Jackson v. Denney

Filing 13

ORDER: ORDERED that this petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied, and this case is dismissed. Signed on June 16, 2014 by District Judge Howard F. Sachs. (Thoennes, Cindy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY L. JACKSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
LARRY DENNEY,
Respondent.

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Case No.

11-1311-CV-W-HFS-P

O R D E R
Petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. '
2254 from his convictions in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri, for murder in the first degree and armed criminal action.
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s convictions and
the denial of the motion for post-conviction relief he filed
pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15.

Respondent’s

Exhibits H and Q (unpublished opinions).
The Missouri Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
In April of 2003, Jackson and Rahmaan Belton, the
victim, had been dating off and on for approximately
four years. They were not involved in an exclusive
relationship at the time, and Jackson was seeing
another man who lived in Chicago. Jackson made plans
to move from his apartment in Kansas City to Chicago.
On the afternoon of April 30, 2003, Jackson rented a
moving van from Public Storage, and two of his friends
helped him move his belongings to a storage unit.
On the night of April 30, Belton was with a
friend, Derrick Green. Belton made a phone call from

Green’s apartment. Belton . . . block[ed] the number
from the caller ID system and signaled for Green to
be quiet. These were Belton’s typical actions when
he called Jackson from Green’s apartment because
Jackson and Green did not get along. After the phone
call, Belton drove away from the apartment, and Green
never saw him again.
On May 1, Jackson returned the moving van to
Public Storage, and Sharon Ealey checked the van in.
Ealey noticed that the van had been cleaned with water.
Jackson had also called Ealey earlier that morning and
said that he had cleaned the van because he had spilled
groceries in it and a friend had cut his hand on some
dishes and gotten blood in the van.
On May 2, Belton’s mother filed a missing
person’s report because Belton had not been home since
April 30.
In the early morning hours of May 4,
Belton’s naked and bloody body was found in the trunk
of his car. The front and sides of Belton’s head had
eleven injuries, including six skull fractures and
multiple stab wounds. Belton’s throat had been cut
and his carotid artery was severed. Belton’s mother
named Jackson as a possible suspect, and the police
arrested him.
The police obtained a warrant and searched
Jackson’s apartment, which appeared to have been
cleaned recently. Officers sprayed the carpet with
luminol and got a positive reaction, which indicated
the possible presence of blood.
Officers then
performed a Hemastix test, which also indicated the
possible presence of blood. . . . The police also
searched the moving van Jackson had rented and
discovered blood under the floor slats in the back of
the van.
The blood found in the van was later
identified as Belton’s blood.
Respondent’s Exhibit Q, pp. 3-4.1

1

In addition to these facts, it is

Page citations are to the paper record unless otherwise
indicated.
2

noteworthy that, at some point while in police custody, petitioner
“jumped from the police car while it was moving at a speed of 40 mph.
He was subsequently recaptured.”

Respondent’s Exhibit H, p. 3.

Petitioner claims 67 grounds for relief; however, he presented
only six of those grounds to the Missouri Court of Appeals.

The Court

will address those grounds first.
As his twenty-second ground for relief, petitioner claims that
insufficient

evidence

was

presented

conviction for first-degree murder.

at

trial

to

support

his

Specifically, petitioner

claims that the State failed to prove the element of deliberation.
Doc. 1-1, p. 12 (petition) (citation corresponds to the electronic
record).

The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed:

Deliberation means cool reflection for any
length of time no matter how brief . . . [and it] may
be inferred when there are multiple wounds or repeated
blows.
The evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
demonstrate that sufficient evidence existed for the
jurors to find that Jackson deliberated.
The
evidence presented at trial established that the
victim received eleven injuries to his scalp and head,
causing five skull fractures.
The victim also
suffered three stab wounds near his right jawbone and
six sharp force defects in the neck.
The wounds
indicated that both a blunt object and a sharp object
were used to inflict the wounds. The evidence also
indicated that the victim’s body was placed in the
trunk of his own car and driven to an area known for
abandoned vehicles and that Jackson attempted to cover
up the crime by cleaning the cargo area of the moving
van. In the instant case, deliberation is certainly
inferable from this evidence.
3

Respondent’s Exhibit H, p. 5 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Missouri Court of Appeals’ resolution of petitioner's
insufficient-evidence claim was not based on “an unreasonable
determination

of

the

facts

or

an

unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law.”

28

U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1) and (2).

in

light

of

the

evidence”

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979) (constitutional standard for judging sufficiency of
evidence in criminal trials); Ellis v. Norris, 232 F.3d 619, 622 (8th
Cir. 2000) (federal habeas court must defer to state court’s
interpretation of state law), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 935 (2001).
Petitioner is entitled to no relief on his twenty-second ground.
As his thirty-first ground for relief, petitioner claims that
the trial court erred by refusing to suppress statements petitioner
made to the police.

Doc. 1-1, p. 18 (petition) (citation corresponds

to the electronic record).

The Missouri Court of Appeals described

petitioner’s police interrogation as follows:
Jackson was arrested on May 4, 2003, and
interrogated by Detective Donie Hoffman. Detective
Hoffman spent approximately one hour building a
rapport with Jackson and filling out the Detective
Interview Report (“DIR”). After completing the DIR,
Jackson signed the Miranda form, informing him of his
rights.
Detective Hoffman began to question him
about the murder. Jackson repeatedly denied being
involved and eventually asked for an attorney.
Detective Hoffman ceased questioning and left the room
to inform her supervisor, Sergeant Smith, that Jackson
had requested an attorney. Sergeant Smith went into
the room to inform Jackson he was going to be charged
4

with murder. Jackson responded that he no longer
wanted an attorney and that he wished to continue
speaking with Detective Hoffman.

Respondent’s Exhibit H, p. 6.
Within his thirty-first ground for relief, specifically,
petitioner claims that the trial court should have suppressed his
statements to the police because the statements (a) “were elicited
after

implicit

promises

and

threats,”

(b)

“induced

after

non-Mirandized questioning by officers,” and (c) “the product of
interrogation after [petitioner] had explicitly asserted his right
to counsel.”

Doc. 1-1, p. 18 (petition) (citation corresponds to

the electronic record).
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s claims,
holding that (a) “Sergeant Smith’s statement [that petitioner was
going to be charged with murder and taken to jail] was not a threat
but was a truthful non-coercive statement related to the routine
incidents of the custodial relationship,” (b) “[t]he DIR was [used]
merely as a tool to gather background information and build a rapport
with Jackson . . . , [and] the court suppressed any information
obtained during the DIR regarding Jackson’s relationship with the

5

victim,”

2

and (c) “[w]hen Jackson reinitiated the conversation [by

asking to speak again with Detective Hoffman], he effectively waived
his

previously

asserted

right

to

have

counsel

present.”

Respondent’s Exhibit H, pp. 7-9 (citations omitted).
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, “a determination of a
factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct
[and petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption
of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”
2254(e)(1).

28 U.S.C. '

As in Thai v. Mapes, 412 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1039 (2005), petitioner “has not presented
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumed
correctness of [the state courts’ factual findings that underlie the
Miranda-related issues].”

See Doc. 11, pp. 23-28 (petitioner’s

reply) (citation corresponds to the electronic record).
Furthermore, the Missouri Court of Appeals’ resolution of
petitioner's suppression claims was not based on an unreasonable
application of “clearly established Federal law.”
2254(d)(1).

2

See

28 U.S.C. '

United States v. Garlewicz, 493 F.3d 933, 935-36

Additionally: “The trial court determined that although
aspects of the initial DIR questioning violated Miranda, such a
violation was not a tactic to elicit a confession or . . . to weaken
the defendant’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily exercise his
constitutional rights. The trial court concluded that Jackson’s
later warned statement was knowingly and voluntarily given.”
Respondent’s Exhibit H, p. 8 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
6

(8th Cir. 2007) (statement is involuntary “when it was extracted by
threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to
overbear the defendant’s will and critically impair his capacity for
self-determination”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 614 F.3d
876, 884 (8th Cir. 2010) (officers’ statements as to potential charges
against defendant were not threats but a truthful response to the
defendant’s mother’s question as to why her son would go to jail);
United States v. Hull, 419 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 2005) (defendant
may waive his previously-invoked right to counsel by voluntarily
initiating a conversation with police), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1140
(2006).

Petitioner is entitled to no relief on his thirty-first

ground.
As his second, fourth, seventh, and sixteenth grounds for
relief, petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance
of trial counsel.

Specifically, petitioner faults his attorneys for

failing (2) to object to the racial make-up of the venire, (4) to
preserve for appellate review the trial court’s exclusion from
evidence of a fingerprint found in a reddish stain that petitioner
claimed to be blood, (7) to investigate the number of miles petitioner
actually drove the moving van before offering the rental records as
evidence because, as the prosecutor pointed out, the number of miles
actually driven did not match petitioner’s version of events, and
(16) to object to the verdict director for armed criminal action.
7

Doc. 1, pp. 17, 20, and Doc. 1-1, pp. 2, 8 (petition).
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected those claims, concluding
that the performance of trial counsel had not been constitutionally
deficient

because

underrepresented

(2)

“[e]ven

if

African-Americans

the

venire

[the

panel

venire

.

was

.

.

9.1%

African-American, and the population of Jackson County was 23.3%
African-American], a single panel that fails to mirror the make-up
of the community is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion,” Respondent’s Exhibit Q, p. 12 (citations and
quotation

marks

omitted);

(4)

“no

tests

were

performed

to

conclusively establish that the [reddish] stain that contained the
fingerprint was blood,” id. at 8; (7) the rental records for the
moving van that defense counsel offered as evidence were cumulative
to evidence that the prosecutor already had offered, id. at 9; and
(16) the challenged verdict director “was consistent with the law
existing at the time of [petitioner’s] trial,” id. at 11.
As stated previously, in a federal habeas corpus proceeding,
“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct [and petitioner] shall have the burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.”

28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1).

Petitioner has presented no

such evidence regarding the ineffective-assistance claims discussed
above.

See Doc. 11, pp. 9-20 (petitioner’s reply) (citation
8

corresponds to the electronic record).
Furthermore, the Missouri Court of Appeals’ resolution of
petitioner’s ineffective-assistance claims was not based on an
unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law.”
U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1) and (2).

28

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 694 (1984) (in order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, habeas petitioner must show that his attorney's performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense); Dyer v. United
States, 23 F.3d 1424, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994) (attorney=s failure to raise
a meritless claim does not offend the Constitution).

Petitioner is

entitled to no relief on his second, fourth, seventh, and sixteenth
grounds.
As for his remaining 61 grounds for relief, “[a] habeas
petitioner is required to pursue all available avenues of relief in
the state courts before the federal courts will consider a claim.”
Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1056 (1996). “If a petitioner fails to exhaust state remedies
and the court to which he should have presented his claim would now
find it procedurally barred, there is a procedural default.”

Id.

Petitioner defaulted all remaining grounds for relief by not
presenting
Compare
Exhibit

those

claims

to

the

Missouri

Court

of

Appeals.

Docs. 1 and 1-1 (federal petition) with Respondent’s
D,

p.

10

(petitioner’s
9

brief

on

direct

appeal)

and

Respondent’s Exhibit L, pp. 14-19 (petitioner’s brief on appeal from
the denial of post-conviction relief).
much.

Petitioner acknowledges as

See Doc. 11, pp. 2-9 (reply) (citation corresponds to the

electronic record).
A federal court may not review procedurally defaulted claims
“unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750 (1991).
Petitioner

attributes

his

default

to

ineffective

legal

assistance on direct appeal, on the motion for post-conviction relief,
and on appeal from the denial of that motion.
(petitioner’s

reply)

(citation

corresponds

to

Doc. 11, pp. 2-9
the

electronic

record).
As for the performance of counsel on direct appeal, which is
the basis for 36 grounds for relief,3 petitioner complains that his
attorney “only raised issues in which ‘he’ felt had merit.”
Doc. 11, p. 7 (petitioner’s reply) (citation corresponds to the
electronic record).
duty.

Actually, that is a good summary of counsel’s

As explained in Charboneau v. United States, 702 F.3d 1132,

1136-37 (8th Cir. 2013):
3

“Experienced advocates since time beyond

Grounds 17-21, 33-62, and 67.
10

memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal.

Therefore, absent contrary evidence, [a

federal court must] assume that appellate counsel’s failure to raise
a claim was an exercise of sound appellate strategy.”
marks and citations omitted).

(quotation

The record in this case leads this

Court to such an assumption regarding the performance of counsel on
direct appeal.
As for the performance of counsel on the post-conviction motion,
which is the basis for five grounds for relief,4 petitioner relies
on Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012), in
which the Court announced that “procedural default will not bar a
federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective
assistance at trial if, in the [State's] initial-review collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was
ineffective.”

Martinez establishes a “narrow exception” within the

doctrine of procedural default.

Id. at 1315.

In this case, in order

to show cause under Martinez, petitioner must “demonstrate that the
underlying

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel

claim

is

a

substantial one, which is to say that [petitioner] must demonstrate
that the claim has come merit.”

Id. at 1318-19 (citation omitted).

The underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims
at issue here are that counsel (32) failed to challenge probable cause
4

Grounds 32 and 63-66.
11

statements used to secure search warrants, (63) stated during the
opening statement and closing argument that petitioner was the
victim’s first boyfriend, (64) stated during closing argument that
the victim moved into the home of the mother of petitioner’s child,
(65) failed to present testimony that a spot on a window blind tested
positive for blood, and (66) failed to educate the jury on the use
of a particular test to identify the presence of blood.

The Court

finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that these claims
are substantial; therefore, petitioner has failed to make the showing
required by Martinez.
As for the performance of counsel on appeal from the denial of
post-conviction relief, which is the basis for 19 grounds for relief,5
Martinez is of no help to petitioner:

“The holding in this case does

not concern attorney errors in . . . appeals from initial-review
collateral proceedings[.]”

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320.

For the reasons explained above, petitioner has failed to
demonstrate cause for his procedural default.

Petitioner also has

failed to show that he is “probably actually innocent” of the crimes
for which he was convicted.

Bowman v. Gammon, 85 F.3d 1339, 1346

(8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1128 (1997); see Doc. 11
(petitioner’s
record).
5

reply)

(citation

corresponds

to

the

electronic

The Court finds that further review of petitioner's

Grounds 3, 5, 6, 8-15, and 23-30.
12

defaulted grounds for relief is not required to prevent a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is denied, and this case is dismissed.

/s/ Howard F. Sachs
HOWARD F. SACHS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kansas City, Missouri,
Dated: June 16, 2014.

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