Maberry et al v. Vescovo et al

Filing 98

ORDER granting 63 Vescovo's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Signed on 3/10/16 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Francis, Alexandra)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
LINDA JEPSEN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PAUL VESCOVO, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-CV-914-W-DGK

ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS TO DEFENDANT VESCOVO
Plaintiffs Linda Jepsen and Lauren Maberry allege that Defendants, the Clay County
Sheriff’s Department (“Clay County”) and its sheriff, Paul Vescovo (“Vescovo”), unlawfully
investigated them. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for common law invasion of
privacy.
Now before the Court is Vescovo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Doc. 63). Finding that the Complaint fails to state any
claim against him, the Court GRANTS the motion.
Background1
James E. Murray (“Murray”) owns a private investigation business called Star
Investigations, LLC. Matthew Hunter (“Hunter”), a Clay County sheriff’s deputy, moonlighted
for Star Investigations.
Murray and Hunter allegedly harassed each Plaintiff while conducting separate
investigations on them. Each incident of harassment occurred in 2012. In their amended

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), the Court here recites the facts as they appear in the amended
complaint (Doc. 56), crediting Plaintiffs with all reasonable inferences. See Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d
659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009).

complaint, Plaintiffs contend that these incidents amounted to unlawful seizures, in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Vescovo did not take office as Clay County Sheriff until late December 2012 or early
January 2013. He thus did not personally participate in these incidents, although he allegedly
ratified them after taking office.
Standard
A moving party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if “there is no dispute as to any
material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ashley Cnty. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th Cir. 2009). A court makes this determination by taking as
true all facts pled by the nonmoving parties and granting them all reasonable inferences. Id.
Analysis
Vescovo seeks summary judgment on the only count charged against him, a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
The amended complaint does not identify a single relevant action Vescovo took while
employed as a government official,2 much less any unlawful seizure supporting § 1983 liability.
Rather, it implies Vescovo is liable for Hunter’s actions simply because he is the sheriff and
because he supported them after the fact. Because this theory is not cognizable under § 1983, the
Court grants judgment on the pleadings to Vescovo. See id.3

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“Only state actors can be held liable under Section 1983.” Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 650 (8th
Cir. 2008). Therefore, Vescovo’s conduct before becoming sheriff is irrelevant.
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Insofar as Vescovo may be liable for Hunter’s actions on behalf of Clay County—i.e., in his official capacity—that
theory was rejected in the Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant Clay County (Doc. 97).

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Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, Vescovo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 63) is
GRANTED. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Vescovo on all counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 10, 2016

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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