Moran v. Missouri Central Credit Union
Filing
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ORDER granting 6 Motion to Dismiss. Signed on 05/26/2011 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Will-Fees, Eva)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
BERNARD W. MORAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MISSOURI CENTRAL CREDIT UNION,
Defendant.
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Case No. 11-0189-CV-W-ODS
ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the motion
(Doc. # 6) is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges he borrowed money to finance the purchase of an automobile
pursuant to a program under which the loans were made or arranged by a company
called Centrix. The loans were ultimately purchased by Defendant, but Centrix
continued servicing the loans on Defendant’s behalf as its agent. E.g., Complaint, ¶¶
10-11, 30, 51. “In connection with each of these loans, [Defendant] took a security
interest in the . . . motor vehicles and was reflected as the secured party and lienholder .
. . .” Complaint, ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s vehicle was repossessed for nonpayment and
subsequently sold. However, Plaintiff alleges the pre-sale notifications sent to him
lacked information required by Missouri’s codified version of the Uniform Commercial
Code. E.g., Complaint, ¶¶ 15-17, 64. At some point, Defendant became aware that the
notices Centrix sent on Defendant’s behalf did not comply with the UCC and sent letters
to borrowers whose cars had been repossessed. These letters allegedly contained a
series of false representations and omissions. Complaint, ¶¶ 18-19.
Plaintiff’s car was repossessed on or about January 20, 2005, and he received
the pre-sale notification on or about the same date. Complaint, ¶¶ 27-28. Plaintiff filed
this suit in state court on December 15, 2010, alleging three causes of action. Count I
alleges violations of the UCC, specifically sections 400.9-611 through 400.9-614 of the
Revised Missouri Statutes. Complaint, ¶¶ 62-64. Count I seeks the relief permitted by
section 400.9-625. Complaint, ¶ 67. Count II asserts violations of the Missouri
Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”). The factual predicates for Count II include (1)
material omissions made when the loan was made, (2) the use of pre-sale notifications
that violated the UCC, and (3) the use of misleading communications once the UCC
“violations” were discovered. Complaint, ¶¶ 76, 82. Count III asserts a claim for
conversion.
II. DISCUSSION
The liberal pleading standard created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Id. (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the Court “must accept as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view them in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff[ ].” Stodghill v. Wellston School Dist., 512 F.3d
472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
2
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).1
A. Count I
Defendant contends Count I is time-barred. The Court holds that the Missouri
Supreme Court would agree, so the claim must be dismissed.2
Defendant argues the applicable statute of limitation for violations of section
400.9-625 is section 516.120(2), which requires suit to be brought within five years of
accrual for any “action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or
forfeiture.” Plaintiff argues the applicable statute of limitation is found in section
516.420, which provides as follows:
1
The Court is limited to a review of the Complaint; the only items outside the
Complaint that may be considered without converting the motion to one seeking relief
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are (1) exhibits attached to
the Complaint, and (2) materials necessarily embraced by the Complaint. Mattes v.
ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2003). Defendant has attached
materials to its motion, including affidavits. The Court declares that it has not reviewed
these materials (other than copies of judicial opinions), so there is no need to convert
the motion to one arising under Rule 56.
2
“[T]he possible existence of a statute of limitations defense is not ordinarily a
ground for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal unless the complaint itself establishes the defense.”
Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008).
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None of the provisions of sections 516.380 to 516.4203 shall apply to suits
against moneyed corporations . . . to recover any penalty or forfeiture
imposed, or to enforce any liability created by the act of incorporation or
any other law; but all such suits shall be brought within six years after the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which such penalty or
forfeiture attached, or by which such liability was created.
The focus is whether section 400.9-625 imposes a penalty. If it does, then
section 512.120 is (by its own terms) inapplicable. In such a case, the limitation period
would ordinarily be prescribed by sections 516.380 through 516.400 and, if the
defendant is a “moneyed corporation,” those provisions would be replaced by the sixyear period prescribed by section 516.420.4 In ascertaining whether the UCC provision
constitutes a penal statute, the Court is bound by decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court. “If the highest state court has not decided an issue we must attempt to predict
how the highest court would resolve the issue, with decisions of intermediate state
courts being persuasive authority.” Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d
388, 390 (8th Cir. 2010).
The question at hand is not simply “is section 400.9-0625 a penal statute?” The
real question is: in the absence of section 516.420, which statute of limitation would
apply? It is a statutory cause of action, so section 516.120(2) would seem to apply –
unless the liability is “a penalty or forfeiture.” The Missouri Supreme Court has not
indicated which statute of limitations applies to a claim under section 400.9-625, which
is unsurprising given that the UCC is generally related to contractual matters. It is
unusual to think of the Uniform Commercial Code as providing for penalties. Inasmuch
as the UCC establishes remedies, rights, and other provisions related to contracts, one
3
This is not a typographical error: section 516.420 includes itself within the range
of statutes that do not apply in the circumstances described in that section. No party
suggests (and the Court does not believe) that this language should be taken literally as
it would completely deprive section 516.420 of all meaning.
4
Defendant also argues that it is not a “moneyed corporation” within the meaning
of section 516.420. The Court disagrees, but there is no need to delve into this matter
in light of the Court’s decision.
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would expect any causes of action created thereunder to be treated similarly to contract
actions.
More specifically, the statute at issue also does not appear to be penal in nature.
Depending on the violation in question, section 400.9-625 allows for, inter alia, actual
damages, return of the “credit service charge . . . or the time-price differential,” statutory
damages in the amount of $500, and a defense to any effort by the creditor to recover a
deficiency. It does not allow for punitive damages. Plaintiff characterizes the statutory
damages as a penalty, but this is not clear from the statute. Some statutory damages
are penalties, while others are simply a form of liquidated damages. Nothing in section
400.9-625 suggests it is penal in nature.
Decisions from other jurisdictions also provide guidance. In interpreting its
version of the predecessor to 9-625,5 the Alabama Supreme Court declined to apply the
limitation period applicable to penal statutes and applied the longer period applicable to
contract actions. The court explained that the UCC provisions became part of the
parties’ contract so the suit “for damages for violation of these requirements is, in
essence, a suit for breach of contract.” Weaver v. American Nat’l Bank, 452 So.2d 469,
473 (Ala. 1984). Unlike Missouri, it appears that Alabama did not have a specific
statute of limitations for actions under non-penal statutes, but the salient point is that the
Alabama Supreme Court did not apply the limitation period applicable to penalties.
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the applicable limitation period was
the “catchall” provision of six years, rather than the shorter period allowed for
conversion claims. State Bank of Standish v. Keysor, 419 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988). The Southern District of Ohio, interpreting Ohio’s codification of section 9625, also held that the limitation period for penal statutes did not apply. Jenkins v.
Hyundai Motor Financing Co., 389 F. Supp. 2d 961, 972 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
Crediting Plaintiff’s argument and holding that section 400.9-625 is penal means
that, in the absence of a “moneyed corporation,” the applicable limitation period is one
5
Section 9-625 of the UCC was adopted in 2000; its predecessor was section 9507. Some of the decisions cited interpret the predecessor provision.
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to three years. This is inconsistent with the longer limitation period normally permitted
for contract and statutory actions and is a further indication that Plaintiff’s interpretation
would not be adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s position gives him a
longer limitation period, but would do so for other plaintiffs only if their defendant
happened to be a moneyed corporation. Other plaintiffs dealing with non-moneyed
corporations would have a less-favorable one to three years limitation period, and this
outcome would not be endorsed by the Missouri Supreme Court.
Plaintiff advances several arguments, none of which the Court finds persuasive.
First, they rely on a series of other statutes relating to credit unions or financial
transactions, including those found in Chapter 408. The obvious flaw in Plaintiff’s
reliance is that he does not assert any claims predicated on Chapter 408 – or any
statute other than the UCC. Second, Plaintiff contends that all statutory claims against
moneyed corporations – including those that are not penalties – are governed by
section 516.420. He points to a phrase from that statute stating that it applies to “any
liability created by the act of incorporation or any other law” (emphasis supplied) and the
Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision in Schwartz v. Bann-Cor Mortg., 197 S.W.3d 168,
178 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). Schwartz did not hold that section 516.420 applies to nonpenal claims against moneyed corporations; in fact, its discussion of section 516.420
followed the court’s determination that the statute in question was penal in nature.
Thus, Shwartz had no occasion to consider whether section 516.420 applied to nonpenal statutes. More importantly, the clear language of the statute dictates a contrary
conclusion. The beginning of the statute establishes that it supplants sections 516.380
to 516.420 when the defendant is a moneyed corporation and in the place of those
statutes establishes a limitation period of six years. However, the limitation period for
Plaintiff’s claim is established by section 516.120 – not one of the statutes supplanted
by section 516.420. Cf. Glen v. Fairway Independent Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474,
476-77 (E.D. Mo. 2010). Plaintiff also exerts considerable effort to identify situations in
which various courts have described various parts of the UCC generally, or section 9625 specifically, as a “penalty.” The problem is that the word is amenable to multiple
definitions in a variety of contexts. The word “is an elastic term with many different
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shades of meaning.” Julian v. Burrus, 600 S.W.2d 133, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(quotation omitted). The critical inquiry is: does section 400.9-625 constitute a “penalty
or forfeiture” within the meaning of section 516.420. Labels attached outside this (or a
similar) context have little value.6
Finally, Plaintiff contends there are unresolved issues that preclude final
consideration of Defendant’s argument. As noted earlier in footnote two, the defense of
untimeliness may be considered under Rule 12(b)(6) so long as the Complaint
establishes the defense. Here, the Complaint establishes that Plaintiff’s car was
repossessed and he received the relevant notices more than five years but less than six
years before suit was filed. A cause of action accrues “when the damage resulting . . .
is sustained and is capable of ascertainment . . . .” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100. This
means that not only must the damage have occurred, but it must be capable of
ascertainment. E.g., Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 582
(Mo. 2006) (en banc). In a claim alleging property was wrongfully taken and inadequate
notice was provided, damages were first capable of ascertainment when the plaintiff
knew the car was taken and the notice was received. Cf. Chemical Workers Basic
Union v. Arnold Savings Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159, 165 (Mo. 1967) (en banc). This is an
objective inquiry: “[t]he issue is not when the injury occurred, or when plaintiff
subjectively learned of the wrongful conduct and that it caused his or her injury, but
when a reasonable person would have been put on notice that an injury and substantial
damages may have occurred and would have undertaken to ascertain the extent of the
damages.” Id. at 584. These facts are provided in the Complaint, so further
development of the Record is not required.
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This is one of the reasons the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant is
judicially estopped from disputing that section 400.9-625 is a penal statute. Defendant
never took a contrary position in the context of dispute or any other circumstance that
renders its current position unfair. Defendant did not try to persuade this (or any other
court) that the statute is penal. The circumstances under which a court might exercise
its discretion to apply judicial estoppel are simply not present. See Capella Univ., Inc. v.
Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 1040, 1051 (8th Cir. 2010).
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Plaintiff nonetheless insists that facts have been alleged that might cause the
Court to decide the claims accrued some time after their cars were repossessed, that
Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting the defense, or that the
limitation period was equitably tolled. Plaintiff has not identified all of these allegations,
so the Court will focus on the arguments actually presented. He points to the
communications sent after the cars were sold (apparently the same communications
that form the basis for Count III) and contend these make the original pre-sale
communications even more unreasonable than they were at first. The Court rejects this
position. According to Plaintiff, the pre-sale notices violated the UCC when they were
sent and subsequent communications were not necessary to establish the violation.
Plaintiff also contend negative credit reports constitute additional violations because
they arise from the original, improper sale and notice. However, (1) Plaintiff’s loss of his
car and (2) the language contained in (and omitted from) the pre-sale notices were
capable of ascertainment immediately. The existence of additional damages did not restart the limitation period.
Missouri’s codification of section 9-625 of the UCC is not a penal statute. Claims
seeking relief under that provision must be filed within the time frame dictated by section
516.120, so section 516.420 does not apply. Plaintiff’s claim was filed more than five
years after they accrued, so they must be dismissed.
B. Count II
The MMPA prohibits “deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any
material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise . . . .” Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 407.020.1. However, these provisions do not apply to
Any institution, company, or entity that is subject to chartering, licensing or
regulation by . . . the director of the division of credit unions under chapter
370, RSMo, or director of the division of finance under chapters 361 to
369, RSMo, or chapter 371, RSMo, unless such directors specifically
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authorize the attorney general to implement the powers of this chapter or
such powers are provided to either the attorney general or a private citizen
by statute.
Id. § 407.020.2(2).
Plaintiff does not deny that Defendant is a credit union, nor do they deny that it is
chartered in Missouri and subject to regulation in Missouri. Indeed, he affirmatively
alleged these facts. Complaint, ¶¶ 28-29. Instead, he contends the exclusion for
entities regulated by the Missouri Division of Credit Unions is inapplicable because
Defendant is also regulated by the National Credit Union Association. The obvious
problem with this argument is that the statute does not say the exclusion applies only if
the Missouri Division of Credit Unions is the only governmental agency charged with the
entity’s oversight. Plaintiff’s related assertion – that the exclusion “is not applicable to
entities whose regulation under federal law is at the heart of the lawsuit” – suffers from
the same flaw: it is not supported by the statute.
Plaintiff’s second argument is that the statute does not apply because private
citizens are permitted to sue, as provided in section 407.025. This argument is
predicated on the exclusion’s last clause, which states that the exclusion does not apply
if the ability to implement the powers of section 407.020 is “provided to either the
attorney general or a private citizen by statute.” This argument is circular: section
407.025 gives private citizens the powers granted by section 407.020, but section
407.020 does not apply to credit unions. For Plaintiff’s argument to be credited, what
must be granted is the power to enforce section 407.020 against credit unions. To hold
otherwise would eliminate the exclusion.
Plaintiff also argues that other statutes allow citizens to apply the MMPA to credit
unions. They cite a variety of statutes creating causes of action, but none permit the
use of the MMPA. The mere existence of other statutory causes of action should not be
interpreted as a silent grant of power to apply the MMPA to credit unions over the
explicit exclusion contained in section 407.020. Plaintiff may be entitled to pursue
causes of action under those “other statutes,” but he has not done so. As laudable as
the MMPA is, and as desirable as it may be to allow for private attorney generals to
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enforce its provisions, the Missouri legislature has dictated that the MMPA generally
does not apply to credit unions.
Plaintiff’s final argument is that Defendant’s interpretation must be rejected
because it causes the MMPA to violate the Missouri Constitution. Article III, section 40,
subsection 28 (“section 40") prohibits the Missouri General Assembly from “granting to
any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or
immunity . . . .” The argument borders on the frivolous. The MMPA does not grant
credit unions a special right, privilege, or immunity: it merely dictates that actions
against credit unions (and other similar entities that are heavily regulated) are not
subject to the MMPA. The distinction is reasonable and does not create a special law.
See Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 831 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)
(discussing when a law violates section 40). Plaintiff’s second constitutional argument
is frivolous. It is based on Article III, section 44 of the Missouri Constitution, which
requires that “rates of interest fixed by law shall be applicable generally and to all
lenders without regard to the type or classification of their business.” Plaintiff contends
that exempting certain financial institutions from the MMPA permits those financial
institutions to charge different rates of interest than other businesses. The MMPA has
nothing to do with interest rates, and laws establishing permissible interest rates do not
rely upon the MMPA for enforcement. Individuals are free to assert claims premised on
unlawful interest rates without relying on the MMPA.
The Missouri Legislature has decreed that the MMPA does not apply to credit
unions regulated by the Missouri Division of Credit Unions. Defendant is such a credit
union, so Plaintiff’s MMPA claim must be dismissed.
C. Count III
Defendant contends Plaintiff’s claim for conversion is time-barred, and the Court
agrees. There is little doubt that the applicable statute of limitation is section 516.120,
which requires suit to be brought within five years. E.g., Gaydos v. Imhoff, 245 S.W.3d
303, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (applying section 516.120 to hold that “all actions upon
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contracts . . . including actions for conversion, must be brought within a five-year statute
of limitations.”); Hamdan v. Board of Police Commissioners, 37 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2001) (same). As stated earlier, section 516.420 does not supplant the
“normal” limitation period if that period is set by section 516.120. Count III must be
dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint establishes that Counts I and III were filed more than five
years after the claims accrued, so they must be dismissed. Plaintiff’s Complaint also
establishes that Defendant is a credit union subject to regulation by the Missouri
Division of Credit Unions. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act does not apply to
such credit unions, so Count II must be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATE: May 26, 2011
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