Knight v. Krauser

Filing 17

ORDER granting 4 defendant Krauser's motion to dismiss and denying 8 plaintiff's motion to strike entry of appearance of the Office of the MO Attorney General. Signed on 6/2/15 by District Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. (Enss, Rhonda) Modified on 6/2/2015 to reflect that a copy of the Order was sent via regular and certified mail, tracking #7013 1710 0000 5617 6810 to Plaintiff (Wheeler, LaTandra).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM MICHAEL KNIGHT,

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Plaintiffs,
v.

KAREN LEE KRAUSER,
Defendants.

NO. 15-CV-00171-FJG

ORDER
Currently pending before the Court is defendant Karen Lee Krauser’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. # 4) and plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Entry of Appearance of the Office of
the Missouri Attorney General as Defendant’s Representative (Doc. # 8).
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on October 20, 2014, he appeared before Judge Krauser, Clay
County, Missouri Associate Circuit Court judge on a municipal ordinance violation.
Plaintiff states that on that date, he asked Judge Krauser two times whether the Court
had adopted the Administrative Procedures Act. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Krauser first
stated she did not know what the Administrative Procedures Act was. Plaintiff states
that the second time she was asked, she assured plaintiff that she had jurisdiction,
without disclosing what the jurisdiction was. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Krauser then
granted the prosecutor a continuance for a “docket review” and the hearing was
continued until November 10, 2014. Plaintiff alleges that on that date, he again
appeared before Judge Krauser and challenged the procedure, rules, personal and

subject matter jurisdiction and venue and then stated that he would not consent to any
further movement until the venue, capacity, process and rules of which Judge Krauser
was attempting to exercise and apply were clearly spelled out. Plaintiff states that
Judge Krauser “acting in the capacity of an elected Circuit Court Judge, stated that she
was not going to answer any more of the injured party’s questions and again assured
the injured party that she had jurisdiction.” (Plaintiff’s Complaint, ¶10). Judge Krauser
then entered a plea of not guilty for plaintiff and continued the case until December 8,
2014. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Krause “acting in the capacity of an elected Judicial
Circuit Court Judge has agreed to knowingly and willfully violating her sworn Oath of
Office and thereby lost all immunity from a lawsuit. . . .by refusing to address the
guaranteed rights of the injured party under the Constitution for the United States, and
the Missouri Constitution, by moving forward with the case without disclosing the nature
and cause of the charges, personal and subject matter jurisdiction, venue, capacity, or
rules to the detriment of the injured party . . ..” (Complaint,¶ 27).
Plaintiff further alleges that “the wrong doer, acting in the capacity of an elected
Judicial Circuit Court Judge never disclosed the venue of which the case was being
heard as the City of Liberty Municipal Court Judge, Thomas Capps, had recused
himself from presiding over the case thus making it nearly impossible for the injured
party to get any proper documentation as to whether the case is being heard in a State
Court, County District Court, or a Municipal Court, in order to obtain documentation for a
new case as the statues of limitations have run out to prosecute under Missouri Revised
Statutes 556.036.2(2) and Missouri Revised Statutes 556.036.6(1) to the detriment of
the injured party in order to properly defend himself against the charges in which the

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injured party submitted to the wrong doer a Notice of Complaint for Judicial Misconduct
and Malfeasance of Office for Clay County, Missouri, Circuit Court Judge Karen Lee
Krauser (Complaint, ¶ 29).
Finally, plaintiff alleges that Judge Krauser “committed an act or acts of fraud
against the injured party as she has refused to answer the injured party’s questions
regarding the nature and cause of the charges, personal and subject matter jurisdiction,
the venue, capacity, and rules when the duty to answer the questions is imposed . .
.and thereby abandoned her sworn Oath of Office and leaving the injured party without
a clear understanding of the rules, jurisdiction, and venue which are guaranteed rights
to which he was unable to defend himself.” (Complaint, ¶ 30). Plaintiff asks for an
award of $250,000 in damages for the cost of mailings, public records costs, research
time, time incurred for proceedings, undue physical, mental and financial stress, as well
as punitive damages and any other compensation the Court deems just.
Defendant Krauser alleges that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
II.

STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), Aa complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.@
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that merely pleads Alabels and conclusions@ or a
Aformulaic recitation@ of the elements of a cause of action, or Anaked assertions@

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devoid of Afurther factual enhancement@ will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly).
ADetermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.@ Id. at 1950. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) we must
accept the plaintiff=s factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff=s favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).
In Driesen v. Smith, No. C13-4037-MWB, 2014 WL 24234 (N.D.Iowa Jan. 2,
2014), aff’d, 584 Fed.Appx. 292 (8th Cir. 2014), the Court explained the standards for
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
A motion attacking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is governed by
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either
attack the complaint’s claim of jurisdiction on its face or it can attack the
factual basis for jurisdiction. . . . In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of
the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and
the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary
for subject matter jurisdiction. . . . If the [defendant] wants to make a
factual attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, the court
may receive competent evidence such as affidavits, deposition testimony,
and the like in order to determine the factual dispute.
Id. at * 6.
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant states that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunity. “It is well settled, under both federal and state law, that judges are
completely immune from civil lawsuits based on claims of misconduct during the
performance of their judicial functions.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct.
1213, 1217-18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57, 98
S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,11, 112 S.Ct.
286, 287-88,116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991); Liles v. Regan, 804 F.2d 493,495 (8th Cir.1986). In
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Hoppe v. Klapperich, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947), the Court stated, “‘It is unquestionable,
and has been from the earliest days of the common law, that a judicial officer cannot be
called to account in a civil action for [ ] determinations and acts in [a] judicial capacity,
however erroneous or by whatever motives prompted.’” Id. at 788 (quoting Stewart v.
Case, 54 N.W. 938 (1893)). “Only if a judge acts in ‘the clear absence of all jurisdiction
over the subject-matter’ can he be liable.” P.G. v. Ramsey County, 141 F.Supp.2d
1220,1230 (D.Minn. 2001)(quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646, 13
Wall. 335 (1871)). Additionally, in Jackson v. Borengasser, No. 2:12-CV-02306, 2013
WL 5218057 (W.D.Ark. Sept. 16, 2013), the Court stated, “A judge will not be deprived
of immunity because the action [s]he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of [her] authority.” Id. at *3 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57). The Court in
Jackson acknowledged that judicial immunity can be overcome in only two situations:
“(1) if the challenged act is nonjudicial; and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature,
was taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at
11).
Judge Krauser states that in the Complaint, plaintiff alleges numerous times that
she was “acting in the capacity of a Judicial Circuit Court Judge.” Additionally, she
argues that she was acting in the capacity of a judge in proceeding over his arraignment
for a municipal ordinance violation and in entering a plea of not guilty for plaintiff. Thus,
she claims she is entitled to judicial immunity.
In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff states that his Motion to Strike the
Missouri Attorney General’s Entry of Appearance acts as his response to the Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiff argues that the Missouri Attorney General, lacks standing to represent

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or file any papers or motions on behalf of Judge Krauser, because she is being sued in
her private, natural person capacity and as there is no action against the state, and no
funds are being sought from the state’s treasury, the Missouri Attorney General lacks
standing to represent Judge Krauser. In his Motion to Strike plaintiff argues that
“[j]udges cannot invoke judicial immunity for avoiding the Constitutional rights of a
litigant. The Defendant is not immune for tortuous acts committed in a purely
administrative, non-judicial capacity.” (Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, p. 6). Plaintiff claims
that he is suing Judge Krauser in her:
private, natural person capacity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). . .
[w]hen a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the
Federal Constitution, she comes into conflict with the superior authority of
the Constitution, and she is in that case stripped of her official or
representative character and is subjected in her person to the
consequences of her individual conduct. The State has no power to
impart to her any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
the United States.
(Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, p. 7).
By arguing that he is suing Judge Krauser in her “private, natural person
capacity” plaintiff appears to be attempting to escape the reach of the judicial immunity
doctrine. Even though plaintiff argues that he is suing Judge Krauser in her private,
natural capacity, the Complaint reveals otherwise, as plaintiff alleges in no fewer than
ten paragraphs that “Karen Lee Krauser, acting in the capacity of a Missouri District
Court Judge for the 7th Judicial Circuit Court, Clay County, Missouri” took actions
which violated his rights. See Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29.
Additionally, the Complaint only describes actions Judge Krauser took on the bench
when plaintiff appeared before her as a sitting judge for 7th Judicial Circuit Court in Clay
County, Missouri. As noted above, the Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to
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the judicial immunity doctrine: “[f]irst a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial
actions, that is, actions not taken in the judge’s official capacity. See Mireles, 502 U.S.
9, 9-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9. . . Second, a judge is not immune for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Jackson v.
Ward County Officials, No. 1:12-CV-017, 2012 WL 3135376, *6 (D.N.D. Mar. 27, 2012).
Although plaintiff argued in his opposition that “[t]he Defendant is not immune for
tortuous acts committed in a purely administrative, non-judicial capacity,” he has not
alleged any facts in his Complaint which support his claim that Judge Krauser acted in a
non-judicial capacity. Additionally, there are no allegations in the Complaint which
would indicate that Judge Krauser’s actions were taken in the absence of all jurisdiction.
In State v. Williams, 46 S.W.3d 35 (Mo.App.2001), the Court stated, “Section
541.020 provides the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Section 541.020 states, in part,
that ‘circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases of felony,
misdemeanor and infractions.’ Thus, associate circuit judges, as judges of the circuit
court, may hear and determine all such cases.” Id. at 38-39. Additionally, Mo.Rev.Stat. §
479.010 states, “[v]iolations of municipal ordinances shall be heard and determined only
before divisions of the circuit court as hereinafter provided in this chapter.” In Calderon
v. Bandera County, No. SA-14-CA-881-XR(PMA), 2014 WL 6769694 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 1,
2014), the Court stated, “[w]here a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is
sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Id. at *12. Thus, the Court finds that Judge
Krauser, as an Associate Circuit Court judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine
plaintiff’s municipal ordinance violation.
Thus, the Court finds that because Judge Krauser was acting in her judicial

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capacity and had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s case, she is entitled to judicial immunity1.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant
Krauser’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 4) and DENIES plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Entry of
Appearance of the Office of the Missouri Attorney General (Doc. # 8).

Date: June 2, 2015
Kansas City, Missouri

S/ FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR.
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.
United States District Judge 

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As the Court has found that defendant is protected by the judicial immunity doctrine, it is not necessary
to address defendant’s second argument – that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also bars plaintiff’s
Complaint.

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