Simon v. Colvin

Filing 23

ORDER. The decision of the ALJ is affirmed. Signed on 8/1/14 by District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey. (Matthes, Renea)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION

TASHA R. SIMON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:13-CV-00531-NKL

ORDER
Plaintiff Tasha Simon seeks review of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision
denying her applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income
benefits.

[Doc. 5].

For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the ALJ is

AFFIRMED.
I.

Background
From August 30, 2011 to January 7, 2012, Simon received regular psychiatric

treatment from Dr. Casey Prough. On January 7, 2012, Dr. Prough completed a medical
source statement regarding Simon’s mental impairments. On this checkbox form, Dr.
Prough indicated that Simon had a multitude of symptoms, which would cause her to be
absent from work more than three times per month. In addition, Dr. Prough indicated
that Simon had a marked or extreme loss in the ability to perform eighteen work-related
mental activities. Dr. Prough further indicated that Simon had moderate difficulties in
maintaining social functioning, constant deficiencies of concentration, persistence or

pace, and repeated episodes of deterioration or decomposition in work or work-like
settings.
The

ALJ

found

that

Simon

had

the

following

severe

impairments:

fibromyalgia/fatigue, shoulder capsulitis (partial tear), degenerative disc disease of the
lumbar spine, depression/anxiety, and obesity. Following an extensive discussion of the
evidence of record, the ALJ found that Simon was not entirely credible and concluded
that Simon retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work,
subject to various further restrictions. This RFC determination paralleled the opinion of
Dr. Thompson, a medical expert who testified at the second administrative hearing in this
case, whose opinion the ALJ found to be persuasive and supported by the record as a
whole. The ALJ considered Dr. Prough’s opinion, but found it to be excessive, internally
inconsistent, and inconsistent with Dr. Prough’s own treatment notes. Based on the
testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded that Simon was capable of
performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy and was,
therefore, not disabled.
II.

Discussion
The Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision denying benefits if it applied the correct

legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. PateFires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence means less than
a preponderance, but sufficient evidence that a reasonable person would find adequate to
support the decision.” Hulsey v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 2010). The Court
must consider the evidence that supports the ALJ’s decision as well as the evidence that
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detracts from it. Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 942. An administrative decision will not be
reversed, however, simply because substantial evidence would have supported a contrary
decision. Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005). If, after reviewing the
evidence, it is possible to reach two inconsistent positions and one of those positions
represents the ALJ’s findings, the Court must affirm the decision. Buckner v. Astrue,
646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011).
Simon argues that the ALJ erred by giving little weight to the opinion of her
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Prough. A treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling
weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable diagnostic techniques and not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL
374188 (July 2, 1996); Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 525 (8th Cir. 2013). Nonetheless,
an ALJ may discount or disregard a treating physician’s opinion if it is internally
inconsistent or conflicts with other substantial evidence in the record, such as the
objective medical evidence, better-supported medical opinions, or the claimant’s
testimony. Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 2012); Myers, 721 F.3d
at 525; Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Medhaug v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 805, 815 (8th Cir. 2009); Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th
Cir. 2006).
In this case, the ALJ gave good reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr. Prough
and substantial evidence supports this decision. First, the ALJ found that Dr. Prough’s
opinion was internally inconsistent. [Tr. 19]. For instance, Dr. Prough indicated that
Simon had a marked loss in the abilities to interact with the public, get along with
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coworkers and peers, and maintain socially appropriate behavior, but later indicated that
she had only a moderate limitation in maintaining social functioning. [Tr. 858]. In
addition, the ALJ correctly found that Dr. Prough’s opinion was not supported by, and in
fact inconsistent with, his own treatment notes. Despite the relatively extreme limitations
set forth in Dr. Prough’s opinion, the mental status examinations he performed
consistently revealed cooperative behavior, normal motor activity, fair attention,
concentration, memory, and judgment, appropriate affect, and coherent thought
processes, with no hallucinations, delusions, or suicidal or homicidal ideation. [Tr. 844,
846, 848, 851-52]. Furthermore, Dr. Prough regularly assessed GAF scores ranging from
55 to 65, [Tr. 846, 848, 889], with a high of 70, [Tr. 844], reflecting only mild to
moderate symptoms or some difficulties functioning. See, e.g., Partee v. Astrue, 638
F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Dr. Bunting gave Partee a GAF score of 55–65,
indicating mild to moderate mental impairment.”).
Simon does not challenge any of the ALJ’s stated bases for discounting
Dr. Prough’s opinion, and instead erroneously argues that the ALJ failed to consider this
opinion. [See Doc. 17 at 12]. As discussed above, the ALJ evaluated, and for good
reasons rejected, this opinion, which consisted of little more than a checklist form with
little to no explanation or elaboration. [See Tr. 855-59]. In sum, the ALJ did not err in
discounting this conclusory and inconsistent opinion. See Strongson v. Barnhart, 361
F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 2004) (“It is appropriate, [] to disregard statements of opinion
by a treating physician that consist[s] of nothing more than vague, conclusory
statements.” . . . In addition, the ALJ need not give controlling weight to a physician’s
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RFC assessment that is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
(quotation and citation omitted)).
Simon also argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence because it is contrary to the opinion of the medical expert that
testified at the second administrative hearing, which the ALJ found “persuasive and
supported by the record,” [Tr. 18]. Specifically, Simon claims that the ALJ erred in
finding that Simon could perform light work, which involves lifting up to 20 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of 10 pounds, because the ALJ’s decision stated that
this expert testified that Simon “should be able to lift 10 pounds frequently and
occasionally,” [Tr. 23]. A review of this medical expert’s testimony, however, reveals
that the expert actually testified that Simon would be able to lift 20 pounds occasionally
and 10 pounds frequently, as reflected in the ALJ’s ultimate RFC determination.
[Tr. 52]. Accordingly, the ALJ’s erroneous transcription of the expert’s testimony does
not require remand. See Collins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n
arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique does not require us to set aside an
administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on the outcome.” (quotation
omitted)).
Finally, Simon argues that the ALJ gave the VE a defective hypothetical because it
did not include all of the functional limitations identified by Dr. Prough or fully reflect
Simon’s subjective complaints of pain. As discussed above, however, the ALJ properly
discounted Dr. Prough’s opinion and, consequently, did not err in not including all of the
limitations identified by Dr. Prough in the hypothetical presented to the VE.
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With respect to Simon’s subjective complaints, the ALJ gave good reasons for
discounting Simon’s credibility, including the lack of objective medical evidence,
Simon’s inconsistent reports to treatment providers, Simon’s sporadic work history, and
the fact that Simon left her last job because the position was eliminated, not because of a
disabling condition. [Tr. 24-25]. Simon has not attempted to identify any defects in the
ALJ’s thorough analysis or cited any countervailing evidence not considered or
improperly rejected by the ALJ.
credibility determination.

Accordingly, the Court will defer to the ALJ’s

See Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1065 (“If an ALJ explicitly

discredits the claimant’s testimony and gives good reason for doing so, we will normally
defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination.”). As the ALJ’s hypothetical appropriately
reflected only those subjective complaints that the ALJ found credible and supported by
the record as a whole, the ALJ presented a proper hypothetical to the VE.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.

s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: August 1, 2014
Jefferson City, Missouri

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