Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Association v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company

Filing 32

ORDER granting 13 defedant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; finding as moot 15 plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Signed on 4/15/11 by District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
SHEET METAL WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AFL-CIO,
Plaintiff,
v.
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY
COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:10-CV-00751-DGK

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This case arises out of Plaintiff Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFLCIO, concerns that Defendant Kansas City Southern Railway Company is violating the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement, and Plaintiff’s subsequent attempt to monitor compliance with
the agreement. Now before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 13). Finding that
the Complaint concerns the same wrong and arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as a
prior lawsuit between the parties, the Court holds the present complaint is barred by res judicata.
The Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (doc. 15) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
Background
The collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the parties provides that nonSMWIA represented employees may only perform sheet metal work that is “incidental” to the
main task they are performing. If there is a dispute over whether the work is incidental, the
Union may request that the work be timed to determine whether the allegedly incidental work
exceeds the time for the main task. If so, it is not incidental. Congress has also created an
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exception to the rule restricting the amount of sheet metal work performed by non-sheet metal
workers in the railroad industry, holding that an employee in any craft may perform tasks
normally performed by another craft for up to two hours a day.
For several years, Defendant Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCSR” or “the
Railroad”) and Plaintiff Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO (“SMWIA” or
“the Union”) have been embroiled in an on-going dispute over the Railroad’s virtual elimination
of sheet metal workers from its shops and the amount of sheet metal work the railroad has
assigned to non-SMWIA represented employees. The Union claims that in 1999 there were at
least twelve sheet metal workers actively working full schedules, but by the end of 2008 the
Railroad had reduced the number to one at its Kansas City shop, and completely eliminated the
position in its Shreveport shop.
In April of 2009 the Union sued the Railroad in this Court, case no. 09-CV-00091,
alleging violations of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 152. The Union claimed the
Railroad abrogated the CBA by assigning sheet metal work to employees who were not sheet
metal workers and by refusing to participate in a “time check”—a union audit designed to
determine if work is being assigned and performed in compliance with the CBA. Among other
things the Union asserted that “[b]y refusing to allow and participate in a time check of the Sheet
Metal work performed for KCS, the Carrier has not dealt with SMWIA in good faith, and has not
complied with its Section 2 First duty to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements.” Compl. at ¶ 31. The Court granted the Railroad’s motion to dismiss, holding that
the dispute between the parties was a minor dispute1 under the RLA and subject to mandatory

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 A minor dispute under the RLA is one growing “out of grievances or out of the interpretation of
application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. §
153 First (i). 

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arbitration by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. See Order dated Nov. 9, 2009 (doc. 21)
at 8.
In the wake of the dismissal the Union notified the Railroad that it would like to begin the
process of moving claims to arbitration “by sending several Union officers to observe work at
the shop for a one week period . . . in order to file any claims or grievances they deem
appropriate.” The Railroad did not agree to this approach and, six months later, informed the
union that it would not permit non-employee union officers to inspect the KCSR shop. The
Union argued its demand was justified by the CBA and the RLA, and the Railroad replied that it
viewed the Union’s request as simply a revised demand for a time check.
The Union has not yet utilized any claim procedures in the CBA on behalf of an
individual employee, or brought a grievance to resolve the threshold issue of its alleged
entitlement to inspect the shops.
On July 10, 2010, the Union filed the present lawsuit. Among other things, the present
Complaint alleges that “[b]y refusing to all SMWIA’s officers access to the Shreveport Shop for
the purposes of observing work and work assignments . . . KCS has violated its duty to make
every reasonable effort to maintain agreements . . .” Compl. at ¶ 42.
Discussion
The Railroad moves to dismiss, arguing (1) that the doctrine of res judicata prohibits the
Union from re-litigating the issue of the observation of carrier operations; (2) that the Union has
no viable cause of action under Section 2 of the RLA; and (3) that the dispute over the Union’s
claimed right of access is subject to mandatory arbitration. Holding that the doctrine of res
judicata bars the Union’s complaint, the Court grants the Railroad’s motion and does not address
the remaining arguments.

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Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits a party from re-litigating a cause of action on
grounds that were raised, or could have been raised, in a prior lawsuit. Lane v. Peterson, 899
F.2d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 1990). The doctrine serves the important interest of finality by preventing
endless litigation of the same claim. See Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02
(1981). Res judicata is a bar to a subsequent action if the prior judgment was rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, and the same
cause of action and the same parties were involved in both cases.

Banks v. Int’l Union

Electronic, Elec., Tech., Salaried & Machine Workers, 390 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2004).
The same cause of action is implicated by a new complaint if “it arises out of the same nucleus
of operative facts as the prior claim.” Banks, 390 F.3d at 1052; Murphy v. Jones, 877 F.2d 682,
684-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose”). “What constitutes a ‘transaction’ or ‘series of
connected transactions’ is ‘to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations
as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations
or business understanding or usage’.” Poe v. John Deere Co., 695 F.2d 1103, 1106 (8th Cir.
1982) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2)).
The Union argues first that the present action is not seeking redress for the same wrong
alleged in the 2009 case. It contends that the allegations in the 2009 case were that the Railroad
violated the terms of the CBA that reserved sheet metal work for sheet metal workers and
provided for time checks to police the CBA. The Union contends it sought to have its officers
observe the assignment of work at the shop only after the Court ruled that this dispute had to be

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handled through the grievance/arbitration process, and the second lawsuit arose because the
Railroad prevented it from making these observations.
The Court finds that present case is only a slightly different formulation of the wrong
alleged in the 2009 case. The 2009 Complaint asserts that “[b]y refusing to allow and participate
in a time check of the Sheet Metal work performed for KCS, the Carrier has not dealt with
SMWIA in good faith, and has not complied with its Section 2 First duty to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements.” Compl. at ¶ 31. The present Complaint
alleges that “[b]y refusing to all SMWIA’s officers access to the Shreveport Shop for the
purposes of observing work and work assignments . . . KCS has violated its duty to make every
reasonable effort to maintain agreements . . .” Compl. at ¶ 42. Both complaints allege that the
Railroad is violating its duty to make every reasonable effort to maintain agreements, that is,
comply with the CBA, by refusing to allow the Union to monitor the agreement on site, the
difference being in the former case the monitoring is called a “time check” and in the later case
an “observation.”
The Union’s second argument, that the conduct complained of in the present case does
not grow out of the same nucleus of operative facts, is also not persuasive. The Union contends
there are three factual distinctions here: (1) time checks are a “creature of contract,” while
observations spring forth from the Union’s function as a representative; (2) time checks are
conducted jointly with the Railroad, while observations involve only Union officers; and (3) the
Union’s plan to conduct observations was developed after the Court dismissed the 2009 case.
These are not meaningful distinctions. Assuming for the sake of argument that time
checks and observations are different and that an “observation” is not simply a “time check”
unilaterally foisted on the Railroad by the Union, they both serve the same function: To monitor

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compliance with the CBA’s provisions reserving sheet metal work for union sheet metal
workers. The Union’s underlying grievance here is the same, that the Railroad is violating these
provisions of the CBA. The second alleged distinction is also meritless because there is virtually
no difference between a time check and an observation. As a practical matter, both time checks
and observations would involve Railroad officials accompanying the Union officers performing
the time check/observations, and the process would be indistinguishable from the shop-wide time
check the Union sought previously. The Union’s suggestion that the Railroad would permit
Union officials to engage in the proposed observations, which are arguably more elaborate and
intrusive than a joint time check, without being accompanied by Railroad representatives, is
unrealistic. With respect to the third distinction, the fact that the Union devised its observation
plan after the Court dismissed the previous case confirms that the Union’s motivation here
remains the same as in the previous case: To gather information about suspected violations of
the CBA without going through the mandated grievance/arbitration procedure.
Finally, the Court finds no merit to the Union’s suggestion that res judicata does not
apply because given the nature of the planned observation and its origination after dismissal of
the earlier case, this issue could not have been fully and fairly litigated in the earlier action. The
Court’s previous ruling was that the time check dispute was subject to mandatory arbitration,
thus the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear it. The Union cannot evade this holding
by re-labeling the proposed procedure an “observation” and insisting it was not addressed in the
prior order.

Consequently, the Court holds this issue was fully and fairly adjudicated in the

previous case.
Conclusion

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For the reasons discussed above, the Court holds the present complaint is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (doc. 15) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: April 15, 2011

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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