Hragyil v. Walmart Stores East, LP et al
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION REMANDING CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. Signed on 3/31/15 by District Judge Ortrie D. Smith. (Matthes, Renea)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. JOSEPH DIVISION
WARREN HRAGYIL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WALMART STORES EAST LP d/b/a
Walmart Store #2857 and
RONALD PERRYN,
Defendants.
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Case No. 15-6015-CV-SJ-ODS
ORDER AND OPINION REMANDING CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Defendants removed this case to federal court. As originally filed there is no
federal jurisdiction because there are no federal questions presented and Plaintiff and
one defendant (Ronald Perryn) are both citizens of Missouri. Defendants’ Notice of
Removal contended Perryn had been fraudulently joined so his citizenship could be
disregarded. The Court directed Plaintiff to respond to this contention and allowed
Defendants an opportunity to respond. Doc. # 3. The parties complied and thereafter
Plaintiff filed an additional brief. The Court has considered the parties’ arguments and
concludes it lacks jurisdiction in this matter because Perryn has not been fraudulently
joined. Therefore, the case must be remanded.
Plaintiff alleges that he was a customer at a Walmart on October 5, 2013.
Petition, ¶ 7. “While Plaintiff was entering Walmart, a shoplifting suspect, who had been
stopped by defendant Perryn for questioning near an exit, fled the store and knocked
Plaintiff to the ground.” Petition, ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges Perryn – a Walmart employee
acting in the scope of his duties at the time – was negligent in that he “stopped a
suspected shoplifter at or near the store’s entrance/exit that was being used by store
customers” and that Defendants knew or should have known “that an attempt to stop a
suspected shoplifter near a high-traffic area where customers entered and exited the
store would subject innocent customers, including Plaintiff, to an unreasonable risk of
injury.” Petition, ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff asserts a single count of negligence against both
Defendants.
As there are no federal issues in this case, jurisdiction exists if more than
$75,0001 is in controversy and there is complete diversity between the parties; that is,
that no defendant is a citizen of a state where any plaintiff is a citizen. 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Defendants removed this case to federal court, so they bear the burden of
demonstrating federal jurisdiction exists. E.g., 4:20 Communications, Inc. v. Paradigm
Co., 336 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Bus. Men=s Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d
181, 183 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d
174, 181 n.13 (8th Cir. 1978)). Defendants attempt to meet this burden by contending
the diversity destroying defendant – Perryn – was fraudulently joined. The Court
concludes Perryn was not fraudulently joined.
The Eighth Circuit has articulated the fraudulent joinder standard as follows:
Where applicable state precedent precludes the existence of a cause of
action against a defendant, joinder is fraudulent. “[I]t is well established
that if it is clear under governing state law that the complaint does not
state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant, the joinder is
fraudulent and federal jurisdiction of the case should be retained.” Iowa
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Med. Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added). However, if there is a “colorable” cause of action - that
is, if the state law might impose liability on the resident defendant under
the facts alleged - then there is no fraudulent joinder. See Foslip Pharm.,
Inc. v. Metabolife Int=l, Inc., 92 F. Supp.2d 891, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal footnote omitted).
A[J]oinder is fraudulent when there exists no reasonable basis in fact and law supporting
a claim against the resident defendants.@ Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868,
871 (8th Cir. 2002). If there is a reasonable basis in fact and law that supports the
claim, joinder is not fraudulent. Filla, 336 F.3d at 810.
In conducting this inquiry, the Court must “resolve all facts and ambiguities in the
current controlling substantive law in the plaintiff=s favor,” but the Court has “no
responsibility to definitively settle the ambiguous question of state law.” Id. at 811
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The Court doubts that more than $75,000 is in controversy, but the Court’s
holding regarding fraudulent joinder makes it unnecessary to examine this issue.
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(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “Instead, the court must simply determine
whether there is a reasonable basis for predicting that the state's law might impose
liability against the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). Where the sufficiency of the
complaint against the non-diverse defendant is questionable, "the better practice is for
the federal court not to decide the doubtful question in connection with a motion to
remand but simply to remand the case and leave the question for the state courts to
decide." Id. (quoting Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 556 F.2d at 406).
Defendants provide additional facts of their own in an effort to prove that
Plaintiff’s claim against Perryn is factually unsupported. Effectively, they ask the Court
to evaluate the merits and resolve issues of fact in order to determine whether the Court
has jurisdiction, which is not allowed. The Court can only resolve disputed issues if it
has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is about judicial power; without judicial power, the Court is
not permitted to rule on the merits. Defendants’ effort fails even if they characterize
their position as seeking some sort of criminal-type preliminary hearing to determine
whether Plaintiff has sufficient evidence to proceed because such a procedure does not
exist in the civil context.
The Court must accept the facts alleged in the state-court petition as true. E.g.,
Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 964 (8th Cir. 2007). “Fraudulent joinder exists
if, on the face of plaintiff’s state court pleadings, no cause of action lies against the
resident defendant.” Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis supplied). To hold otherwise and entertain Defendants’ argument would
allow defendants to allege “fraudulent joinder” every time they can argue that the
plaintiff’s factual allegations are untrue. This places the cart before the horse: the Court
must have jurisdiction before it can address (much less attempt to resolve) competing
factual averments.
Defendants’ videotape may justify a judgment on the merits, but that
determination must come from a court having jurisdiction to enter such a judgment. For
now, the Court is obliged to consider only the facts alleged in the Petition. Viewed in
that light, the Court concludes Perryn was not fraudulently joined. Perryn and Plaintiff
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are citizens of Missouri, so federal jurisdiction is lacking. The case is remanded to the
Circuit Court for Platte County, Missouri.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATE: March 31, 2015
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