Katekaru v. Egan et al
Filing
66
ORDER granting in part 56 Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on Counts I and II. Count III against the City is dismissed without prejudice. Signed on 8/10/15 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)
-IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
PAUL DAVID KATEKARU,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMERON EGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 4:13-CV-00349-DGK
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pro se Plaintiff Paul David Katekaru (“Katekaru”) alleges violations of federal and state
laws arising out of his arrest, detainment, and prosecution for allegedly violating a city
ordinance. Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 56). For
the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion. The Court grants summary
judgment on Counts I and II, and dismisses Count III without prejudice.
Standard
Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims pled against them. A moving
party is entitled to summary judgment if he “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and
a genuine dispute over a material fact is one “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Only those facts supported by the record are before the court on a summary judgment
motion. Unless specifically controverted by the nonmoving party, all facts set forth in the
statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment. L.R.
56.1(a).
To specifically controvert a factual position, the nonmoving party must “refer
specifically to those portions of the record upon which [he] relies.” Id. Once the parties have
satisfied their burdens, the court views the resulting facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
1861, 1866 (2014).
Factual Background
Because Katekaru fails to specifically controvert most of Defendants’ facts, the Court
deems them admitted. See L.R. 56.1(a). Viewing the remainder of the parties’ factual positions
in the light most favorable to Katekaru, the Court finds the relevant facts to be as follows. See
Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866.1
Katekaru lived with his nephew, James Jenkins (“Jenkins”), in Lee’s Summit, Missouri.
One night, a dispute arose between Katekaru and Jenkins at their house. The dispute escalated,
so Katekaru called 911 for assistance from the Lee’s Summit Police Department. As Katekaru
hung up the phone, Jenkins pulled a knife on him. Katekaru successfully wrestled for control of
the knife.
Police officers, including Defendant Cameron Egan (“Officer Egan”), arrived to find
Katekaru holding the knife. Officer Egan took it, and Katekaru explained to him what had
happened inside. Katekaru told him that he had taken the knife because Jenkins had threatened
to hurt himself. Officer Egan, along with Officer Jason Spaeth (“Officer Spaeth”), saw Jenkins
standing nearby and approached him to investigate the disturbance and ensure he was not a threat
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The Court also excludes several immaterial facts raised by Katekaru. For instance, Defendants claim that officers
were dispatched to Katekaru’s residence at 11:45pm. Katekaru vigorously denies that the officers were actually
dispatched at 11:45pm. The officers’ exact time of arrival is irrelevant for purposes of this motion, because it does
not “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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to himself.
Jenkins fled from the officers. The officers commanded him to stop, but he
continued running. The officers chased him through other yards, eventually losing track of him.
As Officer Egan returned to Katekaru and Jenkins’s front yard, Katekaru turned and
began walking toward his front door. Believing that Jenkins may have snuck around and
reentered the house through the back without the officers seeing, Officer Egan ordered Katekaru
not to enter his residence. Katekaru ignored the command and began walking toward the house,
telling Officer Egan that he was “worthless and incompetent.” Officer Egan arrested him.
Katekaru’s citation charged him with violating Lee’s Summit, Mo., Code of Ord. § 1726(D), which makes it unlawful “to willfully and knowingly obstruct, resist, oppose or fail to
obey a lawful command of any . . . officer of the City executing or attempting to execute and
carry into effect any provision of this Code.” The provision of the Code that Officer Egan was
“executing or attempting to execute” was § 17-26(A)(1), which prohibits a person from
“[r]esist[ing] the arrest, stop or detention of himself by . . . fleeing from such officer” if he knows
that a law enforcement officer is attempting to lawfully detain him. Thus, Officer Egan believed
that Jenkins was resisting a stop by fleeing him (a violation of § 17-26(A)(1)), and that Katekaru
was obstructing Officer Egan from stopping that underlying offense (a violation of § 17-26(D)).2
After he arrested Katekaru, Officer Egan called Defendant Terri Round (“Round”), the
municipal prosecutor for Lee’s Summit, and told her information about the incident. Round
ordered a member of the Lee’s Summit Police Department, Defendant Greg Bryant (“Bryant”),
to write an additional explanatory sentence on the citation.
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Katekaru counters that the subsection that he had allegedly obstructed Officer Egan from executing was actually
§ 17-26(A)(2), which prohibits individuals from physically interfering with the detention of another person.
Because Katekaru failed to cite specific parts of the record for this assertion, he has constructively admitted
Defendants’ statement that Officer Egan was attempting to execute § 17-26(A)(1). See L.R. 56.1(a); Schooley v.
Kennedy, 712 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (“[P]ro se litigants are not excused from compliance with relevant rules
of the procedural and substantive law.”).
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Katekaru then filed this lawsuit against Officer Egan, Bryant, Round, and the City of
Lee’s Summit (“the City”).
Discussion
Katekaru’s Amended Complaint pleads three counts: violation of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (Count I); common law malicious prosecution (Count II);
and violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 for enforcing an unconstitutional
ordinance (Count III). Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.
I. Because he had probable cause to charge Katekaru, Officer Egan is entitled to
qualified immunity against Katekaru’s § 1983 false arrest claim.
Count I is a § 1983 false arrest claim against Officer Egan. Section 1983 creates a private
cause of action for the violation of federal rights by an official acting under color of state law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Katekaru alleges that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because it
was unsupported by probable cause. Officer Egan raises the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity.
“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Greenman v. Jessen, 787 F.3d 882, 887 (8th
Cir. 2015). A police officer sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the
alleged facts establish a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the violation. Id.
The first prong asks whether Officer Egan violated Katekaru’s constitutional right to be
free from arrest absent probable cause. Katekaru argues that Officer Egan lacked probable cause
to determine that he violated § 17-26(D), that is, he willfully and knowingly obstructed Officer
Egan from implementing § 17-26(A)(1) against Jenkins.
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“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). “Probable cause exists
when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a reasonable
person to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.” Greenman,
787 F.3d at 888.3
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Katekaru, Officer Egan had probable
cause to believe Katekaru willfully and knowingly disobeyed a command that Officer Egan
issued to stop Jenkins from fleeing.
Officers Egan and Spaeth attempted to ask questions of
Jenkins, but he fled. Thus, Jenkins was resisting a stop by fleeing. Officer Egan, while trying to
enforce the code prohibiting such, returned to Katekaru and ordered him not to reenter the house.
Officer Egan made this command because he viewed Jenkins as a safety threat and feared that
Jenkins may have been able to circle back and gain access to the house. Katekaru heard him, yet
refused and began walking back into the residence. On these facts, no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Officer Egan lacked a reasonable basis for believing that Katekaru was
willfully and knowingly disobeying his command, and that that command was issued in an
“attempt to execute” § 17-26(A)(1) against Jenkins. See id. Because Officer Egan had probable
cause to believe that Katekaru had committed a crime, then he was justified in arresting him and
did not violate Katekaru’s constitutional rights. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. Katekaru having
failed to satisfy the first prong of qualified immunity, the Court grants Officer Egan qualified
3
An officer is entitled to qualified immunity even if he had only “arguable” probable cause, which “exists even
where an officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable cause if the mistake is objectively
reasonable.” Greenman, 787 F.3d at 888. As explained below, the Court holds that no reasonable jury could
conclude that Officer Egan lacked actual probable cause to arrest Katekaru. Therefore, the Court need not apply the
more lenient standard of “arguable” probable cause.
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immunity on this claim without considering the second prong. See Greenman, 787 F.3d at 887–
88.
II. Because Officer Egan had probable cause to charge Katekaru, Katekaru cannot
make a claim for malicious prosecution.
In Count II, Katekaru seeks damages against Officer Egan, Bryant, and Round for the
Missouri tort of malicious prosecution.
A claim for malicious prosecution comprises six
elements, including “lack of probable cause for filing the suit.” State ex rel. O’Basuyi v. Vincent,
434 S.W.3d 517, 519 (Mo. 2014). As discussed above, the facts in the light most favorable to
Katekaru establish that Defendants did have probable cause to believe Katekaru had violated
§ 17-26(D). Therefore, Officer Egan, Bryant, and Round are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Count II. See id.
III. Katekaru lacks standing to challenge § 17-26(A)(2)’s validity.
In Count III, Katekaru seeks damages against the City under § 1983 for unlawfully
applying § 17-26(A)(2) against him. His latest complaint suggests a number of theories for why
§ 17-26(A)(2) is invalid; he claims that the ordinance conflicts with the Fourth Amendment, the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a superior state statute. Whatever the
merits of his argument, he lacks standing to raise it.
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing.”
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342 (2014). Standing requires “(1) an
‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,’ and (3) a ‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable
decision.’” Id. at 2341 (alteration in original).
Count III lacks the requisite “causal connection.” The “conduct complained of” is the
City’s enactment and enforcement of a purportedly invalid ordinance, Section 17-26(A)(2). The
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“injury . . . complained of” is Katekaru’s arrest, detention, and prosecution for interfering with
Officer Egan’s execution of Section 17-26(A)(1). That is, the City charged Katekaru under a
different subsection than the one he complains is void. Katekaru makes no claim or argument
that Section 17-26(A)(1) is invalid. There is no connection between the injury and the wrong, so
Katekaru lacks standing to pursue Count III. See Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341–42.
Katekaru argues that because the City previously admitted it had charged him under
Section 17-26(A)(2), it is now judicially estopped from claiming he was charged under Section
17-26(A)(1). Judicial estoppel “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case
on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”
Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. v. Sveen, 776 F.3d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 2015). Judicial
estoppel applies only if “a party’s later position [is] clearly inconsistent with its earlier position.”
Id.
The City’s “later position” is that Katekaru was charged with abetting a violation of
Section 17-26(A)(1). Its “earlier position” comes from its motion to dismiss, in which it cited
Section 17-26(A)(2) and discussed how Jenkins violated that subsection. The procedural posture
explains why the City discussed Section 17-26(A)(2): it was required to take as true Katekaru’s
allegation that he was charged under that subsection. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). Here, on a motion for summary judgment, the City may offer and rely on its
own statement of that fact that it charged him under Section 17-26(A)(1). The City’s earlier
commentary is inapposite in this context.
Therefore, the City’s positions are not “clearly
inconsistent,” and judicial estoppel does not apply. See Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, 776 F.3d
at 557.
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In light of the facts now before the Court, the City’s allegedly invalid ordinance did not
cause Katekaru’s injury. The Court has no jurisdiction to consider Count III, see Already, LLC v
Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (requiring standing for subject-matter jurisdiction), and so
dismisses that count without prejudice, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
101–02 (1998) (prohibiting federal courts from ruling on the merits of claims over which they
lack jurisdiction).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 56). Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on Counts I and II.
Count III against the City is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:
August 10, 2015
/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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