Labunski v. Saint Luke's Health System

Filing 34

ORDER denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Doc. 27 . Signed by Judge Nanette Laughrey on 3/9/2015. (Hatting, Elizabeth)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
CARLA LABUNSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAINT LUKE’S HEALTH SYSTEM,
Defendant.

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Case No. 4:14-cv-00708-NKL

ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Saint Luke’s Health System’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, Doc. 28. Saint Luke’s moves for Plaintiff Carla
Labunski’s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful
termination for whistleblowing claims to be dismissed. Saint Luke’s’ motion to dismiss
is denied.
Labunski was an admitting employee at Saint Luke’s in Overland Park, Kansas,
until Saint Luke’s terminated her employment in November 2013. Labunski argues that
her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Family and Medical
Leave Act, constituted a wrongful termination for whistleblowing, and gave rise to claims
for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Saint Luke’s argues that Labunski’s claims for intentional and negligent inflection
of emotional distress and wrongful termination for whistleblowing should be dismissed
because Labunski plead these claims in accordance with Missouri law. Saint Luke’s
argues that the claims should have been plead according to the law of Kansas.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the dismissal of a complaint if
the plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In determining whether a complaint is sufficient, the document must be read as
a whole. Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1985).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). In determining whether the complaint
alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim to relief, all factual allegations made by
the plaintiff are accepted as true. Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492
F.3d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that legal allegations are not accepted as true). If
the facts in the complaint are sufficient for the court to draw a reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, the claim has facial plausibility and
will not be dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Saint Luke’s contends that in order to determine whether Labunski sufficiently
plead her causes of action, the Court must first decide whether Missouri or Kansas law
applies to the three claims at issue. Upon review of the elements of the relevant claims in
both states, the Court concludes that it is unnecessary to decide which state’s law applies
to these claims in order to dispose of the motion to dismiss. The elements of all three
claims are largely the same between Missouri and Kansas, and Labunski plead sufficient
facts to maintain her causes of action under both states’ requirements. Given that the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to state claims under both states’ laws, at this

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stage in the litigation it is not required that Labunski be able to accurately identify which
state’s law governs her common law actions.
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, both states require
that a plaintiff plead (1) intentional or reckless disregard of the plaintiff, (2) extreme and
outrageous conduct, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. See Gibson v.
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo. 1997) (“To state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead extreme and outrageous conduct by a defendant
who intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress that results in bodily
harm.”); McIlrath v. City of Kingman, Kansas, 324 P.3d 343, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014)
(“To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (or outrage), ‘a
plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in
reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) there
was a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s mental
distress; and (4) the plaintiff[’s] mental distress was extreme and severe.”).
Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress require that a plaintiff plead
that the defendant knew or should have known that its actions involved an unreasonable
risk of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff, and that the defendant’s actions caused
physical injury to the plaintiff. Henson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 627, 629
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (“The elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress are: (1) a legal duty of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2)
breach of the duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) injury to the plaintiff.’ Additionally, to
recover damages, the plaintiff must prove two additional elements: (1) that the defendant
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should have realized his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress,
and (2) that the emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable and of
sufficient severity to be medically significant.”) (citations omitted); Lovitt ex rel. Bahr v.
Board of County Com’rs of Shawnee County, 221 P.3d 107, 114 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009)
(“The current state of Kansas law is that a plaintiff claiming damages for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress must demonstrate a physical injury or physical impact
which causes an actual injury.”).
Wrongful discharge claims exist in both Missouri and Kansas when an employer
fires an employee for a reason that conflicts with public policy. Both states require that
the plaintiff identify a public policy mandate or right that was violated when the
employer terminated the plaintiff. See Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d
579, 595 (Mo. 2013) (“An at-will employee may not be terminated (1) for refusing to
violate the law or any well-established and clear mandate of public policy as expressed in
the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, or rules created by
a governmental body or (2) for reporting wrongdoing or violations of law to superiors or
public authorities . . .”) (quoting Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Institute, P.C., 304 S.W.3d
81, 92 (Mo. 2010)); Kerns v. City of Dodge City, Kan., 313 P.3d 105, at *3 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2013) (“The four elements of a prima facie case of a state retaliatory discharge
claim generally include: (1) the plaintiff exercised a statutory or constitutional right
recognized as a basis for a retaliatory discharge claim; (2) the employer had knowledge
of plaintiff[’s] exercise of that right; (3) the employer terminated the plaintiff[’s]
employment; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
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termination.”); see also Goodman v. Wesley Medical Center, L.L.C., 78 P.3d 817 (Kan.
2003) (recognizing a Kansas retaliatory discharge claim for whistleblowing).
Saint Luke’s asserts that Labunski improperly plead her claims under Kansas law,
citing her purported failure to plead an immediate physical injury for her negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim and failure to plead a “statutory or constitutional
right” required by a Kansas retaliatory discharge claim. Contrary to these assertions,
Labunski plead that “[w]ithin days of her termination, PLAINTIFF . . . experienced
sudden worsening of her [chronic insomnia] symptoms,” along with extreme anxiety,
inability to concentrate, impaired short-term memory, and inability to function. She also
plead substantial facts giving rise to a wrongful termination for whistleblowing claim in
accordance with Kansas law. See id. Construing the allegations in the complaint broadly
and liberally, the complaint is sufficient to maintain causes of action under both Kansas
and Missouri law, and Labunski’s claims will not be dismissed regardless of which
state’s law applies to her claims. See Goldblatt v. Herron, 2010 WL 3522811, at *1
(W.D. Mo. Sept. 2, 2010) (“When the author of the complaint is a pro se litigant the court
construes the complaint broadly and liberally.”).
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.
s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: March 9, 2015
Jefferson City, Missouri

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