Swafford v. Colvin

Filing 17

ORDER affirming decision of Commissioner re 1 Social Security Complaint. Signed on 9/22/2017 by District Judge Roseann Ketchmark. (Perry, Madison)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

DAVID W. SWAFFORD,

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Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security1;
Defendant.

No. 4:16-00842-CV-RK

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying disability benefits. The
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability benefits is limited
to determining if the decision “complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”

Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929

(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is
‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the
[Commissioner’s] conclusion.’”

Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). In determining whether existing
evidence is substantial, the Court takes into account evidence that both supports and detracts
from the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) findings. Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102
(8th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “If the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, [the Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite
outcome or [the Court] would have decided differently.” Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625
1

Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 23, 2017,
however for consistency purposes, the case style in this legal action remains as originally filed.

(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis, 239 F.3d at 966). The Court does not re-weigh the evidence
presented to the ALJ.

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005)

(citing Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003)).

The Court should “defer

heavily to the findings and conclusions of the [Commissioner].” Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734,
738 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Discussion
By way of overview, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff suffered from the following severe
mental impairments: affective disorder, anxiety disorder, and cognitive disorder. However, the
ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, whether considered alone or in combination,
meet or medically equal the criteria of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404. Subpt. P,
App. 1 (“Listing”). Additionally, the ALJ found that despite his limitations, Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with
non-exertional limitations. Although the ALJ found the Plaintiff unable to perform any past
relevant work, the ALJ found there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the Plaintiff can perform.
On appeal, the issues raised by Plaintiff in support of reversing the ALJ’s decision are:
(1) whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence in the record and (2)
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ properly considered and weighed the available
medical opinion evidence.2 See Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (an ALJ
must assess a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence); Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619
(8th Cir. 2007) (while the ALJ’s assessment must be supported by some medical evidence, it is
not limited to considering medical evidence exclusively).

The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s

testimony, Plaintiff’s medical treatment records, and the physicians’ medical opinions. Upon
review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable authority, the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination and the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was
not disabled during the relevant time period.
2

The treating physician’s, Dr. Fristo, treatment notes dated May 7, 2015, through May 29, 2015,
were not considered by the ALJ because the ALJ’s decision was made on March 23, 2015. The Appeals
Council correctly noted the new information from Dr. Fristo concerned a later time, and therefore, is
immaterial as to the ALJ’s March 23, 2015, decision. The Appeals Council directed, and this Court
agrees, that Plaintiff must reapply for Social Security disability benefits for Dr. Fristo’s May 2015
treatment notes to be considered. See 20 C.F.R. §§404.620(a) and 404.970(b).

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Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.

s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: September 22, 2017

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