Martin v. US Postal Service et al

Filing 106

ORDERED denying 82 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Copy of order mailed via regular and certified mail as directed in the order (article # 7001 0360 0003 3497 8546). Signed on 4/2/2012 by Chief District Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. (Baldwin, Joella)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
STEPHANIE A. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE,
POSTMASTER GENERAL, et. al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
) Case No. 10-00917-CV-FJG
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Stephanie Martin’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 82). 1
I.

Background
This is an action arising out of Plaintiff’s termination from her employment with

the United States Postal Service (“Employer”) (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges
that the Employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
by discriminating against her on the basis of race (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff seeks
reinstatement of her job and backpay (Doc. No. 1).
Plaintiff submits the present Motion for Summary Judgment for the Court to enter
judgment in her favor on all claims (Doc. No. 82).
II.

Facts
Plaintiff worked for the United States Postal Service from August 1997 through

February 2009. 2 During 2008 and 2009, Plaintiff worked as a mail handler at the

1

Plaintiff Stephanie Martin is proceeding in this action pro se.

Employer’s Processing and Distribution Center in Kansas City, Missouri. During 2008,
Plaintiff was suspended from work for absenteeism and failure to follow instructions.
Plaintiff received a Notice of Removal from Employer. Subsequently, Mailhandler Union
Local 297 (“Local 297”) filed a grievance challenging Plaintiff’s Notice of Removal. On
November 24, 2008, Plaintiff and Employer settled Plaintiff’s grievance by entering into
a Last Chance Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement provided that Plaintiff could
return to her employment position, as long as she complied with the terms and
conditions of the Last Chance Agreement for a period of 15 months or she would be
terminated. The Last Chance Agreement also provided that Plaintiff must limit
unscheduled absences to no more than 36 hours of the normally scheduled work hours
or 5 absences, whichever is less, during the 15 month trial period. Furthermore, the
Agreement stated that the settlement of Plaintiff’s grievance constituted withdrawal of all
current appeals including Equal Employment Opportunity claims and that no other
appeals would be filed, processed or pursued.
Plaintiff was absent from work December 24, 2008 through January 2, 2009. As
such, Plaintiff was removed from her employment on February 3, 2009. Mailhandler
Union Local 297 filed another grievance on behalf of Plaintiff contending the removal
was improper. On July 10, 2009, the grievance proceeded to arbitration. During
arbitration, Plaintiff’s Union advocate argued that Plaintiff’s absences were caused by
legitimate medical problems and provided the arbitrator with copies of documentation
from Plaintiff’s doctor. On July 16, 2009, an arbitrator upheld the removal, finding that
Plaintiff violated the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, and ruled in favor of the

2

The facts contained herein are taken from the pleadings (Doc. No. 1, 69, 80, 82, 87, 92) and are used solely for
purposes of this order. Plaintiff provided a scarce amount of facts. As such, the facts contained therein are taken in
large part from Defendants’ pleadings. The Court is not bound by the facts contained herein.
2

Postal Service. In July of 2009, Plaintiff made contact with an Equal Employment
Opportunity counselor. On October 13, 2010 Plaintiff brought suit in the above-styled
action against Mailhandler Union Local 297 and Employer alleging violation of Title VII
on the basis of race.
III.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 82)
Plaintiff submits the present Motion for Summary Judgment against Employer

and Mailhandler Union Local 297. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Mailhandler Union
Local 297 did not inform her of her right to exhaust administrative remedies and the
Equal Employment Opportunity process. Plaintiff claims Employer wrongfully
terminated her for absenteeism. Plaintiff states she had legitimate medical reasons for
her absence – a severe head injury. Furthermore, Plaintiff states that Employer
discriminated against her on the basis of race because similarly situated AfricanAmerican or Black employees were given their jobs back under similar circumstances.
Plaintiff is a Caucasian or White female. (Doc. No. 82).
Defendant Donahoe, on behalf of Employer, submits that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment should be denied. Specifically, Defendant Donahoe states that
Plaintiff does not support her assertions of facts by citations to material in the record,
nor by affidavits or declarations, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c)(1)(A) and (4) and by Local Rule 56.1(a) Moreover, even if the assertions of facts
are accepted, Plaintiff’s Motion does not establish that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. The Motion does not set forth assertions that would arguably establish
that the Court has jurisdiction, nor arguably establish the elements of a claim for
discrimination. (Doc. No. 87).

3

Defendant Mailhandlers Union Local 297 submits arguments similar to that of
Defendant Donahue in that it argues that Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied on the
grounds that it is procedurally and substantively deficient. In addition to not comply with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56, Local 297 submits Plaintiff has
been unable to provide any factual support for her claim that Local 297 engaged in Title
VII discrimination. Discrimination on the basis of a disability is subject to protection
under The Rehabilitation Act, not Title VII. Furthermore, Defendant Local 297 contends
what Plaintiff appears to be alleging against it is a violation of the duty of fair
representation, not Title VII. A 6-month statute of limitations is applied to duty of fair
representation actions. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Local 297 are barred. Finally,
to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred, there is no factual support for her
assertion that the Union failed to adequately represent her. (Doc. No. 92).
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment shall be granted when the “movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Plaintiff’s evidence is to “be believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [Plaintiff’s] favor.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The moving party must carry the burden of
establishing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that such party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
B. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that a party moving for summary
judgment must assert a fact cannot be genuinely disputed by citing to particular parts of
4

material in the record or by showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute. If a party fails to properly support an
assertion of fact, the Court may issue any order it deems appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(4). Local Rule 56.1 states that a party moving for summary judgment must file its
suggestions in support which set forth facts supported by reference to where in the
record the fact is established.
In this case, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is not supported by
citations to material in the record. Plaintiff merely makes factual assertions and legal
conclusions based on her beliefs. As such, the Court has discretion to enter any order it
deems appropriate. The Court deems it appropriate to rule as currently exists on the
record.

3

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 82) is

DENIED.
IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 82) is DENIED. The Clerk of

the Court is directed to mail a copy of this order via regular and certified mail to the
following: Stephanie A. Martin 14208 W. 83rd Street Lenexa, KS 66215.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/2/2012
Kansas City, Missouri

3

S/ FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR.
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge

It is important to note that Plaintiff has been granted four Motions for Extension of Time in the above-styled
action. (Doc. No. 23, 53, 81, & 95). Plaintiff received a one month extension of time in which to file Reply
Suggestions to Defendants’ Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 98).
Plaintiff’s ultimate Reply Suggestions filed did not address the issue at hand, but rather responded to Defendant
Donahoe’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 103).
5