Waller v. City of Grandview, Missouri et al

Filing 29

ORDER - the Court GRANTS defendant City of Grandview, Missouri and Officers Jacob Gross and Scott Evans' Motion to Dismiss 4 ; DENIES AS MOOT defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct Rule 26 Conference 12 ; DENIES AS MOOT Pla intiff's Motion for Scheduling Order 23 ; DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion to Attach 24 and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of his Motion to Appoint Counsel 25 . Signed on 1/4/18 by District Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. (Enss, Rhonda)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL T. WALLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF GRANDVIEW, MISSOURI,
ET AL.,
Defendants.

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) No. 17-587-CV-W-FJG
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ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is defendant City of Grandview, Missouri and
Officers Jacob Gross and Scott Evans’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 4), defendants’ Motion
for Extension of Time to Conduct Rule 26 Conference (Doc. # 12), Plaintiff’s Motion for
Scheduling Order (Doc. # 23), Plaintiff’s Motion for Attachment (Doc. # 24) and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration of Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. # 25).
I. BACKGROUND
On November 18, 2012, after a three day bench trial, plaintiff was found guilty by
Jackson County Circuit Judge James Kanatzer of first degree felony property damage.
Plaintiff was represented by public defenders during this trial. On December 17, 2012,
plaintiff was sentenced to three years in jail as a persistent felony offender. Plaintiff
appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals. On April 15, 2014, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction. On May 31, 2017, plaintiff filed an action in Jackson
County Circuit Court against the City of Grandview, Officer Jacob Gross, Scott Evans,
Sherry Sample, Sylvia Breckenridge, Susan Hopkins, Rebecca McNeal, Elizabeth

Abram, Ashley Smith, Latania Ceesay and Zachary Powell 1. On July 17, 2017,
defendants the City of Grandview, Officer Jacob Gross and Detective Scott Evans
removed this case from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri to this Court.
Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
It is unclear what claims plaintiff is asserting in his petition as there are no separate
counts and no specification as to what claims are alleged against which defendant.
Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Conspiracy
against rights). Under the heading “Claims” plaintiff cites a series of cases and states: his
due process clause the defendant has a right to trial before an impartial judge.”
“Defendant’s guarantee of due process and to an impartial jury by the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of Article I,
Sections 10 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.” Plaintiff then cites to what appears
to be an exchange between potential venirepersons and counsel. Plaintiff then cites to
the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause and demands judgment against the
state in “whatever amount in an amount in excess of 10 million [he/she] is found entitled,
plus costs and fees.” (Doc. 1-2).
II. STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), Aa complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868

1

Plaintiff has filed two other Complaints in the Western District of Missouri against many
of the same defendants relating to his 2012 felony property damage conviction in
Jackson County Circuit Court. See Case No. 16-1218 and Case No. 17-00039.
2

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that merely pleads Alabels and conclusions@ or a
Aformulaic recitation@ of the elements of a cause of action, or Anaked assertions@
devoid of Afurther factual enhancement@ will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly).
ADetermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.@ Id. at 1950. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) we must
accept the plaintiff=s factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in
the plaintiff=s favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005. “A pro se
complaint must be liberally construed, however inartfully pleaded, and held to less
stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Librace v. Valley,
No.2:17CV00140JLH, 2017 WL 5560412, *1 (E.D.Ark. Nov. 17, 2017), citing (Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s petition on three grounds: 1) the petition fails to
state a claim against the City of Grandview and Officers Gross and Evans; 2) plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine and 3) plaintiff’s claims are barred by
the doctrine announced in Heck v. Humphrey. Defendants argue that the petition states
no facts concerning the City of Grandview or Grandview Police officers Jacob Gross or
Scott Evans. Defendants observe that the petition makes only general conclusions of
law, such as “deprivation of civil rights” “Section 1983” “Conspiracy to Convict” “False
Imprisonment”, references to Article I of the Missouri Constitution and to the Due Process
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clause. However, defendants argue that plaintiff provided no factual context as to how he
believes his rights were violated or what claims he is asserting against which defendants.
Additionally, defendants state that because the petition is silent as to capacity, any claim
against the officers must be considered a claim against them in their official capacity with
the City. “Where a ‘complaint is silent about the capacity in which [plaintiff] is suing the
defendant, [a district court must] interpret the complaint as including only official-capacity
claims.’” Spencer v. Pemiscot County Prosecutor, No. 1:11CV217SNLJ, 2011 WL
6140909,*2 (E.D.Mo. Dec. 9, 2011), (quoting Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72
F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir.1995)). Additionally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s petition is
barred by collateral estoppel because he was convicted and his conviction was upheld on
appeal. Finally defendants argue that plaintiff’s petition is barred by the decision in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) which
stated that before an individual may recover for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, the plaintiff must show that the conviction or sentence was
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid or called into
question.
Plaintiff did not initially respond to the Motion to Dismiss. As a result, the Court issued
an Order directing plaintiff to show cause why he had not responded. Plaintiff stated that
he “was waiting for a federal judge rule to tell me it’s okay to proceed in the United
States District Court for all future proceedings. . . .Wherefore, it would be highly
prejudiced for this court to deny me to show how and why Mr. Waller, Plaintiff rights his
constitutional rights had been violated buy [sic] these two officers of the law.” (Doc. #
4

11). Plaintiff filed a response to the instant Motion to Dismiss and mentions another
case which he filed in the Western District of Missouri earlier this year: Case No. 1700039-CV-W-BCW 2. In response to the instant Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff incorporates
arguments related to his earlier case and why he believes that the Court incorrectly
dismissed that action. The only statement that he makes in reference to the instant case
is that “it would be highly prejudiced for this Court to deny Plaintiff rights his constitutional
rights had been violated by these two officers of the law.” (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff then
provides some case citations, but offers no further response to the Motion to Dismiss nor
does he provide any additional factual details describing how he believes his
Constitutional rights were violated.
In reply, defendants state that plaintiff has failed to allege any specific City policy or
custom which caused him any injury and also failed to respond to defendants’ arguments
that his claims are precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or by the decision in
Heck v. Humphrey. Plaintiff filed an Amended Motion to Consider in apparent response
to the Motion to Dismiss, but the Court could not discern any difference between the two
pleadings. After reviewing plaintiff’s petition, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
plaintiff’s responses, the Court agrees that plaintiff’s petition contains only legal
conclusions and fails to state any claim for relief. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Because the Court finds that plaintiff’s petition
2

In Case No. 17-CV-00039, plaintiff had filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. The Court denied plaintiff’s motion because it found that he had the necessary
funds to be able to pay the filing fee and additionally, the Court found that his Complaint
failed to state a claim for relief.
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fails to state a claim for relief, the Court need not reach defendants’ alternative
arguments that plaintiff’s petition is also barred by the Collateral Estoppel doctrine or the
decision in Heck v. Humphrey.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant City
of Grandview, Missouri and Officers Jacob Gross and Scott Evans’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. # 4); DENIES AS MOOT defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct Rule
26 Conference (Doc. # 12); DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for Scheduling Order
(Doc. # 23); DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion to Attach (Doc. # 24) and DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of his Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. # 25).

Date: January 4, 2018
Kansas City, Missouri

S/ FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR.
Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.
United States District Judge

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