Campbell v. Berryhill

Filing 52

ORDER denying 42 motion for attorney fees. Signed on 3/26/2020 by District Judge Greg Kays. (Law Clerk) (Main Document 52 replaced on 3/26/2020) (Drouhard, Maria).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION
MARETHA CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 4:18-cv-00167-DGK-SSA

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s application for attorney’s fees (Doc. 42) under
§ 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Plaintiff Maretha
Campbell appealed a partially favorable ruling from Defendant, the Commissioner of Social
Security, that she was not disabled prior to August 4, 2012 (Doc. 4). Plaintiff now seeks
reimbursement of $17,401.40 for 85.7 hours of attorney work (Doc. 42).
Defendant objects to the request (Doc. 46). Defendant claims the Commissioner’s position
was substantially justified, despite the partial remand, and Plaintiff seeks an unreasonably high
award of fees. Because the Court finds that Defendant’s position was substantially justified,
Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.
The Equal Access to Justice Act (“the EAJA”) requires a court to “award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position
of the United States was substantially justified . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Because the
Court granted a remand, Plaintiff is a prevailing party. Neither party disputes this. Instead, the
issue is whether the “position of the United States was substantially justified.” Id.

The position of the United States is “substantially justified” if it is “justified to a degree
that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The
Eighth Circuit interprets “position” under the EAJA to refer to the Government’s “prelitigation
and litigation” circumstances. Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.
1984). The Commissioner bears the burden of showing substantial justification by establishing
that “the denial had a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Welter v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 674, 676 (8th
Cir. 1991) (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565–66). Thus, under this standard, it is possible for the
Commissioner to “lose on the merits of the disability question and win on the application for
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 676 (internal citations omitted). “[F]ees are not to be awarded just because
the [Commissioner] lost the case.” Brouwers v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal
citations omitted).
This test to determine substantial justification is “a lesser standard than the substantial
evidence standard used to review administrative determinations.” United States v. 1,378.65 Acres
of Land, 794 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.3 (internal citations omitted). In Brouwers, the Eighth Circuit
found that where the district court remanded to consider additional evidence regarding plaintiff’s
ability to perform work, it could not conclude that the Government’s position “in both the
administrative and judicial proceedings was unreasonable.” Id. at 275–76. This ruling left open
the possibility that the ALJ “could again decide to deny benefits.” Id.
Similarly, this Court remanded, ordering the ALJ to properly explain the “evidentiary basis
for Plaintiff’s functional limitations,” and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision finding Plaintiff
not disabled prior to August 4, 2014 (Doc. 37 at 8). Thus, the Commissioner cannot be said to
have taken an unreasonable position in the administrative proceedings, as the ALJ agreed with its
position; nor can it be said the Commissioner took an unreasonable position during the judicial

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proceedings, as the Court affirmed in part and remanded only for the ALJ to expand upon the
findings related to the evidence related to “Dr. Winkler’s unexplained opinion in formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC” (Doc. 37 at 8). After remand, the Court could still affirm the ALJ’s denial of
benefits after given further explanation. A review of the administrative record shows that a
reasonable person could take the position of the Commissioner. Taken together, the Court cannot
conclude that the Commissioner’s position at either the administrative or judicial proceeding was
unreasonable.
Plaintiff’s argument seems to conflate the substantial-justification standard with the
substantial-evidence standard. The standard under the EAJA for substantial justification is lower,
and the ALJ had a reasonable basis in law and fact for denying benefits to Plaintiff. Indeed, this
Court could, upon the expansion of the ALJ’s findings, affirm the denial of benefits. This shows
that there was a substantial justification for the denial, even if there was not substantial evidence.
Although Plaintiff is a prevailing party, the position of the Commissioner is substantially
justified under the EAJA. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: March 26, 2020

/s/ Greg Kays
GREG KAYS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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