Martin v. US Postal Service et al
Filing
109
ORDER granting 68 Defendant National Mail Handlers Union Local 297's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting 80 Defendant Postmaster General Patrick R. Donahoe's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Pl aintiff's suit is DISMISSED. Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this order via regular and certified mail to plaintiff. Signed on 4/12/12 by Chief District Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. (Enss, Rhonda) Modified on 4/12/2012 to reflect that copy of order 109 and clerk's judgment 110 was mailed by regular and certified mail #7006 2760 0000 6384 4049 to the plaintiff at her listed address this date (Rowland, Bonnie).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
STEPHANIE A. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
PATRICK R. DONAHOE,
POSTMASTER GENERAL, et. al.,
Defendants.
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) Case No. 10-00917-CV-FJG
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ORDER
Currently pending before the Court is Defendant National Mail Handlers Union
Local 297’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Postmaster General Patrick
R. Donahoe’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 68 & 80).
I.
Background
This is an action arising out of Plaintiff Stephanie Martin’s1 termination from her
employment with the United States Postal Service (“Employer”) (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges that the Employer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, by discriminating against her on the basis of race (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff
seeks reinstatement of her job and back pay (Doc. No. 1).
Defendant National Mail Handlers Union Local 297 (“Local 297” or “Union”)
Defendant Postmaster General Patrick R. Donahoe submit the present Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss for the Court to enter judgment in their favor
on all claims (Doc. No. 68 & 80).
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Plaintiff Stephanie Martin is proceeding in this action pro se.
II.
Facts
Plaintiff worked for the United States Postal Service (“Employer”) from August
1997 through February 2009.2 During 2008 and 2009, Plaintiff worked as a mail
handler at the Employer’s Processing and Distribution Center in Kansas City, Missouri.
During 2008, Plaintiff was suspended from work for absenteeism and failure to follow
instructions. Plaintiff received a Notice of Removal from Employer. Subsequently,
Local 297 filed a grievance challenging Plaintiff’s Notice of Removal. On November 24,
2008, Plaintiff and Employer settled Plaintiff’s grievance by entering into a Last Chance
Agreement. The Last Chance Agreement provided that Plaintiff could return to her
employment position, as long as she complied with the terms and conditions of the Last
Chance Agreement for a period of 15 months or she would be terminated. The Last
Chance Agreement also provided that Plaintiff must limit unscheduled absences to no
more than 36 hours of the normally scheduled work hours or 5 absences, whichever is
less, during the 15 month trial period. Furthermore, the Agreement stated that the
settlement of Plaintiff’s grievance constituted withdrawal of all current appeals including
Equal Employment Opportunity claims and that no other appeals would be filed,
processed or pursued.
Subsequently, Plaintiff was absent from work December 24, 2008 through
January 2, 2009. As such, Plaintiff was removed from her employment on February 3,
2009. Local 297 filed another grievance on behalf of Plaintiff contending the removal
was improper. On July 10, 2009, the grievance proceeded to arbitration. During
arbitration, Plaintiff’s Union advocate argued that Plaintiff’s absences were caused by
2
The facts contained herein are taken from the pleadings (Doc. No. 1, 69, 80, 82, 87, 92,103) and are used solely for
purposes of this order. The Court is not bound by the facts contained herein.
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legitimate medical problems and provided the arbitrator with copies of documentation
from Plaintiff’s doctor. On July 16, 2009, an arbitrator upheld the removal, finding that
Plaintiff violated the terms of the Last Chance Agreement, and ruled in favor of the
Postal Service. In July of 2009, Plaintiff made contact with an Equal Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor. On October 13, 2010, Plaintiff brought suit in the
above-styled action against Local 297 and Employer alleging violation of Title VII on the
basis of race. Plaintiff claims similarly situated African-American or Black employees
were given their jobs back under similar circumstances. Plaintiff is a Caucasian or White
female.
III.
Defendant Mail Handlers Union Local 297’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 68) & Defendant Patrick R. Donahoe’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
No. 80)
Defendant Mail Handlers Union Local 297 contends that the Court should grant
Summary Judgment in its favor. First, Plaintiff’s claims are barred because Plaintiff
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Aggrieved persons who believe they
have been discriminated against must consult an EEO counselor prior to filing a
complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter. The contact with the EEO
counselor must be made within forty-five (45) days of the date of the discriminatory
contact or within forty-five (45) days of the date of the discriminatory personnel action.
Plaintiff’s contact with an EEO counselor in July 2009 for termination that occurred on
February 3, 2009 is outside of the forty-five (45) day deadline, and is therefore untimely.
Second, although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Local 297 discriminated against her
in violation of Title VII, Plaintiff is actually claiming that Local 297 breached its duty of
fair representation. A 6-month statute of limitations is applied to duty of fair
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representation actions. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Local 297 are barred. Finally,
alternatively, Plaintiff cannot establish that Local 297 violated its duty of fair
representation. Local 297 was under no obligation to provide Plaintiff with information
about the EEO process and there is no factual support for Plaintiff’s assertion that the
Union failed to adequately represent her. (Doc. No. 68 & 69).
Defendant Donahoe articulates much of the same reasoning of Defendant Local
297 in that the Court should dismiss this action because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, Plaintiff’s claims are still subject to summary
judgment because the merits of the arbitrator’s decision are not open for
reconsideration per the language of the Last Chance Agreement in which Plaintiff
signed. Finally, Plaintiff cannot establish a Title VII cause of action. Plaintiff’s claims
fail for lack of evidence that the Black employees were “similarly situated in all relevant
respects”, but treated differently by the Employer. As such, Plaintiff is unable to
establish a prima facie case under Title VII. (Doc. No. 80).
Plaintiff’s Complaint and subsequent pleadings contend that Employer fired her
despite knowing about her severe head injury. The pleadings also contend that
similarly situated Black employees were permitted to return to work. Plaintiff states that
Local 297 did not inform Plaintiff of her right to exhaust administrative remedies and the
Equal Employment Opportunity process.3 Furthermore, Local 297 should have done
3
It is important to note that Plaintiff did not file any Suggestions in Opposition to Defendant Local 297’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Although this would be a sufficient reason for the Court to grant Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Eighth Circuit has instructed that when a Plaintiff fails to respond adequately to a Motion
for Summary Judgment, a court should “proceed to examine those portions of the record properly before them and
decide for themselves whether the motion is well taken. Even on unopposed motions, courts should view the facts
in the light most favorable to the party who would be opposing the motion.” Lowry v. Powerscreen USB, Inc., 72
F.Supp.2d 1061, 1064 (E.D.Mo. 1999), quoting Canada v. Union Electric Co., 135 F.3d 1211, 1213 (8th Cir. 1997).
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more for Plaintiff in its representation of Plaintiff’s interests. Local 297 did not act
zealously against Employer on Plaintiff’s behalf when medical documentation was
provided stating that Plaintiff had a severe injury. As such, Local 297 discriminated
against Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff can provide factual support of Local 297’s deficiencies.
Specifically, Union representatives often stated to Plaintiff that she should not have
signed the Last Chance Agreement. (Doc. No. 82, 103).
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment shall be granted when the “movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Plaintiff’s evidence is to “be believed and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [Plaintiff’s] favor.” Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). The moving party must carry the burden of
establishing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that such party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the
Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Graham Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Hammer
& Steel, Inc., No. 4:11CV1316 JCH, 2012 WL 685459, at *2 (E.D. Mo. March 2, 2012)
citing Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the
Court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. citing Coons v. Mineta, 410
f.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005). A motion to dismiss must be granted, however, if the
Complaint does not contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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face. Id. citing Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a
Complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Id. Stated differently, to survive a motion to
dismiss the Complaint’s factual allegations, must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level. Id.
B. Discussion
Before the federal courts may hear a discrimination claim, an employee must
fully exhaust her administrative remedies. Burkett v. Glickman, 327 F.3d 658 660 (8th
Cir. 2003). For a federal employee, this requires, as an initial matter, that she “initiate
contact” with an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor “within 45 days of the
date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory” or of the effective date of the alleged
discriminatory personnel action. Id. citing 29 C.F.R. 1614.105(a)(1). See also Jensen
v. Henderson, 315 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2002). Discriminatory acts are not actionable
if time barred. Id. citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122
(2002).
Plaintiff was removed from her employment on February 3, 2009. Plaintiff did not
contact an Equal Employment Opportunity counselor until July of 2009. This is well
beyond the forty-five (45) day deadline. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are time barred.
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and thus, the Court may not hear
Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. Plaintiff’s suit is DISMISSED.
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IV.
Conclusion
Defendant National Mail Handlers Union Local 297’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 68) is hereby GRANTED. Defendant Postmaster General Patrick
R. Donahoe’s Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 80) is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s suit is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the
Court is directed to mail a copy of this order via regular and certified mail to the
following: Stephanie A. Martin 14208 W. 83rd Street Lenexa, KS 66215.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/ FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR.
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
Date: 04/12/12
Kansas City, Missouri
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