Waldron v. USA
ORDER - Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1) is DENIED, the Court will not hold an evidentiary hearing, and the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Signed on 8/29/17 by Chief District Judge Greg Kays. (Strodtman, Tracy)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
DANIEL W. WALDRON,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
(Crim. No. 4:12-CR-00118-DGK-1)
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE
Petitioner Daniel W. Waldron (“Petitioner”) pled guilty to one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the Honorable Dean Whipple
sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment. On May 10, 2017, this case was administratively
transferred to this Court.
Now before the Court are Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
(Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the Government’s Opposition and Request to Lift Stay
In the Government’s Opposition, the Government requests the Court deny
Petitioner’s motion on the merits and with prejudice. Because the Supreme Court recently
rejected Petitioner’s argument in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), his § 2255
motion is DENIED. The Government’s motion to deny Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED.
On November 13, 2012, Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Plea Agrmnt. (Crim. Doc. 18). In this
The facts in this section derive from: (1) the criminal case record; and (2) the allegations in Petitioner’s motion,
taken as true except where they contradict the record. Because the facts in this light do not entitle Petitioner to
relief, the Court denies him an evidentiary hearing and rules on the facts in the record. See Thomas v. United States,
737 F.3d 1202, 1206 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)); Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule
agreement, Petitioner waived his right to attack his sentence, directly or collaterally, on any
ground except claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or an illegal
sentence. Id. ¶ 15. The agreement defines an “illegal sentence” as one “imposed in excess of the
statutory maximum,” and states the term specifically “does not include less serious sentencing
errors, such as a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, an abuse of discretion, or the
imposition of an unreasonable sentence.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
Petitioner does not
challenge the validity of his plea agreement and this waiver.
On April 1, 2013, the Honorable Dean Whipple sentenced Petitioner to 70 months’
imprisonment after carefully considering the relevant factors and reviewing the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). In calculating Petitioner’s Guidelines range, the
Probation and Parole Office found he was eligible for an enhanced base offense level because he
had a prior conviction that qualified as a “crime of violence.” Specifically, the Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) states Petitioner’s prior Missouri conviction of resisting arrest by
fleeing qualified him for an enhancement under Guidelines § 2K2.1(a). See PSR ¶¶ 19, 38
(Crim. Doc. 19). This enhancement elevated Petitioner’s base offense level to 20, yielding an
advisory imprisonment range of 70 to 87 months. The Court sentenced Petitioner to the bottom
end of the advisory range, and below the statutory maximum of 10 years. Petitioner did not file a
Petitioner filed the instant motion on June 16, 2016. The Court withheld ruling while
awaiting the Supreme Court’s opinion in Beckles. That decision was handed down on March 6,
A district court may vacate a sentence if it “was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A § 2255 motion “is not a substitute for a
direct appeal, and is not the proper way to complain about simple . . . errors.” Anderson v.
United States, 25 F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).
Petitioner argues his prior conviction for resisting arrest by fleeing no longer qualifies as
a crime of violence in the wake of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Supreme
Court decision invalidating the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) residual clause, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Petitioner contends that under Johnson, the Court’s Guidelines
calculation violated due process.
This argument is without merit. Petitioner was not sentenced under the ACCA, but
instead under a similarly-worded provision in the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The
Guidelines are not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause like
the ACCA’s residual clause was in Johnson. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 896. Unlike the ACCA, the
Guidelines do not fix the permissible statutory range of punishment. Id. at 894. Instead, they
merely guide the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence
within the permissible range. Id. Here, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that
was not in excess of the statutory maximum and, therefore, not an illegal sentence.
Because Petitioner’s claim is based on the same vagueness challenge the Supreme Court
rejected in Beckles, it is denied.
For these reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Doc. 1)
is DENIED, the Court will not hold an evidentiary hearing, and the Court declines to issue a
certificate of appealability. The Government’s Motion to Lift Stay and Deny Pending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 Motion on the Merits (Doc. 10) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: August 29, 2017
/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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