheless, ACG permitted
volunteer employees who were selected after an interview and ranking process to take a leave of
absence from their jobs at ACG to participate in the program.
Aegis Aspire operated Aegis Global Academy (“Academy”) in India and contracted with
ACG to operate the Cross-Shoring Program. 3 Specifically, ACG entered a contract with Aegis
Aspire to provide services under the Cross-Shoring Program. The “Master Support Agreement”
was entered into on July 1, 2011 and stated the Company [ACG] requires Support in training and
development of their employees and the Academy [Aegis Aspire] is willing and able to provide
2

Aegis, USA and Aegis Communications Group, LLC merged effective as of December 31,
2013. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiff remains employed by ACG.
However, the Undisputed Statement of Facts states Plaintiff currently works for Aegis USA.
3
Aegis Aspire is an Indian entity.
2

such Support. As set forth in the agreement, Support to be provided by Academy included, but
was not limited to: “providing training and people development support to the employees of the
Company on a residency programme basis, which would include without limitation, following:
(1) class room training; (2) medical facilities; (3) practical training; (4) stipend; (5) mobile phone
allowance; (6) administrative services; (7) transportation; (8) printing and stationary services; (9)
any other auxiliary services.”
Employees from Aegis Aspire prepared materials that described the Cross-Shoring
Program and subsequently sent the materials to ACG management in Texas to be used to
introduce the program to ACG employees. ACG management then created and distributed a
basic flyer, based on materials and information provided by Aegis Aspire, to local HR managers
at call centers around the United States, including Joplin, Mo. The flyer promised participants a
$100 monthly allowance and that participants would receive a $2,000 savings payment at the end
of the program period. The flyer references “Aegis” several times but does not identify a
specific Aegis entity.
The Cross–Shoring program was a one year program that took place in India. ACG
provided transportation to and from India. Aegis Aspire provided the meals, lodging, internet
access, pre-paid cellular phone, Indian-based health insurance and transportation in India. Aegis
Aspire provided the $100 per month stipend to cover miscellaneous expenses and also provided
the educational component to the participants through a contract it had with Cornell University.
Participants who completed the program in good standing were informed they would receive a
complimentary Indian vacation excursion from Aegis Aspire.
ACG informed participants they would receive a $2,000 pre-tax bonus at the end of the
program period and would return to a position with ACG in the United States. ACG also

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informed participants they would later be placed in its “ACE Blue” supervisor training program.
Plaintiff’s leave of absence agreement stated “provided that Employee has successfully
completed the one year study program and has remained in good standing throughout such one
year period, Employee’s return to work at Aegis and Employee’s employment with Aegis will be
reinstated as if he had never left employment with Aegis.” The Agreement further states “‘Good
Standing’ for purposes of this Agreement shall mean Employee completed the study program
without any infraction of policy or any unexcused absences, as determined by the Company in its
sole discretion and such determination shall be deemed final and binding between the parties.” If
the participant did not complete the program the bonus would be retained by ACG to cover the
cost of the participant’s travel to and from India.
Plaintiff received a copy of the flyer on his desk and expressed his interest in the
program. He then had a short meeting with the HR manager and the Joplin call center director
regarding the opportunity to participate in the program. After the meeting, Plaintiff felt the
program was a good opportunity and therefore had a telephone interview with an ACG executive
in Texas. Plaintiff was accepted into the cross-shoring program after his interview.
As part of the process, Plaintiff went to Texas and attended several group discussions
about the Cross-Shoring program. During the discussions, participants were informed about
food, transportation, pay, education and work hours. Plaintiff was trained on the client account
and was provided information about what would happen in India. Plaintiff did his own research
on India, and at a minimum concluded he would not like the food there. Before Plaintiff left for
Texas he sold all of his belongings, except for a truck. Plaintiff signed a leave of absence
agreement with ACG on June 29, 2011.

4

Plaintiff arrived in India on July 3, 2011. Upon his arrival he was given an “Exchange
Student Handbook,” a set of off-campus guidelines and a PowerPoint presentation. Plaintiff had
approximately $4,200 when he arrived in India. Plaintiff was told prior to leaving for India he
would be working overnight shifts. Plaintiff did work overnight shifts, but did not work on
American holidays or the weekends. Plaintiff complained about the food and the pay while in
India. He voiced his complaints to the HR manager in Joplin, Mo. The HR manager forwarded
Plaintiff’s complaints to ACG’s Vice President of Human Resources and ACG’s liaison for the
Cross-Shoring Program – both of whom were located in Texas. These complaints were also
communicated to the supervisors in India.
Plaintiff completed the Cross-Shoring program in June 2012 and returned to Joplin, Mo.
Plaintiff returned to work at the call center, received the $2,000 bonus, received a certificate
from eCornell and was placed in ACG’s “ACE Blue” supervisor training program. 4 Plaintiff has
not applied for a promotion since his return.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 29, 42 and 47)
were filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These three motions seek to dismiss Counts VII,
VI and V respectively. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 62) also
addresses Counts V- VII. The Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplement Motion to
Dismiss incorporates by reference the prior Motions to Dismiss. However, it also includes
arguments in its summary judgment briefing regarding why judgment should be entered in favor
of Defendants. Based on the record before the Court, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss under

4

Plaintiff alleges the ACE Blue program was cancelled shortly after he was placed in it.
5

Rule 12(b)(6) will be treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56. The briefing
and record before the Court presents matters outside the pleadings. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12.
All parties have been given time to present all material pertinent to the pending motions and the
issues are now fully briefed.
Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law if they can
establish there is “no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247 (1986). Once the moving party has established a properly supported motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on allegations or denials but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 248.
A question of material fact is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of the
party asserting its existence. Rather, all that is required is sufficient evidence supporting the
factual dispute that would require a jury to resolve the differing versions of truth at trial. Id. at
248-249. Further, determinations of credibility and the weight to give evidence are the functions
of the jury, not the judge. Wierman v. Casey’s General Stores, et al., 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir.
2011).
DISCUSSION
A.

Fraudulent and Negligent Misrepresentation – Counts I-II
1.

Negligent Misrepresentation

The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are : (1) the speaker supplied
information in the course of his business; (2) because of a failure by the speaker to exercise

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reasonable care, the information was false; (3) the information was intentionally provided by the
speaker for the guidance of a limited group of persons in a particular business transaction; (4) the
listener justifiably relied on the information; and (5) due to the listener’s justified reliance on the
information, the listener suffered a pecuniary loss. Ryann Spencer Group Inc. v. Assurance
Company of America, 275 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. App. 2008).
Simply put, to maintain a claim for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff must establish
that due to a failure to exercise reasonable care, Defendants made false statements that plaintiff
justifiably relied upon to his detriment. Baum v. Helget Gas Products, Inc., 440 F.3d 1019, 1023
(8th Cir. 2006); citing, Collins v. Mo. Bar Plan, 157 S.W.3d 726, 734 (Mo. App. 2005). “A
negligent misrepresentation claim cannot arise solely from evidence that the defendant did not
perform according to a promise or statement of future intent.” Id.
2.

Fraudulent misrepresentation

To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, plaintiff must prove (1) a false, material
representation; (2) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or his ignorance of its truth; (3) the
speaker’s intent that it should be acted upon by the hearer in a manner reasonably contemplated;
(4) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the representation; (5) the hearer’s reliance on its truth;
(6) the hearer’s right to rely thereon; and (7) the hearer’s consequent and proximately caused
injury. Bohac v. Walsh, 223 S.W.3d 858, 862-863 (Mo. App. 2007). “It is well-settled that an
unkept promise does not constitute actionable fraud unless it is accompanied by a present intent
not to perform.” Urologic Surgeons, Inc. v. Bullock, 117 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Mo. App. 2003).
Further, “statements, representations, or predictions about an independent third party’s future
acts do not constitute actionable misrepresentation.” Massie v. Colvin, 373 S.W.3d 469, 472
(Mo. App. 2012).

7

Both of Plaintiff’s claims for misrepresentation are based on whether Defendants made
materially false statements about the Cross-Shoring program upon which he relied in making his
decision to participate in the program.

Plaintiff claims Defendants made the following

representations: (1) he would receive $100 per month; (2) he would be placed in the ACE or
supervisor fast-track training program upon completion of the program; (3) he would be staying
in an apartment similar to ones shown to him in photographs; (4) he would have internet access
at his living quarters; (5) he would have access to a full-service laundry facility; (6) he would
receive three meals per day; (7) he would work the same hours in India that he worked in
Missouri; (8) he would have $2,000 put into a savings account at the end of the program; and (9)
if he terminated the program early the costs would be recovered from the annual savings related
pay.
First, Defendants argue that any actions taken by Aegis Aspire, the owner and operator of
the Academy, are independent of, and not subject to the control of ACG or Aegis USA and
therefore Defendants cannot be held liable for any representations made regarding the CrossShoring program. However, based on the record before the Court, a question of fact exists
regarding the independence of Aegis Aspire and/or the Academy from the Defendants. The
Defendants continued involvement with the participants in the Indian program, including their
involvement with Plaintiff’s complaints while he was in India, creates questions of fact with
regard to their “independence” from the program. Further, the terms of the contract between
ACG and Aegis Aspire, the evidence regarding the interaction between Plaintiff and individuals
from both companies during his training, and the information contained in the flyer Plaintiff
reviewed further present genuine issues of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s claims and in
particular the relationship between ACG and Aegis Aspire.

8

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that “all individually described perpetrators
were agents, servants, and employees of defendant ACG and were at all times acting within the
scope and course of their agency and employment…” Plaintiff has shown sufficient facts that a
jury might be persuaded by his theory of respondeat superior and agency (whether by authorizing
or ratifying the actions of Aegis Aspire or being liable for them on a theory of joint venture or
other theory of agency). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
negligent misrepresentation claim is denied.
Next, Defendants argue that they did not make any statements to Plaintiff that they knew
were false at the time they were made. As set forth herein, in order to give rise to fraud, a
promise of future performance must be accompanied by a speaker’s present intent not to
perform. See, e.g., Trotters Corp., v. Ringleader Rests., 929 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Mo. App. 1996).
However, as set forth above, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the
independence of ACG and Aegis Aspire with regard to any statements made to Plaintiff. This
alone creates a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. If ACG is liable
for Aegis Aspire’s misstatements then knowledge by Aegis Aspire of the falsity of the
representations may also be imputed to ACG.
Further, even if a jury were to find Defendants are independent of the Indian entities, and
not liable for representations of the Indian entities, Plaintiff has provided enough evidence to
create a question of material fact with regard to whether Defendants exercised reasonable care in
making the statements about the Cross-Shoring program now alleged to be false and what
information they knew about the program when promoting it.
Defendants also contend that any statements made beyond those in the flyer were made
after Plaintiff made the decision to participate in the Cross-Shoring program and therefore cannot

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be representations Plaintiff relied upon in making his decision. However, Plaintiff disputes the
timing of when he made his decision to participate in the Program. Therefore, taking the
evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard
to the timing of Plaintiff’s decision to participate in the program and when any alleged
representations were made. 5
For these reasons, summary judgment on Counts I-II of Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint is DENIED.
B. Unjust Enrichment - Count III
“An unjust enrichment has occurred where a benefit was conferred upon a person in
circumstances in which the retention of the benefit, without paying its reasonable value, would
be unjust.” S & J, Inc. v. McLoud & Co. LLC., 108 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Mo.App. 2003). A claim
for unjust enrichment has three elements: (1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff on a defendant; (2)
the defendant's appreciation of the fact of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance and retention of the
benefit by the defendant under circumstances in which retention without payment would be
inequitable. Hertz Corp. v. RAKS Hospitality, Inc., 196 S.W.3d 536, 543 (Mo.App. 2006).
Demonstrating unjust retention of the benefit is the most significant element of unjust
enrichment and also the most difficult to establish. Executive Bd. of Mo. Baptist Convention v.
Windermere Baptist Conference Ctr., 280 S.W.3d 678, 697 (Mo.App. W.D.2009). “Mere receipt
of benefits is not enough, absent a showing that it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the
benefit.” Id.
5

Plaintiff has set forth nine alleged misrepresentations. While the Court is not inclined at this
point to sort through each specific allegation, it notes that the record before it already indicates
some of these alleged misrepresentations will not make it to a jury. While Plaintiff has
submitted enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to his general
claims, it is clear Plaintiff admits certain representations were fulfilled and therefore will not
constitute misrepresentations.
10

Plaintiff claims Defendants were enriched by his labor provided in the Cross-Shoring
program in India. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was compensated with less than 100 dollars
per month but provided services more valuable than that amount. Plaintiff argues it is reasonable
to infer that Defendants received a benefit at Plaintiff’s expense of at least $19.25 per hour.
“The essence of unjust enrichment is that the defendant has received a benefit that it would be
inequitable for defendant to retain.” Pitman v. City of Columbia, 309 S.W.3d 395, 403 (Mo.App.
W.D. 2010). Here, it is unclear where this amount of alleged benefit is derived from. Plaintiff
participated in a Cross-Shoring program in which the terms included receiving a $100 stipend,
housing, meals, and training courses through Cornell University, in exchange for his work at the
call center in India. There is no evidence that Defendants were unjustly enriched by this
arrangement. Plaintiff may ultimately demonstrate Defendants got the better end of the bargain
but that falls short of proving unjust enrichment. Defendant’s summary judgment motion with
regard to Count III is SUSTAINED.
C. Breach of Contract - Count IV
Plaintiff concedes in his response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment that his
breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 65 p. 4). Plaintiff states his claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.

Therefore, based on Plaintiff’s concession, the Court

SUSTAINS summary judgment on the breach of contract claim contained in Count IV of
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in favor of Defendants.
D. Forced Labor and Benefiting from Forced Labor – Count V-VII
Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). Plaintiff seeks a civil remedy under this Act pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1595. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint separates his claims into three Counts –

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Count V against Defendant ACG, Count VI against Defendant Aegis USA and Count VII against
Defendant ACG.
Plaintiff alleges, in part, both Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations and
mistreated him in a way that constituted a scheme, plan or pattern that he believed would cause
him to suffer severe harm if he did not continue to work in the Cross-Shoring Program.
Section 1589 states:
(a)

Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person
by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means-(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of
physical restraint to that person or another person;
by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person
or another person;
by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;
or
by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm
or physical restraint, 6

shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).
(b)

Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value,
from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or
obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection
(a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has
engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of such
means, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d).

(c)

In this section:
(1)

The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process”
means the use or threatened use of a law or legal process, whether
administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose
for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on
another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain
from taking some action.

6

Plaintiff states in his oppositions to the Motions to Dismiss that his claim is based upon
paragraph (4). (See e.g. Doc. No. 49 p.8).
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(2)

The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or
nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational
harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same
background and in the same circumstances to perform or to
continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring
that harm. (emphasis added).

Several Courts have discussed the scope of the TVPA. The TVPA is “an Act to combat
trafficking of persons, especially into the sex trade, slavery, and slavery-like conditions, in the
United States and countries around the world through prevention, through prosecution and
enforcement against traffickers, and through protection and assistance to victims of trafficking.
The purpose of the Act is to ‘combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of
slavery whose victims are predominately women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers. Many of the victims are ‘trafficked into the international sex trade,
often by force, fraud or coercion.’” Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,
790 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2011); citing, H.R. Conf. Rep. 106-939, at 1 (2000). See
also, Antonatos v. Waraich, 2013 WL 4523792 (D.S.C. August 27, 2013)(denying motion to
dismiss claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1589).
In discussing the application of the TVPA, the Ninth Circuit stated “Congress intended to
‘reach cases in which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion’…
and the means used by modern-day traffickers are increasingly subtle.” U.S. v. Dann, 652 F.3d
1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). However, not all bad employer-employee relationships will
constitute forced labor. Id. at 1170. Congress intended to address serious trafficking, and the
threat considered from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the place of the victim must
be sufficiently serious to compel the person to remain. Id.
While this Court believes Plaintiff’s claim stretches the boundaries of the intended nature
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and purpose of this Act, Plaintiff has created a narrow, but genuine, issue of material fact to
survive summary judgment. Plaintiff creates a factual question regarding whether an objectively
reasonable person with the same background as Plaintiff and under his circumstances would
have felt forced to continue performing labor in the Cross Shoring Program. Plaintiff alleges
both ACG and Aegis USA threatened him with the loss of his job in Joplin, Mo if he left the
Program. He also alleges he was financially unable to pay for his trip home. Plaintiff further
claims that Defendants are liable, at a minimum, because they “knowingly benefited” from the
Cross-Shoring Program. Defendants believe that Plaintiff cannot establish he was threatened
with serious harm. However, at this juncture Plaintiff has alleged enough to survive summary
judgment. 7
Defendants also argue that the TVPA does not apply because its focus is on the
trafficking of people into the United States for the purpose of compelling forced labor.
Specifically, Defendants argue the TVPA does not apply to “forced labor” in India and that the
statute should not apply extraterritorially. They cite to Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 2014 WL
3953672 (2nd Cir. August 14, 2014) for the proposition that the TVPA does not apply to
Plaintiff’s claims. In Liu Meng-Lin the plaintiff was a Taiwanese citizen and resident employed
by a Chinese corporation. His complaint failed to plead that any of the events related to his
claim occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at *1. Instead, he
alleged Siemens employees in China and North Korea were making improper payments to
officials in China and North Korea. Id. The plaintiff alleged he was fired for reporting his
allegations and then two months after he was fired he also reported the alleged conduct to the
7

Defendants Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 29, 42 and 47) all address Plaintiff’s claims under
the TVPA. The Court has considered these Motions in light of the entire record before it,
including the summary judgment briefing, and as such issues its rulings on these motions
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 56.
14

Securities and Exchange Commission. The plaintiff subsequently brought a lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York alleging, in part, that Siemens had violated the antiretaliation
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims arguing, in
part, the antiretaliation provision did not apply extraterritorially. Id. The District Court granted
the motion to dismiss on this issue and the 2nd Circuit affirmed. Id.
A review of Liu Meng-Lin shows that the facts are dissimilar to the allegations in this
case. Here, both Plaintiff and Defendants are U.S. citizens and the claims are based on conduct
that occurred, in part, within the United States. For example, Plaintiff’s claim is based on
alleged misrepresentations he was given while still in Missouri and Texas. Further, Plaintiff
communicated with the Defendants, who remained in the US, while he was in India. Plaintiff
also alleges Defendants benefited in the U.S. from the work he performed in India. Defendants
contend they are not responsible for the acts of Aegis Aspire or anything that occurred in India.
However, as this Court has previously stated, the relationship between Defendants and Aegis
Aspire is unclear and a genuine question of material fact exists regarding the independence,
control and relationship between these entities. A genuine issue also exists with regard to
whether Defendants benefited from the alleged forced labor. As such, summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s TVPA claim is improper.
Defendants also point to their allegation that Plaintiff had sufficient funds to return home
but instead spent his money on cigarettes, alcohol, food and travel rather than saving it for his
return to Missouri. Defendants urge the Court to find as a matter of law that based upon all these
facts a reasonable person in similar circumstances would not have felt compelled to work.
Defendants also point out that Plaintiff is currently working for the same employer(s) he alleges
“enslaved him” in India.

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The Court notes Plaintiff faces a difficult task of convincing a jury that a reasonable
person in his financial condition would feel forced to tolerate the conditions he alleges he faced
in the Cross-Shoring Program. The Court further notes the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s
participation in the Cross-Shoring Program, including communications with Defendants while he
was in India, create further difficulties. However, after careful review of the pleadings, the Court
finds that the facts alleged by Plaintiff, when taken in a light most favorable to him, create a
genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment on these claims and summary
judgment on Counts V-VII is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 62) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as described herein.
Defendant Aegis Communications Group’s (“ACG”) Motion to Dismiss Count VII of Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 29) is DENIED for the reasons set forth herein. Defendant
Aegis USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Count VI (Doc. No. 42) is DENIED for the reasons set
forth herein. Finally, Defendant ACG’s Motion to Dismiss Count V (Doc. No. 47) is DENIED
for the reasons set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

September 9, 2014
/s/ Douglas Harpool_________________
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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