Clark v. Astrue

Filing 26

ORDER Affirming Commissioner's Decision. Signed on 9/24/12 by District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
WILLIE C. CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:10-01046-DGK-SSA

ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Willie C. Clark seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s
denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
(“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et. seq., and his application for supplemental security income
based on disability under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et. seq. Clark contends he is
entitled to benefits because he is unable to work due to his depressive disorder and borderline
intellectual functioning. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Clark’s applications for
benefits, finding that but for his substance abuse he would be able to perform past relevant work
as a forklift driver.
Plaintiff has exhausted all of his administrative remedies and judicial review is now
appropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). After reviewing the record, the Court finds the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
Procedural and Factual Background
The complete facts and arguments are presented in the parties’ briefs and are repeated
here only to the extent necessary.

Standard of Review
A federal court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits is
limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole. McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000).
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough evidence that a reasonable mind
would find it sufficient to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.

Id.

In making this

assessment, the court considers evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision, as well
as evidence that supports it. Id. The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision as long
as substantial evidence in the records supports this decision, even if substantial evidence in the
record also supports a different result, or if the court might have decided the case differently
were it the initial finder of fact. Id.
Analysis
Generally, a federal court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny an application
for benefits is restricted to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is consistent with
the Act, the regulations, and applicable case law, and whether the findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. In determining whether a claimant is disabled,
the Commissioner follows a five-step evaluation process.1

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The five-step process is as follows: First, the Commissioner determines if the applicant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If so, he is not disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At step two the Commissioner
determines if the applicant has a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment” or a combination
of impairments. If so, and they meet the durational requirement of having lasted or being expected to last for a
continuous 12-month period, the inquiry continues; if not, the applicant is considered not disabled. At step three the
Commissioner considers whether the impairment is one of specific listing of impairments in Appendix 1 of 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. If so, the applicant is considered disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At step four the
Commissioner considers if the applicant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allows the applicant to perform past
relevant work. If so, the applicant is not disabled; if not, the inquiry continues. At step five the Commissioner
considers whether, in light of the applicant’s age, education and work experience, the applicant can perform any
other kind of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) (2009); King v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 978, 979 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009).
Through step four of the analysis the claimant bears the burden of showing that he is disabled. After the analysis
reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are other jobs in the economy that the
claimant can perform. King, 564 F.3d at 979 n.2.

2

Clark filed this application for disability benefits and supplemental security income on
December 20, 2004, alleging he was disabled as of October 30, 2002. R. at 24. But because he
alleged the same disability onset date in two previous applications, which the Commissioner
denied on April 2, 2003 and February 23, 2004 respectively, the doctrine of res judicata
prevented the ALJ from considering his allegations from October 30, 2002 through February 23,
2004. R. at 24. Thus, the ALJ’s decision considered Clark’s claims from February 24, 2004 to
the date of the ALJ’s decision, September 24, 2008.
After reviewing the record and conducting a hearing, the ALJ held that, absent his
substance abuse, Clark could perform his past relevant work as a forklift driver despite the
limitations identified by the ALJ in his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ: (1) erred by not determining what Clark’s physical and
mental limitations would be if he did not have a substance abuse problem and then determining
whether these limitations, by themselves, would be disabling; and (2) reached the wrong
conclusion in not finding him disabled because another ALJ subsequently held Clark was
disabled as of October 7, 2010.
The Court finds no merit to Clark’s arguments.
A.

The ALJ’s drug and alcohol analysis was proper.
Under the Act, “An individual shall not be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or

drug addiction would (but for this subchapter) be a contributing factor material to the
Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C),
1382c(j). Drug addiction or alcoholism is “material” if the claimant would not be disabled if he
stopped abusing alcohol or drugs. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935.

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Under the regulations,2 where there is medical evidence of drug addiction or alcoholism,
the ALJ must first determine whether the individual is disabled under the standard five-step
evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535, 416.935. If the claimant is disabled, then the ALJ
must determine whether absent the drug or alcohol abuse the individual would still be disabled.
Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2003). That is, the ALJ must focus on
whether the impairments would remain if the substance abuse ended and “whether those
impairments are disabling, regardless of their cause.” Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir.
2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving that drug abuse or alcoholism is not a material
factor. Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 888 (8th Cir. 2005). If the ALJ is unable to determine
whether substance abuse is a material factor, the claimant’s burden has been met. Brueggemann,
348 F.3d at 693. “In colloquial terms,” on the issue of the materiality of drug or alcohol abuse,
“a tie goes to [the claimant].” Id. In sum, the ALJ must determine (1) whether the claimant is
disabled, then (2) whether drug or alcohol use is a concern, and if so (3) whether substantial
evidence on the record demonstrates these limitations would remain in the absence of the
claimant’s substance abuse. Id.
Clark argues the ALJ failed to analyze the evidence to determine whether it was possible
to separate his mental disorders from his substance abuse problems. Pl’s Br. at 22. He claims
there is not substantial evidence in the record indicating how he functions absent his substance
abuse, thus the ALJ could not make any finding whether he would be disabled absent the
substance abuse. Pl’s Br. at 22. He specifically asserts that none of the doctors opined whether
his substance was a material factor in his disability. Pl’s Br. at 22-24. Thus, he should be found
disabled under the “tie goes to the claimant” rule.

2

The regulations implementing the law are identical with respect to disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535, with 20 C.F.R. § 416.935.

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These arguments are meritless. The ALJ followed the regulations in determining whether
Clark’s substance abuse was a material factor in his disability, and the ALJ’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record. First, the ALJ found that Clark’s mental
impairments, when considered in conjunction with his substance abuse, met the listings for
disability under 20 CFR § 404.1520(d) and § 416.920(d). R. at 34. The ALJ then discussed
Clark’s impairments in the absence of substance abuse, finding that “[i]n the absence of
substance abuse, the remaining limitations would cause more than a minimal impact” on his
ability to work. R. at 35. Next, he determined that, “[in] the absence of substance use, the
claimant would not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals” the disability listings under 20 CFR § 404.1520(d) and § 416.920(d). R. at 35. He cited
the testimony of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Nancy Winfrey, Ph.D., concerning Clark’s
limitations if his drug and alcohol abuse were excluded. R. at 35. Dr. Winfrey opined Clark
could work but should not have frequent contact with other people or perform complex
instructions. R. at 557. Other evidence in the record confirms her opinion. Dr. R.L. Pentercost,
M.D., stated in his mental RFC assessment that if Clark maintained his sobriety, he would be
able to understand, remember, and perform short, simple instructions, keep to a routine of simple
tasks, and interact with others adequately for work. R. at 404. These doctors were able to
separate Clark’s limitations from his drug and alcohol abuse, and they provided a basis for the
ALJ to make his finding.
The Court also observes that throughout his opinion the ALJ discussed Clark’s substance
abuse and its relationship to his ability to work. R. at 35-40. For example, in discussing Clark’s
RFC, the ALJ wrote, “[i]f the claimant stopped the substance abuse, the undersigned finds that
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce

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some symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible . . .” Among other things, the ALJ noted
Clark lost his home and car because of substance abuse, R. at 38, 323, and that Clark told Dr.
James True, M.D., that he lost his job as a stocker at a grocery store in October 2002, when he
began using drugs and drinking, reporting to work late, and not showing up. R. at 324. While
Dr. True’s testimony, if believed, would support an award of benefits, the ALJ discussed his
opinion and gave sound reasons for discounting it. R. at 39. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence on the record.
B.

The award of benefits on a subsequent application for benefits in 2011 by a different
ALJ is not a basis for reversal.
Finally, Clark argues the Court should reverse the ALJ’s decision because a different

ALJ’s ruling on a subsequent application found Clark disabled because of his mental
impairments beginning October 7, 2010. Pl.’s Br. at 25. Clark claims the ALJ in the subsequent
case reached his decision by “evaluating essentially the same evidence” presented to the ALJ in
this case, thus the ALJ here must be wrong.
As a threshold matter, the Court does not know what evidence ALJ Dawson relied on in
reaching his decision. Although his decision refers in passing to some evidence which is part of
the record in this case, including a medical source assessment completed by Dr. Kathleen King,
Ph.D. along with a reference to Dr. True’s “a longitudinal relationship” with Clark, such
references do not prove that the record in front of him was the same as the record in this case.
The fact that another ALJ ruling on a subsequent application found Clark to be disabled as of
October 7, 2010, simply suggests that Clark met the requirements for disability in October 2010,
and that when he met these requirements, the Commissioner found him disabled.

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In any event, the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision in this case concerns Clark’s
December 2004 application and is limited to determining whether the his findings are supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.
2000). The court may not reverse the ALJ’s decision as long as substantial evidence in the
records supports it, even if substantial evidence in the record also supports a different result, or if
the court might have decided the case differently were it the initial finder of fact. Id. In this
case, after reviewing the record and carefully considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Clark was not disabled under the
Act during the relevant time period, namely from February 24, 2004 to September 24, 2008.
Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: September 24, 2012

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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