Barnhill v. Allied Waste Industries Inc et al
Filing
15
ORDER granting 7 motion to remand to Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. Signed on 13-804 by Magistrate Judge John T. Maughmer. (Alexander, Pam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
Jon David Barnhill,
Plaintiff,
v.
Allied Waste Industries, and American
Home Assurance c/o Chartis Claims, Inc.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action Number
13-00804-CV-W-JTM
ORDER
On June 18, 2013, plaintiff Jon David Barnhill (“Barnhill”) filed the present action in the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, against defendants Allied Waste Industries (“Allied”)
and American Home Assurance 1 (“AHA”). In his lawsuit, Barnhill assets three claims against
Allied and AHA:
(1)
a request for a declaratory judgment as to Barnhill’s rights under
the Missouri workers’ compensation law,
(2)
a request that Barnhill’s previously-litigated workers’
compensation award be reduced to a civil judgment as permitted
by MO. REV. STAT. § 287.500, and
(3)
a claim for damages arising from the alleged vexatious refusal of
Allied and AHA to provide benefits owed to Barnhill pursuant to
the aforementioned previously litigated workers’ compensation
award.
AHA was served with process on June 26, 2013 and Allied was served with process on July 16,
2013. The defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court based on alleged diversity
jurisdiction on August 15, 2013. Thereafter, Barnhill timely sought a remand of the case to the
original state court. For the reasons set out herein, the motion to remand is granted.
1
AHA subsequently became Chartis Claims, Inc.
Barnhill seeks a remand based on two arguments. First, Barnhill contends that the
removal was untimely in that it was initiated more than 30 days after AHA was served with
process. Second, Barnhill asserts that the defendants cannot establish that the amount in
controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for diversity jurisdiction.
As to the first argument, Barnhill’s reasoning is flawed. While it is true that a party
seeking removal must file its motion within 30 days of receiving notice of the state court lawsuit
[28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)] and that all defendants must consent to a removal [Chicago, Rock Island,
& Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 251, 20 S.Ct. 854, 856 (1900)], the Eighth Circuit
nonetheless has adopted the so-called “last served” rule regarding the timing of removal.
Specifically, the court has held:
[T]he later-served defendants in this case had thirty days from the
date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the
unanimous consent of their co-defendants, even though the firstserved co-defendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty
days of service on them.
Marano Enterprises of Kansas v. Z-Teca Restaurants, L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001).
See also Caranchini v. Kozeny & McCubbin, LLC, 2011 WL 5921364, op. at *2 (W.D.Mo. Nov.
28, 2011) (recognizing that the Marano holding is still in effect). While the “last served” rule is
the minority view among the federal circuits, it is still the law in the Eighth Circuit and, thus,
binding on this Court.
In applying the “last served” rule to this case, it is readily apparent that removal in this
case was timely. The last served defendant was Allied, which was served on July 16, 2013.
Exactly 30 days later, on August 15, 2013, the defendants filed the notice of removal with this
court. Barnhill’s first argument for remand, thus, is rejected.
2
Turning to Barnhill’s second argument in favor or remand, the Court initially notes that
inasmuch as federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the threshold requirement in every
federal case is jurisdiction. Bradley v. American Postal Workers Union, 962 F.2d 800, 802 n.3
(8th Cir. 1992). This requirement applies with equal force to cases originally filed in state court,
but later removed to federal district court. It is axiomatic that a defendant may remove any civil
action brought in state court when the federal court has original jurisdiction over the case. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). To that end, district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
meeting the criteria for diversity jurisdiction, to wit: where the matter in controversy exceeds
$75,000 and no plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In
this case, there apparently is no question that the parties are citizens of different States. The
parties do dispute whether the amount-in-controversy exceeds the $75,000 statutory requirement.
A court determines whether an amount-in-controversy required by Section 1332 is
satisfied based on the record at the time of removal. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291, 58 S.Ct. 586, 591 (1938); St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Lifecare
International, Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 593-94 (8th Cir. 2001). Typically, courts in the Eighth Circuit
have found that when contesting a motion to remand, the non-moving party bears the burden of
proving that the complaint establishes the requisite amount-in-controversy by a preponderance of
the evidence. As such, where the complaint alleges no specific amount of damages or an amount
under the jurisdictional minimum, the removing party must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000. In re Minnesota Mutual Life
Insurance Co. Sales Practices Litigation, 346 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2003); James Neff
Kramper Family Farm Partnership v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 2005) (party
invoking federal jurisdiction must prove the amount by a preponderance of the evidence).
3
As previously noted, Barnhill’s case asserts three causes of action. In responding to the
motion to remand, AHA and Allied focus their arguments exclusively on Barnhill’s second
count, namely his request to have his previously-litigated workers’ compensation award reduced
to a civil judgment as permitted by MO. REV. STAT. § 287.500. The defendants reason that since
the underlying workers’ compensation award involves benefits well exceeding $75,000, the
jurisdictional threshold is satisfied. AHA and Allied make no arguments for diversity
jurisdiction arising under any other claim asserted by Barnhill. 2
With regard to Barnhill’s claim under MO. REV. STAT. § 287.500, he does not dispute that
the applicable workers’ compensation benefits exceed $75,000. But Barnhill argues that an
action to reduce a prior administrative award to a civil judgment does not mean that all of the
monies involved in the underlying award are “in controversy” merely by a request to have the
previously-litigated award reduced to a judgment. In response, AHA and Allied argue that if the
award is reduced to a judgment, Barnhill will have the ability to enforce a judgment that exceeds
$75,000 and, therefore such an amount in most definitely “in controversy.” Ultimately, however,
the Court concludes that it need not decide whether Barnhill’s Section 287.500 claim meets the
jurisdictional threshold.
2
Count I of Barnhill’s petition seeks only a declaratory judgment. With regard to
Barnhill’s claim for damages for vexatious refusal set out in Count III of his petition, AHA and
Allied merely note that the “statutory penalties requested by [Barnhill] in Count III of his
petition is just a proverbial ‘drop in the bucket’ [when compared to the Section 287.500 claim]
and is not the true statement of the amount in controversy in the case.” Setting aside the issue of
Barnhill’s claim under Count II (discussed infra) and focusing solely on the vexatious-refusal-topay claim, this statement falls short of the Eighth Circuit requirement that “[t]he party seeking to
remove . . . ‘has the burden to prove the requisite amount by a preponderance of the evidence.’”
Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in part, Advance America
Servicing of Arkansas, Inc. v. McGinnis, 526 F.3d 1170, 1173 (8th Cir. 2008)). As such, Count I
and Count III may remain in federal court only if federal jurisdiction exists over Count II of
Barnhill’s petition.
4
While Congress has created diversity jurisdiction in the federal district courts, it has also
explicitly excepted certain cases from such jurisdiction – regardless of the citizenship of the
parties and the amount in controversy. Specifically, federal law unambiguously provides that
“[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State
may not be removed to any district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). As a result,
when Section 1445(c) is applicable, “a case is nonremovable, even if it presents a federal
question or there is diversity.” Humphrey v. Sequentia, 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir. 1995). The
initial and ultimately dispositive question, then, is whether Barnhill’s count under MO. REV.
STAT. § 287.500 arises under the Missouri workers’ compensation law.
The question is easily answered by examining the statute itself. Section 287.500 is
contained within Chapter 287 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The Missouri legislature has
decreed that Chapter 287 “shall be known as ‘The Worker’s Compensation Law.’” MO. REV.
STAT. § 287.010. Section 287 itself was first enacted in the 1925 version of the Missouri
workers’ compensation law and has long been recognized as an integral part of the “Workmen’s
Compensation Law.” State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 320 Mo. 893, 8 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Mo. 1928) (en banc). Under
these facts, the Court concludes that an action under Section 287.500 arises under the workers’
compensation and is, thus, not removable to federal court. Compare Humphrey, 58 F.3d 1246
(an individual bringing a claim under MO. REV. STAT. § 287.780 alleging injury as a result of
retaliation for exercising workers’ compensation rights is asserting a claim arising under the
workers’ compensation law and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), such a claim is non-removable
to federal court).
5
Inasmuch as AHA and Allied make no request to sever the vexatious-refusal-to-pay claim
(nor, in any event, do they offer evidence to show that amount in controversy for that claim
meets the jurisdictional threshold), the Court remands this entire action back to state court.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that the Motion to Remand, filed August 26, 2013 [doc. 7] is GRANTED
and the Clerk of the Court shall REMAND this case to the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Missouri.
/s/ John T. Maughmer
John T. Maughmer
United States Magistrate Judge
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?