Davis et al v. Buchanan County, Missouri et al
Filing
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ORDER by Judge Nanette K. Laughrey. The ACH Defendants' motion (Doc. 721 ) to amend the answer three years after the deadline to amend pleadings in order to assert an affirmative defense of "good faith immunity" is DENIED. (Sreeprakash, Netra)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
ST. JOSEPH DIVISION
BRENDA DAVIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BUCHANAN COUNTY MISSOURI, et
al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 5:17-cv-06058-NKL
ORDER
Defendants ACH, Inc., Catherine M. Van Voorn, M.D., Ann Marie Slagle, L.P.N., and
April Powers, L.P.N. (together, the “ACH Defendants”), move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15 and Local Rule 15.1 for leave to amend their answer to assert a new affirmative
defense grounded in “good faith immunity.” For the reasons discussed below, the motion is
DENIED.
DISCUSSION
The deadline in the Scheduling Order to amend pleadings passed more than three years
ago, on November 1, 2018. Doc. 243, p. 2; Doc. 241, p. 2. The ACH Defendants’ most recent
amended complaint was filed nearly two-and-a-half years ago, on July 23, 2019. Doc. 462.
Defendants—including the ACH Defendants—filed multiple dispositive motions in mid-2019, in
advance of a then-scheduled trial date of August 19, 2019. See, e.g., Doc. 334. Still, years after
those dispositive motions were not only decided, but also, insofar as they asserted qualified
immunity, appealed, and six months after the appellate decision, the ACH Defendants attempt to
assert an affirmative defense based on “good faith immunity.”
To support their request to be allowed to assert this new purported affirmative defense, the
ACH Defendants cite two Supreme Court cases from 25 or more years ago that they say show that
the “Supreme Court has not expressed a view on whether private contractors facing 42 USC §
1983 liability are entitled to assert a good faith defense.” Plainly, whatever defense the ACH
Defendants seek to assert at this very late stage in the litigation was available to them at the outset
and could have been raised at any number of earlier junctures in this case. The ACH Defendants
have proffered no explanation at all for their failure to attempt to assert the defense in a timely
fashion, except to claim that they “could not assert this defense earlier as the Eighth Circuit only
recently ruled on the qualified immunity issue.” However, the ACH Defendants do not explain,
and the Court cannot see, how the Eighth Circuit’s ruling on the qualified immunity issue—which
in any event was rendered on August 24, 2021, nearly six months ago—affected the ACH
Defendants’ ability to assert the “good faith immunity” defense.
Although the ACH Defendants move pursuant to Rule 15, “Rule 16(b)’s good-cause
standard governs when a party seeks leave to amend a pleading outside of the time period
established by a scheduling order, not the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a).” Sherman v. Winco
Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716 (8th Cir. 2008). Thus, to succeed on a motion to amend
pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling order has passed, the movant must show “good
cause.” Ellingsworth v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 949 F.3d 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing, inter alia,
Rule 16(b)).
“The primary measure of good cause is the movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the
order’s requirements.” Ellingsworth, 949 F.3d at 1100 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court “will not consider prejudice if the movant has not been diligent in meeting the
scheduling order’s deadlines.” Sherman, 532 F.3d at 717. Instead, courts “focus in the first
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instance (and usually solely) on the diligence of the party who sought modification of the order.”
Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 948 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, the ACH Defendants have pointed to “no change in the law, no newly discovered
facts, or any other changed circumstance” that would have made the good-faith-immunity defense
more viable “after the scheduling deadline for amending pleadings.” Sherman, 532 F.3d at 718;
see also Ellingsworth, 949 F.3d at 1100 (“Good cause may be shown by pointing to a change in
the law, newly discovered facts, or another significant changed circumstance that requires
amendment of a party’s pleading.”). Because ACH has failed to show good cause, the motion
must be denied. See Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 949 (8th Cir. 2012) (denying
motion to amend complaint made two years after deadline for amending pleadings and six months
after denial of class-certification motion where plaintiff purposely waited until after denial of the
class-certification motion to assert a claim for punitive damages, noting that “th[e] tactical decision
is fully the [plaintiffs]’ prerogative, but it hardly constitutes good cause for an extremely tardy
pleading-amendment motion”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the motion by the ACH Defendants for leave to amend
their answer more than three years after the Court-ordered deadline in order to assert “good faith
immunity” as an affirmative defense is DENIED.
s/ Nanette K. Laughrey
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY
United States District Judge
Dated: February 22, 2022
Jefferson City, Missouri
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