Hall v. The Nutro Company et al

Filing 16

ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed on 8/16/17 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Matthes Mitra, Renea)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

MAURICE L. HALL,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
THE NUTRO COMPANY, and
MARS PETCARE US, INC.,
Defendants.

Case No. 17-00326-CV-W-ODS

ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count III and any claim for punitive
damages in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. #12. For the reasons below, the Court grants
the motion in part and denies it in part.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants Mars Petcare US, Inc., and The Nutro
Company, alleging Defendants jointly employed Plaintiff.1 Plaintiff began working for
Defendants in April 2011 as a “utility packer,” and was a “packing operator II” in May
2015 when Defendants terminated his employment.
Plaintiff sustained an injury in February 2015 which required him to be absent
from work. Due to his injury, Plaintiff requested and received leave pursuant to the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Prior to taking leave, Plaintiff regularly worked the
7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. (“day shift”). However, while Plaintiff was on FMLA leave, his
supervisor informed him that employees had voted on new shift assignments based on
seniority. Despite Plaintiff’s seniority, he was not given the opportunity to participate in
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All factual statements are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Doc. #1. At this stage,
Plaintiff’s factual allegations must be accepted as true and reviewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff. See Section II.

the vote, and was informed he was required to work the 6:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. (“night
shift”) upon his return from FMLA leave. Plaintiff complained about his lack of a vote
despite his seniority, and expressed an inability to work the night shift due to childcare
obligations, but his supervisor indicated they would “work something out.” Although
Plaintiff was required to work the night shift, he was informed he could arrive late and
use vacation time for the missed time.
On April 28, 2015, Plaintiff was cleared to return to work, and did so that same
day. However, Plaintiff slipped and fell only hours into that shift, aggravating his
previous injury. Plaintiff was unable to return to work until May 4, 2015, when he
reported at 10:00 p.m. for the night shift. Plaintiff continued “in this practice” until
Defendants terminated his employment on May 27, 2015. In June 2015, Plaintiff
complained to Defendants’ human resources department that his termination was unfair
because he did not vote on the new shift assignments, and he was required to use
vacation time for the hours he was unable to work on the night shift.
Plaintiff brings claims for FMLA violations, retaliation in violation of Missouri’s
Workers’ Compensation Law (“MWCL”), and infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), move to dismiss
Count III and any claims for punitive damages in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

II. STANDARD
The liberal pleading standard created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires Aa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.@ Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). ASpecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only >give the defendant
fair notice of what the…claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.=@ Id. (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
Court Amust accept as true all of the complaint=s factual allegations and view them in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff[ ].” Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist., 512 F.3d 472,
476 (8th Cir. 2008).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss
can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679. A claim is facially plausible if it allows the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. See Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd.,
729 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2013); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594
(8th Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION
(A) Count III
Count III is a claim for infliction of emotional distress, but Plaintiff does not
specify whether he alleges negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defendants argue Count III, whether negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is preempted by the
MWCL. As explained below, the Court finds Count III fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and finds the MWCL precludes the claim.

(i)
To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must plead
the general elements of negligence: (1) a legal duty of the Defendant to protect the
plaintiff from injury, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) injury.
Plaintiff must also plead “that the defendant should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing distress and that the emotional distress or
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mental injury must be medically diagnosable and must be sufficient severity so as to be
medically significant.” Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing
Thornburg v. Fed. Express Corp., 62 S.W.3d 421, 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (internal
citations omitted). To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff
“must plead extreme and outrageous conduct by a defendant who intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress that results in bodily harm.” Nazeri v. Mo.
Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 316 (Mo. banc 1993) (citation omitted).
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants’ acts and omissions...directly caused or
contributed to cause the Plaintiff garden variety emotional distress....” Doc. #1, at 12.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege he had suffered a medically diagnosable mental
injury or other mental injury of “sufficient severity so as to be medically significant.” Nor
does Plaintiff allege “severe emotional distress that results in bodily harm.” Plaintiff’s
“garden variety emotional distress” is not of sufficient severity to state a claim for either
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because Plaintiff fails to state a
claim for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court grants
Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this regard, and dismisses Count III.

(ii)
Defendants also argue Count III is preempted by the MWCL. The MWCL bars
common-law suits for damages covered by the law. Giandinoto v. Chemir Analytical
Servs., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 952, 960 (E.D. Mo. 2007); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.120(2)
(2017). The MWCL provides a remedy for claims of emotional distress. See Russell v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 666 F.2d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1981). Where a plaintiff files
claims under Title VII or the Missouri Human Rights Act, a claim for infliction of
emotional distress, a common-law tort claim, is preempted by the MWCL. Giandinoto,
545 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Hardebeck v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1062,
1065 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (collecting cases). If emotional distress results from
discriminatory treatment or termination, as opposed to emotional distress arising out of
the course of employment, the workers’ compensation laws do not apply. See Palermo
v. Tension Envelope Co., 959 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

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Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ breach
in their duty to “adequately and properly train” supervisors and human resources
representatives regarding “handling of employee requests for FMLA leave and for
Workers’ Compensation matters.” Doc. #1, at 11. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants
knew or should have known their conduct in handling these matters involved an
unreasonable risk of causing Plaintiff emotional distress. Count III does not allege
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress from his unemployment following his termination.
Cf. Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 990 F.2d 1051, 1061 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
workers’ compensation laws did not apply to plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress
arising from her unemployment). Count III does allege Plaintiff suffered emotional
distress as a result of Defendants’ failure to supervise and train employees in leave
matters while Plaintiff was employed by Defendants. Because the alleged infliction of
emotional distress arose in the course of Plaintiff’s employment, this allegation has its
remedy in the MWCL, not in a separate common-law claim. Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss Count III for this additional reason.

(B) Punitive Damages
Defendants move to dismiss claims for punitive damages, arguing Plaintiff failed
to plead facts to support the claim under the MWCL.2 With the dismissal of Count III
explained above, Plaintiff’s remaining claim for punitive damages is in Count II, alleging
retaliation in violation of the MWCL.
Punitive damages are available in a claim for retaliation in violation of the MWCL.
See Krasney v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 765 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). To
state a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff must allege, either directly or from
necessary inference, that Defendants acted willfully, wantonly, or maliciously. Wilson v.
Image Flooring Co., 400 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges
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Defendants also argue the FMLA does not provide for punitive damages. Count I,
alleging FMLA violations, seeks liquidated damages, while Count III seeks punitive
damages for Defendants’ alleged failure to supervise and train employees regarding
FMLA leave and workers’ compensation laws. Liquidated damages are appropriately
sought in Count I. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(a)(A)(iii). The Court does not address
punitive damages sought in Count III because Count III was dismissed. See Section
III.(A).
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Defendants’ issuance of written discipline and later termination of his employment after
exercising his rights under the MWCL was “intentional, wanton, and with conscious
disregard for Plaintiff’s rights....” Doc. #1, at 10-11. Plaintiff alleges Defendants ignored
his seniority when employees voted on new shifts, and then disciplined and terminated
him after he exercised his rights under the MWCL. At this stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently
pled punitive damages. Thus, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this
regard.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The
Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Count III, and denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages in Count II.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATE: August 16, 2017

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