Waters v. Colvin

Filing 20

ORDER affirming decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (Schroeppel, Kerry)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
PAULA B. WATERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 13-371-CV-DPR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to Plaintiff Paula B. Waters in a decision dated June
6, 2012 (Tr. 12-27). The Appeals Council denied review. The ALJ’s decision became the
Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying Social Security Disability benefits. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481. For the reasons set forth below,
the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Judicial review of a denial of disability benefits is limited to whether there is substantial
evidence on the record as a whole to support the Social Security Administration’s decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Minor v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is
“‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole,” however, requires a
more exacting analysis, which also takes into account “whatever in the record fairly detracts

from its weight.” Minor, 574 F.3d at 627 (quoting Wilson v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir.
1989)). Thus, where it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence, and
one conclusion represents the ALJ’s findings, a court must affirm the decision. See Robinson v.
Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th
Cir. 1989)). In other words, a court should not disturb an ALJ’s denial of benefits if the decision
“falls within the available zone of choice.” Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011).
A decision may fall within the “zone of choice” even where the court “might have reached a
different conclusion had [the court] been the initial finder of fact.” Id. (quoting Bradley v. Astrue,
528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008)). A reviewing court is directed to “defer heavily to the
findings and conclusions” of the Social Security Administration. Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d
577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001).
ANALYSIS
The operative facts and argument are presented in the parties’ briefs and will be
duplicated only to the extent necessary. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s opinion is not based upon
substantial evidence on the record as a whole because 1) the ALJ improperly weighed the
objective medical evidence, 2) the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion evidence, and 3) the
ALJ did not properly evaluate the demands of the claimant’s past relevant work (Doc. 6). The
Court has thoroughly reviewed the claimant’s medical records, opinion evidence, hearing
testimony, and the ALJ’s opinion, and finds no reversible error.
The ALJ discussed in detail the claimant’s severe impairments, both physical and mental,
the medical and psychological treatment she received, the objective medical findings, and her
subjective complaints regarding the severity of her impairments. The description of the RFC
itself is detailed, accounts for the claimant’s severe impairments, and reflects a review of all the
relevant evidence in the case record. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p. Furthermore, the ALJ

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conducted a proper credibility analysis and found many of her subjective complaints not
credible. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). In reviewing an appeal of
the denial of Social Security benefits, a court gives great deference to an ALJ’s credibility
finding so long as the ALJ “explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives a good reason
for doing so.” Buckner, 646 F.3d at 558 (quoting Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th Cir.
2010)).
The ALJ also properly weighed the medical opinions and gave good reasons for the
weight he afforded them. See Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 921 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). The claimant argues that it was error for the ALJ to give greater
weight to the opinion of Dr. Rath, the non-treating physican who testified at the hearing, than to
the opinion of Dr. True, the claimant’s treating psychiatrist. The ALJ gave good reasons for the
weight afforded to the opinions in the record. She determined that Dr. Rath’s mental functional
assessment was most consistent with the evidence in the record. She discounted Dr. True’s
opinion because it did not contain a functional assessment, but a vague recommendation
regarding whether the claimant could work. This is a decision reserved to the commissioner. See
Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[O]pinions that a claimant is ‘disabled’
or ‘unable to work’ concern issues reserved to the Commissioner and are not the type of opinions
which receive controlling weight.”). Because the ALJ explained the reasons for the weight given
to the opinions in the record, she did not err. See Reed, 399 F.3d at 921.
Finally, the ALJ properly discussed the demands of the claimant’s past work as a night
auditor at a hotel. The claimant is correct to point out that an ALJ is required to “make explicit
findings regarding the actual physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past work.” Pfitzner
v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Groeper v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1234, 1239
(8th Cir. 1991). An ALJ may, however, discharge this duty by specifying the job description

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listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that describe a claimant’s past work.

The ALJ

here referred to DOT 210.382-054, the listing for night auditor, a skilled, sedentary job. The
ALJ found the specific requirements of this job consistent with the claimant’s RFC, and
therefore determined that the claimant was capable of performing her past work as a night
auditor.
Therefore, despite the existence of some evidence in the record that might support the
opposite conclusion, the Court finds that the record as a whole reflects substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s decision. Taken together, the ALJ’s determinations fall within the acceptable
“zone of choice” of the finder of fact, to which the Court gives great deference. Accordingly, the
Court will not disturb the ALJ’s denial of benefits.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 30, 2014
/s/ David P. Rush
DAVID P. RUSH
United States Magistrate Judge

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