Wessling v. Berryhill

Filing 18

ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER'S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS. Signed on 8/15/2018 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Kitsmiller, Julia)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
LARRY LEE WESSLING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 17-00383-CV-W-ODS

ORDER AND OPINION AFFIRMING
COMMISSIONER’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
Pending is Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision
denying his applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. For the
following reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination of
whether the decision is “supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but…enough that a reasonable mind
would find it adequate to support the conclusion.” Andrews v. Colvin, 791 F.3d 923, 928
(8th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “As long as substantial evidence in the record supports
the Commissioner's decision, we may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in
the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because we would have
decided the case differently.” Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). Though advantageous to the Commissioner, this standard also requires the Court
consider evidence that fairly detracts from the final decision. Anderson v. Astrue, 696 F.3d
790, 793 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere
scintilla” of evidence; it is relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Gragg v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 2010).

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born in 1959, and is a high school graduate. R. at 36, 38, 130. He
previously worked as a service technician. R. at 26, 74-75. In July 2014, Plaintiff applied
for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset date of
June 20, 2014. R. at 130-36. Plaintiff’s applications were denied, and he requested a
hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). R. 66-78, 87-88. A hearing was held in
November 2015. R. at 32-65. In March 2016, ALJ Janice Barnes-Williams issued her
decision, finding Plaintiff was not disabled. R. at 14-28.
In rendering her decision, the ALJ found Plaintiff had one severe impairment: mood
disorder. R. at 16. After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: He is limited to work that does not require the
performance of more than simple, routine and repetitive tasks, which may
require detailed instructions, but does not involve complex tasks, with no
public interaction. He can work around co-workers, but with only occasional
interaction with co-workers.
R. at 21. Based upon the RFC and the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony at the hearing,
the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could work as a dishwasher, order filler, or laundry worker. R. at
27. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, which denied his appeal.
R. at 1-10. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the
record and must be reversed because (A) the ALJ erred when she failed to afford
controlling weight to Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, and (B) the ALJ failed to properly
account for all of Plaintiff’s limitations in his RFC.
A. Treating Psychiatrist
Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in affording “little weight” to the opinion of his treating
psychiatrist, Asim Ulusarac, M.D. Generally, a treating physician’s opinion is given more
weight than other sources in a disability proceeding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A
treating physician’s opinion may be disregarded if it is unsupported by clinical or other data,
or is contrary to the weight of the remaining evidence in the record. See Anderson, 696

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F.3d at 793-94; Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 1996). The ALJ must “give good
reasons” to explain the weight given the treating physician’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2); Anderson, 696 F.3d at 793.
From April 2014 to May 2016, Plaintiff visited Ulusarac on fourteen occasions. In
August 2015, Ulusarac executed a Physical Residual and Mental Functional Capacity
Questionnaire. R. at 274-78. Therein, Ulusarac opined Plaintiff had “extreme” difficulties in
maintaining social functioning, and “extreme” deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or
pace. R. at 275. He indicated Plaintiff had “marked” restrictions with daily living activities,
and had continual episodes of deterioration that would cause him to withdraw from a
situation or experience exacerbation of symptoms. R. at 275. Ulusarac stated Plaintiff did
not have the ability to complete a normal workday, and would have to miss work more than
four days per month. R. at 274, 278.
The ALJ afforded “little weight” to Ulusarac’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s mental
functioning because his opinion was not consistent with the record as a whole, and not well
supported by the objective medical evidence. R. at 25. 1 She also found Ulusarac’s opinion
to be conclusory, providing no specific or substantiated explanation of the evidence on
which he relied. Id. Rather, it appeared Ulusarac relied heavily on Plaintiff’s subjective
reports of symptoms and limitations. Id. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s “conservative
treatment and relatively benign objective evidence” suggested his symptoms are not as
severe as claimed. R. at 23. And the ALJ found Ulusarac observed Plaintiff had “grossly
normal mental status examinations” on many instances. R. at 23.
The Court reviewed the record, and finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision to discount Ulusarac’s opinion. The Court also finds the ALJ provided good
reasons explaining the weight she afforded Ulusarac’s opinion. As noted by the ALJ,
Ulusarac provided conservative treatment consisting of medication with few adjustments.
Between April 2014 and December 2014, there were no adjustments to Plaintiff’s
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The ALJ also afforded “little weight” to Ulusarac’s opinions on Plaintiff’s physical
limitations because the limitations were not supported by the objective medical
evidence; the limitations were more severe than those reported by Plaintiff; and
Ulusarac, a psychiatrist, provided opinions on matters outside his area of expertise. R.
at 18. Plaintiff’s brief does not argue the ALJ erred in affording little weight to
Ulusarac’s opinions related to Plaintiff’s physical limitations. Doc. #6. Because Plaintiff
has limited his arguments as to the mental limitations set forth by Ulusarac, the Court
does likewise.
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medications. R. at 264-71. One medication was added in December 2014, but Plaintiff
chose to stop it. R. at 305-10. In March 2015, one medication was added, and after
Plaintiff reported the medication was helping, the dosage was increased. R. at 297-301. In
June 2015, Plaintiff reported he chose to reduce the dosage of one medication by fifty
percent. R. at 289-92. Other than a medication for anxiety (that he previously used) being
prescribed in September 2015, Plaintiff’s medications remained unchanged through March
2016, the last appointment with Ulusarac in the record. R. at 284-87, 336-49.
Although Ulusarac opined Plaintiff had “extreme” deficiencies in concentration, his
notes do not support that opinion. Rather, at each appointment except one, Ulusarac
observed Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were “within normal limits.” R. at 267, 27071, 291, 294, 298, 302, 306, 309, 312, 314, 338, 343, 348. It was only in September 2015
that Ulusarac noted Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were “somewhat impaired.” R. at
286. Although he opined Plaintiff had “extreme” deficiencies in maintaining social
functioning, Ulusarac notes Plaintiff’s socialization was either “within normal limits” or
“limited.” R. at 267, 286, 291, 295, 299, 303, 306, 309, 312, 314, 338, 343, 348. Ulusarac’s
notes do not support moderate impairment with regard to concentration and socialization,
much less “extreme” impairments. Further, the record indicates Plaintiff has not received inpatient treatment or hospitalizations since the onset of his alleged disability, which would be
consistent with a disabling mental state.
The ALJ properly discounted Ulusarac’s opinion because the limitations he set forth
were not consistent with his treatment records. See Cline, 771 F.3d at 1104; see also
Davidson v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting “[i]t is permissible for an ALJ
to discount an opinion of a treating physician that is inconsistent with the physician’s clinical
treatment notes.”). The Court finds the ALJ properly weighed Ulusarac’s opinion.
B. Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff’s other argument pertains to the RFC set forth by the ALJ. Plaintiff argues
the RFC did not account for (1) physical limitations associated with monocular vision and
thoracic spondylosis, and (2) all mental limitations. One’s RFC is the “most you can still do
despite your limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ must base the RFC on “all
of the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians
and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.” McKinney v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff’s RFC is a medical question, “an ALJ’s
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assessment of it must be supported by some medical evidence of [Plaintiff’s] ability to
function in the workplace.” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 f.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted). “However, there is no requirement that an RFC finding be supported by a specific
medical opinion.” Id. (citations omitted).
Right Eye Blindness
Plaintiff’s right eye was injured at age thirteen. R. at 17. As noted by the ALJ,
Plaintiff “has been capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity for many years since
his distant eye injury, at a skilled job that required good vision.” Id. In addition, Plaintiff
drives two or three times per week, attends weekly meetings, and shops at thrift stores. Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s “eye deformity” was not severe. Notably,
Plaintiff cites nothing in the record establishing (or even suggesting) his right eye blindness
is severe, or his ability to perform substantial gainful activity is limited because of his right
eye blindness. In fact, in his Function Report, Plaintiff did not set forth any sight limitations
(other the wearing glasses), and he did not list his right eye blindness as limiting his ability
to work. R. at 189, 194. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and the ALJ did not err in
formulating an RFC that did not include limitations associated with Plaintiff’s right eye
blindness.
Thoracic Spondylosis
With regard to Plaintiff’s thoracic spondylosis, the ALJ found the record did “not
contain evidence of any significant back complaints to his medical providers,” and Plaintiff
was not hospitalized or seen in the emergency room for chronic exacerbations of a back
condition.” R. at 18. The ALJ noted several musculoskeletal examinations showed normal
gait, and as recently as September 2015, Plaintiff had no complaints of back pain. Id. The
ALJ placed significance on the fact that Plaintiff did not report or testify that his “physical
condition interferes with working or affects any area of functioning.” Id. The ALJ also
observed Plaintiff, on this Function Report, answered “does not apply” when asked how far
he could walk without resting. R. at 18, 194.
The Court also notes Plaintiff represented to Defendant that he had the ability to sit,
stand, walk, bend, lift, kneel, reach, or climb stairs were not affected by his conditions. R. at
194. Similar to his argument associated with his right eye blindness, Plaintiff cites nothing
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in the record establishing physical limitations caused by thoracic spondylosis. Based upon
the foregoing, the Court finds the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole, and the ALJ did not err in formulating an RFC that did not include
limitations associated with Plaintiff’s thoracic spondylosis.
Additional Mental Limitations
Finally, Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have included limitations regarding his
interactions with supervisor, his moderately limited ability to accept instructions and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and his moderately limited ability to work in
proximity to others without being distracted. The RFC limited Plaintiff to work that does not
require more than simple, routine, repetitive, non-complex tasks. R. at 21. The RFC also
allowed no public interaction, and only occasional interaction with coworkers. Id. Given,
among other things, Ulusarac’s notes (see supra, section III(A)), the conservative nature of
Plaintiff’s treatment, and the opinion of a state agency psychological consultant, the
substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s RFC. Further, the record
does not support additional or more severe mental limitations. Accordingly, the Court finds
the ALJ did not err in failing to include additional or more severe mental limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATE: August 15, 2018

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