Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC et al

Filing 103

ORDER DETERMINING BILL OF COSTS. Signed on 1/22/18 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Strodtman, Tracy)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
ROCHELLE GARRISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOLGENCORP, LLC and SANDRA BELL,
Defendants.

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No. 4:16-CV-00349-DGK

ORDER DETERMINING COSTS
This case involved claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Missouri Human Rights Act. On December 6, 2017, The Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 95).
Now before the Court is Defendants’ Bill of Costs seeking $2,943.70 (Doc. 97). Plaintiff
objects to the taxation of the costs for the video transcript of the Winchester deposition (Doc.
98). Defendants did not file a reply. For the following reasons, the Court awards Defendants
$2,803.70 in costs.
Standard
Rule 54(d)(1) provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order
provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). A district court “has discretion in determining and awarding
costs in a given case.” Pershern v. Fiatallis N. Am., Inc., 834 F.2d 136, 140 (8th Cir. 1987); see
Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013) (“[T]he word ‘should’ makes clear that
the decision whether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the district
court.”).

But, the “prevailing party is presumptively entitled to recover all of its costs.”

Thompson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 472 F.3d 515, 517 (8th Cir. 2006). The prevailing party
bears the burden of persuading the court that the items and amounts sought are compensable
under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 or some other authority. Combs v. Cordish Cos., No. 14-0227-CV-ODS,
2015 WL 5096009, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2015).
The court’s power to tax costs under § 1920 is limited to the items enumerated in the
statute.

Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012).

“Costs” are

construed narrowly under the statute. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]lthough ‘costs’
has an everyday meaning synonymous with ‘expenses,’” taxable costs “are a fraction of the
nontaxable expenses borne by litigants for attorneys, experts, consultants, and investigators.” Id.
Section 1920 identifies six expenses that may be taxed as costs, one of which is
applicable to the present case, “fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Discussion
Defendants seek costs for transcripts of four depositions. In determining whether the cost
of a deposition transcript is compensable under § 1920, the relevant question is not whether the
deposition was used to decide the summary judgment motion, but whether it “reasonably seemed
necessary at the time [it] w[as] taken.” Zotos v. Lindbergh School Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 363 (8th
Cir. 1997). To be compensable, the transcript must be “necessary for use in the case” and “not
obtained primarily for the convenience of the parties.” McDowell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 758
F.2d 1293, 1294 (8th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff objects to $140.00 for a video transcription of the Winchester deposition.
Plaintiff argues Defendants had a “stenographic version” of this deposition and that the video
transcription was “extraneous and a convenience.”

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Considering the case was determined at the summary judgment phase, it appears the
depositions were reasonably necessary at the time they were taken. However, the Defendants do
not state how the video transcript of the Winchester deposition was necessary and not for its
convenience. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is sustained and the cost for the video version of
the Winchester deposition transcript is not compensable.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Defendants $2,803.70 in costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 22, 2018

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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