Katekaru v. Egan et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 10 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Dismissal of Counts I and II is with prejudice and Count III without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Signed on 1/31/14 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
PAUL D. KATEKARU,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMERON EGAN, et. al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 13-CV-00349-W-DGK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
This case arises from Lee’s Summit Police Officer Cameron Egan’s (“Officer Egan”)
arrest of Plaintiff Paul Katekaru (“Plaintiff”) for failure to follow Officer Egan’s directives
during an attempted detention of Plaintiff’s nephew. Following Plaintiff’s arrest, temporary
imprisonment, and eventual release, he filed suit in this Court against Officer Egan, Lee’s
Summit Police Sergeant Greg Bryant (“Officer Bryant”), Lee’s Summit Municipal Court
Prosecutor Terri Cipolla Round (“Prosecutor Round”), and the City of Lee’s Summit, Missouri
(the “City”) alleging four claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim for malicious prosecution
under Missouri common law.
Now before the Court is the Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss all claims (Doc. 10).
After carefully reviewing the relevant documents,1 the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
Furthermore, Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend Count III of his complaint.
Background
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) (the “Complaint”) and attached documents
allege the following. On April 8, 2011, Plaintiff’s nephew, James Jenkins (“Jenkins”), who lived
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The Court considered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 4), Defendants’ Suggestions in Support (Doc. 10),
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), and Defendants’ Reply Suggestions (Doc. 13).
with Plaintiff at the time, arrived at Plaintiff’s residence in Lee’s Summit in an intoxicated state.
When Plaintiff confronted Jenkins regarding his intoxication, Jenkins immediately became
belligerent. Jenkins shouted at Plaintiff and then destroyed several of Plaintiff’s possessions,
including his computer and microwave. Plaintiff called 911 to report the disturbance, which
further enraged Jenkins.
After hearing Jenkins’ outburst, Kevin Katekaru, Plaintiff’s other
nephew who also resided with him, attempted to intervene. An altercation then ensued between
the two nephews resulting in Jenkins procuring a knife and threatening to harm himself and the
other nephew. In response, Plaintiff wrestled the knife away from Jenkins.
Soon thereafter, Officer Egan arrived at Plaintiff’s residence with Lee’s Summit Police
Officer Jason Spaeth (“Officer Spaeth”). After ordering Plaintiff to drop the knife, the two
officers confronted Jenkins, but he immediately fled the scene. In response to several questions
about Jenkins, Plaintiff stated that he was unsure whether Jenkins was currently armed, and he
notified the officers that Jenkins had access to firearms inside Plaintiff’s residence. Following
further questioning, Plaintiff began to criticize Officer Egan and other members of the Lee’s
Summit Police Department by calling them incompetent and worthless. Then, when Plaintiff
attempted to enter his home, Officer Egan forbade Plaintiff from doing so. Plaintiff ignored the
order and walked toward the house. Officer Egan then grabbed Plaintiff, placed him under
arrest, and provided him with a written citation for failure to obey an order of a police officer.
Officer Spaeth and Lee’s Summit Police Officer Phillip Stewart (“Officer Stewart”) then entered
Plaintiff’s home, purportedly to search for Jenkins.
Eventually, Officers Stephen Grubb and Scott McMillan of the Lee’s Summit Police
Department Canine Unit arrived at Plaintiff’s residence. Following a brief search, these officers
located Jenkins hiding in the backyard of a nearby house. Sometime after Jenkins’ detainment,
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Officer Egan transported Plaintiff to the police station, where he remained until he posted bond
thirty-four hours later. On July 29, 2011, Round dismissed the case against Plaintiff.
Following dismissal, Plaintiff engaged in an informal investigation. Plaintiff located the
original citation that charged him with failing to obey a police officer, another citation that
charged him with the same offense but with a more detailed explanation, and a probable cause
review statement. From discussions with Prosecutor Round and Lee’s Summit Police Captain,
Mark Liebig, Plaintiff learned that following his arrest Prosecutor Round advised Officer Egan
and Officer Bryant to add more details to the original citation and the probable cause review
statement. The officers complied with this request.
On April 8, 2013, proceeding pro se, Plaintiff filed a three-count lawsuit in this Court.
Count I alleges three separate violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Egan individually,
including claims for false arrest, retaliatory arrest, and an unconstitutional search of his home.
Count II alleges a Missouri common law claim for malicious prosecution against Officer Egan,
Officer Bryant, and Prosecutor Round. Count III alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the City and Prosecutor Round for failure to properly train and supervise the Lee’s Summit
police officers.
Standard
A court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing the adequacy of a complaint, the court assumes that the
factual allegations in the complaint are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Data Mfg. Inc. v. UPS, Inc., 557 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2009). To survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the complaint must do more than recite the bare elements of a cause of action.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). Rather, it must include “enough facts to state a
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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). “While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must
provide the grounds of his entitlement with more than mere “labels and conclusions,” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (internal citations
omitted)). A complaint that alleges only “naked assertion[s] devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement’” will not survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
Additionally, in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court is not limited to the four
corners of the complaint. Outdoor Cent., Inc. v. GreatLodge.com, Inc., 643 F.3d 1115, 1120 (8th
Cir. 2011). The court may consider “the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the
pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.” Mills v. City of
Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186
F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Analysis
A. Count I is dismissed with prejudice.
If an official acting under color of state law deprives an individual of a constitutional
right, that individual may bring a suit against the official for either monetary or injunctive relief.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Count I, Plaintiff alleges that his arrest and the search of his home
violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Because the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim for false arrest, retaliatory arrest,
an unconstitutional search, and conspiracy all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court dismisses Count
I with prejudice.
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1. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
To state a claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a Plaintiff must
demonstrate that the officer conducted a warrantless arrest without sufficient probable cause.
Joseph v. Allen, 712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013). “Probable cause exists when the totality of
the circumstances at the time of the arrest [is] sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe
that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because this inquiry solely focuses on the information available at the time of the
arrest, later developments, such as the dismissal of charges, is immaterial to the probable cause
analysis. See id.
Officer Egan argues that he possessed sufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for
violating Section 17-26(D) of the Lee’s Summit Municipal Code. This provision of the code
makes it unlawful for any individual to knowingly disobey or oppose a police officer’s command
made during an officer’s attempt to “execute and carry into effect any provision” within the
municipal code.
Lee’s Summit, Mo., Municipal Code § 17-26(D) (1988).
Officer Egan
identifies Section 17-26(A)(2) as the provision that he was attempting to execute when he
commanded Plaintiff not to enter his home. This section prohibits a person from interfering with
an arrest of another person “by using or threatening, in addition to vocal protest, the use of
violence, physical force, or physical interference.” Lee’s Summit, Mo., Municipal Code § 1726(A)(2) (1988). Essentially, Officer Egan contends that he was in the process of locating and
detaining Jenkins. In order to prevent Plaintiff’s interference with the arrest, Officer Egan
forbade Plaintiff from entering his residence because there was a possibility Jenkins had
reentered Plaintiff’s home. Thus, Officer Egan concludes that Plaintiff’s attempt to enter his
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residence in direct disregard of Officer Egan’s order provided him with sufficient probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff for violating Section 17-26(D). The Court agrees.
Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has failed to
sufficiently plead lack of probable cause. Under Section 17-26(A)(2), the interference must be
by use or threatened use of “violence, physical force, or physical interference.” Lee’s Summit,
Mo., Municipal Code § 17-26(A)(2) (1988). The Complaint confirms that Officer Egan had
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because his attempt to enter the residence constituted a
threatened physical interference with the detention of Jenkins. Interference is defined as an
“obstruction or hindrance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 831 (8th ed. 2004). The Complaint alleges
that the Lee’s Summit police officers believed that Jenkins may have reentered Plaintiff’s home,
and it states that “Plaintiff’s presence in his residence would have impeded the residence
search….” Compl. at 13 (emphasis added). When considered together, the allegations in this
passage imply that Plaintiff’s physical presence in the home would have obstructed or hindered
the attempted detention of Jenkins. From this, it follows that Officer Egan’s order to not enter
the home was an attempt to prevent a violation of 17-26(A)(2), i.e. physical interference with
Jenkins’ detention. Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to obey this order provided Officer Egan with
probable cause to believe Plaintiff violated Section 17-26(D). Because Plaintiff’s allegations
indicate probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s arrest, he has failed to state a claim for false arrest
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First
Amendment.
To successfully state a claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, a
Plaintiff must, as a threshold matter, plead a lack of probable cause supporting the arrest. See
Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d
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1068, 1075 (8th Cir. 2010)). As discussed above, Plaintiff failed to plead a lack of probable
cause, and his failure to do so is fatal to this claim.
3. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a warrantless home search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for a warrantless search of his home. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of an individual’s home unless the search fits within
one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement. See Burke v. Sullivan, 677 F.3d 367,
371 (8th Cir. 2012).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Officer Egan personally conducted a warrantless
search of his home, the allegations in the Complaint clearly contradict such a claim. Both the
Complaint itself and the documents attached to it state Officer Egan neither participated in nor
ordered the search of Plaintiff’s home. See, e.g., Compl. at 13 (“Defendant Egan did not
participate in the warrantless search of plaintiff’s residence, but was outside of plaintiff’s
residence while the warrantless search was being conducted.”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for Officer Egan’s personal search of the home.
4. Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy claim under Section 1983.
Although not captioned as such, Plaintiff’s allegations related to the warrantless search
also arguably raise a conspiracy claim against Officer Egan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To plead a
claim for conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him of constitutional
rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that the overt act injured the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is additionally required to [allege] a deprivation of a constitutional
right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim.
Burton v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm’rs., 731 F.3d 784, 798 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting White v.
McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir. 2008)).
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To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff must also allege a meeting of the minds
among the conspirators “sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendants reached an
agreement to deprive the plaintiff of constitutionally guaranteed rights.” Id.
Plaintiff, however, has failed to plead a meeting of the minds among the alleged
conspirators. The Complaint is devoid of sufficient factual detail indicating that Officer Egan
conspired with Officers Spaeth and Stewart—the two who conducted the search of Plaintiff’s
home—to deprive Plaintiff of his Fourth Amendment rights. On the contrary, Plaintiff alleges
Officer Egan arrested him for impeding the detention of Jenkins, Plaintiff’s critical comments of
Officer Egan, and the potential safety risk posed by Jenkins being in the home with access to
weapons. Compl. at 11, 13, 36. Without further facts implying that the three officers agreed to
deprive of him any constitutional rights, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for conspiracy under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Count II is dismissed with prejudice.
Under Missouri common law, a plaintiff must plead the following to state a claim for
malicious prosecution: “(1) commencement of an earlier suit against plaintiff; (2) instigation of
the suit by defendant; (3) termination of the suit in plaintiff’s favor; (4) lack of probable cause
for the suit; (5) malice by defendant in instituting the suit; and (6) damage to plaintiff resulting
from the suit.” Edwards v. Gerstein, 237 S.W.3d 580, 582 (Mo. banc. 2007).
As discussed previously, the Complaint fails to allege a lack of probable cause, thus this
element of malicious prosecution is lacking. Moreover, the Complaint also fails to allege that
malice motivated the prosecution. The malice element requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
“the proceedings [were] initiated primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender
to justice.” Cassady v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 167 F.3d 1215, 1219 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting
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Sanders v. Daniel Intern. Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo. 1984)). To demonstrate sufficient
malice to avoid dismissal, Katekaru “was required to [plead] either that [the Defendants] had an
illegitimate motive for the prosecution, or that they knowingly acted with flagrant disregard for
[Katekaru’s] rights so that an improper motive may be inferred.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Complaint fails to allege either.
As relates to malice, the Complaint states “Cameron Egan, Greg Bryant and Terri Cipolla
Round acted with malice and reckless indifference to the rights of plaintiff….” Compl. at 18.
This legal conclusion, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements.
However, Plaintiff contends that he has provided sufficient factual enhancement of this statement
to allege malice. Plaintiff asserts that Prosecutor Round’s order to Officer Bryant and Officer
Egan to add more detail to the original citation and the probable cause statement demonstrates
the Defendants’ malice. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the addition of the extra details
transformed the bare legal conclusions in the original citation and probable cause statement—
which lacked sufficient detail to support a conviction—into a new and different charge for
violating Section 17-26(D). This argument lacks merit.
Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.39, a municipal prosecutor may add factual
details to a citation or information-charging form that alleges an ordinance violation any time
prior to trial so long as the amendment does not include an additional or different ordinance
violation. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 37.39. Here, when one compares the original citation form to the
enhanced citation form and the probable cause statement, it is clear that the documents
consistently charged Plaintiff with violating Section 17-26(D) for failing to obey a lawful
command of an officer. Compl. at 27-29. The only difference is that the amended citation and
probable cause statement possess more factual details than the original citation. While it is clear
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that Officer Egan and/or Officer Bryant added additional facts to the original citation form, the
applicable Missouri Supreme Court rule explicitly authorizes such an amendment. Therefore,
rather than demonstrating malice, the Defendants’ addition of further factual enhancement
merely evidences their lawful exercise of Rule 37.39. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a
lack of probable cause and an improper motive underlying the prosecution, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for malicious prosecution, and, thus, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.
C. Count III is dismissed without prejudice.
Defendants’ contend—and Plaintiff concedes—that Count III fails to provide sufficient
factual details on the City’s policy, practice, or custom which operated to deprive Plaintiff of his
constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court agrees. Accordingly, Count III
is dismissed without prejudice.
D. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint.
Finally, Plaintiff requests leave from the Court to amend his pleadings to allege further
factual details regarding the City’s custom or policy. Given the early stage of the litigation and
the limited nature of the amendment, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint. Plaintiff may amend Count III to further allege a custom or policy.
Conclusion
Viewing the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and construing them in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that all claims against Defendants must be
dismissed. Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to all counts. Dismissal of
Counts I and II is with prejudice and Count III without prejudice. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave
to amend the complaint as articulated in Section D. Plaintiff must file the amended complaint
within thirty (30) days of entry of this order.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 31, 2014
/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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