Ralstin v. Bowersox

Filing 14

ORDER: ORDERED that: (1) the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied; (2) the issuance of a certificate of appealability is denied; and (3) this case is dismissed with prejudice. Signed on January 13, 2015 by District Judge Brian C. Wimes. (Thoennes, Cindy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
RANDY RALSTIN,

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Petitioner,
v.
MICHEAL BOWERSOX,
Respondent.

Case No. 14-0744-CV-W-BCW-P

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
DENYING THE ISSUANCE OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner, a convicted state prisoner currently confined at the South Central Correctional
Center in Licking, Missouri, has filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2009 convictions of two counts of second-degree
murder, one count of resisting a lawful stop, one count of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle
accident, and one count of driving while intoxicated, which were entered in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri. Petitioner asserts two (2) grounds for relief: (1) the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support his conviction for resisting a lawful stop; and (2) the trial court erred in
finding him guilty of two counts of second-degree murder because there was insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the predicate offense, resisting a lawful stop. Respondent contends
that petitioner’s claims are without merit.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In affirming petitioner’s convictions and sentences, the Missouri Court of Appeals set forth
the following facts:
[Petitioner] was indicted in Jackson County Circuit Court for the murder of
Tiffany Berry and S.R., a minor child, which occurred on May 12, 2008.
[Petitioner] was charged with two counts of felony murder in the second degree for

his conduct that caused a vehicular collision with the victims' vehicle resulting in
their deaths in Kansas City, Missouri. The State alleged that these victims were
“killed in a vehicular collision as a result of the perpetration of the Class D Felony
of Resisting a Lawful Stop under Section 575.150.”
This matter was tried to the court without a jury on June 22 and 25, 2009,
and the trial court found [petitioner] guilty as charged. In doing so, the trial court
made the following relevant Findings of Fact Supporting Trial Court Judgment:
At approximately 20:48 hours on May 12, 2008
[petitioner]'s vehicle was observed by Kansas City police officers
Robert D. Guffey, Jr. and trainee Rieman at or near 24th and
Jackson Streets in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri. The
officers observed [petitioner]'s vehicle to be traveling at a speed in
excess of the posted limit, pulled their patrol car behind
[petitioner]'s vehicle and activated lights and siren, for the purpose
of making a routine traffic stop of [petitioner]'s vehicle. The
officers notified police dispatch that they were pursuing
[petitioner]'s vehicle.
Officers John Mattivi and Michael Baker were patrolling
Southbound on Prospect when they heard a radio call relating to
[petitioner]'s vehicle and turned around to head toward the vicinity
in which officers Guffey and Rieman were attempting a traffic stop
of [petitioner]'s vehicle.
[Petitioner] pulled his vehicle over the curb near 23rd &
Mersington just long enough for two passengers to exit then sped
off. [Petitioner]'s stop was not long enough for officers Guffey and
Rieman to approach [petitioner]'s vehicle. The officers remained
with the individuals who exited [petitioner]'s vehicle and did not
pursue [petitioner]; however, officers Mattivi and Baker were then
traveling Northbound on Prospect for the purpose of assisting in the
traffic stop of [petitioner]'s vehicle.
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[The victims] were occupants of a car struck by [petitioner]'s
vehicle on May 12, 2008 in Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri.
The parties stipulate that both occupants of the car struck by
[petitioner]t's vehicle died of blunt force injuries suffered as the
result of the collision of [petitioner]'s vehicle and the car occupied
by them.

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The trial court subsequently sentenced [petitioner] to thirty years on both
felony murder counts (Counts I and II) to run concurrently with each other; four
years for resisting a lawful stop (Count III), to run consecutively to Counts I and II;
four years for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, to run consecutively to
Count III; and six months for driving while intoxicated, to run concurrently with
Counts I and II.
Resp. Ex. E at 2-4
Before the state court findings may be set aside, a federal court must conclude that the
state court’s findings of fact lack even fair support in the record. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459
U.S. 422, 432 (1983). Credibility determinations are left for the state court to decide. Graham
v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1540 (8th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984). It is
petitioner=s burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the state court findings are
erroneous.

28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1).1

Because the state court’s findings of fact have fair

support in the record and because petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the state court findings are erroneous, the Court defers to and adopts those factual
conclusions.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues now, as he did in his direct appeal of his convictions and sentences (Resp.
Ex. E), that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting a lawful stop,
and that because resisting a lawful stop was the predicate felony for his two second-degree felony
murder convictions, the evidence was also insufficient to support these convictions.

The

Supreme Court has explained that claims of insufficient evidence to support a verdict face “a high
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In a proceeding instituted by an application for writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State
court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by Aclear and convincing evidence.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1).
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bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.”
Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012). The first layer of deference is on direct
appeal, where “[a] reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient
evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.’” Id. (quoting Cavazos v.
Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011)). A second layer of deference then applies on habeas review, where “a
federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence
challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court.” Id. Rather, [t]he
federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”
Id.
In evaluating petitioner’s claims, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained:
[Petitioner]’s first two Points Relied On are based on the same argument
that “there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction” for Counts I and II
(felony murder in the second degree) and Count III (Resisting A Lawful Stop)
based on [petitioner]’s assertion that he “stopped for Officer Guffey . . . and there
was no evidence of pursuit” by the police after [petitioner] stopped to drop off two
passengers to allow them to flee from the police. Because the State used the
resisting a lawful stop felony charge as its predicate offense for both felony murder
charges, [petitioner] argues that the State’s failure to adduce sufficient evidence on
the resisting a lawful stop charge necessitates reversal on all three charges. We
disagree.
Our applicable standard of review is the following:
The standard of review in a bench-tried case is the same as in
a jury-tried case. We will affirm a trial court's denial of a motion
for judgment of acquittal if, at the close of evidence, there was
sufficient evidence from which reasonable persons could have
found the defendant guilty of the charged offense. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all evidence
and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and disregard all contrary evidence and
inferences. The trier of fact determines the credibility of the
witnesses, and may believe all, some or none of the testimony of a
witness. The function of the reviewing court is not to reweigh the
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evidence, but only to determine if the evidence is supported by
sufficient evidence.
State v. Burse, 231 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (citations
omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Section 575.150 is entitled “Resisting or interfering with arrest,” and
provides the following:
1. A person commits the crime of resisting or interfering with arrest,
detention, or stop if, knowing that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest, or
attempting to lawfully detain or stop an individual or vehicle, or the person
reasonably should know that a law enforcement officer is making an arrest or
attempting to lawfully detain or lawfully stop an individual or vehicle, for the
purpose of preventing the officer from effecting the arrest, stop or detention, the
person:
(1) Resists the arrest, stop or detention of such person by using or
threatening the use of violence or physical force or by fleeing from such officer; or
(2) Interferes with the arrest, stop or detention of another person by using or
threatening the use of violence, physical force or physical interference.
2. This section applies to:
(1) Arrests, stops, or detentions, with or without warrants;
(2) Arrests, stops, or detentions, for any crime, infraction, or ordinance
violation; and
(3) Arrests for warrants issued by a court or a probation and parole officer.
3. A person is presumed to be fleeing a vehicle stop if that person continues
to operate a motor vehicle after that person has seen or should have seen clearly
visible emergency lights or has heard or should have heard an audible signal
emanating from the law enforcement vehicle pursuing that person.
After a bench trial, the trial court expressly rejected the arguments raised by
[petitioner] on appeal in its Findings of Fact Supporting Trial Court Judgment
On Appeal, [petitioner] makes two interrelated arguments in an attempt to
demonstrate that the above findings and conclusions of the trial court were in error.
To begin with, [petitioner] argues that “[i]t is uncontroverted that the defendant
pulled his car over within one-half block from the time the police activated their
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lights and siren and thereby ‘stopped.’” While we agree that the trial court found
that [petitioner] stopped his vehicle momentarily in order to allow two passengers
from his vehicle to flee on foot, [petitioner] fails to articulate on appeal why this
fact alone precluded the trial court from finding him guilty of Section 575.150.
Simply put, no part of the statute or any Missouri case law provides that merely
stopping, no matter how briefly, immunizes one's unlawful conduct pursuant to
Section 575.150.
The Missouri Supreme Court has provided five elements that must be
satisfied to be found guilty of resisting a lawful stop under Section 575.150:
1) a law enforcement officer is making or attempting to make a
lawful arrest or stop, 2) the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known of the law enforcement officer's attempt to arrest or
stop, 3) the defendant resists arrest by fleeing; 4) the defendant
resisted for the purpose of thwarting the law enforcement officer's
attempt to arrest or stop by using or threatening the use of violence
or physical force or by fleeing, and 5) the defendant fled in a manner
that created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to
another.
State v. Daws, 311 S.W.3d 806, 808-09 (Mo. bane 2010); see also MAl
329.60.
When reviewing the findings of fact as set forth by the trial court, it is clear
that the State proved each of the five elements of this crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Just because [petitioner] stopped his vehicle for a moment in time cannot
obviate the fact that there was copious evidence that a “law enforcement officer”
was attempting to stop [petitioner] and that he resisted by fleeing. Section
575.150. “The words in criminal statutes, because they affect the general public
and are written by lay legislatures, are interpreted in accordance with common
understanding.” State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 643 n.6 (Mo. banc 2010).
However, because section 575.150 implicates [petitioner]’s liberty, it "should not
be extended by judicial interpretation so as to embrace persons and acts not
specifically and unambiguously brought within its terms," and the statute is
“construed strictly against the state and in favor of the defendant.” State v.
Starnes, 318 S.W.3d 208, 214 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). However, “[c]onstruction of statutes should avoid
unreasonable or absurd results.” Reichert v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d
301, 305 (Mo. banc 2007).
Pursuant to these standards, we find the legislative intent of Section
575.150 clear and unambiguous that it is a crime to flee from a law enforcement
officer who is “attempting to lawfully detain or lawfully stop an individual or
vehicle.” Section 575.150 does not provide that stopping briefly prior to fleeing
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precludes a guilty finding under the statute because momentarily stopping still
allows the defendant to do that which is prohibited by the statute: “[r]esist[ing] the
arrest, stop or detention of such person by using or threatening the use of violence
or physical force or by fleeing from such officer.” 575.150.1(1). Here, had
[petitioner] stopped so that the police could have detained him (as is required by the
statute), two lives would have been saved. Instead, [petitioner] fled from the
officers and, thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding of guilt was
unsupported by substantial evidence.
[Petitioner] further argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to
find him guilty of this crime because “[t]here was no actual police pursuit of
defendant's vehicle after it pulled away.” We disagree.
As outlined by the trial court above, there was ample evidence that the
police continued to pursue [petitioner] after he stopped momentarily to drop off his
two passengers. On appeal, [petitioner] highlights the fact that the two officers
that first attempted to stop [petitioner]'s vehicle subsequently detained the two
individuals that exited from [petitioner]'s vehicle when it briefly stopped, instead of
further pursuing [petitioner]'s vehicle. But as also found by the trial court, this fact
alone did not translate into the conclusion that [petitioner] was free to leave the
scene or that the police were no longer interested in detaining [petitioner]. To the
contrary, it is only logical that his suspicious conduct in dropping these individuals
off before speeding away only heightened the interest of the police in also detaining
[petitioner] and his vehicle.
Officer Guffey testified that he was in the car that initially attempted to stop
[petitioner]'s vehicle, and that after it stopped and the two individuals exited the
vehicle that he “told dispatch” that “we were attempting the car check and he took
off . . . like a bat out of hell.” Based on this information, Officer Mattivi, who was
on patrol in a separate vehicle nearby, turned his patrol car around to find the
vehicle that matched the description of [petitioner]’s vehicle. Officer Mattivi
testified that it was his intent to “[c]hase it until we could try to get him stopped,”
but that when he found the vehicle, the collision had already occurred.
Further corroborating the evidence that [petitioner] was being pursued by
the police after failing to stop was [petitioner]’s own conduct and admissions.
After dropping the two other individuals off, [petitioner] proceeded to drive at a
speed nearly triple the limit (69 mph in a 25 mph zone) in an intoxicated condition
and in such a fashion that was so reckless as to cause a fatal accident in less than a
minute after fleeing the police. After being arrested by the police, [petitioner]
waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement wherein he admitted that after
seeing the police he panicked and fled because he had a warrant and also
presumably because, as he admitted, he had been drinking.

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Because “this Court will not weigh the evidence anew since the fact-finder
may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with
the facts, circumstances and other testimony in the case,” we must reject
[petitioner]’s arguments on appeal. State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Mo.
banc 2008). Ultimately, [petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that the evidence
was insufficient for the fact finder to find him guilty of each and every element of
the crime of resisting a lawful stop.
Furthermore, because [petitioner]'s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence for both of his convictions for felony murder in Point Two is limited
solely to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the predicate offense of
resisting a lawful stop, we must affirm those convictions for the same reasons.
Resp. Ex. E at 5-12.
The Missouri Court of Appeals= resolution of petitioner’s claim that there was sufficient
evidence to convict him was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts or on a
misapplication of federal constitutional law. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and (2); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (constitutional standard for judging sufficiency of the evidence
in criminal trials is Awhether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt@). AIn applying this standard, >[t]he scope of our review for a collateral
challenge to the sufficiency of the state’s evidence is extremely limited. . . We must presume that
the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in the record in favor of the state, and we must
defer to that conclusion.@ Sexton v. Kemna, 278 F.3d 808, 814 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Miller v.
Leapley, 34 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 886 (2002).
In the present case, a judge or jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, based
on the evidence, that petitioner resisted a lawful stop. Although it is possible to conclude from the
evidence that petitioner did not resist a lawful stop, this Court may not conduct its own assessment
of the evidence. United States v. Anderson, 78 F.3d 420, 422 (8th Cir. 1996) ( A[t]he evidence
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need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. . . we may not disturb the conviction if
the evidence rationally supports two conflicting hypotheses.@). The appellate court’s ruling did
not result in “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or in “a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding,” see U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2), and as such, Grounds 1 and
2 will be denied.

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY WILL BE DENIED
Under 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c), the Court may issue a certificate of appealability only Awhere
a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.@ To satisfy
this standard, a petitioner must show that a Areasonable jurist@ would find the district court ruling
on the constitutional claim(s) Adebatable or wrong.@ Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276
(2004).

Because petitioner has not met this standard, a certificate of appealability will be

denied.

See 28 U.S.C. ' 2254, Rule 11(a).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied;
(2) the issuance of a certificate of appealability is denied; and
(3) this case is dismissed with prejudice.

/s/ Brian C. Wimes_______________
BRIAN C. WIMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Kansas City, Missouri,
Dated: January 13, 2015.
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